UNITED NATIONS

MINE CLEARANCE PROGRAMME

INVESTIGATION REPORT, KABUL CITY

28 May - 1 June 1995

INTRODUCTION

The Technical Advisor (Mr Noel Spencer) to the UNOCHA Mine Clearance Programme in Afghanistan was appointed by Ian Mansfield, Programme Manager to investigate the technical aspects of the points raised by HALO Trust in their letter dated 25 May 1995. The Terms of Reference for the investigation are at Annex A and the HALO Trust letter is at Annex B.

The technical investigation was carried out in Kabul during the period 28 May to 1 June 1995.

An initial meeting was held at the office of HALO Trust, Kabul on 28 May 1995 with Ian Clarke, of HALO Trust and Ian Mansfield and Noel Spencer, of UNOCHA. During this meeting the various points in HALO's letter were discussed.

At a second meeting the same day Ian Mansfield and Noel Spencer returned to HALO's office to discuss the same points with Mr S Mcleod, HALO's Technical Advisor.

On the point of poor command and control, lack of safety equipment, dangerous working practices and excessive clearance rates within ATC, no specific claims were made and no dates, times or locations could be remembered by the HALO staff. The individual teams of the UNOCHA Demining Programme are required to maintain a daily diary of work carried out and in which minefield/area they were operating thus making it a fairly simple task for any specific comment to be investigated. Due to the lack of information from the HALO Trust representatives none of the these points could be investigated fully.

As a matter of course the investigating officer took the opportunity to check each team's safety equipment and to monitor each team whilst they were conducting their normal demining procedures. The results of these checks and monitoring are contained in this report under the heading Conclusions.

On the points raised on the five areas which were checked by HALO it was agreed that they would accompany the investigating officer to each area to show the exact location and to explain what checks they had carried out.

HALO Trust were requested to supply the investigating officer with copies of the photographs and film referred to in their letter. Photographs of four of the five sites were supplied but they stated that they did not have any film of the ATC demining teams.
SITE INVESTIGATION OF AREAS LISTED BY HALO TRUST

The inspection was carried out by the investigating officer accompanied by I Clarke and S Mcleod of HALO Trust, on the morning of 29 May. Each site was visited and exact locations mutually agreed as two of the sites had been marked incorrectly on the original map provided and proved to be some 300 metres south of that shown on their map.

Area One, Kabul University

This area was not marked correctly on the map attached to HALO’s letter but was some three hundred metres south on a small track running east west, see map at Annex C. The HALO representatives agreed to this new location on the map.

On inspection of the MCPA survey maps, attached at Annex D and E. This area was shown to be on a path between MCPA minefields No 004 and No 005 and had been cleared as part of the technical survey carried out by MCPA team No 5 and not ATC team No 7 as stated. Photographs at Annex F and G.

On questioning MCPA team No 5, it was ascertained that the normal survey drill was carried out using the mine dogs attached to the team. Some 20 PMN anti personnel mines had been found and destroyed by the team during this survey, approximately five metres from the area of the investigation. The mine dogs are trained to smell and indicate on explosives, not metal fragments, and each indication by the dog is checked and cleared by a manual deminer. It would be perfectly normal to find scrap metal and metal fragments both in and on the ground after using this method of clearance.

There is no cause for any concern in this area.

Area Two, Kabul University

With the HALO representatives present it was agreed that the location of the monitoring was marked incorrectly on the HALO map. The correct location was agreed to be some 300 metres south of the area marked on the HALO map and is shown at Annex C.

On inspection of the MCPA surveyed minefield map, daily diaries and on questioning the team the area in question is within a five metre cleared lane which runs parallel to a hard surfaced road.

The area is within MCPA minefield No 003. Map at Annex H and photographs Annex I and J. The clearance of this minefield was started on 22 April 1995 by ATC manual demining team No 9. The task was suspended the next day after the team located a T72 Chinese anti personnel mine laying on the surface of the ground. The T72 mine contains a minimum amount of metal making it very difficult to detect using mine detectors and is thus dangerous to manual deminers. It is standard policy within the UNOCHA demining programme that this type of minefield be cleared using MDC mine dogs, who detect the explosive content of the mine thus reducing risk of injury to the deminers.
An MDC mine dog group was tasked with the clearance of this minefield commencing on 25 May 1995 and at the time of this investigation the task was ongoing.

During the period that the task was suspended it was decided to use this surfaced pathway during a donor visit and demonstrations. For safety reasons it was decided to clear an additional five metre safe lane on either side of the sealed path. As this area may have contained T72 mines the clearance was carried out by MCPA using the mine dogs. As previously stated after this type of clearance is carried out there will be metal fragments and scrap metal present.

There is no cause for any concern in this area.

Area Three Kabul University

On inspection of the relevant maps and paperwork it was ascertained that this minefield was MCPA No 002, (minefield map Annex K and photographs Annex L and M) a lawn area in the university complex and was cleared manually by ATC team No 9. The task was completed on 21 April 1995 and a standard completion report was filled in.

As there was no immediate answer why ten metal fragments were found by HALO the team's daily diary was checked and the operations officer, team and assistant team leaders together with the section leaders and the investigating officer visited the minefield in question.

During this visit it was ascertained from the daily diary that the team had investigated 20,151 fragments and destroyed 23 fragmentation mines and items of UXO during the clearance procedure. On questioning, the team showed they had carried out the clearance using the correct drill and techniques as prescribed by the Programme. After clearance the entire team had walked the area to prove the clearance was complete. The investigating officer, the team and section leaders walked the area and carried out a visual check of the minefield and found nothing amiss.

Although all metal fragments are investigated during clearance, they are not all removed from the minefield as this is too time consuming. Also twenty three items of fragmentation mines and UXO's were destroyed in situ during the clearance of this minefield which would have contaminated the previously cleared areas with shrapnel and metal fragments. They are not re-investigated and the fragments will remain after the clearance is complete.

This minefield was completed and checked, over two months ago. It is a public area and has been in daily use by the public since clearance.

From this investigation the investigating officer has no reason to believe that anything other than the correct demining procedures were carried out during this clearance operation. All the metal fragments found had been investigated and were either left by the team or came from the exploded items.

There is no cause for concern in this cleared area.
Area Four

Inspection of the survey map made by MCPA and the team's daily diary showed this area to be in the surveyed and cleared safety lane around MCPA minefield No 006. Minefield map at Annex N and photographs at Annex O and P. The clearance of this minefield is still in progress. As previously stated the MCPA survey teams use mine dogs to clear these safe paths around each minefield, so even after clearance metal fragments and scrap will be left in the ground.

This area gives no cause for concern.

Area Five

This is the area in which HALO stated that ATC had cleared and marked as clear. They also state that they removed ATC deminers from the same area as they were unsupervised.

On investigation of the surveyed and cleared minefield maps and discussions with the UNOCHA Regional Manager, Kabul, it was ascertained that in early April the Regional Manager, UNOCHA and HALO had agreed that HALO would clear this area, see map at Annex C. HALO started this task soon after. The nearest ATC minefield is over two hundred metres east of that location and deminers would have no reason to be in another teams' minefield.

Further investigation shows that a ten man immediate response team was asked by the Afghan Government Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) and the University's Director of Reconstruction (Tasking letter at Annex Q) to carry out a visual search of the Men's Hostel, a building within the agreed HALO minefield. Map at Annex E and photographs at Annex R. The response team at first refused to carry out the search because of its location. At the insistence of the University’s Director of Reconstruction it was agreed by ATC to commence the task, as the Director stated he could not wait for the complete clearance of the minefield by HALO. It was agreed that the team would check the short path from the main road to the building entrance, some five metres long, and conduct a visual search inside the building. The task was carried out the same day HALO reported seeing ATC personnel in their minefield.

The UNOCHA mine programme has three ten man immediate response teams in Kabul. These teams carry out Battle Area Clearance tasks in non-mined areas and conduct visual searches of buildings. This team was carrying out a visual search of a building and therefore had no need for standard demining equipment and were in all probability the men seen by HALO.

It is my conclusion that a mistake was made by the immediate response team leader in that he should not have entered an area which was under the control of HALO without requesting permission. The ATC staff in question were conducting a visual battle area clearance task and were not demining.
CONCLUSIONS

1. All five areas of concern were investigated. Three had been cleared by mine dogs, which explains the presence of metal fragments and on the ground after such a clearance.

One area was cleared by an ATC manual team and after investigation there is no reason to believe that the correct drills and techniques were not used in this clearance.

The last area was minefield where an UNOCHA immediate response team carried out a visual clearance of the building required to house the Men's Hostel. This building was contained within a HALO designated work area and the ATC team leader failed to inform his HALO counterpart that he was going to carry out this task. The team leader has been reprimanded.

2. No specific investigation was conducted into the points raised by the letter concerning safety equipment, poor command and control and dangerous working procedures as the representatives of HALO could not remember any specific points, time or place of their occurrence.

During the course of the investigation the investigating officer took several days to check the teams' safety equipment and observed the teams at work. No discrepancies or faults were found with the safety equipment or the procedures being employed by the teams during these checks.

Subsequently the independent monitoring reports which are compiled by UNOCHA every six months on each team were checked for all of the teams mentioned and all but one were classified as good. There was one exception where MCPA team No 5 had a poor report for lack of safety equipment, ie no oxygen cylinder was present on site during the monitoring. This has now been rectified and there was no fault found with their demining procedures.

3. Some concern was shown over the clearance rates achieved by the UNOCHA demining teams. These teams will naturally have a higher rate of clearance then HALO Trust teams because of the differing procedures employed.

a. The UNOCHA demining teams comprise of thirty men whereas HALO demining teams have twenty three men.

b. Due to the threat of minimum metal mines the HALO Trust procedure for clearance of minefields is to remove the top 5cm of earth by hand and continue to detect until all metal fragments are investigated. The UNOCHA programme uses the information provided by technical surveys to ascertain if the minefield contains minimum metal mines or not. For minefields containing such mines, mine dogs are used releasing the manual teams for the clearance of minefields containing conventional mines. This results in saving an enormous amount of time and increases the clearance rates.

One method is faster than the other, but neither is unsafe or incorrect.
4. After speaking to the HALO representatives it is concluded that they are not fully aware of the various mine clearance methods carried out by the UNOCHA Mine Clearance Programme and this can give rise to misunderstandings.

For example the same demining problem is tackled by two very different methods by each organisation as mentioned above for minimum metal mines.

A second example is that each member of a HALO demining team wears protective equipment, a small flak jacket and a full face visor plus the deminers squat while uncovering a mine. In the UNOCHA programme only the deminer dealing with or uncovering the mine wears protective equipment and he takes up the prone position while working. Again two solutions to the same problem and again both are safe and neither is incorrect.

Unless the personnel from each organisation understands what the other is doing there will be room for confusion.

5. The UNOCHA Mine Clearance Programme holds a monthly demining conference at various locations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are also weekly demining coordination meetings held in Kabul and attended by all other demining NGO's and the Afghan Government Department of Mine Clearance. At this weekly meeting it is decided what are the highest priority tasks, who will carry out the various tasks, liaison and coordination is agreed. This is the obvious venue to raise any demining problems.

HALO Trust, although invited to both meetings, have not regularly attended in the past.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. As a result of this investigation no changes are required at this time to any of the UNOCHA operational or training procedures, equipment or equipment scaling.

2. To avoid further confusion and misunderstandings in the future it is recommended that a representative from HALO Trust attend the weekly coordination meetings held in Kabul. This would keep them fully informed on the movements of the other demining NGO's in and around Kabul city.

3. If there are any other areas of concern these can be brought up at the meetings or addressed to the Programme Manager with all relevant information. As with any other concerns these would be investigated as soon as possible and the findings made known.

Mr N R Spencer MIEexpE
Technical Adviser
8 June 1995
ANNEXES

A. Terms of Reference.
B. HALO Trust letter.
C. Map of University area.
D. MCPA survey map No 004.
E. MCPA survey map No 005.
F. HALO Trust photographs, area one.
G. UNOCHA photographs, area one.
H. MCPA survey map No 003.
I. HALO Trust photographs, area two.
J. UNOCHA photographs, area two.
K. MCPA survey map No 002.
L. HALO Trust photographs, area three.
M. UNOCHA photographs, area three.
N. MCPA survey map No 006.
O. HALO Trust photographs, area four.
P. UNOCHA photographs, area four.
Q. Tasking letter.
R. UNOCHA photographs, area five.
To: Noel Spencer  
Training Coordinator  
Peshawar

From: Ian Mansfield  
Programme Manager  
Mine Clearance Programme

Subject: TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR INVESTIGATION INTO ATC WORK PRACTICES

Islamabad, 30 May 1995  
File: 7.6.14/665

Attached is a copy of a letter from HALO Trust which raises some serious allegations about the working practices of ATC in Kabul city. You are appointed to investigate these matters and provide me a comprehensive written report by 10 June 1995.

Without limiting the scope of your investigation, you should report on the following points:

- Personally check on the areas listed by HALO, and confirm whether they have been cleared in accordance with UNOCHA procedures.
- Determine the method of clearance used in these areas.
- Identify the ATC, MCPA or MDC teams responsible for these tasks.
- Determine whether the teams proof checked the areas by walking through them after clearance.

In your report you should attach the following documents:

- Copies of the MCPA survey maps of the areas in question.
- Copies of the ATC completion reports or progress reports for the area.
- Copies of the last monitoring reports of the teams concerned.

As a result of your investigations, you should recommend whether it is necessary to modify operational or training procedures, amend the Mine Clearance Training Manual or modify equipment. You should also recommend whether any other follow up action is required.
From: I Clarke  
Head Of Mission  
The HALO Trust  
Kabul, Afghanistan

To: Cold Mansfield  
Programme Manager  
Mine Clearance  
UNOCHA

Date: 25th May 1995

See distribution

QUALITY CONTROL OF UNOCHA COORDINATED TEAMS IN KABUL

1. Both The HALO Trust and UNOCHA coordinated demining programs have been operating in Afghanistan since 1989. However, due to the different areas of operation neither has had a good chance to see the other's work. The HALO Trust has always been suspicious of demining statistics published by Afghan demining NGOs, especially those concerning area cleared and devices destroyed. These concerns have been voiced verbally to UNOCHA with no effect.

2. Since the redeployment of deminers to Kabul, HALO has found itself working alongside UNOCHA teams, notably ATC (Afghan Technical Consultants). Bearing in mind the long term criticism of HALO by UNOCHA, we have been appalled by what has been witnessed. Poor command and control, lack of safety equipment and dangerous working procedures all put the individual deminers at risk. Far more worrying though, is the fact that areas now marked by ATC as cleared are in fact NOT. Since displaced people are being encouraged to return to these areas, this activity is creating an increased risk to the population. The concept of humanitarian mine clearance relies on 100% clearance of mines and explosive devices from a given location. If this can not be achieved, the task should not be attempted or the owners of the area warned of the implications. Dishonest working practices are also reflected in the impossibly high rate of clearance. Working in an area alongside a HALO team, an ATC team of the same strength supposedly cleared some 20,000 m² in a month. The HALO team cleared 500 m². Further examples of work by ATC deminers are outlined below.

3. During clearance in the city ATC deminers have frequently been observed demining without any safety equipment or lane markings. The normal practice seems to be for the detector operator to walk through the unsafe area waving his detector in front of him. Signals from metal contamination are diametrically ignored. On one occasion 2 pairs wandered, unsupervised, onto a HALO clearance site using these drills. They were removed and the matter was raised with UNOCHA Kabul.
4. Following this HALO decided to check over recently cleared ATC minefields, details of which are outlined below:

a. Area 1 Kabul University, Team 7 S-4.
An area of 1 m$^2$ was chosen at random inside the marked 'clear' area. This was then marked off with rope and manual clearance with an Ebinger metal locator was conducted. Four buried metal fragments were uncovered. There was no evidence of any attempt having been made to investigate these fragments previously.

b. Area 2 Kabul University, Team 9.
In the same manner an area of 1 m$^2$ was randomly chosen and marked. During the clearance five uninvestigated fragments were uncovered.

c. Area 3 Kabul University, Team 9 S-1
In the same manner, ten metal fragments were uncovered in an area of 1 m$^2$. Once again there was no evidence of any investigation.

d. Area 4 Kabul University, Team 22 S-2
As above, seventeen buried metal fragments were discovered in an area of 1 m$^2$.

e. A 5th area cleared by ATC is currently being re-cleared by HALO. A record of all metal fragments found in this area will be kept.

These checks were carried out by Sam Mcloed and Ian Clarke using normal HALO demining equipment and drills. In all cases the fragments found were of a large size and gave clear signals. Photographs were taken at all sites. In addition, ATC teams have been filmed at work, showing deminers without protective clothing and using unlawful drills.

5. The only way to ensure 100% mine clearance when using a metal locator is to remove and check every piece of metal fragment from the ground. This is the practice taught on both HALO and UNOCHA training courses. It is impossible for a deminer to discern from his locator whether the reading indicates a mine or not. In the four cases described above this obviously did not happen.

6. In all cases there was an evidence of digging which is normal in an area of high metal contamination such as Kabul University. Three of the four sites were covered by thick vegetation over 20cm high. There was no evidence of this having been cut back to allow the detector man to use his detector in the manner taught. At present, in addition to using metal locators, HALO teams are removing the top 5cm of soil to counter the high metal content and the possibility of Chinese Type 72 mines. Due to the unacceptable risk to the people using these areas, HALO has now painted all white markings around these four sites red and declared the area UNSAFE. In addition to the local Afghans a number of NGO's have also been using the area, notably MSF. They have all been warned that the area is uncleared. These areas will all have to be re-cleared at a later stage if they are to be used.
7. Since demining began in Kabul HALO Trust expatriates have brought these points to the attention of UNOCHA staff on several occasions. However, up to now there has been no change in the working procedures of the ATC teams. We can only assume, therefore, that these practices are condoned by UNOCHA staff. It is a sad fact that demining in Afghanistan is seen by some as a competition between UNOCHA and HALO. HALO is not prepared to become involved in a battle to discredit the 'opposition'. We rely on the quality of our work to maintain our presence in the demining community worldwide. In this instance our concern is for the safety of the Kabul population.

8. Many discussions on this subject have taken place. Little has been done to remedy the situation. (The aim of this letter is to formally register our concern and warn of the dangers to the Kabul population. It is hoped that action will be taken by UNOCHA to bring this matter to a swift and satisfactory close.

Ian Clarke

[Signature]

Head of Mission
HALO Trust

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Annexes:

A. Maps
PATH BETWEEN M FIELD NOS 004 AND 005

X = AREA OF CONCERN

PHOTO OF BANK WHERE 20 PMN MINES DESTROYED
AREA CLEARED BY MINE DOGS
UNOCHA PHOTOS OF AREA NO. THREE

GENERAL VIEW OF M'FIELD NO. 002

AREA OF CONCERN AND GENERAL VIEW OF M'FIELD
UNOCHA PHOTOS AREA FOUR

PATH AND VERGE CLEARED BY MINE DOGS

X = AREA OF CONCERN
Translation of Request Letter

ANNEX Q

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURAL
DIRECTORSHIP OF PLANNING
GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF ECONOMICAL SUPPORT

To: ATC

By thinking you in advance!

In order to reconstruct and rehabilitate the hostel of Kabul University after it demined, therefore we request you to kindly accelerate the demining process in the region and assure us.

Regards

Sayed Noorullah Hemad
Minister of Agricultural Affair
And Chief of Reconstruction Bearue of Kabul University.
دولت اسلامی افغانستان
وزارت زراعت
پیام
مدیر عمومی تعاون اقتصادی

به مؤسسه محترم

با اظهار تعارف تقبل

فرزندان و بازسازی لیبله مزرعه‌های کابل پس از ازاتیاب از تطهیر بینها
پلان عاجل روز دست آمده و بنیان‌گذاری از مؤسسه محترم خواهش‌هایم ناد را که تطعیب می‌گیرند به دست آورند و فضای مالکیتی را به مردان بهبود بخشان

(۱) مالون سازنده

با احترام

(۲) سید نورالله عابد

وزیر زراعت

(۳) ناصر خان میرزاهوران

(۴) نامیزدی
PART OF HALO TRUST M'FIELD
BUILDING IN BACKGROUND VISUALLY CLEARED BY ATC.
SKETCH MAP OF MINEFIELD NO 006 SURVEYED IN MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (KARTA I SAKHI) WARD NO 03 OF KABUL CITY KABUL PROVINCE.

CODE NO: 01/01/03/006

NOTE:
1. AREA OF BUILDING: 64235 m²
   AREA OF LAWN: 43152 m²
   FOR VISUAL CHECK: 43255 m²
2. THE SAFE LINE IS CHECKED BY MDC
   TEAM NO 14.

AREA OF CONCERN

No 4.

INFORMATION

ACTUAL AREA: 107397 m²
ESTIMATED AREA: 107397 m²
H W S MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE NO: 006
EXPECTED TIME FOR CLEARANCE:
A DEMINING TEAM: 311 HOURS
PRIORITY NO: 1st
SURFACE: SOFT
CATEGORY: A
SHEET NO: 2886
COORDINATE: X:1912
TYPE OF LAND: BUILDINGS&LAWN
TYPE OF MINE: PMN2 & LIKE MGN 50
LOCAL NAME: MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
START DATE: 12.04.95
COMPLETE DATE: 16.04.95
SURVEYED BY: TEAM NO 10
DRAWN BY: SEDIG
CHECKED BY: MOHABAT KHAN

LEGEND

BENCH MARK (BM) START POINT (SP)
BUILDING RUINED BUILDING
ANTI PERSONAL MINE DESTROYED MINE
WALL ACCIDENT POINT
SEALED ROAD STREET
TREE
UNCLEARED AREA
SKETCH MAP OF MINEFIELD NO 002 SURVEYED IN UNIVERSITY OF KABUL, WARD NO 3, KABUL PROVINCE.

Note: During the survey of this M.R. (Mining) Team, there was not enough time to cross the minefield.

INFORMATION

ACTUAL AREA: 53674 m²
ESTIMATED AREA: 53674 m²
NWS MINEFIELD NO: NO
EXPECTED TIME FOR CLEARANCE:
- A DEMINING TEAM: 119 HOURS
- A FLAIL: NO
PRIORITY: 1
SURFACE: UNPAVED
CATAGORY: C
SHEET NO: 2086
COORDINATE: X19Y12
TYPE OF LAND: UNIVERSITY LAWN
TYPE OF MINE: PMN & UXO
LOCAL NAME: KABUL UNIVERSITY
START DATE: 05.04.95
COMPLETE DATE: 08.04.95
SURVEYED BY: TEAM NO 10
DRAWN BY: AMANULLAH
CHECKED BY: M. SEDIQ

LEGEND

- BENCH MARK: BM
- START POINT: SP
- TURNING POINT: TP
- WALL
- BUILDING
- SHRINE
- RUINED HOUSE
- PAVED ROAD
- TREE

SCALE 1:2000

AREA OF CONCERN: No. 3
ANNEX E

SKETCH MAP OF MINEFIELD No. 005 SURVEYED IN KABUL UNIVERSITY KABUL CITY (WARD 3)
KABUL PROVINCE CODE No. 01-0101-0-005

SCALE: 1/3000

All Abad Hospital

Building Visually Cleared by ATR

Halo Trust M Field

Area

To Dehord 01KM

Men Host

Medical Faculty

To Jamal Mina 500M

To University Gate 500M

AREA OF CONCERN

N

MCPA

INFORMATION

Actual Area: 138560 m²
Team: 288 hrs
b Flatt: Suitable
Suitable for MDC: Yes
Coordinate: X: 19 Y: 12
Sheet No: 2886
Type of Land: Low & Buildings
Type of Mine: PMN
Priority: No. 1
Category: B
Surface: Soft
Local Name of the Area: University
Survey Date: 26/10/93
Start Date: 09-04-95
Complete Date: 12-04-95
Surveyed by: Team No. 5
Drawn by: Shafullah Mullah Jan

NOTE:
Measurement of building (10,000 m²) for Visual check.

This Minefield has not been surveyed by NWS.

FOR DEMINING

Cleared Area
Agency
Team No.
Date

LEGEND

Bench Mark (BM) (Δ)
Start Point (SP) (XXX)
Turnin Point (TP) (X)
Un-mined UC
Unknown area (UK)
Wall
Hospital
Cross Line
Surround Mine
Foot path
Tree
Ruin Buildings
Buildings
Sealed Road
ANNEX C

O - MINEFIELD NUMBER.
\( \times \) - AREA CHECKED BY HALO TRUST.

\( \times \) - BUILDING VISUALLY SEARCHED BY IMMEDIATE RESPONSE TEAM.