VITA PLANNING UNIT/PAKISTAN

AFGHANISTAN: ISSUES FOR REHABILITATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND REPATRIATION

(By Dr. G. Nasir & Dr. R. Carpenter)
Afghanistan: Issues for
Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, & Repatriation

prepared by

Dr. Ghulam A. Nasir
&
Dr. Ray Carpenter

For Presentation at the Meeting of
the
Afghan Institute of Architects, Engineers, and Planners

San Francisco July 14, 1990

Afghanistan: Issues for Rehabilitation, Reconstruction, & Repatriation

The authors have attempted to provide an overview with background information providing a sketch of the impact of Soviet occupation and its economic, social and political impact on Afghanistan as a base for considering issues pertaining to reestablishing a truly self governing country, now that the occupation forces have departed.

While the cost of lives and infrastructure damage left in the wake of occupation forces could appear to be fundamental issues to be considered, the authors further highlight recent events in eastern Europe and Russia as a base for considering two realities; that perceived by the Afghans and that perceived by sympathetic, nevertheless external global power centers. The authors suggest that recent events have put the Afghan issue as but one of many third world brush fires on the back burner in contrast to a global concern for democratization of eastern Europe and the realignment of NATO and WARSAW pact countries. It is suggested that any strategy for Afghan reconstruction to be successful must evolve in the global reality.

Recommendations look to ways in which Afghan expertise can be best mobilized to be effective.

Note: Authors:

Dr. Ghulam A. Nasir, C. E., emigrated to the United States in May of 1989. During the past year he has been teaching basic science to Saudis on a special program in the Department of Atmospheric Science, College of Engineering, University of Wyoming; teaching basic mathematics to students in the Laramie County Community College, and been serving as a Research Associate in the Department of Agriculture Economics.

Dr. Ray Carpenter is an economist/agricultural economist, on loan to the University of Wyoming under the "Reverse Joint Career Corps" program from the U.S. Agency for International Development.
Note: Authors:

Dr. Ghulam A. Nasir, C. E., emigrated to the United States in May of 1989. During the past year he has been teaching basic science to Saudis on a special program in the Department of Atmospheric Science, College of Engineering, University of Wyoming; teaching basic mathematics to students in the Laramie County Community College, and been serving as a Research Associate in the Department of Agriculture Economics.

Dr. Ray Carpenter is an economist/agricultural economist, on loan to the University of Wyoming under the "Reverse Joint Career Corps" program from the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Data:
The information provided herein was drawn from the documents indicated and other sources. Some of the information is based upon the individual authors' knowledge base of either Afghanistan or current policy and attitudes of the donor community as indicated in public documents.

The information and points of view are those of the authors, and do not in any way represent new policy or points of view of either the U.S. Agency for International Development or the University of Wyoming.
Afghanistan:
Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Repatriation

Contents

I. Background Information & Purpose
II. Survey of Destruction
III. Strategy Given Current Events
   III.a. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
   III.b. Repatriation and Resettlement
IV. Discussion
V. Recommendations
I. Background Information

The twelve years of communist intervention in Afghanistan have caused significant destruction throughout the country. On the first day of the communist coup, April 27, 1978, Soviet jets began bombardment of villages, destroying both public and private property. The presidential palace was severely damaged from heavy bombing which occurred during the takeover of the Afghan government in Kabul city. A general estimate is that over 3/4 of the villages, irrigation systems, roads and other public structures have been destroyed or heavily damaged. Power sources, industrial establishments, mining operations, educational institutions and other infrastructures have been seriously damaged and in many cases rendered inoperational.

It is believed by a majority of Afghans, as well as by international investigators of Afghanistan's occupation, that the Soviet intention was to eliminate a significant portion of the population, retaining only those who would be loyal to Soviet interests. One of the Soviet puppet leaders in Kabul stated publicly in 1979 that a population of 2,000,000 would be sufficient in Afghanistan. The evacuation process was planned and many villages, as well as forested green-belts along the main highways, were to be demolished as a first step in the process. The main cities were shrunk to "manageable" size; the more heavily populated urban areas, characterized by row structures, were demolished, forcing thousands to become homeless.

Villages were searched, looted, mined and then bombarded from the air until they were nothing but shambles. The inhabitants had to seek shelter and refuge in the already crowded, controlled urban areas within the country or in neighboring Islamic countries. The puppet regime in Kabul continued their institutional, ecological destruction process by burning farms and harvested crops, as well as hay and fuel depots. Destroying the infrastructure and irrigation systems in these areas and also isolating and cutting the access of the rural areas to the larger cities was part of a larger scenario. In many rural areas, irrigation sources were disturbed, gardens were destroyed, farm animals shot, fields made sporadically
unworkable through dropping of plastic mines as adjoining villages were attacked. Thus, the majority of inhabitants in the disrupted areas had to evacuate and migrate. The few who were unable to move stayed in the ruins of their villages to suffer further consequences. Indiscriminate nightly shelling of congested urban areas with Soviet heavy artillery was a common practice, which the puppet regime blamed on the Mujahideen. The shelling often started widespread fires burning in large residential sections, forcing more Afghans from their homes.

The combination of external aggression and the puppet government's policy of institutional and human genocide has exacerbated: tribal disputes; conflict between the commanders of the resisting political parties; and widening controversy between the Suni and Shiat populations, added to the general as well as institutional chaos in the country.

As the residents of the disturbed areas were forced out of their villages, the ruins were left vacant. With no attendance and maintenance, the ruins are deteriorating with time, to become only archeological sites for future generations to ponder.

In Afghanistan's efforts to reestablish an independent free government, its leaders must strive for the following goals:

a. Unification of the factions to facilitate agreement to disagree on some issues, yet promote unity of purpose in achieving the goals b and c.

b. Reestablishment of institutional structures at the federal and provincial levels

c. Restructuring and redeveloping an economy that fosters free enterprise production systems.
TABLE 1
DAMAGE AND LEVEL OF NEED ESTIMATES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Level of Need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads- all weather</td>
<td>3,100 km</td>
<td>rehabilitation and or reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads - gravel</td>
<td>4,100 km</td>
<td>rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>roads - laterite</td>
<td>5,000 km</td>
<td>rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges 20 meters +</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>moderate to major repair and or reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges 8-19 meters</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>partial or full reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public buildings</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>rehabilitation and repair to major reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family dwellings</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
<td>partial to full reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>potable water systems</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>hand pumps and shallow wells --repaired or installed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>village sewage disposal</td>
<td></td>
<td>repair and or installation based upon sanitary engineer inspections and reports of need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>maintenance, repair, replacement of turbins/ upgrading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power plants</td>
<td></td>
<td>repair, upgrading, and increasing the capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal/nat. gas</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diesel powered</td>
<td>30 - 40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Clinics</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Repair, rebuild re-equip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agriculture</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karezes</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>mine clearing, accurate estimate area not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation structures</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Repair and or rehabilitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>canals</td>
<td>100 km</td>
<td>major diversion dam repair, in some cases reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>repair, in some cases reconstruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II Survey of Destruction

Due to the intense disputes among different interest groups within the country, a factual survey of damage and destruction has not yet been possible. Conversely, fairly reasonable rough estimates of the destruction within Afghanistan during the war have been made by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) working with Afghan refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan. UNHCR has gathered a good deal of estimated survey information regarding destruction and loss of productive capacity inside Afghanistan. The Islamic Unity Government of the Afghan Mujahideen also has an abundance of useful data which provides the basis for reasonable estimates of losses throughout the country.

The following represents an estimate of the damage indicative of the magnitude of the problem.

A. Motor Vehicle Transportation

Afghanistan's road networks have been severely damaged by the war, and civil strife has resulted in lack of maintenance. The current state of the transport arteries poses a serious constraint to initial and medium term rehabilitation, reconstruction and repatriation, subjecting the system to vehicular volume and loads far beyond its current capacity. Limited road and bridge repairs and reconstruction activities, for reopening areas and facilitating the passage of larger vehicles, are underway through IUGA, NGO's, AID and others. Much remains to be done, and a high priority must be directed to resolving what will be a serious constraint.

B. Agriculture: Field Mines, Farm and Ranch Structures and Irrigation (Dams, Karezes, Canals and Ditches)

Agricultural sectors that were high risk due to weather and other uncertainties are an even higher risk after aerial sowing of millions of plastic devices. If experience in the Pacific after World War II with respect to clearing unspent munitions is any indicator, the
risk, even with a tremendous clearing operation, will remain constant well into the next century and will impact negatively on agricultural production. Demolition experts from the occupation nation (Russia), as well as donor nations, consider the mining of agricultural lands in Afghanistan a crime that will impede reestablishment of a viable agricultural sector. Generations of Afghan hate toward the occupiers will persist in the coming decades. Children, as well as livestock and cultivators, will suffer crippling wounds resulting from this mining. Although the occupation is over, new casualties are to be expected from these mines over the coming decades.

Destruction of centuries-old karezes (water harvesting and distribution structures) resulted from the bombardment of irrigation systems and structures, as well as carpet bombing in arid areas where scarce water is harvested for crop production. Costly labor input and materials will be required to return them to operation.

C. Power

In the areas of energy and industry, attention must be directed to the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure projects, primarily dams for hydroelectric power, and natural resources (coal, gas and oil). To meet the minimum power needs of the urban centers in the country, rehabilitation and reconstruction of hydroelectric plants such as Chak Wardak, Jabul Seraj, Sarobi, Naghlu, Mahipar and Kajakai is a necessity.

Appropriate sized diesel or thermal power stations should be investigated for the immediate domestic needs in other areas, especially where traditional fuel-wood resources are no longer available.
D. Public Health

Although NGOs and IUGA continued to equip, staff and build hospitals and clinics for refugees and Mujahideen during the 1980s, they concentrated their efforts outside of Afghanistan, mostly on the immediate needs.

Preventive medicine health institutes, mainly in the capital city and the major urban centers, are also in need of rehabilitation and reactivation.

III. Strategies Given Current Events

A successful strategy must consider the current realities. There are two perceived realities, the first as perceived by the Afghans, and the second that of the rest of the world, including that portion acting as consistent supporters of the freedom-fighting Mujahideen and refugees.

The Afghan reality is based upon a decade of immoral, illegal occupation aggravated by usurpation of economic, social and other liberties by those placed in power by the occupiers. Financial rewards reaped by those currently holding the reins of power on one hand, and lives and property that have been lost by the Mujahideen and other Afghan patriots, all point to the need for a reawakening of justice. It is justice, not revenge, that must be achieved. Furthermore, the Afghan reality is a monocular reality: events outside the Afghan context are not perceived to be within the viable reality of both the aggressors and their installed lackeys if rectification of past immoral acts is to be achieved.

Reality as perceived by the world and supporters of the Afghan resistance is, conversely, at considerable variance with Afghan reality. Current events in Eastern Europe, Russia and even in many of the developing socialist countries over the past year, (more importantly, during the past three to six months) are causing a restructuring of power blocks. This will significantly alter the allocation of resources available for Afghan reconstruction, rehabilitation and repatriation.
The collapse of the political and economic framework of the socialist economies toward more free market economies; disarmament and a trend to major realignment between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations; and the independence movement of the Russian republics to a more federated relationship: these are but the tip of the iceberg. Of more relevance are the near collapse of the present Soviet economy in its attempts to shift to a more capitalist system, and the increasing internal awareness of the costs of the past four decades of communist policies. All pose a threat of escalating internal strife which could spill over into adjoining countries -- Eastern Europe as well as Afghanistan. Such issues are considerably more important to world policy makers than saving and/or getting one's pound of flesh from the Russians for what has transpired in Afghanistan.

In retrospect, the inability of the Mujahid to win the battle of Jalalabad was a turning point in the assistance from external supporters, enlightening them to the lack of unity among the Afghan factions. Since then, the Najeeb government, despite numerous coup attempts, from an outside perspective would appear to be surviving better than was expected. Disillusionment has replaced dedication among expatriate support workers in Pakistan; they are leaving by the score, in large part "burnt out" by lack of success, and frustrated by the lack of unity among their Afghan compatriots.

The realities are that Eastern Europe and Russia (perhaps to a lessor degree) will serve as a sponge for economic aid that has been inadequate for the developing nations. At this point the "west" considers Eastern Europe as probably the most critical area requiring massive resource inputs, some of which may be diverted from military expenditures; nevertheless, that will involve reallocation from other activities including foreign aid to such nations as Afghanistan, to other geographic areas.
III.a. Rehabilitation and Reconstruction.

A rehabilitation and reconstruction program will be a difficult, costly and long-range activity, as indicated by the estimated scale of the destruction accumulating over the years of the Soviet interference. The reconstruction program must be planned and implemented in stages so that construction material, skilled and unskilled manpower, supplies and personnel requirements can be efficiently met with combined domestic and foreign resources over the next decade. This will require establishment of several operating centers at regional locations, providing some coordination and professional management in two to three provinces.

While some thought has been given to the establishment of a management center outside the country, in a worst case scenario, given current events, it is hard to conceive that minimal security conditions would not be available to allow the operation to be directed from within the country. Similarly, in light of political and economic instability in Russia, support for a continuation of rehabilitation activities managed in exile is highly unlikely. Most of the effort should be directed to the regional operating centers where adequate professional, managerial and trade skills as well as training will have to be located.

The lack of adequate qualified Afghan manpower for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development has been identified by Afghan engineers as well as by concerned internationals. Qualified Afghanis to conduct a well managed rehabilitation and reconstruction program and to insure future development in Afghanistan will be necessary. This is especially true when professional evaluation, technical guidance and high quality performance are required. The establishment of a nucleus (a society, an institute or a union) of Afghan architects, engineers and technical experts would not only be a valuable asset, but will also be essential for the country and will facilitate the productive use of Afghan professionals in the future development of their country.
Professional, managerial and trade skills of the Afghans should be used extensively. Expatriates may be called upon to beef up planning, procurement and evaluation activities where qualified Afghans are not available.

III.b. Repatriation of the Displaced Afghans.

Repatriation of the displaced Afghans is a major program dependent on many factors, and must be planned and implemented parallel to the reconstruction programs.

Questions arising in this area include: What will be the problems facing the agriculture sector for the returning refugees? Would the returning agriculturists find their fields and farms clear of mines and safe to work? Would they have essential support for their survival until their farms are productive? Would the returning farmers have the equipment and/or livestock with which to plough? Would they have sufficient irrigation water? How soon can they become self sufficient? What about their cattle and livestock enterprise activities? Such questions should be carefully investigated before a practical repatriation program is initiated.

Political factors, security and peace settlements would be the primary factors in initiating repatriation. Planned programs for mine clearing and reestablishment of self-government, along with a viable economy generating revenues to support such a government without outside interference, will be critical for initiation of any successful repatriation. It is assumed that repatriation would be encouraged voluntarily, withstanding the external pressures of hosting neighbors to shed themselves of the economy-draining refugees. Returning refugees would be provided with financial assistance to enable them to reestablish themselves. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that such a program will be fraught with problems, as refugees' departure and absence have resulted in their properties being either sold or traded numerous times to assist those remaining.
Suggestions for possible procedures and approaches for implementing repatriation of the Afghans will be discussed in a separate paper.

IV. Discussion

Given the current realities, perceived and actual, the peak of support in terms of morale and massive resource transfers to Afghanistan began to decline with the battle of Jalalabad. Events in Eastern Europe and Russia have further undermined external support as it has been perceived that the Russian aggressors were sitting on an economic time bomb about to go off in their own backyard. Internal politics in Russia are such that the leadership of that country has international public support in its effort to put its house in order. Any argument for reparation to Afghanistan must be in a context that links with the current Russian government in a condemnation of previous regimes as the perpetrators of the injustice that has taken place over the past decade in Afghanistan. In this context, the United States State Department support of the "resistance groups" demands for replacement of the Najeeb government is notable.

During the coming century if Afghans view the aggressors with distrust and malice, that mental set will accomplish little in the way of restructuring their lives and their economy. Unconditional acceptance by the aggressors of a moral, legal and financial obligation along with repatriation payments is likely to be the only basis for future constructive relations between Afghanistan and its northern neighbor.

Afghanistan in Donor Asia/Near East Country Considerations:

Afghanistan has been a special case given cold war politics where multi-lateral and more importantly bilateral assistance has been pouring into the area in support of one side, faction or another. The cold war is over, hence, by and large while the refugee problem remains, the previous level of support based upon fighting Communist aggression no longer exists.

Since the mid-seventies, and particularly during the period of the Soviet occupation, Afghanistan has for the most part been cut off from the
western sphere of both influence and technical assistance. Nevertheless, an overview of development activities in Asia and current perceptions of their effectiveness should provide some parameters from which a more realistic Afghan program can be planned, as well as a better appreciation for where what kinds and or levels of assistance can be sought.

In her opening remarks at the HIID/USAID symposium for Agriculture in the 1990s, Julia Chang Bloch indicated that in 1976, the allocation to agriculture within the ANE region amounted to approximately 306 million dollars, while 12 years later it was only 194 million, or a decline of approximately 112 million dollars. While the decline in part can be attributed to a common (but mistaken) view that agricultural growth in developing countries is a direct threat to US agricultural exports. More importantly, other needs when compared to what appear poor returns from some development initiatives bear some discussion. Overall, funding levels are down for Asia, and Afghanistan funding will be increasingly difficult to justify.

While agriculture and rural infrastructure may be considered as the backbone for development, the following table is indicative of the concerns of donors, especially in the context of development loans and/or grants that have been made over the past 10 - 20 years.
### TABLE II

Per Capita GDP (U.S. Dollars), 1985

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National Average</th>
<th>Agricultural Sector</th>
<th>Agric. % Nat. Av.</th>
<th>Annual % change in per capita Agricultural sector income 1965-1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>3.0 rep 65-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1080</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table indicates striking contrasts in policy-based patterns of structural change and economic diversification which bear on the per capita GDP and the percent of change in per capita sector income. Infrastructure investment directly supporting and complimentary to the agriculture sector provide the base for progressive rural communities. However, there are many factors to be considered in developing a successful comprehensive policy agenda.
For example, irrigation has been heavily supported and, in combination with green revolution technology, has resulted in considerable success in raising yields during the decades of the 60s and 70s. Nevertheless, declining prices resulting from green revolution surpluses have resulted in the need for costly price stabilization and/or policies that would promote inter- as well as intra-sectoral diversification. Based upon declining grain prices, World Bank officials indicate that Bank-funded irrigation projects generate poor rates of return, hence they are decreasing their allocations in this sector. Since 1983 there has been a decline in wheat and rice yields attributed to structural rather than transitory factors.

There is some consensus that investment in irrigation should be demand or market led. There is and should be some concern that multi-lateral loans are invested in either capital or program activities that will at least generate returns, to at minimum cover operating costs, hence will not serve to escalate the debt burden of the borrowing country. Bilateral grant funding can, on the other hand, be carefully invested in activities that are considered to be fundamental, yet likely to have a longer lag in achieving a payoff. Funding of activities that are prone to corruption (construction) are likely to be rejected or carefully scrutinized before approval and during implementation.

An increasing donor concern deals with natural resource management, and there is some consensus that rural poverty is a leading cause of environmental degradation. Environmental projects which can be shown to lead to growth or sustain agricultural production, thus serving both interests are more likely to generate funding support.

Factual data for Afghanistan is scarce, and that which exists for the past decade is suspect. UN/FAO publications tend to omit data for Afghanistan, and one can only suppose that the annual submissions have not been forwarded to the UN. Without such information, policies concerning production, pricing, trade and diversification are little more than abstract. However, Afghan government data, and that generated by surveys, indicate that food production is down and food aid from Russia
has been and continues to be considerable. Obviously there is a serious domestic food gap.

Assuming that the Majuhideen can come to some agreement among themselves and reach a position where they are at least a significant part of the government, it will be important that they have some policy platform that makes sense, a policy that must be more than, "Let's put it back the way it was."

Development/reconstruction policy combined with sound fiscal policy must be formulated so the IMF, as well as multilateral and bilateral donors, can feel comfortable with it. Progressive structural change that will mobilize human as well as natural resources must be part of any viable plan. Table II above, would suggest review of policies of the governments of Malaysia, Tunisia and the Philippines (all with national average per capita GDP > 500) which have had a steady rate of growth in their agricultural sectoral per capita incomes and whose agricultural sectors appear to be lagging less badly than those in some of the other countries listed. Trade and aid with perhaps some barter are areas that must be carefully explored.

With or without largess on the part of donors, a continuation of internal strife will significantly limit assistance. Donors and governments are looking at Eastern Europe as investment targets. To be competitive, Afghanistan must don a businesslike approach that will convince donors that their investments will pay off. One of the best ways to do that is to invest in oneself. While the so called "operation bootstrap" is in part an illusion, the concept of mobilization of Afghan resources to lift itself out of chaos into viability is an appealing sell. How can such a program be structured? In large part it must be conceptualized by Afghans.

In the same vein, Afghans must recognize and come to grips with a greater enemy: the multitude of factions continuing to divide the nation into petty feudal feifdoms. The divisive issues among the factions fuel and strengthen the aggressor's aims to divide and conquer. The world fails to perceive the continuing role of the occupiers as they have withdrawn
most of their personnel. The dependency wrought by the almost total destruction of agricultural production and of the Afghan economy will continue unabated until the various Afghan interest groups reconcile their differences in a true Islamic spirit which will enable the population to come to grips with what is left of their country. Further, those who have left must be wooed, not coerced or threatened, to return to assist in rebuilding the Afghan nation. If you want the heart of a man, you do not threaten to cut it out, since it, as well is his constructive mind, is required. Professionals who were threatened when remaining in Afghanistan and emigrated to other lands should be sought out to serve, even if only for short periods of time.

While we consider the repatriation of refugees, the realities of repatriation must be faced. Many Afghans have been disenfranchised of their lands and wealth. In many instances land holdings and property left behind changed hands 5 to 10 times since the owner’s departure. Many Afghans believed their property would be restored to them, but it is an unlikely prospect to count on. Many who were formally agricultural and livestock producers may not have the opportunity to pick up where they left off. Some medium range plan must be formalized to begin industrialization. Given that our ecosystems are fragile, industry must begin within a framework that will serve to improve rather than further degrade the natural resources of the nation.

An effort to reestablish a government with sound fiscal policies and a viable means of planning suggests assistance along the lines of that provided during the 1950s and 1960s. While central planning is not the goal, the means of evaluation and decision making concerning wise use of minimal resources must be reestablished. Government policy should support free enterprise in a way that disallows profiteering at the expense of restructuring goals.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Professional Afghan expatriate assistance must be organized, or implemented in an organized way.

1. Ad hoc professional assistance will probably be more successful if provided through a central "brokering" (for a better term) office. This does not rule out the individual utilizing personal contacts to make arrangements for his or her services.

2. Organized availability of expatriate professional Afghans will be more successful if there is an organization that keeps a data base of professionals available for either short- or long-term assistance efforts. An organizational capability statement is a first step in establishing credibility.

3. Willingness to participate must be advertised. This can best be done in the aggregate where groups of engineers, for example, or agriculturists provide resumes to those agencies in need of a particular expertise. Such lists should be provided to agencies of the government, donor agencies, private voluntary agencies and NGOs.

B. Communications and collegial relations with resistance groups, as well as contact with key people in various Afghan geographic districts/ regions, must be maintained. To be most effective, the communications should be formalized with the incorporation of the service groups being recognized by those seeking the professional services.

1. Service groups should establish contacts with firms and/or agencies that currently have contracts. Initial services can, in all likelihood, be provided under a subcontract.

2. Cross-disciplinary working groups should be established, since multidisciplinary teamwork is generally sought after.

3. Sectoral, geographic or problem oriented working groups would further create an awareness to donors that capable services and expertise are available.
4. A multidisciplinary planning group, for example, would appear to be appropriate to focus on national, sectoral and/or district area problems, as well as policies that should be considered as a starting point for a new government. In parallel there should be a fiscal counterpart that considers cost options of various alternatives, and analyzes potential domestic revenues, or external financial sources for funding. If possible, consideration should be given to establishing an Afghan planning group with a recognized expatriate firm or institution(s) recognized as policy and planning expert(s), preferably a private institution with previous experience in Afghanistan.

C. De-politicization of the professional groups should be a goal, since donors are not looking to back particular individuals or groups, but rather to reconcile and address problems. Some consideration might be given to an umbrella organization that is politically neutral and is composed of the various professional groups. The umbrella and/or the subgroups should be incorporated as non-profit organizations that nevertheless could charge annual registration fees, maintain a modest office, and be organized to charge fees for services rendered, which would include overhead costs to support the operation, communications, etc.

D. Current awareness - knowledge of pertinent facts and figures - should rest with an organization that is capable of making the information available to its members. An effort should be made by the Afghan professional umbrella organization to collect and aggregate data where it can be accessed, or at least to know where it can be acquired. Suspect data should be questioned and/or verified.

E. The organization structure, capability statements, and letter of interest should be communicated to the appropriate donor and other agencies concerned with the future of Afghanistan.
F. The organization and/or its sub-groups should begin to prepare issue papers that would be useful to a future government of Afghanistan, and/or to its constituent parts. Such papers should provide a basis and recommendations for fiscal, sectoral and other policies that can be quickly considered by a new government.

G. The idea of preparing a rough operational national annual plan, along with a budget for either a new or interim government, also has some merit. One would expect that a proposal for creation of an operational planning entity to generate a five-year rolling plan and subsequent plans should be given early consideration by a new government.
References:


2. Emadi, Hafizullah, "The Afghan Refugee in Pakistan," Khoransian,


6. Kabul Times Annual, 1974, Kabul, Afghanistan


