COUNTERING THE REVOLUTION:
THE MUJAHIDEEN COUNTERREVOLUTION

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Introduction

In April of this year, with the signing of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, serious questions arose about the state of an Afghan peace. What will happen to Afghanistan if the Soviet's complete their withdrawal? Will the Mujahideen be able to stop fighting or will the war in Afghanistan turn into a civil war? What kind of government can and will arise to meet the needs of the Afghan people?

Questions like these require answers. However, current analyses of the conflict are inadequate to provide these answers. Much of the analysis done on the conflict emphasizes events that have occurred either since the Saur Revolution of 1978 or since the Soviet Invasion of 1979. Additionally, such analysis tends to focus on the Jihad dimension of the conflict (i.e., Muslims opposing communism), or on the nationalistic dimension (i.e., Afghans opposing the foreign occupation of the Soviets). While both of these dimensions are vital to understanding the conflict, they tend to emphasize the homogeneity and not the heterogeneity of the Mujahideen.

The Mujahideen are a diverse group, with different goals and objectives, fighting for various reasons. They have diverse visions of what the future of Afghanistan should look like and different expectations of what an Afghan peace should provide for their particular group. By focusing on the differences in the Mujahideen resistance and analyzing these differences, we can gain a better understanding of the possibilities for peace after the Soviet withdrawal is completed.

The purpose of this paper is to establish a theoretical framework which will focus on the differences inherent in the Mujahideen resistance by analyzing the Afghan conflict as a counterrevolution. While a few analysts, like David Busby Edwards (Farr and Merriam, 1987, pp. 32), have made a passing reference to the Mujahideen resistance as a counterrevolution, the acknowledgement in the West that the Mujahideen are waging a counterrevolution against the PDPA government in Kabul is certainly not widespread. This stems partly from a lack of development in counterrevolutionary theory, and partly from a lack of application of that theory to the current Afghan case. This paper will attempt to break new ground in the areas of counterrevolutionary theory and counterrevolutionary analysis. (1) It will establish a theoretical base for discussing the Afghan counterrevolution. (2) It will examine the various visions for peace inherent in the Mujahideen counterrevolutionary resistance and the groups that represent these visions. (3) It will summarize the major points of agreement and disagreement that make up "Mujahideenism," the collection of ideas and visions espoused by the resistance. By understanding the Afghan Mujahideen resistance as a counterrevolution made up of various segments, each having its own vision for peace, we can begin to
discern the heterogeneity of the Mujahideen and suggest the parameters for a successful resolution to the conflict.

The Counterrevolution

In Afghanistan a social revolution occurred in April of 1978 (i.e. the Saur Revolution) when an unpopular communist minority gained power and attempted to reconstruct the political regime, and the political and civil society according to Marxist-Leninist ideology. However, the Afghan communists were not the only revolutionary group opposing the Daoud republic. Islamist groups, alienated by the secularization of Afghanistan had also begun an active resistance to Daoud's vision for Afghanistan. These two groups not only opposed Daoud's political-social vision, but were mutually alienated from one another. In 1978, the communists, not the Islamists, succeeded in overthrowing the Daoud regime. Governmental power was acquired by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which then attempted to remake Afghanistan by force according to its Marxist-Leninist political-social vision. The Saur Revolution further alienated the revolutionary Islamists from the Afghan communists, as well as other segments of Afghan society. Alfred Meyer, in his article on "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems," concludes that when the governmental power is transferred to a revolutionary but unpopular communist minority (as in Afghanistan's "top-down" Saur Revolution), the new government faces a desperate crisis for regime legitimacy. (Meyer, 1967, pp. 7) The revolutionaries' societal transformation can produce multiple alienations within the society. In the midst of this crisis, a revolutionary, communist regime is vulnerable to a counterrevolution. The PDPA crisis of legitimacy marked the start of the Afghan Mujahideen counterrevolution.

In order to analyze a counterrevolution like the Mujahideen's, two key points should be kept in mind: (1) A counterculture is symbiotically related to the social revolution it opposes. (2) A counterrevolution possesses traits similar to a social revolution. Therefore, the methodology used to analyze a social revolution can be used to analyze a counterrevolution. However, one should keep in mind that a counterrevolution does not occur in opposition to an established state government (as a revolution would), but instead it forms in opposition to a relatively new revolutionary government. A counterrevolution is basically a social revolutionary response to a social revolution.

As the new government's sociopolitical transformation begins, individuals alienated by the developing revolutionary vision begin to advocate an alternate, exclusive vision. The collective social vision of the counterrevolutionaries does not have to be any less "liberating" than the revolutionaries' vision. These alienated individuals can then form into contending groups which oppose the new regime's social vision. These groups can contain alienated elements whose existence predates the revolution (i.e., they were alienated by both the previous government and the
current revolutionary government) as well as alienated elements that have arisen in response to the revolution. The ability of these various alienated groups to unite, which can be essential to the success of the counterrevolution, depends on how amenable their social visions are as well as their perception of a common enemy. Part of the weakness of the Mujahideen counterrevolution involves these two issues of alienated groups' unity. First, despite the Mujahideen's ability to agree on two broad enemies, the PDPA communists and the Soviet invaders, they have been unable to reach agreement on who is a specific enemy of Jihad (i.e., who is a Muslim heretic). Second, the Mujahideen have had some difficulty in forming an amenable set of social visions.

The social visions of the counterrevolutionaries who have united in opposition to the revolutionary government contain both their empirical grievances and claims against the government, as well as their normative vision of "what should be" as a result of their counterrevolution. Since the counterrevolution is made up of various contender groups of individuals alienated either by the revolutionary regime or by its transformation of social and political structures, these visions are not necessarily homogeneous. Many amenable groups and visions can be subsumed within the counterrevolution; therefore, in analyzing a counterrevolution, it is useful to examine the various social visions contained within it.

Theoretically, within a counterrevolution two major categories of social visions can exist, each one having its set of claims as well as its own set of subcategories. The first category emphasizes macrocosmic claims (i.e. the actual sociopolitical vision of what that future state should be if the counterrevolution is successful). The second category emphasizes microcosmic claims (i.e. the claims of specific individuals or groups mobilized during the counterrevolution to some position or power within the future state if the counterrevolution is successful). The microcosmic claims are not necessarily tied to or dependent upon macrocosmic claims. For example, minority ethnic or religious groups within Afghanistan, who participate in the counterrevolution, can seek a greater position or role in Afghan civil and political society of the regime that develops (i.e., a microcosmic social vision) irrespective of whether that future regime is an Islamic state, a parliamentary democracy or a traditional monarchy (i.e., a macrocosmic social vision).

Both the macrocosmic and microcosmic social vision categories, contain at least three different subcategories. The organization of these subcategories is based upon the symbiotic revolution-counterrevolution relationship. The key criteria separating one subcategory from another are: when the group's claims developed vis-a-vis the revolution, and what that set of claims include. The main subcategories are: (1) pre-existing, progressive; (2) resulting, restorative; and (3) resulting, progressive. The term "pre-existing" identifies revolutionary elements that were first alienated by the previous regime and then alienated by the
revolutionary regime. The term "resulting" identifies revolutionary elements which became alienated only after the existing revolutionary government took power. The term "progressive" identifies revolutionary elements which seek something historically new. A progressive vision advocates an historically new set of social and political structures for a state. The term "restorative" identifies revolutionary elements which seek the reestablishment of an historically previous set of social and political structures. By using this framework, the differences within the Mujahideen's counterrevolution can be analyzed.

Macrocosmic Social Visions: Peshawar's Unity and the Iranian-based Organizations

The Mujahideen resistance movement consists of two main parts, the political organizations outside Afghanistan and the patchwork interior guerrilla fronts. The fronts, about 300, operate in all of Afghanistan's provinces. For the most part the fronts run their own show, but have loose undefined ties with one or several political organizations. The exiled political parties in Pakistan and Iran play several significant roles in support of the counterrevolution, the most important being to provide arms and material to the interior fronts. But they also serve to publicize the movement, take care of refuge problems, and advocate their particular macrocosmic social vision for Afghanistan. Certain exiled political organizations, particularly the Peshawar-based ones, have the corner on worldwide publicity. Therefore their macrocosmic social visions are the best known. These organizations have learned how to manipulate the media and they have a virtual monopoly on information about the Mujahideen. This monopoly continues because the Iranian-based organizations have little contact with Western media, and the fronts inside Afghanistan are difficult, dangerous news-gathering assignments. Recognizing the limitations connected with reports coming from both Peshawar and Iran about the counterrevolution, this analysis has tried to rely on reputable sources with a long involvement with the Mujahideen or with Afghanistan.

In approaching these organizations, the key question is "how are the different counterrevolutionary visions structured and organized into politically oriented groups? The seven major Peshawar organizations in May of 1985 finally were able to form a loose unity, despite their many disagreements and personal rivalries. This group, the Ittehad-i-Islami Mujahideen Afghanistan (Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen IUAM), is commonly called just Ittehad or Unity. It attempts to combine the two major macrocosmic social visions advocated by the Peshawar organizations: the pre-existing, progressive social vision of the Islamists and the resulting, restorative social vision of the traditionalists. These two outlooks were previously divided into two major coalitions, the "Group of 7" Islamist parties, and the "Group of Three" traditionalist
parties. By 1985 both of these coalitions had dissolved and, after much pressure from Pakistan, the United States, and the internal Mujahideen front commanders, a new alliance, the present Unity party, was formed. The Unity consists of four Islamist parties and three traditionalist parties. The macrocosmic social vision represented by the Peshawar parties can best be understood by examining the generalities associated with each vision and then specifically analyzing each particular party's leader, social vision, and support base.9 (Rashid, 1987, pp. 214-217)

Pre-existing, Progressive Macrocosmic Social Vision

The pre-existing, progressive macrocosmic social vision is advocated by groups and individuals called Islamists, who can trace their origins back to Afghanistan's constitutional period. However, their revolutionary activity began in earnest during the Daoud republic. They opposed both Daoud's secularism and Afghan communists' atheism. Since the Saur Revolution the Islamists' revolutionary vision has become an integral part of the counterrevolutionary resistance.

The pre-existing macrocosmic vision of these Islamist groups, while evolving over the years, still advocates a new social and political structure for Afghanistan. Hence, theirs is a progressive social vision. As Seyed Qassem Reshtia has pointed out, the Islamists are attempting to bring another type of Islam into Afghanistan. (Magnus, 1985, p. 84) The Islamists seek to create a nontraditional, politicized form of Islam which will define the society and politics of the state. Oliver Roy has described the Islamists' social vision as "the total reconstruction of political relations ... (and the creation of ) a political model capable of competing with the great ideologies of the Western world ... utopia, the millennium and revolution." (Klass, 1987, pp. 459) It is the political role of Islam within Afghanistan which serves as the center of gravity of the Islamists' progressive social vision.

The Islamist parties despise "the secular nationalism which [would leave] power in the hands of khans, maliks and other secular leaders" and reject "anything to do with either the jirga or a monarchy, and want [instead] a greater if not decisive role for religion in overall government affairs." Instead of the secular Afghan jirga, the Islamists demand its replacement "by a shura system based on Islamic religious law under the authority of religious leadership." (Rashid, 1987, pp. 215, 217, 214)10

This pre-existing, progressive Islamist social vision is far from homogeneous. In fact, two variants exist within the Unity organization. One variant advocates a more radical and exclusive form of "new" Islam, the other is more moderate in its desires and more willing to work with organizations representing a non-Islamist social vision for Afghanistan. Within the Unity, two Islamist parties are of the radical variant and two are of the moderate Islamist variant.
Unity's Islamist Parties, Radical Variants

Hezb-i-Islami (Hekmatyar) or The Islamic Party of Afghanistan

The Hezb-i-Islami's leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, has had a long revolutionary career prior to the counterrevolution. He has been described as strong-willed, ambitious, opportunistic, and dogmatic. However, he is a pragmatic Pushtun leader with more than a decade of active resistance experience. This experience combined with his fanatical form of revolutionary Islam have made him a very hardened man. In 1968, he helped form the Hezb, the first group to begin armed resistance against the PDPA. As a result of his long standing opposition to Afghan governments, he has also served as a key Pakistani protege.

Hekmatyar's party, as its name implies, assumes an enlightened, vanguard role as part of the Islamic revolution. His vision, the most extreme of the Islamists, is rigid revolutionary Islam achieved through the radical imposition of his views on the society. He opposes both modernist and leftist trends; seeks to place women back behind the veil; is very anti-West and anti-U.S.; and is very pro-Khomeini, pro-Qaddafi, pro-PLO, and pro-Muslim Brotherhood. His vision has also been described as very Hekmatyar-centered. He has opposed most resistance unification moves and joint policies, choosing instead to establish his own separate power base. His opponents accuse "the young autocrat" of working for the Soviets in order to remove his Afghan opponents. His organization is not opposed to fighting Soviets, Afghan communists or other resistance organizations - including firing on both Mohammadi's and Gailani's traditionalist parties. (Klass, 1987, pp. 395) He has also widened his split with Professor Rabbani's Islamist party over their views on the foreign versus internal threat to Islam. Hekmatyar sees the internal threat as greater. As a result, he views cooperation with the traditional families as onerous, especially Gailani whom he has described as the "epitome of decadent, superstition-ridden and self-seeking men" who have corrupted religion among Afghans. Henry Bradsher cites that in early 1981, Hekmatyar blamed the Saur Revolution and the Soviet invasion on former King Zahir Shah, and "talked of kidnapping him from Rome and putting him on trial in an eventually liberated Kabul for having ruined the country." (Bradsher, 1983, pp. 292) Hekmatyar envisions a revolutionary Islamist political system that would not tolerate any political rivals. Prior to the signing of the Geneva accords, he remained aloof from the other parties in order to take advantage of any political compromise solutions that would neutralize Afghanistan. Many see his vision as seeking only personal political power.

Hekmatyar, a rural Kharrut Pushtun, comes from one of the displaced Pushtun communities in northern Afghanistan. As a result, his major constituents are rural Pushtuns from the northeast provinces. He also has cells in almost all major
urban centers within Afghanistan, and operates from Iran as well as Pakistan.

**Ittehad-i Islami Baray-Azadi-ye Afghanistan or The Islamic Unity to Liberate Afghanistan**

The Ittehad is led by Professor Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a former professor with Rabbani at the Faculty of Islamic Law in Kabul. Before the Saur Revolution, he was a leader of Kabul's Ikhwan ul-Muslimi (Muslim Brotherhood). After the revolution he was imprisoned until in late 1979 when he fled to Pakistan. His lack of party associations and his pre-revolution credibility, led to his selection in 1980 to head an early attempt at resistance unity. His age, scholarship and recognition in the Arab world allowed him to raise ample Middle Eastern funds for this resistance alliance. But there were problems with distribution of these funds and resources and in 1980, this attempt at unity failed. He kept the alliance's name and transferred what was left to his own resistance party.

Sayyaf, like Hekmatyar, is a radical Islamist leader. The specifics of his party program are unclear but generally appear to parallel the vision of the international Muslim Brotherhood. He is normally allied with Hekmatyar against the other Unity parties. In 1986, Sayyaf sided with Hekmatyar and denounced the Rabbani-led Unity delegation to Washington. (Klass, 1987, pp. 402)

Despite Sayyaf's international reputation, he still lacks a personal support base in Afghanistan. He is a Kharruti Pushtun from Paghman and, like Hekmatyar (and Hafizullah Amin), has had nominal results in attracting disgruntled traditional members to the Islamist camp. His small following is based on his ability to supply weapons in exchange for their limited loyalty. His large financial resources permit him a position within the inner circle of resistance leaders, but his followers in the field function more like mercenaries than adherents to his social vision for Afghanistan.

**Unity's Islamist Parties, Moderate Variants**

**Hezb-i-Islami (Younus Khalis faction)**

This party, a breakaway faction from Hekmatyar's party, is led by Younus Khalis, a Pushtun from Nangrahar province. Khalis, despite being one of the oldest resistance leaders, is visually one of the most impressive looking. He combines his Afghan educated ulema status with rural, unsophisticated Pushtun spunk. He is "direct, forthright, and to the point" and enjoys wide respect among Mujahideen. (Klass, 1987, pp. 397) He began his Mujahideen career during the constitutional period as part of the separate ulema Islamist groups.
Khalis rejected Hekmatyar's radicalism and formed his more moderate, almost traditionalist-oriented, Islamist party. He is agreeable to cooperating with the three traditionalist parties. Khalis is the only exile organization leader who fights regularly with his men in Afghanistan. As a result, he is able to incite stronger loyalties from his interior front commanders than most of the other Peshawar parties can. His party is described as having a "high teeth to tail ratio" due to its heavy emphasis on fighting organization and low emphasis in political bureaucracy. Most of Khalis' support is tribal-based and comes from the strategic southeastern Pushtun areas of Afghanistan. However, he is trying to expand his support north into non-Pushtun areas.

Jamiat-i-Islami or The Islamic Society of Afghanistan

Led by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, this group is one of the largest non-Pushtun Mujahideen political organizations. Rabbani, a Tajik from Badakhshan, was a professor in the Faculty of Islamic Law at Kabul University where he was a leader in the Ikhwan ul-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood). His background, ideas and revolutionary stance forced him to flee Afghanistan in 1973. He was at one time an associate of Hekmatyar, but he broke with him in 1978, over Hekmatyar's impractical and rigid approach, to form the Jamiat.

Originally, Rabbani's party program differed little from Hekmatyar's, but he has become less radical. Prior to the Soviet invasion, he concentrated largely on Afghanistan's growing foreign contamination (Russian, American and Chinese) in the school system. Currently, he would like to establish a government based on a literal interpretation of Islamic law, combined with an open political system that would even allow modernist parties. Rabbani's willingness to cooperate with traditionalists can be partially explained by the similarity of counterrevolutionary "enemies" or targets for both Rabbani and the traditionalists. Moderate Islamists like Rabbani define a Muslim heretic (i.e., the enemy of the Jihad) according to simple religious criteria, as do Unity's traditionalist elements. Radical Islamists like Hekmatyar have a more politically-based definition of a Muslim heretic. As a result, Hekmatyar is willing to fight those Afghans who are opposed to the establishment of an Islamic state and consider them to be heretics, but Rabbani is not.13 His current party, the Islamic Society (or Association) "corresponds to his aim of rallying (multiple) forces to action." (Roy, 1984, pp. 126) His ability to cooperate with competing political leaders makes him one of the most effective leaders in the Unity. Additionally, Rabbani remains the closest figure to a philosopher that the resistance has produced. He stresses "the need to live in the 'electronic age' while upholding the principles and values of Islam ... to include justice, equality, seeking knowledge, election of leaders rather than hereditary elevation, government through ... parliamentary institutions ... and freedom of speech." (Magnus, 1985, pp. 76)
Rabbani is a Tajik from Faizabad, near the Soviet border. After breaking with Hekmatyar, he pulled many Hezb members with him, such as Ahmad Shah Massoud. His non-Pushtun status allows him to attract large minority ethnic support (Tajik, Uzbek and Turkmen). In spite of this, he continues to have Pushtun support as well. Rabbani was able to "capture much of the political and military turf, influence, and personnel that had formerly belonged to [Hekmatyar's] Hezb, creating hostility between the two organizations—a hostility which has continued and intensified over the years and which has been one major cause of the consistent failure of all efforts to unify the resistance." (Rashid, 1987, pp. 210) Rabbani's party now enjoys a broad following throughout Afghanistan. However, the fact that Rabbani is a non-Pushtun limits his effectiveness in a new government. Additionally, he comes from a family of small landlords heavily influenced by Sufism. His party continues to attract support from northern "spiritualistic" Sufi brotherhoods. His second level leaders, like Hekmatyar's, come from the educated class of Afghanistan.

Resulting, Restorative Macrocosmic Social Vision

The Saur Revolution and the subsequent Soviet Invasion alienated many Afghans who became a part of the Mujahideen counterrevolution. As a result, the resulting, restorative macrocosmic social vision of the counterrevolution developed. This vision does not advocate something historically new for Afghanistan, but instead seeks to restore social and political structures to coincide with a previously existing Afghan social vision. The individuals and groups who advocate this social vision for Afghanistan are called the traditionalists. All the traditionalist leaders come from the privileged prerevolutionary elite of Afghanistan, and their struggle to restore the prerevolutionary status quo appears very "bourgeois." The traditionalists have been labeled by some as having no goals, save the return of the pre-Daoud status quo and maybe the restoration of King Zahir—either as a figurehead or as an acting monarch. Yet this gross over-simplification trivializes the traditionalists' desires for Afghanistan, which is the key macrocosmic alternative to the Islamists' vision for Afghanistan.

Like the Islamists, the traditionalists, seek the elimination of the PDPA government in Kabul and the complete removal of the Soviets from their country. However, beyond this, the traditionalists' vision varies greatly from the Islamists'. The traditionalists appear to be pro-West and to welcome Western aid and contacts. The traditionalists seek a democratically elected government for Afghanistan, but appear more oriented toward a constitutional monarchy or a secular republic. The ethnic component of the traditionalists' vision appears to be Pushtun dominated, but they have been able to gather some minority ethnic support. However, it is the traditionalists' religious
component, more than anything else, that makes their vision inherently different from the Islamists'.

Traditionalists, in the Afghan pattern, separate the spiritual realm from the temporal. As a result, the traditionalists are no more or less devout as Muslims than the Islamists and even derive some of their leadership legitimacy from their religious credentials (e.g., Sufi leaders). But for the traditionalists, Islamic religious practices are a concern of a person's private life and do not have a place in the business of government. According to Abdul Rashid, traditionalists support a political system for a free Afghanistan based upon "the uniquely Afghan and basically secular jirga" and not the shura. Additionally, the khans, maliks and other traditional secular leaders who advocate this vision are "reluctant to accept religious leadership and abandon their traditional roles as spokesmen for their communities." (Rashid, 1987, pp. 214, 215) In a traditional tribally oriented society, rapid reforms are rejected; change is not a revolutionary process, but a slow step-by-step evolutionary process. In Afghanistan, the traditionalists are trying to maintain a restorative vision for the Pushtunwali, and the jirgas. These Afghan temporal codes and traditions are not based on Islamic law, and their legitimacy lies outside it. The leadership of the traditionalists in Peshawar,

had all been part of the regular political process in Afghanistan before the Daoud coup and they opted for a similar, basically secular government structure based on the jirga formula, a confederation of tribes and communities, a loose central government, and an executive monarchy, working in semi-religious and semi-nationalist style. (Rashid, 1987, pp. 217)

Hence, traditionalists are trying to restore the political role of Islam in Afghanistan to its pre-communist status, as opposed to having that role completely revised. Within Unity, three traditionalist parties exist. These parties will be analyzed individually.

Unity's Traditionalist Parties

Mahaz-i-Milli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan or The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan - NIFA)

The Mahaz is headed by Sayed Ahmad Gailani. As a pir of the maraboutic Qadirya Sufi order, he is an Islamic religious leader of international importance. He is also a specialist on Islamic law. Prior to 1973, he served as a religious advisor to the King. After the Saur Revolution, he was initially impressed by Taraki's proposed reforms and served the revolutionary government as an advisor for two months before fleeing Afghanistan and joining the resistance. Gailani has since been able to gain support throughout the world. He is a modernist Pushtun, who dresses in Western clothing, travels widely publicizing his
cause, and commands sympathy in Washington D.C. and London due to his westernized background. His moderate, nationalistic, modernist, democratic philosophy appeals to both Europeans and Americans. Still, Gailani does not look like a revolutionary, which for a Pushtun is important. John Fullerton describes him as "otiose, sedentary, sleepy-eyed, and boastful." (Fullerton, 1984, pp. 66)

Gailani's views have changed since he first entered the resistance. While pro-monarchy, he now "calls for a basically secular government incorporating Islamic law and Afghan tradition, preferably with a parliament based on free elections." (Klass, 1987, pp. 394)

Gailani's support base, like his ideas, has changed over the course of the counterrevolution. Despite his political influence over a large sector of the population - based on his client oriented Sufi order - his party was not well organized. At the start, Mahaz failed to gain wide large support from rural Afghans, but since 1983 the party has reversed that trend. Mahaz now has gathered strong Pushtun support from the areas of Paktya, Paktika, Nangrahar, Ghazni, and Wardak, and has become well organized, effective and one of the larger parties of the Mujahideen.

Jabha-ye Nijat-i-Milli-ye Afghanistan or The Afghan National Liberation Front - ANLF

The ANLF is led by Sibgatullah Mojaddidi, a trained philosopher, intellectual, theologian and teacher as well as a member of one of the most powerful religious families in Afghanistan which leads part of the spiritualist Naqshbandiya Sufi order. He was imprisoned briefly by Daoud. His family has suffered greatly since the Saur Revolution. In 1978, thirty family members were executed by the communists. Later that year, he organized the National Liberation Front, a coalition of emigre groups based on a modern consensus of national liberation goals. (Hekmatyar naturally was an exception to the coalition.)

Mojaddidi's party promised progress together with Islamic socialism according to a traditionalist perspective. The organization's manifesto stated that:

The Afghan National Liberation Front (ANLF) strongly believes that sincere and true application of Islamic principles is the only way to ensure the survival and well being of our nation. Therefore, we shall struggle for the establishment of a government founded on Islamic teachings and our own traditions of democracy .... ANLF will fight all elements of imperialism and feudalism which hinder the establishment of a politically independent, economically prosperous and socially progressive Afghanistan. ANLF ... will re-establish, according to Afghanistan's traditional policy, a true
and constructive neutrality ... May God lead us into victory over atheism, treason and national slavery in our land. (Newell and Newell, 1981, pp. 104)

Mojaddidi's Afghan National Liberation Front represents pro-Afghan nationalism. His party's program supports a "constitutional monarchy, based on the traditional institutions of pre-Communist Afghanistan and possibly involving the former King." (Klass, 1987, pp. 400)

The ANLF is very influential politically but has only a modest military presence in Afghanistan. His party is small in size and lacks a broad rural support base. Despite Mojaddidi's "conservative" traditionalist approach (in comparison to Gailani's liberalism), he has been unable to develop widespread minority support.

Harakat Inqilab-i-Islami or The Islamic Revolutionary Movement

Harakat is led by the mildly revolutionary Maulawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, a politically experienced religious authority. He is an Ahmadzai Pushtun, a trained theologian, a Sufi, and a former member of parliament during the Constitutional Monarchy era.

The Harakat is a moderate party that combines traditional elements with urban intelligentsia. The Harakat "supports a popularly elected government with a system based on Islamic law (but not theocracy or radical Islam) and on the traditional Loya Jirga rather than a Western-style parliament." (Klass, 1987, pp. 399) However, because of the party's political flexibility, the component Mujahideen groups of the Harakat do not necessarily possess a clear political ideology. (Amstutz, 1986, pp. 98)

Mohammadi's movement, despite its widespread support and appeal in non-Pushtun areas, is still supported primarily by Pushtun tribes. Currently, it serves as a rallying point for village mullahs and has strong support from educated religious leaders nationwide. He appears to be the only traditional leader with long-term endurance, combining westernized or modernist Afghan intellectuals with strongly traditional religious followers. The Harakat's flexibility helps make it one of the largest Mujahideen parties. Mohammadi's organization is loose, emphasizing local leadership. He has experienced several factional breakoffs and Afghan secret police penetrations, but still has a solid organization.

The Traditionalists' "Window of Effectiveness"

From the perspective of counterrevolutionary theory, the traditionalists suffer one major difficulty: resulting, restorative macrocosmic social visions are constrained by a "window of effectiveness." A social-revolution aims at transforming society, by disrupting the social fabric, tearing it
apart, and then reweaving it. In Afghanistan, that fabric has been significantly torn by the Saur Revolution, the Soviet invasion and migratory genocide policy, and by the Mujahideen counterrevolution itself. Even if the Marxist social vision was not achieved, it would have been possible for the social fabric of Afghanistan to be changed so fundamentally as to prevent a major restoration of pre-revolution social and political structures. Once a revolutionary regime has succeeded in fully transforming the old sociopolitical order, the effectiveness of a resulting, restorative counterrevolutionary vision has lapsed.15 Since the old social fabric no longer exists, it becomes impossible to restore the old order and an old vision. This is, for example, what the collectivization campaign did in the Soviet Union. Collectivization so completely disrupted and erased the previous fabric of Soviet society that the Czarist Whites would have been unable to restore the old order. According to Theda Skocpol, such a social revolution should be labeled "successful" because it succeeded in transforming both a state's political and social structures. In the "new" revolutionary society, there would be nothing for the counterrevolution to restore. As a result, all change becomes progressive, and the resulting, restorative vision must either become a progressive vision or cease to exist. At this point in time, the "window of effectiveness" for the restorative vision is closed. Therefore, in light of this theoretical discussion, any American unwillingness to support the Mujahideen's resulting, restorative vision could not just be considered political apathy or "a wait and see" attitude. Instead, it would be a default decision, from the perspective of counterrevolutionary theory, to encourage the closing of the traditionalist's "window of effectiveness." Also, it would imply a default decision to support one of the Mujahideen's progressive macrocosmic social visions. The previous Soviet strategy of "we can last, even if it takes 20 years" (as with the Basmachis of Soviet Central Asia), was a policy which could have permanently removed the restorative vision's ability to affect change. Once the Soviets' and the PDPA had sufficiently transformed the fabric of Afghan civil society and its political structures - especially if it had been transformed according to a Soviet model - the effective period of the traditionalists' restorative vision would have been over, and the only possible counterrevolutionary change would have become progressive.

Thus, in light of the role time plays in a counterrevolution, the signing of the Geneva Accords is really a great boon for the traditionalists. The Accords, which allow for the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, signal the near term resolution of the Afghan counterrevolution; hence, the "window of effectiveness" for the traditionalists has not and most likely will not close before the counterrevolution is completed. Therefore, the Accords permit the continued theoretical viability of the traditionalists' macrocosmic social vision for Afghanistan.
Resulting, Progressive Macrocosmic Social Vision

A second group of macrocosmic counterrevolutionary visions resulted from the communist PDPA revolutionaries coming to power. It is a resulting, progressive social vision advocated by the Iranian-based Mujahideen organizations. They, like the traditionalists, were alienated by both the Saur revolution and the Soviet Invasion. But, unlike the traditionalists, this group of counterrevolutionaries pursued a progressive macrocosmic vision for Afghanistan. The resulting, progressive Mujahideen were alienated by the Saur revolution, but did not want to return to a previous Afghan social or political situation. They were also unlike the Islamists. This counterrevolutionary progressive vision did not begin to take shape until it was unleashed as a result of the Saur revolution.

The Iranian-based Afghan Shi'ite Mujahideen seek to reshape Afghanistan in accordance with the principles of Khomeini's Islamic Revolution. During the development of this social vision for Afghanistan, two significant events came together between 1978 and 1979. First, the Afghan Hazara population launched its own independent opposition to the 1978 Saur Revolution. Of all Afghanistan's oppressed minority ethnic groups, the Hazaras were the largest to be constantly oppressed by the Pushtun majority. The Hazaras Mongol appearance, Shi'ite religion, and relatively recent Pushtun subjugation (they were not brought under effective Kabul government control until the 1890s) made them a constant source of friction for Afghanistan's Pushtun majority. While only about 15 percent of Afghanistan's population is Shi'ite, almost all of these Shi'ites are Hazaras from the mountainous Hazarajat region of central Afghanistan. The second major event was Khomeini's "Islamic Revolution" and the overthrow of the Shah in Iran. Khomeini's social vision for the Muslim world at large is very progressive. The Hazara Shi'ites had always maintained a close relationship with their Iranian co-religionists. Therefore, given their established ties with Iran, it was natural for the Afghan Shi'ites and their local religious leadership to turn to Khomeini's Iran for assistance in their counterrevolution against the PDPA and the subsequent Soviet invaders.

The Iranian government began by supporting Afghan Shi'ite groups with aid and arms but later began to take control and dominate the macrocosmic social visions espoused by the Afghan Shi'ites. The Iranian-based political parties, of which there were many, formed into several key umbrella parties, all advocating a resulting, progressive social vision for Afghanistan based upon the radical Islamic ideology of the Ayatollah Khomeini. This resulting, progressive social vision differs not only from Unity's moderate variant, but also from Unity's radical variant. Unity's radical variant parties, like Hekmatyar's Hezb, draw their inspiration primarily from the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, and not Khomeini. Khomeini's progressive world social vision subsumes the Mujahideen's resulting, progressive social vision advocated by the Afghan Shi'ites for Afghanistan.
Khomeini's Islamic Revolution asserts its "ideological belief in the ultimate supremacy of the 'Umma, (the entire body of Muslim faithful), united in a theocratic nation-state (of which Afghanistan of course would be an integral part) and all under Iranian Shi'a leadership." (Rashid, 1987, pp. 220) These Iranian-based Mujahideen parties are very weak compared to the Peshawar parties. As a result, Abdul Rashid concludes that "they play only a small direct role in the fighting or the political affairs of Afghanistan and the resistance." (Rashid, 1987, pp. 220)

This discussion of the Iranian-based organizations concludes the analysis of macrocosmic social visions for the Mujahideen counterrevolution. The next category of social visions, "microcosmic" social visions, emphasizes the specific power distribution that will occur within Afghanistan after peace is restored.

**Microcosmic Visions: Power Distribution Problems**

The microcosmic social visions of the counterrevolution deal with the specific problems of power distribution. Regardless of what Afghanistan becomes after the counterrevolution is successful or what macrocosmic social vision succeeds in shaping the resulting peace, political power must be redistributed. At this point microcosmic social visions are important because the leaders and commanders of the counterrevolution have not struggled for so long only to be displaced by peace. Therefore, for the counterrevolution to be successfully resolved and peace restored to Afghanistan, political power must be allocated anew. Many groups are in conflict for this limited quantity of power. The Afghan leaders in Peshawar, Afghanistan and Iran all seek what they perceive to be their share of the "spoils." Even the former King could play a role. Out of these conflictual elements arise three main microcosmic social visions of a counterrevolution: the pre-existing, progressive; the resulting, restorative, and the resulting, progressive. The explanation of these terms parallels the explanation given when they were applied at the macrocosmic level. The chief difference in their application at the microcosmic level is the shift in emphasis from the normative view of the future Afghan state to an emphasis on what particular individuals or groups have power claims that must be dealt with and resolved.

**Pre-Existing, Progressive Microcosmic Social Vision and Resulting, Restorative Microcosmic Social Vision**

These two microcosmic social visions can be discussed in tandem because of the overlapping power distribution problems that all the Peshawar-based parties and their leaders must resolve. The pre-existing, progressive microcosmic social vision, like its macrocosmic variety, is advocated by the Islamists involved in the Unity party. The Islamists are the former revolutionaries turned counterrevolutionaries. During their revolutionary days,
the Islamist leaders sought to redistribute Afghan power to themselves, so they could enact their macrocosmic social vision. Regardless of how their macrocosmic social vision has evolved during the counterrevolution, their microcosmic vision remains basically a progressive one. The Islamists are trying to "break into" Afghanistan's power game and create a new power distribution equilibrium. The resulting, restorative microcosmic social vision, as advocated by Unity's traditionalists, differs from the Islamists' microcosmic vision. The key leaders of the traditionalists are trying to be restored or to restore others (like the former King) to their former pre-Saur Revolution positions of power. After all they represent the pre-Saur Revolution winners of Afghanistan's power distribution struggle. Hence, traditionalists' microcosmic social vision derives from their desire to restore a power distribution to Afghanistan that was removed as a result of the Saur Revolution.

The key leaders within each party, Islamist as well as traditionalist, all seek political power as an outcome of their role as part of the counterrevolution. They each hope that their macrocosmic social vision for Afghanistan will be the one adopted. And certainly, if they are successful at the microcosmic level by gaining a large portion of political power, then they can influence the future of Afghanistan to a great extent. Microcosmic power distribution successes can lead to a macrocosmic victory for any of these leaders and their parties. However, if any of these leaders is excluded from political power or feels cheated in the resulting power redistribution, he may be unwilling to accept a new Afghan government. If carried to the extreme, leaders who are completely unsuccessful in achieving any of their microcosmic claims may even refuse to encourage their parties to put down their arms and cease their counterrevolutionary struggle. At this point, a failure to achieve at least a microcosmic level of success could lead to possible civil war within Afghanistan or even to the evolution of Mujahideen counterrevolutionary claims into revolutionary claims. Add to this the problems associated with Afghan (Pushtun) mores of honor and revenge, and excluded Islamist and traditionalist leaders may feel a need to encourage violent redress. And to further add to this problem, the plan for the final redistribution of power from the interim government in exile in Peshawar to the hopefully soon-to-be established Islamic government in Kabul may be decided by a democratic vote. Such an election would be an uphill battle given all the difficulties associated with conducting a fair election in a backward, war-torn Third World nation. All of this speaks to the difficulty involved in resolving the distribution of power within the various parties. Therefore, resolving these microcosmic social visions peacefully is not a surety at all, but it is a prerequisite for peace.

In order to assist the peaceful resolution of these two microcosmic visions, the Peshawar parties were compelled to begin resolving the power distribution problems before the
counterrevolution could succeed. Unity's formation was a first step in that direction. The second step was the June 1988 formation of an interim government in exile by the Peshawar-based political parties. This twelve member government, with Ahmad Shah of Sayyaf's party as the president, is intended to replace the Najib regime in Kabul after the counterrevolution is concluded. The interim government is intended to resolve at least some of the microcosmic social vision conflicts of the Mujahideen by trying to formulate the power distribution beforehand, among the seven parties of Unity. How successful the interim government will be remains to be seen. Certainly party leaders, like Hekmatyar, who have been charged with using the counterrevolution to wage a personal power struggle, can still keep this struggle active until a final peace occurs. One of the issues that may undermine the interim government is its possible exclusion of those groups advocating a resulting, progressive microcosmic social vision (e.g., the Iranian-based Afghan Shi'ite groups). The leaders of these groups also seek a favorable resolution to Afghan's power distribution problem. The problem is that Unity's interim government has neglected their microcosmic claims.

Resulting, Progressive Microcosmic Social Vision

Normally, a resulting, progressive microcosmic social vision is advocated by those groups of individuals alienated from a revolutionary regime and via the counterrevolution have improved their political or social position either within Afghanistan as a whole or within their respective geographic region. The resulting, progressive microcosmic vision involves three sets of Afghan individuals: Shi'ites, minority ethnic groups, and interior front commanders. These groups have long been subordinate to other groups: the Afghan Shi'ites to the dominant majority of Sunnis, the minority ethnic groups to Afghan Pushtuns, and the emerging front commanders to both the dominant tribal, ethnic, and religious leaders as well as to the various leaders of the Peshawar political parties. These groups have microcosmic claims that any Afghan peace must attempt to resolve.

The leaders of the Afghan Shi'ites have developed their microcosmic social vision along the same lines as the Peshawar leaders. Due to the hierarchical nature of Shi'a Islam, these leaders maintain much greater control over their interior front commanders than the Peshawar Sunni leaders. Hence, to resolve the Afghan Shi'ite microcosmic demands requires a resolution agreeable to these exiled leaders rather than to the Shi'ite front commanders. Additionally, the Shi'ite fronts have not been as effective a fighting force as the Sunni fronts. Thus their importance to the counterrevolution is very limited and parochial. The Afghan Shi'ite counterrevolutionaries microcosmic demands call for the Sunni recognition of Afghan Shi'ites and the inclusion of Afghan Shi'ites in any new government. Therefore, the Afghan Shi'ites are seeking to improve their position within Afghanistan. The power
distribution problems Afghanistan will face have a religious side. As one Afghan Shi'ite representative stated in June of last year,

A monopolistic solution will not solve the problems .... The only practical solution to the future of Afghanistan is the formation of a revolutionary council with the participation of all effective parties in the struggle—those based in Iran and Pakistan, both Shi'ite and Sunni. Apart from this, anyone who gets involved with only a part of the resistant and popular forces of Afghanistan is doomed to defeat. (FBIS-NES-88-121, pp. 33-34)

The Afghan Shi'ite leaders have been most upset with the failure of Peshawar Mujahideen leaders to consult with them over the formation of an interim government, and their exclusion from all posts within Unity's proposed government. This then becomes the Afghan Shi'ite resulting, progressive microcosmic social vision, to ensure a new power distribution that is more favorable to Afghan Shi'ites than the pre-Saur Revolution distribution. 19

The other two groups comprising the resulting, progressive microcosmic social vision are the Sunni minority ethnic groups and the interior front commanders. The minority ethnic groups include all the non-Pushtun Sunni groups fighting in the counterrevolution. The Northern Tier of the Mujahideen contains most of them. This tier tends to be a more effective fighting region than the Pushtun Southern Area. The northern areas form a coherent fighting organization because of the relatively strong cooperation that exists between the Jamiat-i-Islami and the Harakat Inqilab-Islami. These two groups collectively control the entire northern tier of Afghanistan stretching from Iran to China and embracing Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkomens, Hazaras, and northern Pushtuns. Despite the tier's heterogeneous ethnic nature, it is receptive to modern, organized fighting and resistance. Therefore, in Afghanistan the most effective resistance involves minority ethnic groups. The Pushtun's political dominance, according to Eden Naby, has rested upon their fighting abilities based primarily upon Pushtun tribal structures. (Magnus, 1985, pp. 68) However, those historic Pushtun military abilities appear to be losing ground. Most southern Pushtuns organize their fighting fronts around tribal groups. In the Southern Tier those tribal structures contribute to a less organized and proficient fighting force. The ancient Pushtun rivalries have made it almost impossible for them to form the large, united, combined fronts that are possible in the Northern Tier areas. As a result of these rivalries, the Pushtuns have also become easy targets for infiltration, or "divide and rule" tactics. While it is true that the southern Pushtuns, over the course of the counterrevolution have increased their military effectiveness, they still fall short of the effectiveness of the northern minority groups. 20 Hence, the traditional legitimacy of southern Pushtun political power over
all of Afghanistan has declined during the counterrevolution. This creates a power distribution problem that can not be resolved by old forms. Even an Afghan democracy, given the Pushtuns' numerical majority, would not "reward" the northern tier minority groups' valuable contribution to the counterrevolution. These groups have not fought so effectively for so long only to become Pushtun dominated again. This particular resulting, progressive microcosmic social vision must be resolved to ensure ethnic peace in Afghanistan.

Within Afghanistan, the counterrevolution is forging a "new man." (Magnus, 1985, pp. 95) The epitome of that new Afghan man is represented by the Mujahideen interior front commanders. These commanders have microcosmic claims for the power distribution that will take place after the conclusion of the counterrevolution. Edward Girardet sees a small number of emerging leaders from the ranks of the resistance movement, leaders whose position, status and power relate not to their tribal position, but to their leadership and merit in battle. (Girardet, July 1983, pp. 100) As a result, their power is not derived from or even dependent on traditional power distribution patterns. In the Afghan counterrevolution, military success has become a legitimate vehicle for gaining power. These men generally accept modern fighting methods and tend to be highly politicized. Some of these men are a part of what Grant Farr calls "the Afghan new middle class." (Farr and Merriam, 1987, pp. 128-130) However, their claim to political power does not rest upon position or politics but upon military status. Some are Islamists who accept modern technology but reject the "negative aspects of western and eastern society." (Girardet, July 1983, pp. 100) Others are members of traditionalist parties. Since May 1988 the interior front commanders have been proposing an alternate military strategy for victory in Afghanistan which opposes the interim government's strategy. The commanders generally advocate a Maoist attrition strategy designed to slowly "strangle" the Afghan communists without risking high casualties. This strategy does not emphasize capturing and holding cities because of the direct cost to the Mujahideen and to the civilian population. (Desmond, August 29, 1988, pp. 36) However, Peshawar leaders like Hekmatyar continue to advocate capturing large Afghan cities "so that the alliance's 'transitional government' can establish itself there as a rival to the Soviet backed one in Kabul." ("Theirs for a Day," August 20, 1988, pp. 28) The root of this strategy struggle is not just the issues of military strategy, but also of political power. The commanders' resistance to the Peshawar leadership questions the legitimacy of the interim government. Hence, the successful commanders pose a progressive challenge to the exiled Peshawar political parties and the traditional ethnic power distribution structures.

The list of key front commanders may appear small, but many more are suspected to exist within Afghanistan. One who seems to combine the attributes that both Dupree and Girardet highlighted
is Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Lion of the Panjshir Valley. Massoud is probably the most successful and capable of all the interior front commanders and has been considered a possible post-counterrevolution national leader. Politically, he is affiliated with Rabbani's party. He has organized his men into specialized military units, established an internal provincial government system to run his region, and managed to both educate the children of the Panjshir as well as collect taxes despite the fighting. Additionally, he has even successfully negotiated a year long cease-fire with the Soviets. Currently he heads the Council of the North. Commanders like Massoud appear to have developed a new microcosmic counterrevolutionary vision concerning the distribution of power within Afghanistan. Their militarily-derived political power base emerged after the social revolution; hence, they are "resulting." But they also represent a new and evolving order, one that is merit-based as opposed to tradition-based. As a result, they are progressive. In fact, if Massoud were a Pushtun instead of a Tajik, some Afghan experts feel he would be the perfect leader of a future Afghan government. But due to his minority ethnic background, his future currently appears restricted by traditional criteria.

In July 1987, 1200 interior front commanders or their representatives met inside Afghanistan to discuss the future of Afghanistan. This group encompassed commanders associated with all the major Mujahideen parties. While they discussed several macrocosmic issues, the first item on their 21 Point Resolution has direct application for understanding this resulting, progressive microcosmic social vision and the prospect of deriving political power based upon military involvement and success. It states that, "The right to determine the future destiny of Afghanistan belongs to the inheritors of the Martyrs and to the faithful Mujahideen who are engaged in a fierce struggle in the battlefields and are ready for martyrdom. No one else will be allowed to infringe on their right." (ASMMR, August 1987, pp. 47-51) The deciders of Afghanistan's fate, according to these commanders, are to be the Mujahideen themselves. In that light, battlefield involvement and battlefield command serve as a basis for Afghan political power. Therefore, the questions are whether these commanders will be able to exchange their military power for political power once peace has been established and military power is devalued; if not, will these commanders still be willing to lay down their arms and accept the demotion? As Edward Girardet has observed, "the commanders fear a power grab by the Peshawar politicians." (Girardet, August 22, 1988, pp. 31) This new group of leaders, the commanders, has developed a vested stake in the power distribution outcome of the counterrevolution because they have gained so much as a result of it. They maybe unwilling to support a peace that leaves them without their fair share of the power distribution "rewards." 23

In summary, the minority ethnic groups and the interior front commanders are playing a major military role in the
counterrevolution. Their elevation in power has not been based on political criteria so much as on non-ethnic, merit-based criteria. The focus is not on what these groups have said, but on what they have achieved. The role that military effectiveness plays should not be underestimated. Emigre organizations and their leaders justify their positions by their political leadership abilities or by their previous positions within traditional political society, or both. But they are not (except for Khalis) military leaders, fighting in the field. The interior front commanders differ from the leaders of the Peshawar parties because they incite strong vertical ties and affiliation which the Peshawar parties have not necessarily been able to do. Their fighting role gives them political power that can be overlooked by those who focus only on the Peshawar parties. Thus while different minority ethnic groups and front commanders might strongly support a particular macrocosmic vision for a future Afghan state or be tied to a particular party, their political power stems from the counterrevolution's military need and their military successes. Some minority ethnic groups have even gone so far as to reject ties to the exiled parties in Pakistan and Iran and have chosen instead to take an independent fighting stance, operating their own nonaligned front. Hence, for peace to return to Afghanistan the political power of the fighters must be dealt with as successfully as the political power of the politicians, if the fighters are expected to lay down their arms. As a result, this aspect of the resulting, progressive microcosmic vision presents certain power distribution demands to any interim government that must be acknowledged and dealt with to ensure the eventual cessation of hostilities and the start of peace. Figure 1, Mujahideen Social Visions, summarizes the various visions of the Mujahideen counterrevolution that must be resolved before peace can be restored to Afghanistan (See the next page).
FIGURE 1: MUJAHIDEEN SOCIAL VISIONS

MACROCosMIC SOCIAL VISIONS

Pre-existing, Progressive Vision

Radical Islamist Variant

Hezb-i-Islami (Hekmatyar)
Ittehad-i Islami Baray-Azadi-ye Afghanistan (Sayyaf)

Moderate Islamist Variant Vision

Hezb-i-Islami (Younus Khalis)
Jamiat-i-Islami (Rabbani)

Resulting, Restorative Vision

Mahaz-i-Milli-ye Islami Afghanistan (Gailani)
Jabha-ye Nijat-i-Milli-ye Afghanistan (Mojaddidi)
Harakat Inqlab-i-Islami (Mohammadi)

Resulting, Progressive Vision

Iranian-based Afghan Shi'ite organizations.

MICROCosMIC SOCIAL VISIONS

Pre-existing, Progressive Vision

Key exiled Islamist leaders like Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, Khalis, Rabbani and others who were involved in revolutionary activity prior to the Saur revolution and derive their power basis as a result of that involvement.

Resulting, Restorative Vision

Key Traditionalist leaders like Gailani, Mojaddidi, and Mohammadi as well as various khans and maliks all of whom possessed political and social power prior to the Saur Revolution and desire to restore or maintain it.

Resulting, Progressive Vision

Key Afghan Shi'ite leaders, minority ethnic groups, and interior front commanders (e.g., Massoud) who have increased their political importance or power due to their military role in the counterrevolution.
One of the problems any political settlement will face is the resolution of the areas of agreement and disagreement imbedded within the counterrevolution. Any political settlement must recognize the major areas of agreement and disagreement within the Mujahideen. These ideas can be summarized within the topic "Mujahideenism."

COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY IDEAS: MUJAHIDEENISM

"Mujahideenism" is the collection of counterrevolutionary ideas and visions espoused by the Mujahideen and incorporates their macrocosmic and microcosmic views. Although these views are not necessarily held in common agreement throughout the resistance, they have a definite normative dimension, envisioning the desired outcomes of the conflict. As a result, Mujahideenism is the summation of social visions of all the different counterrevolutionary groups which oppose the Marxist government in Kabul and the Soviet invaders. These social visions are structured in a complex mosaic pattern of leaders, front commanders, parties, and alliances. Despite the complexities, however, certain points of widespread agreement exist. Mujahideen unity on these points of agreement has been strengthened during the course of the counterrevolution by the presence of the atheistic Soviet invaders. Figure 2, Points of Agreement, summarizes the primary areas of consensus which unite the Mujahideen.

FIGURE 2: POINTS OF AGREEMENT

1. Anti-Russian, and Anti-Soviet.
2. Anti-Occupation.
4. Pro-Afghanistan State.
5. Anti-Marxist, and Anti-Atheism.
6. Pro-Islam, and Pro-Islamic State.

Besides these areas of consensus, there are also five points on which the Mujahideen have been unable to reach a consensus. These are subpoints to several of the primary points of agreement stated above and involve issues which lie just below the surface of Mujahideen unity, threatening to split it apart. Nevertheless, the presence of a common powerful enemy, the Soviets, proved to be a strong stimulus for unity. Mujahideen military necessity required that these issues of disagreement remain only subpoints. However, after the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan, these subpoints should increase in their importance. In order to conclude the conflict, these subpoints of agreement must be resolved. If these points of disagreement are not dealt
with successfully, the Afghanistan conflict will not evolve into peace but into civil war. This is the inherent tension involved in Mujahideenism, the tension created by the presence of both the points of agreement and the corresponding subpoints of disagreement. Currently, these subpoints of disagreement remain largely unresolved within the ranks of the Mujahideen. As a result, these subpoints can best be expressed as a question which still awaits an answer. These questions are listed in Figure 3, Subpoints of Disagreement.

FIGURE 3: SUBPOINTS OF DISAGREEMENT

1. How independent can and should Afghanistan be in the international community?
2. Which Afghans are or were enemies of the Mujahideen, and how should they be handled?
3. What kind of political system should Islamic Afghanistan have?
4. Will the efforts of the non-Pushtun Mujahideen be rewarded and if so, how?
5. Will the efforts of the Mujahideen commanders and fighters be rewarded and if so, how?

For the current politically arranged peace to be successful, the points of Mujahideen agreement cannot be compromised. However, it will be the new regime's ability to overcome these subpoints of disagreement that will determine the stability of the regime. Some specialists feel that Afghanistan has always had these types of disagreements and can survive despite them. Some conclude that a new Afghan regime can remain relatively united without overcoming these disagreements; however, it is possible that after the Soviets have completed their withdrawal, the subpoints will cause dissension within the ranks of the Mujahideen leading to a dissolution of Mujahideen unity and produce internecine violence. In a post-Soviet Afghanistan, the "new" enemy of the counterrevolution will be the heterogeneity of the Mujahideen and the diversity of their social visions. Thus, the political settlement that will eventually produce an Afghanistan without Soviets could also mark the start of an Afghan civil war. This political settlement is certainly not a guarantor of Afghan peace. Not until a new political and social equilibrium is established within the country will peace exist. This new equilibrium will mark the end of the Mujahideen counterrevolution.
ENDNOTES

1 The Soviets have been analyzing the Mujahideen resistance as a counterrevolution all along. However Western specialists have not given much thought to this analytical approach.

2 Some Western specialists on Afghanistan have been unwilling to accept the Saur event as a genuine revolution. This perspective has also contributed to the general neglect of analyzing the Mujahideen resistance as a counterrevolution. However, the Saur event is in fact a legitimate social revolution. It includes the key factors which characterize a social revolution: an existing governmental vision for the state's political-social reality; alienated individuals or groups of individuals within the state who advocate alternate, and exclusive political-social visions to the government's vision; the union of multiple alienated individuals or groups having amenable visions, contending against the same government; and the ability of a single group or united multiple groups to acquire state power, usually accomplished through violence, in order to transform the state's social and political structure. For more on the theory of social revolutions, see Goldstone's general discussion (1986) and Skocpol's more specific discussion (1979).

3 The term "Islamist" or "Islamists" is what these groups have used to call themselves. However, they have also been referred to as "fundamentalists", or simply the "religious" groups. In order to avoid any Western connotation, distortion or confusion associated with this term, this paper will use the Mujahideen term "Islamists." For more, see Klass (1987, pp. 459).

4 This type of revolution is commonly called a "top-down" social revolution because the change in government occurs prior to the transformation of the political and social structures of the society. Hence, the revolution occurs from the top, down.

5 The term "progressive" does not imply a valuative judgment about whether the vision is good or bad. Instead, progressive is used in a strictly historical sense.

6 Another term "regressive" is theoretically possible for identifying a counterrevolutionary social vision. This term can be used for certain counterrevolutions arising in industrialized societies, but is generally inappropriate for counterrevolution arising in feudal societies. A regressive vision attempts to turn the state's historical clock back to some idealized or romanticized long-term past, possibly to an earlier industrial or agrarian past. This vision differs from a restorative vision which only seeks to resume political and social structures found in the short-term past. In Afghanistan's case, the restorative vision includes both the regime immediately preceding the communist takeover in 1978, and the monarchy that ended in 1973.
Due to Afghanistan's feudal development and tribal society, a regressive vision is not appropriate to our case study.

7 The following specific information on Peshawar organizations is a synthesis of information compiled from many varied sources. Specific citations are listed only for quotes. The material originates from the following references: Amin (April 1984), Amstutz (1986), Bradsher (1983), Dupree (February 1984, and February 1985), Fullerton (1984), Klass (1987), Magnus (1985), Newell and Newell (1981), Rashid (1987), and Roy (December 1983 and 1984).

8 This paper will use the term "traditionalists" to refer to these resulting, restorative groups. However, these same groups have been referred to as "nationalists" and as "moderates." While the word choice here is not as important a distinction as with the Islamists, this paper will be consistent in referring to these groups and individuals as "traditionalists."

9 Three traditional party splinter groups, who were members of the Islamists' Islamic Alliance are outside the umbrella of this Unity party: Maulana Mohammad Mir's party from the Afghan National Liberation Front, and Maulavi Nasrullah Mansur's and Maulavi Mohzen's parties from the Islamic Revolutionary Movement. Besides the seven more prominent parties, the resistance is also swamped with numerous independent (i.e., non-Unity) parties, operating out of both Peshawar and Iran, as well as within Afghanistan. Some of these parties are secularist, like the Rahaie (liberation) Party or the Shu'la-yi-Jawed (Eternal Flame). These two Maoist type parties advocate the only non-Islamic claims made by the resistance. But they refrain from being anti-Islamic. They maintain the anti-Soviet stance that is universal among the Mujahideen freedom fighters. Other parties are "specialty" parties. One example is the Kabul-based SAMA party (SAMA stands for Sazman-e-Azadbaksh Marcom-e-Afghanistan or the Organization for the Liberation of Afghanistan) which specializes in urban guerrilla warfare (an escalating specialty in Afghanistan. (Dupree, February 1983, pp. 389) In 1982, Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, the former President of the UN General Assembly in 1966, tried unsuccessfully to organize these independent, minor parties along some sort of negotiated statement of principles.

10 The jirga is an Afghan social and political institution of Pushtun origin that resolves disputes or makes leadership decisions for people in a community, tribe, region, or country. The Loya Jirga is the "Great Assembly" and is the supreme Afghan political institution. The shura is a consultative assembly or council primarily made up of religious leaders. (Klass, 1987, Glossary)

11 In many respects his party functions as a Leninist vanguard organization of enlightened Islamists, willing to force its
social vision upon the unenlightened Afghan masses for their own good.

12 In 1974, after fleeing to Pakistan following Daoud's crackdown on Islamists, Hekmatyar originally split from Rabbani.

13 It is the political nature of Islam as well as the inability to clearly define the Islamic heretic enemy which creates variations between radical Islamists and moderate Islamists. The moderate Islamists' definition of the enemy coincides more closely with the traditionalists' definition than the radical Islamists' definition. These variations form the basis of strong disagreements within the Mujahideen and affect not only the Islamist image of the correct revolutionary target but also the strength of Unity's alliance. After the Soviet withdrawal is completed, Unity's ability to clearly define who is the enemy will in part determine how long the jihad will last and whether the Mujahideen counterrevolution will evolve into a civil war.

14 For more on Afghan Sufism and its relationship to the Mujahideen, see Oliver Roy's article, "Sufism and the Afghan Resistance." (Roy, December 1983)

15 Normally, the restorative vision's effectiveness lasts no more than one generation from the time of the social revolution. After the first full generation of children have grown up under the revolutionary regime, it is very difficult to recruit them to a vision aimed at restoring something they never knew. At that point, the restorative vision is becoming foreign to civil and political society.

16 Due to the scarcity of resource material concerning the Iranian-based organizations as well as the dominant influence of Iran on these Mujahideen organizations, this topic will not be discussed in greater detail as part of this research effort. However, the presence of these groups and their resulting, progressive macrocosmic social vision testifies to the difficulty of maintaining an independent Mujahideen resistance. This, in turn, is illustrative of the difficulty of developing an independent Afghanistan (i.e., without sides or bi-tarafi) after the counterrevolution is concluded. For more on the Iranian-based Mujahideen, see Abdul Rashid's book, which contains a short historical discussion of the various Mujahideen Shi'ite groups and the Iranian factor in the resistance. (Rashid, 1987)

However, analyzing the counterrevolution in Shi'ite areas as both a posterior counterrevolutionary response by regional elements (i.e. Hazaras) to the Saur Revolution, and as an external counterrevolutionary response (i.e., either an externally licensed or externally imposed response) by international elements (i.e. Iran) to both the Afghanistan government and the Soviet involvement remains relatively unexplored as a research topic. Analyzing Iranian intentions from the perspective of counterrevolutionary theory would be an important addition to both the field of counterrevolutionary theory and the field of
Afghan studies, especially in light of the following conclusion made by the French reporter Jean-Jose Puig, in 1983: "The Iranians consider the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the most favorable situation for the consolidation and extension of their influence in the country." (AICMB, November/December 1983, pp. 27) For a theoretical explanation of these concepts, see Mayer's varieties of counterrevolution. (Mayer, 1971, pp. 86)

17 For more on this interim government and its leadership, see FBIS-NES-88-118, pp. 42-43.

18 Rabbani has begun work at correcting this problem by trying to bring the Shi'ite groups into Unity. However, the Afghan Shi'ites' microcosmic claims have not yet been resolved.

19 The Afghan Shi'ite's microcosmic vision can not be separated from Iran's expectations for post-Soviet withdrawal Afghanistan; the two are intertwined. Hence, the resolution of the Iranian-based Afghan Shi'ite microcosmic vision for the counterrevolution is complicated by the presence of both domestic and foreign concerns. Given the Iranian logistical support and the relatively homogeneous ethnic composition of Afghan Shi'ites, this aspect of the counterrevolution's power distribution problem may very well be the hardest to resolve peacefully.

20 The conclusion of a special correspondent for The Economist magazine is that "Pushtuns make lousy guerrillas," especially southern Pushtuns. ("A Short Walk," July 14, 1984, pp. 38) This point is of course open to much debate. The majority of the interior fronts and Peshawar organizations are Pushtun or Pushtun dominated. Many of the Mujahideen leaders are Pushtun. Pushtun fighters are actively and integrally involved as part of the counterrevolution. But in order to promote military efficiency at the regional and supraregional level, unity must be achieved among various vertical groupings of Mujahideen. Political, tribal, and ethnic differences must be subordinated to military needs. The northern minority ethnic groups have demonstrated a greater ability to subordinate those differences than have either the northern or southern Pushtun tribes. Hence, the northern minority ethnic groups make better fighters, and by comparison, the Pushtuns make worse fighters. While one may take offense at the connotations of the adjective "lousy", the comparison and the point still remain valid.

21 Girardet estimates the number of successful front commanders emerging as potential leaders as "perhaps a dozen in all." (Girardet, July 1983, pp. 100) Dr. J. Bruce Amstutz, the former American Charge d'Affairs to Kabul, counts the number of key interior front commanders as eight. (Amstutz, 1986, pp. 112-115, 118-119) Rosanne Klass lists about a dozen key interior front commanders. (Klass, 1987, pp. 393-403) Certainly the following 14 names could be included in a list of key interior front commanders: Anwar Amin, Mohammad Anwar, Nasim Akhundzada, Abdul Kariam Brahui, Dr Shah Rukh Gran, Abdul Haq, Maulawi Jalauddin
Haqani, Sayed Jaglan, Ismail Khan, Ahmad Shah Massoud, Qari Taj Mohammad, Maulawi Shafiullah, Mulawai Mohammad Shah, and Amin Wardak. This list is not in any way complete, because many key commanders are still relatively unknown outside Afghanistan. For more on these 14, see Amstutz (1986, pp. 112-119) and Klass (1987, pp. 393-403).

22 Massoud was originally a member of the Muslim Youth during the Constitutional Monarchy. Yet following the split of the Islamist Hezb leadership, he joined Rabbani's Jamiat-i-Islami. (Roy, 1984, pp. 119) Massoud's brother has married Rabbani's daughter. Thus this political alliance is being strengthened by marriage according to Afghan historic traditions.

23 This issue of the fair distribution of the "power rewards" must also be related to the general suspicions held by the interior commanders concerning the Peshawar politicians. The Economist reports that "increasingly, the field commanders [have] come to suspect that some of these people [i.e., the leading members of the Peshawar political parties] were using the war to line their pockets; they saw no reason why [the Peshawar leaders] should run postwar Afghanistan." ("Arm Us," August 27, 1988, pp. 23) If these suspicions continue to increase among the commanders, suspicions that the politicians are trying to "cheat" either them or the Afghan people, the Mujahideen commanders and fighters may ultimately decide to turn their weapons against these Peshawar leaders.
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