Coping with Local Elites in Community Organisation for Rural Development with Specific Reference to Afghanistan

A Dissertation Submitted to the University of Manchester for the Degree of M.Sc. in Community Organisation for Rural Development in the Faculty of Education

1991

by

Mohammad Umer Daudzai

Centre for Adult and Higher Education
Contents

Introduction to the dissertation 4

Chapter 1 6
1. Introduction to the theory and concept of the elite 6
   1.1 Elitism 6
   1.2 Pluralism 8
2. Social stratification and elite's composition in Afghanistan 11
   2.1 Traditional society and local leadership 11
   2.2 Changes in social structure and local leadership 13
3. Introduction to rural development 15

Chapter 2 20
1. Rural social realities in Afghanistan 20
   1.1 Elite's power and source of domination 22
   1.2 Vulnerability of the poor 23
   1.3 Methods of exploitation 25
      1.3.1 Methods used by Religious Elites 26
      1.3.2 Methods which are practiced by Economic Elites 26
2. Elites role in exogenous development 28
   2.1 Unfavourable policy environment 29
   2.2 Structural, administrative and attitude difficulties 30
   2.3 Adoption of inappropriate agricultural strategy 31
2.4 Exogenous methods to cope with local elites

2.4.1 Excluding Elites from local organisations

i) Passive exclusion

ii) Active exclusion

2.4.2 Inclusion of elites in rural organisations

3. Endogenous development strategy

3.1 Boomi Sena

a) Exploiter Elites in Boomi Sena's birth time

b) Conscientisation in Boomi Sena

c) Animators in Boomi Sena

Concluding Analysis

Chapter 3

Recommendation for future rural development strategy coping with local elites in Afghanistan

1. Endogenous development process of Qataghan

2. Helman Valley development programme

3. Conclusion/comparison

4. Problems expected during rehabilitation and rural development

5. Policy strategy and legislations

6. Autonomous people's organisation

7. The role of the external agency

8. Roles which implement agency must avoid play

Bibliography
Introduction to the Dissertation

There is enough for everyone's need and not everyone's greed. The difference between need and greed forms the basis of many types of social stratification. Such stratification is evident at international, national and local levels. At international level, there are states which can afford to spend huge sums on exploring stars, while there are other states which can hardly survive under the burden of foreign debt and can hardly feed their respective population. At national level there are those who make policies, plans, rules and regulations, and who also control vast sources of the state, there are also those whose voice is not heard, whose stomach is not filled, and whose very basic needs are not met. The situation is similar at local and village level.

The above scenario represents the distinction between the elites and the poor. On the one hand there are elite states, elite societies, elite groups and elite persons, while on the other hand there are poor states, poor societies, poor groups and poor individuals. The problem is not existence of two different groups, each possessing a different degree of power, it is rather the manner in which the elites exercise their power over non-elites. The problem is exploitation and manipulation of non-elites.

Most rural development strategies have been aimed at helping the poor to meet their needs, however, such measures have failed to bring changes in the lives of the poor. Benefits intended from outside are grabbed by the local elites. On the other hand there are cases where the rural poor have consciously carried out their own initiated efforts and succeeded to transform their life.

The aim of this dissertation, therefore, is to analyse the way and means of the elite who dominates, manipulates and exploits the poor. An attempt is also made to explore the best way of ending the above negative exercise of elites power. In other words, efforts are being made to find out how the greedy may be stopped from inhibiting the needy from meeting his/her needs.
The study will be conducted with specific reference to social realities in rural Afghanistan.

The format of the study is organised as follows.

Chapter 1

Chapter 1 will consist of a brief introduction to the concept of the elite in the light of elitism and pluralism - Introduction to elite concept and composite in rural Afghanistan - and a brief introduction to the two different strategies of rural development.

Chapter 2

This chapter will consist of analysis of rural social realities, and elite problems in Afghanistan - and a comparative analysis of exogenous and endogenous rural development strategies in regard to their effectiveness and efficiency in terms of coping with local elites.

Chapter 3

Will consist of recommended strategy for implementation of rural development in Afghanistan, in terms of coping with local elites.
CHAPTER 1

1. Introduction to the Theory and Concept of Elite:

In every society - old or new - big or small - rich or poor - modern or primitive, there are groups and individuals who are set as important, prominent and powerful who function within the larger society, which may be disorganised, unimportant, powerless, neglected and even manipulated. Questions, such as; why is the former group superior to be 'the latter? what is the basis of their superiority? and how is such superiority exercised and maintained, are what has formulated the basis of elite theories and concepts. To understand these theories and concepts, let us begin with a brief examination of the following theories.

1.1 Elitism

Elitists who are also referred to as 'classic elitists' believe in a single, united, powerful elite, who always in one way or another rule the non-elites and enjoy the benefits brought by their power. In the elitists view, an elite is a necessary and unavoidable feature of every society. Any measure to overcome the elite's power and rule, will either fail or will leave the society handicapped. The following quote from Mosca is perhaps the best representative of elitists theory in this respect:

"In all societies ... two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first, always the less numerous, perform all political functions, monopolises power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second class, the more numerous is directed and controlled by the first." (1)

All elitists are in full agreement on the above qualities of an elite, however, they are deeply divided on the qualities, which actually form the basis of elite's power. The following quotes from the four prominent elitists, chosen on the basis of their representativeness should best indicate such division:

"Elite control depends on the minority's capacity to weld itself into a cohesive force presenting a common front to the forces in society"(1).

"Ability in every human activity — law, poetry, thieving — might at least in theory, be measured and each practitioner awarded marks according to his success"(2).

"It is control over chief means of production that gives a group dominant position in any society"(3).

"The power elite consist of those ... in command of major hierarchies and organisations of modern societies"(4).

It is evident that, in Mosca's view, the ability of the elite is rooted in their capacity to form and rule organisations which turns them to a united front, and as they are the minority, they can easily communicate with one another. Pareto traced elite power to psychological make up and human nature of both elite and non-elite. Best performance in each group is recognised by the members of the group and thereby rewarded with leadership and power(4). Burnham in this sense crossed the boarder of elitism and became a companion of Marx in accepting

economic advantages as a power base. Mills' distinction is perhaps the most important, for the coming discussions in this paper. Though this theory is based on his study of American society, to some extent, it is relevant to elite power in Afghanistan, which will be discussed later.

In general, elitists theory is best summarised in James Meisels three c's which are group consciousness, coherence and conspiracy (common will to action)(1). Elite's are conscious of both their power and potential threats. They are united in order to maintain their power and position, even if they are in contest for power and wealth.

1.2 Pluralism

The main difference between elitism and pluralism is that of single and plural. Pluralism advocates multiple elite rather than single, multiple power basis rather than single and multiple ways of power exercise instead of just political rule. In a pluralists view, the elite may be united, they can also be divided and opposed to each other. R. Dahl argues that:

"No one power group is able to rule the community. Instead a number of rival leaders compete for power, each attempting to form loose coalitions from the local interest group so as to form a majority to secure office"(2).

In a pluralists view, elite's are divided on the basis of their interest and speciality. For instance, an economic elite may be interested to further accumulate wealth, while an education elite may fight for educational reforms that suits his interests.

Also an economic elite may be expert on economic policies, but he may lack experties to contribute to educational policies, so is the case with the education elite. In this way there are many types of elite, perhaps as many as there are human functions. K. Mannhiem makes an interesting distinction between two types of elites; an 'integrative' elite composed of political and organisational leaders; and a 'sublimative' elite made up of moral, religious, aesthetic and intellectual elites\(^1\). Integrative elite's function through formal political organisations (Mosca's ruling class) and sublimative elites work through informal channels such as groups, cliques and cateries. S.R. Scott while in agreement with the above distinction, traces the cause of such division into the stages of modernisation which societies have undergone. From his study in latin America, he argues that, "the more traditional societies are still dominated by the united power full elite ... while societies which have undergone the experience of modernisation, contain a multiplicity of elite based on interests\(^2\).

Finally, a more perceptive and easy to understand distinction is provided by Marc Nerfin, who stratify society into three groups of PRINCE, MERCHANT and CITIZEN. Prince and Merchant are both elites, who function through governmental and economic organisations at local, national and international levels. In his view, people - CITIZEN - are dominated by the governmental power - PRINCE - and economic power - MERCHANT - sometimes united, sometimes antagonistic but always present\(^3\). It is interesting to note that even elitists, agree on the dominant and monopolising role of elites. If we refer back to Mosca's word (page 2) who says: "elites monopolise power and enjoy the benefit brought to them by this power". The questions which remain are: should the sheep allow the wolf to tear him into pieces or should he learn and investigate ways and acquire means to end the wolf's domination? Should the poor accept the power of elites

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and obey them as elitism will suggest? Or, should the poor be empowered to overrule elite's power and free themselves in order to control their own affairs? These are all questions which dominate current debates on community organisation for rural development. To find a solution to all these questions that are applicable everywhere and in each society may be an impossible task, as, first the relationship between the elite and the poor in each society is rooted in traditional, socio-economic, cultural, moral and religious values, specific to each society; second, elite may not always be as bad as they are commonly perceived; and third, the limited scope of this study does not allow for wider research, therefore, the aim of this study is to further analyse the role of the elite - both positive and negative - in rural development activities in Afghanistan. As the country has been in the grip of military fighting over the past decade, not much rural development has been carried out, the little that has, is not written about. To fulfil the task I will have to rely on experiences elsewhere especially in Asia and that of my own work.
2. Social Stratification and Elite Composition in Afghanistan:

Afghanistan as a group of feuding tribes and ethnic groups has a long history of existence, though as a state, its history goes back only a few centuries. Ahmad Shah Durani, an ex-general of the Persian army, was thrown in as the first King of Afghanistan in 1747 by tribal chiefs\(^1\). As he owed his rule to tribal chiefs, he awarded them with higher government and army positions. This move boosted the power of tribal leaders and for a long time to come, tribal and sub-tribal leaders formulated elite groups in Afghanistan. Abdul Rahman (1880-1901) was the first Monarch who institutionalised government affairs and separated the army from administration and judiciary\(^2\). His most important measure was to encourage the installment of capable Afghans in different institutions. However, tribal and ethnic group leaders still remained as the real rulers in rural Afghanistan. The major shake up in the traditional social structure occurred in 1978 when communists took over the power of the state through a military coup. The communists termed the coup as a revolutionary product of the struggle of the oppressed against the oppressors, while the vast majority of the Afghan population termed it as an invasion of their religious-Islamic and traditional values by a foreign ideology and therefore, organised themselves in haste and fought the communist regime and the subsequent invasion of the red army, for ten years. The combination of military and ideological war greatly influenced traditional tribal leadership and opened up the way for the emergence of other forms of rural leadership. In the following sections, elites in rural Afghanistan will be discussed in two separate contexts; traditional (before 1978) and modern (after 1978).

2.1 Traditional Society and Local Leaderships

Traditional Afghan society has no politico-economic doctrine of its own, although the structure of relationships between producer and consumer has

2. WUFA Journal, Special Issue, (1990 p 38).
resemblance to capitalism. It is a tribal, Islamic, agricultural, pastoral, settled, nomadic, peaceful and warlike society with its own unique characteristics and a minimum of political and economic theory\(^1\). Unlike India, there is no class system in Afghanistan. Both tribal society and Islamic tradition forbid such sharp distinctions in the value of different human beings and groups. In Allah's eyes all men are equal. In the eyes of men, however, there are social distinctions based on a variety of factors; wealth, birth, human power and education are some of the most visible factors which have put some as more important than others.

Afghan society is stratified in a both horizontal and vertical manner.

- Horizontal stratification is based upon ethnic groups, family groups and tribal structure; each producing its own type of local leadership. This group has traditionally provided the state with central leadership. Pushtoons (40\%) is the only ethnic group that has maintained its tribal and sub-tribal structure intact. Other ethnic groups are Tajik – 20\%, Hazara 8\%, Baluch, Uzbeck, Trukman and a few other smaller minorities where tribal structure, to a large extent is replaced by other functional, however, loose structures. Relationship amongst the ethnic groups has commonly been described as feuding, however, the country has never been considered as sectoral. Pushtoons have provided central leadership for centuries and have remained dominant at every level. Traditional tribal structure and tribal leadership have made it easier for Pushtoons to get a quick consensus on major issues. This is a quality which is rarely seen in other ethnic groups.

- Vertical stratification of the Afghan society is based on major human functions like economic and social values. In this respect, the Afghan society is commonly divided into the four stratas; i) elite, which consists of headmen, religious leaders, land owners, government officials, teachers and merchants, ii) middle class, consist of farmers, shopkeepers, tenants, butchers, grocers,

carpenters, masons etc., iii) lower class which consists of barber, weaver, musician, blacksmith, well digger, etc. and iv) below lower class, which consists of toilet cleaners and gypsies(1). All the four classes are led by elites who exceed in number the third and fourth class. The middle class remains as majority.

Both the horizontal and vertical division contribute in its own relative way to elite composition in Afghanistan. Birth, social position and merit (education and wisdom) are more important than wealth, in elite membership in Afghanistan. For instance, to assume a leading position in a tribal structure requires leading family background, while in the case of assuming governmental and religious leading position, requirement is relevant educational competence.

Tribal leaders from horizontal division and religious leaders from vertical division are the two most important elite, in terms of the consequences of their decisions for the rest of society. Large landowners and governmental officials came second in this regard.

2.2 Changes in Social Structure and Local Leadership During the Last Decade:

In the last decade there has been a shift of balance from horizontal stratification and leadership to vertical stratification and related local leadership. As the coup and subsequent invasion by the red army caught the Afghan society by shock and surprise, Afghans began to organise themselves in one way or another to launch their resistance. Pushtoon tribes had the advantage of being loosely organised in terms of their traditional structure, therefore, in most cases they chose their tribal leaders as military commanders and launched armed resistance. Areas occupied by other ethnic groups and also areas occupied by a mixture of ethnic groups had a challenge to face. The major influence came from religious organisations and political parties mostly led from abroad. Very quickly

the whole of each part of the Afghan society was organised around a local commander and an administrator. Both these positions were either directly appointed or approved by a respective political party. Areas controlled by the communist regime which formed an estimated 20% of the whole country were controlled by a combination of army commanders, bureaucrats and political intelligence. In most places traditional tribal leadership was replaced by military and political leadership. Religious leadership was also strengthened, though it was mostly combined with political leadership.

All these current categories of local leadership have accumulated power and wealth and thereby form a powerful elite group.

In contrast with the traditional situation, wealth now does determine the power of an elite and no doubt it will intensify in the future.
3. Introduction to Rural Development

Rural development is commonly viewed as efforts to bring rural areas on line with national economic growth and to match the development of urban areas. Over the past 40 years or more, various approaches have been adopted to attain the above goal. The results have been rather depressing as the rural has still remained rural, the poor are still poor, though in some cases rural development activities may have positively contributed to the national economic growth. Some general policy adjustment is also introduced by the host government. Some of the most important of these adjustments are land reform, regulation of tenancy and borrowing etc. However, the outcome has always been depressing as there hasn't been any substantial change in the life of the poor. External input mostly coming from big donors are hardly channelled in rural productive activities, if at all, it is both the external input and internally generated benefits that are grabbed by those already rich local elites. Who should be blamed for this situation, providers or the poor? To find an answer let us examine how providers describe their strategy by analysing a few representative definitions of rural development strategy.

"The broad spectrum of rural development activities encompassing the simultaneous fostering of small farmer agricultural progress; improvement of level of living (income, employment, education, health, nutrition, house and other social services) for the rural people; reducing inequality in distribution of rural incomes and urban–rural imbalances in incomes and economic opportunities and accelerate in pace of these improvements over time(1)."
"Attaining the multiple objectives of (1) achieving self-sustaining, cumulative economic growth, (2) expanding opportunities for productive employment, (3) reducing poverty (with emphasis on malnutrition and excessive mortality and morbidity), and (4) slowing population". (1)

"Rural development is a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people – the rural poor ... [it] encompasses improved productivity, increased employment and thus higher incomes for target groups, as well as minimum acceptable levels of food, shelter, education and health". World Bank, 1975.

From the above set of definitions, we understand the needs of the rural poor as becoming: i) lack of enough food, ii) lack of cash income due to unemployment and no surplus for sale, iii) lack of welfare services to overcome health and other related problems, and iv) lack of equitable distribution of benefits.

To meet the needs of the poor then requires the intervention by governmental, non-governmental and private organisation to analyse these problems with the help of people (elite) and to plan projects on the basis of those problems to be implemented by project staff.

Planning, implementation and evaluation of such projects or programmes are sometimes carried out on a sectoral basis where there is a government ministry for each sector, e.g. health, agriculture, welfare, etc., each has its own representative at the local level. Sometimes these efforts are made area bounded and integrated

at the local level through co-ordinators of ministries and NGO’s if involved.

Other side approaches such as provision of credits and formation of co-operatives are also being applied.

In all cases the real owners of projects are governmental and non-governmental organisations. Though due to the past failure there is a growing tendency to participate beneficiaries of programmes in the development process, however such participation is limited to approval of externally designed strategies as well as contribution to the process both in cash and kind. Complete transferral of power in terms of planning, implementation and decision making is feared and termed as road to anarchy a term which governments automatically hate and oppose. Limited participation has proved to be inefficient and unacceptable to the poor and it ultimately fails for reasons which will be discussed in Chapter 2.

In general, the best of the above strategy of rural development is called 'Induced' a term used in Gynaecology to cause a woman to begin childbirth by means of drugs. Drugs are equated to technology, though the society may have choice of selection as an elite may choose a tractor, small farmers will choose a spade and nothing will be left for the landless.

In this study from this stage onward we will refer to the above strategy as Exogenous Rural Development.

As opposed to the above strategy there is another development strategy initiated by the rural poor. The history of this strategy is perhaps as old as the human being or the social stratification. Human beings, by nature are free to practice, to discover more of what makes him/her satisfied. Some are perhaps satisfied in others sub-ordination and exploitation, while others are satisfied through seizing such exploitation and creating social harmony.

In recent history, some rural communities have managed to cross mental barriers, realised their situation and have planned conscious actions that has brought harmony, peace and satisfaction to their community. Such communities have set examples for others to follow. Such experiences are analysed by theorists and thus have formed a strategy of rural development, which some term it as People
Centre, others term it as Authentic, Autonomously, Human scale development, participatory Rural Development, we in this study would refer to as Endogenous Rural Development.

Participatory rural development is a process of creative change initiated by organized self-conscious rural people. The people concerned are the hitherto excluded, that is the poor sections of the rural population who have traditionally lacked the opportunity to participate in rural social development.

The notion of development is viewed in fundamental human terms as development of men and women, that is a process of releasing their creativity and liberating their initiatives(1).

"Human Scale Development focuses and forms its basis on the satisfaction of human needs, on the generation of growing levels of self-reliance and the construction or organic articulation of people with nature and technology of global processes with local activities, of personal with society of planning with autonomy and of the civil society with the state"(2).

In endogenous strategy, rural development is human development, which requires human growth (as opposed to economic growth) in the sense that people become freer human beings, liberated from their own sense of powerless and dependency.(3)

Freedom here is not for the sake of freedom, it is for the sake of practical action which follows. Freedom here is not granted or awarded, it is acquired through: i) education, which is developed through critical thinking, investigation and dialogue, ii) through organisations that facilitate collective actions of members, and iii) resources which are internally mobilised, claimed back from those who had grabbed it illegally and savings of members surplus.

The real players of this strategy are the people consisting of all those previously excluded, and now united not on the basis of economic interest but on the basis of humanity and struggle for their human rights.
CHAPTER 2

1. Rural Social Realities in Afghanistan

A few years ago a foreigner in a foreign country asked me: where are you from? I replied, from Afghanistan. He said, which Afghanistan, Kabul or real Afghanistan.

He was right to divide my country into two distinctive parts. The urban and the rural. This division exists in every country, even in the so-called advanced countries. The important thing is the basis on which such distinction is made, and the image represented by each category. Urban in third world context speaks of sky reaching buildings, modern roads, every type of transport, communication, play grounds, schools, hospitals, television and more important than all jobs and other sources of income. Rural represents the image of poverty, unemployment, insufficient and inappropriate welfare services, lack of communication, transport etc. Inferiority to Urban in terms of living standards is a rural reality, however, it is not the whole scenario of the rural deprivation. Rural reality is far more complex and far more depressing than a simple lag behind the urban development. In most rural villages one finds houses that are bigger and more modern than those in cities, cars that are more expensive than those in town, when driven, the dust which rises beneath its wheel sits on families who boil rocks, pretending to be a meal in order to deceive their children to go to bed on an empty stomach.

These luxury cars and houses belong to those who are termed as lords or landlords of business, lords of trading, lords of politics and even lords of the people. On the other hand there are those who are lords of nothing, not even lords of themselves; their thinking, their decisions, their energy, their future and their current vital resources that are all controlled and dominated by their local lords or elites.

Elite domination and poor's deprivation are economical, biological and sociological, specific to each society. Economic domination of elite is based on control over chief means of production such as agricultural and pastoral land, rural
industries, fishing, irrigational water sources etc. Biological domination of one
group over another is based on colour and sex. Domination of white minority or
black majority in South Africa is an obvious example of such domination.
Domination of men over women in most areas of less developed countries,
especially in Afghanistan, is well known to all of us. Sociological domination is
the more complex and the most varied type known so far. Domination of one
religious group over another, one caste over another, one tribe over another, and
one ethnic group over another are common features of rural Afghan societies.
Both the dominant and the dominated — the oppressor and the oppressed — and
the elite and the poor, are often parts of the same society initially established on
natural resource, available to them in order to feed themselves, their children and
perhaps even their successive generations. For some broad historical and
evolutionary reasons some have emerged as dominant, boss, leader, elite and even
exploiter, while others are left as dominated and sub-ordinated and thus exploited.

What is discussed so far is a broad representative of the problem faced by the
rural poor in every country, the degree of which may be varied. It also exists in
rural Afghanistan, if not to an extreme degree, but almost certainly to a moderate
degree. (See Chapter 1).

The question which arises is that; can the poor acquire the ability to
overcome their domination, exploitation and oppression by the elites? How can
such ability be acquired? And what external assistance is required? There is no
simple answer nor is there a single solution applicable everywhere in each society,
however, an attempt will be made to propose solutions that should possibly be
applicable in the current situation of Afghanistan. This solution will be presented
in the last chapter. Before which, in this chapter, in order to reach these
solutions, I will have to examine the following issues, in the rest of this chapter:
- What is the power basis of the elite's action?
- In what way do elites exercise their power?
- What has so far been done to control the elite's power?
Due to the lack of enough hard materials on Afghanistan and also in order to make the subject more comprehensive the above three questions will be examined in the light of general experiences in the third world countries, as well as in Afghanistan.

1.1 Elites Power and Source of Domination

As discussed in the previous chapter, there are many types of elites in each society. Similarly, their source of power varies from one society to another, depending on socio-economic conditions, culture and traditions. In societies such as India, the elite's power is derived from membership of the upper class. Such membership enables them to accumulate wealth through both legal and illegal means. They use the power of the state to their own ends. They provide the best education for their children, who will then form a new type of elite. They have access to the best type of welfare services which makes them more healthier and stronger. In societies like Afghanistan (see Chapter 1), where social structure is not stratified on the basis of class, but more on the basis of tribal kinship and family groups, the elite's power is derived from leadership and control over the affairs of these groups. In both the above cases, elites are identified with one or more of the following qualities: 1) wealth, having greater command over economic resources, whether land or capital (sometimes control over labour) ... landlords, merchants and money lenders come under this category; 2) status, being identified with a prestigious family, clan or other social group, able to command esteem and deference from others ... where there are remnants of aristocracy or ethnic/racial hegemony this kind of elite may be found; 3) education, being trained to perform professional roles such as doctor, lawyer, teacher or administrator; 4) political influence, having goods or services to distribute to loyal followers, as local bosses or party leaders are often able to; 5) political authority, flowing from some recognised position of power in the community, for instance that of local headman or other local office; 6) moral authority, being regarded by others as deserving obedience, for example religious leaders or elders in a society that has great
respect for age; and 7) force, having control over the use of coercion against others as for instance, with local military commanders, or the police chief who can act as he wishes or with petty warlord brigand, boss or other local "strongman". Ownership of one of the above qualities often leads elites to acquire another; for instance, an elite who commands wealth may use it to buy votes to be elected for political office. He may then use both his political and economical means to install his aides and relatives in important bureaucratic and administrative positions. Or a military or police commander may use his coercive force to accumulate wealth and thereby enter the same circle of acquiring other qualities. Not all the above seven qualities are, however, equal in terms of their importance, as they are highly dependent on specific conditions of each society. In Afghanistan, for instance, elites who possess moral authority such as religious leadership, are more important than any category. Second and third comes status and educational elites while economic elites in most cases occupies fourth position. But in the current situation as the country is grabbed by a civil war, the most powerful elites are the local military and gorilla commanders. The bad news is that the economic elite are fastly growing and there is a tendency amongst other elites to accumulate wealth in order to prolong their domination over the rest of the society.

Experience indicates that the following two factors often enhance such domination.

1.2 Vulnerability of the Poor

Power can only be exercised on those who are powerless. Elites exercise their power on the poor because they are powerless and vulnerable. There are many reasons for the poor's powerlessness, defencelessness and vulnerability, lack of ownership and control over economic resources, lack of organisations to encounter aggressors and more importantly reliance on local elites to protect them against corrupt bureaucrats and government administrators, are the most common examples of the poor's vulnerability and powerlessness.
"Traditional group structure and strong patterns of social differentiations often combine to create a system of organisation dominated by a few powerful local elites. The elites are linked to the poor through a variety of patronage/dependency relationships ... people look for help to kinfolk or at most to individuals whom they personally know. The poor then tender support of various kinds in exchange for and expectation of, such patronage, which further secures the privileged position of the elite. While the reciprocal dependency further undermines the position of the poor(1).

Uneven distribution of land and other social values, has put those who get the least share, even though they are the majority dependent on those who get the rest. This majority in order to get food for themselves and their children, need to work and earn cash and kinds. They also need to cover unexpected and unplanned expenditures such as weddings and funerals. In both cases they depend on opportunities directly controlled by the elites. They work on land, farm, industry and other productive properties owned by elites. Their wages are decided by the elite and the poor can hardly object to the minimum, for the fear of loss of job. They borrow money on the terms wished by the lenders. When they disagree with the terms and conditions laid down by the elite, they lose their job and future chances of borrowing. If they fail to meet such conditions they lose their little lad or cattle through misuse of law or they are threatened by visits from the police and local thugs and dacoits who function under the elite's mercy.

The consequences of such dependency becomes even more serious for their children, as they either cannot afford to go to school or are not allowed to do so. Dependency thereby is transferred from generation to generation and becomes even worse. Apart from economic dependency, there are other types of social dependencies that are often ignored. Religious dependency rooted in faith, leadership dependency rooted in traditional tribal and kinship structure, are some of the most obvious of its kind. Such dependency has made the poor accustomed to leaving decisions and initiatives to their "leaders"\(^1\). In Afghanistan it is seen as an obligation to follow religious and tribal leaders on major issues which affect the whole society. False spiritual leaders constitute a major problem; as it is accepted by most rural people that if false spiritual leaders are not made happy, something terrible may happen to them or their children. Most diseases are often linked to be caused by ghosts and the spiritual leaders who are supposed to have control over such events, therefore the poor are obliged to pay those leaders, in order to save themselves and their children.

1.3 Methods of Exploitation

To say elites are powerful and the poor are weak is not a sufficient explanation of the tragedy of exploitation. We need to understand and analyse means, methods and tactics which elites utilise to exploit the poor.

Generalisation and analysis of such methods and tactics is a difficult task, as it is highly dependent on the type of elite as well as basic circumstances of each society. Economic elites may use entirely different tactics from those of religious leaders; also leaders of each category may use different tactics in different societies. For instance, tactics used by a "muslim leader" might be different from those of a christian, or tactics used by a landlord may be different from those of a capitalist. The other important contrast is that a landlord in one society may

\(^1\) Peter Okley et al. "Project with People". ILO (1990 p 13).
use entirely different tactics to a landlord in a different society.

Keeping in view all the above difficulties, an attempt is made in the following sections to briefly discuss some of the more prominent methods used by the two most important elites to exploit the poor.

1.3.1 Methods used by religious elites

As discussed in Chapter 1, in Muslim societies in general, and specifically in Afghanistan, true religious leaders are often opposed to any type of oppression. In most cases such leaders provide a source of inspiration to the poor to stand against aggression and oppression. However, there are instances of wide misuse of religious value by false religious spiritual leaders. Tactics used by such leaders to exploit the poor is already discussed.

1.3.2 Methods which are practiced by economic elites

As economic elites are divided into many categories of landlords, traders, money lenders, industrialists, etc. so are the poor divided into many categories. Here I will divide the poor into two broad categories of i) those who own little source of subsistence income, ii) those who entirely depend on their labour force. Economic elites are always after both of these categories, though they apply two different overlapping methods in order to continuously exploit the poor. In the case of the former group, the elites priority is to deprive them of their little source of independent income. To reach this end they apply blackmailing, deception, violence and many other dirty tactics. Illiterate people are asked to sign documents they do not understand or falsely described to them; ignorant, misled and fearful, they unwillingly denounce their right in land, accept debts without knowing the terms of repayment, mortgage possessions without being clear about how they can retrieve them and accept terms of loans which are grossly extortionate. They then lack recourse to justice - since they do not know the law, cannot afford legal help, fear to offend the patrons on whom they depend, and would anyway be bringing their case before members of the very elites against
which the appeal would lie. If they complain or resist, they can be brought to heel by a visit from the police, a threat of prosecution or arrest, the calling in of a debt, a refusal of employment or violence - the burning of a hut, a roughening up by thugs or worse(1). Worse than the above happens in areas that are sensitive to state rule, where elites implicate the poor in false charges such as anti-state activities and put them behind bars. Relatives then turn for help to the elites who will buy their land and other properties at the lowest price and the money will be paid to officials against the release of the accused.

Other indirect ways of depriving the poor are customs initially created by elites. Bride or groom wealth and huge spending on funerals are examples of this type. The poor, in order to be seen as part of the society, have to abide by these customs and spend huge sums borrowed from the economic elite. In return they either put their property at risk or sell their work force on the lowest wages for years to come. Teenage members of poor families are made accustomed to social evils such as drug abuse, hashish smoking, gambling, attending dance shows and even gangstering. Most of the subsistance family income goes to these activities and therefore, the family becomes more and more dependent on the elites.

In summary, the discussion so far reveals limitations of elitism in terms of understanding rural social problems as there is no single united ruling class, neither is there one way of exploitation in rural Afghanistan. In fact, there are so many different and localised types of elites and methods of their domination, that studies of limited scope such as this one in hand falls short of analysing them all.

2. Elite's Role in Exogenous Development

As briefly mentioned earlier, in exogeneous model of development; planning, implementation, evaluation, selection of actors etc. are all decided by those who do not belong to the community of the poor. At best, local elites are consulted about the needs of the poor and their acceptance and agreement is seen as agreement of the whole society. Currently there is a growing tendency amongst the players of this model to involve more of the community in decision making. Such efforts have also fallen short of gaining satisfactory results. Most approaches and programmes designed on the basis of this model have failed to overcome the poverty which is increasing day by day. Though there are some examples of economic success based on general increase in local food products, in almost all cases the benefits from rural development have gone mainly to local elites. Most attempts to organise the rural poor, if they survive at all, are "captured" by local elites who use them to enhance their position, power and wealth more effectively than before. This was the case in early efforts to build political organisation at the local level (Leys, 1971, Chambers, 1974, p 86). It is the fate of most functioning cooperatives (Innayatullah, 1972, Hunter, 1971, p 2) and community development programmes (Holdcroft, p 15). It is almost certainly the future of most of today's New Direction Programmes as they are in the old community development mold.(1)

Elite domination and grabbing the benefits of exogenous is now realised even by those who still support the model. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, in its report of 1975 concluded that, "Rural cooperatives in developing areas today bring little benefit to the masses of poorer inhabitants ... it is the better off rural inhabitant who mainly takes advantage of the cooperative services and facilities such as government support credit and technical assistance channelled through cooperatives". The question which must be asked is; why is

exogenous model of rural development so vulnerable to easily become dominated by elites? Chambers answers this question by arguing that "Most governmental, parastatal and private sector programmes and campaigns are either designed identically for the elites, or so designed and implemented that they are likely to be intercepted by them".

In reality there are more reasons for vulnerability of exogenous development models to elites domination than one can find in the available literature.

Programmes which are designed on the basis of "trickle down" of benefit are not to be blamed as they are designed to benefit the elite. Introduction of tractors and other high-tech machinery is an obvious example. It is believed that when the already well-off accumulate more wealth, they will invest in rural industry and thereby more employment for the rural poor will be created. Realities speak against the above assumption as in most cases where the elite has managed to further accumulate wealth, instead they invest in heavy urban industries and take the benefit further away from the poor areas.

There are a number of reasons responsible for this situation, which are summarised under the following headings.

2.1 Unfavourable Policy Environment

Biased policy environments often encourage elites to enhance their position, to further exploit the poor. Too much concern about national economic growth and bringing rural growth to the folk of national economy, encourages the introduction of capital intensive technology by large land owners. Government subsidies and concessions, or import of heavy machinery further enhances the elites position. It is obvious that subsistence farmers and the landless cannot benefit from capital intensive technologies.

As a result of these policies, subsistence farmers loose control over their little properties and the landless become unemployed as their role is played by a machine.

Low pricing policies aimed at the provision of cheap food to urban based
bureaucrats, army and others, also directly affects the poor farmers, while the large land owners often produce crops which are for export and thereby they get more than they expect.

2.2 Structural, Administrative and Attitude Difficulties

Centralised, political and bureaucratic structures in most of the third world countries often stand as an obstacle against devolution of decision making power to the poor population. "Structural obstacles also include the tensions which can arise between the mechanisms promoted locally by the state in order to achieve centrally planned objectives and the spontaneous informal development efforts at grass roots level". (1) Organised poor will mean acquiring decision making powers in all those matters which affect them. The state's structure allows only a limited involvement to the poor, which is insufficient to match the social and formal authority of formal and non-formal elites. It is also feared that if the poor are allowed to influence one decision they will demand to be involved in another which may not be in favour of the state's structure and thereby such organisation which autonomously speaks for the poor are disbanded or intentionally controlled by elites who are trusted by the state. As a result, the poor lose their interest and do not participate in such activities at all and become passive recipients of what is offered by external implementing agencies of rural development. Similarly, strict and centralised planning and administration, play an important role in overruling decisions which may be made by the poor at the grass-root level. Such decisions are related to resource allocation, project planning and staff recruitment. Administrators and professionals are often reluctant to give away such control, as they see it as a threat to their power and professional knowledge.

2.3 **Adaption of Inappropriate Agricultural Strategy**

Thorbeke identifies the follow four agricultural strategies which are pursued in third world countries.

1) "Unimodal" (or progressive strategy of modernisation) strategy, 2) "bimodal" (or dualistic) strategy, 3) industrialisation first strategy, in which positive actions to promote agricultural development receive scant attention and the agricultural sector is discriminated against, and 4) strategy for collectivisation or socialisation of rural areas. All these four strategies have direct influence on the relationship between elite and the poor and thereby are relevant to our discussion however, as the latter two are now much a thing of the past, and also as Johnston and Clark (1982 p 72) argue that, even where the later two strategies are adopted they still have to chose between the former two, therefore, we will further discuss only the unimodal and bimodal strategy effects on the elite-poor relationship.

Unimodal strategy is widely identified with Japan, Korea and Taiwan while Bimodal is a strategy first adopted by Mexico. Both these strategies were considered as success stories during the mid 1960's, "there is a general agreement now that the Mexican Agricultural strategy has made an inadequate contribution to the multiple objectives of rural development because the great majority of rural population was bypassed", Johnston and Clark (1982 p 75). The contrasting outcome of these two strategies is rooted in many of their characteristic, two of which are most relevant to this study; farm size and capital or labour using. Unimodal is referred to large numbers of small farms, while bimodal is referred to small numbers of large farms. Also unimodal tends to be capital saving, labour using and bimodal is usually capital using and labour saving; as it tends to exploit government policies and replaces labour with high tech machines.

Encouraging small numbers of large farms, strengthens the hands of the elite to use all those dirty tactics discussed earlier to deprive the poor from their subsistence source of income. It also encourages large landowners to use machines to replace labour and thereby results in increased unemployment.

Though some countries over the past few decades have partially adopted
unimodal strategy and have carried out major socio-economic reforms such as redistribution of land ownership, abolition of tenancy and expansion of educational facilities or nationwide literacy campaigns, thereby causing some reduction in economic inequalities, however, due to unauthentic participation of the rural people the exogeneous model of rural development seems to have brought little or no improvement to the situation of the rural people. Tilakaratna see the following reasons responsible for this situation:

- political control of the countryside by urban elites and urban biases in policy making which have, in general, created disadvantages in terms of trading for rural producers and resulted in the transfer of rural economic surpluses to urban centres and for urban investment.
- operation of political elites who decide for the people and have created a substantial gap between them and the people.
- bureaucratic controls and methods of dealing with rural people which have inhibited the generation of self-initiatives by the rural masses.
- perpetuation of traditional leadership patterns in rural areas which are generally non-innovative and tend to resist any change which undermines their social power base(1).

2.4 Exogenous Methods to Cope with Local Elite

Failures of the past efforts to ensure that the benefits of rural development reach the poor rather than the elites, have made supporters of exogenous development to try various tactics to cope with local elites. Methods used in the past are numerous and locally specific, some methods have been successful, though temporarily while others have failed. Following is a generalisation of two of the most prominant and widely used methods:

2.4.1 **Excluding elites from local organisations**

Exclusion of elites from organisations which are intended to benefit the poor, often means exclusion from benefits, exclusion from membership and exclusion from leadership. In all three cases there are mainly two different tactics of excluding elites, i) passive exclusion and ii) active exclusion.

i) **Passive exclusion:**

Passive exclusion means defining organisational functions in such a way that does not match the interest of the elite and therefore they do not want to be part of it at all. Such intolerable functions for elites may be too frequent and time consuming to meet (a tactic used in Daudzai IRD programme)(1). It can be the simultaneous requirement of manual labour from participants and elimination of handouts to them (this tactic was used by Bangladesh Rural Advance Committee BRAD)(2). Passive exclusion can also be achieved when the benefits of the organisation is defined and selected, in a manner that does not attract the elite's interest. In a broad sense, all productive and those aimed at empowerment of the poor are more attractive to elite, than welfare services. The following table represents a more specific rating of programmes on the basis of their acceptability and attraction of local elites:

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1. Shoib Sultan Khan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of Programmes</th>
<th>Acceptability of Local Elites</th>
<th>Attractiveness to Local Elite</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Eye Camps</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feeding Programmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Planning</td>
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<td>Curative Health Services</td>
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<td>Roads</td>
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<td>Extension</td>
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<td>Seasonal Credit</td>
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<td>Crop Insurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preventive Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution of new assets and re-distribution of old assets</td>
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<td>Legal Aid</td>
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<td>Enforcement of Liberal Laws</td>
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<td>Trade Union</td>
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<td>Political Mobilisation</td>
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<td>Non-violent political change</td>
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<td>Violent political change</td>
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Adapted from R. Chambers (1983 p 164).
From the analysis of the above table, one may suggest that in order to make rural development activities more acceptable and less attractive to the local elites, implementing agencies must begin with the provision of welfare services and less productive programmes. The implication of such a suggestion is that the rural poor must be organised around provision of welfare services, and their organisation gain momentum, more productive programmes and activities aimed at political change gradually added. Though such a suggestion may sound logical, however, it is in complete contrast to current views of rural development as self-reliance. It is obvious that the rural poor lack such sources to support welfare and non-productive services, therefore, they have to be provided by external sources and thus the organisation of the rural poor will instead become outside reliant right from its birth. As members of organisations become accustomed to others doing things for them, it will be hard to motivate them to mobilise their own resources. In a survey carried out in Pakistan, 60 per cent of those interviewed demanded that the government must do everything to meet their needs, while only 4 per cent demanded the availability of loans to enable them to meet their needs. (S.M. Haider 1981, p 105). The author of the survey, not surprisingly, blamed past development activities for creation of the spirit of dependency on outsiders. This is in complete contrast with self-reliance, defined as:

"local organisations must be based on the autonomous ability on the part of the people to organise themselves and to undertake and manage collective action to bring about change in their life".

Autonomous ability of the poor, no doubt stands against the elites interest and power status.

ii) Active exclusion

Active exclusion of elites refer to direct exclusion of an elite from the
membership of the organisation of the poor. Such decisions are often made by
the project workers representing the implementing agency. This is at best a risky
choice as competent, committed, external organisations will be required to support
and protect the poor's organisation if it is to have any chance of success.\(^{(1)}\)
Action Aid in Nepal, for instance, chose to face any of the elites group of any
advisory committee in its punchayat and the rich elites were kept at a distance.
AAN laid great stress on ensuring that projects were run by the poor themselves,
and yet in nearly every case, the leaders who emerged in the grass-root groups
were from the richer elite families. No-one with a little knowledge of village
social dynamics would expect anything else.\(^{(2)}\)

In the Afghan Refugees primary health care programme, Save the Children
Fund also used this tactic. As a result, the elite group propagated the new
leadership as unimportant and tried to divide them amongst themselves, as a result
most of the Health Committees gradually lost importance and ultimately existed
only on paper.\(^{(3)}\)

2.4.2 Inclusion of elite in rural organisations

Effective leadership by individuals who understand the nature of the problem
and are willing to make strong personal commitments to its resolution, are perhaps
the key to the process of capacity building\(^{(4)}\). The question is where should such
individuals come from? In the previous section we discussed the views of those
who see the elites as evils, and therefore, argued for their exclusion from the local
organisation in order to allow the poor to contribute their own leadership. Here
we examine the view of those who argue for inclusion of the elites in the local
level organisation as its leaders. Supporters of this method argue that: Firstly, the
poor are inexperienced in running organisations and they lack management and

2. Poulton (1988)
3. Author's own experience.
communication skills which elites possess as they are already running traditional organisations. Secondly, local elites are an important, if imperfect source of home-grown, grass-roots leadership - a source both scarce and invaluable for promoting the transition from traditional kin-group to modern interest group form of local organisations(1). The argument goes even further, to the extent that supporters of elites, as a source of leadership say that, to undermine traditional elite leadership is asking for trouble caused by the elite and depriving the poor from something which they need and depend upon. They say that elites often form a shield against external threats and risks in order to protect the poor. For instance, it is often an elite who tries new risky ideas such as high yield varieties. They also protect the poor against cruel bureaucrats and other corrupt officials using their current power and status to rob the poor. Leadership that emerges from amongst the poor are vulnerable to these threats. Supporters of the above argument are in trouble when critics ask the question of accountability; for instance are elites accountable to the poor in traditional organisations? Will they be accountable in the modified organisations?

Uphoff et al and Bell, from their research found that in most societies elites are divided on the basis of ethnicity religion, regional bond and conflict of interest, therefore they argue that the project implementers must turn those realities to the advantage of the poor and secure more influence for them over elites(2).

This is perhaps in many ways even more risky than the elite's exclusion, as the project workers can easily be accused of fuelling traditional feuds. Project workers by nature are exogenous and thereby suspected by the local population. "In a UNICEF programme in Afghanistan the development team arriving in a remote mountain village were considered as an enormous threat not only to the safety of the hierarchy, but to the spiritual and physical well-being of the whole population. They were considered initially as government spies, then as tax

2. Uphoff, Usman and Bell (1974)
assessors, then as recruiters for military services, vampires, child stealers, women seekers, casters of the evil eye, etc. (1).

Even when external project workers are trusted there are still problems in choosing the right elite from amongst the conflicting groups. Carl H. Lande has made an attempt to rescue the workers by dividing local leaders on the basis of two different types of traditional organisations. The first type, in his view is associations based on some common trait of a member, and where leaders are, to some extent, accountable to their membership and their power is likely to benefit members. The second type is followings, constructed out of vertical bonds between followers and a common leader. Elites who base their power on followings are not accountable to members. Lande, therefore, recommend that the project implementor must begin the process with including association leaders in the new leadership.

In reality whether elites are excluded or included, serious problems are faced as a consequence, either the project is not implemented or the benefits still rest in the hands of the elite. The most obvious reason for such failure, is that such decisions are made by project workers who have little or no knowledge of the realities which exist in the concerned area. Proposing one method or another, inhibits critical thinking of the poor to find a solution to their problems. Methods which are wrongly proposed or even directly implemented without active involvement of the poor, do not belong to the poor, they are not controlled by the poor and thus fail to produce any good. The real answer tends to lie in endogenous methods of coping with local elites, where methods are neither initiated nor implemented by the project workers but by the poor themselves.

1. R. Poulton
3. **Endogenous Development Strategy**

Almost 40 years of national and international development have passed without any fundamental changes in the lives of the poor, something must be very wrong\(^1\). Billions of dollars as loan and aid is transferred every year from the so-called advanced countries to the Third World countries, aimed at helping the poor. The intentions of donor states beyond doubt is not purely humanitarian. There is always political and military objectives attached to these aids, which consequently influence the host countries decisions to be political and military biased rather than people biased. Around 50% of annual budgets which are basically owed to debts, are allocated to military spending. Rural development in most third world countries gets the lowest priority. The subsistence amount allocated often attracts national corrupted elites, who take their share, before the process of development even begins. When activities begin at the community level, local elites also follow the footsteps of their superiors. Unnecessarily high emphasis on economic growth, cash crops and capital infrastructure building needs are not mentioned.

What is the solution?

There is a need for a fundamentally different development model based on an alternative development, that enhances the sustainability of the community. It must be understood as a process of economic, political and social change that need not necessarily involve growth. Sustainable human communities can only be achieved through a people-centred development\(^2\). Based on the three principles; 1) sovereignty must reside with the people as real actors of positive changes, 2) people control their own resources, have access to relevant information and have means to hold government officials accountable; and 3) the value of outside contribution measured in terms of the enhanced capacity of the people to

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1. Nyoni (p 52)
2. Manila declaration (IFDA Dossier 75)
determine their own future(1).

It should be autonomous based on decentralisation of political and economic power to be exercised by the people in a more egalitarian and humane way in different domains of society, thus ensuring adequate consideration of local and regional interest(2). Such autonomy must not be confused with the state power as people (citizen) are not seeking governmental or economic power. On the contrary, it is to help people to assert their own autonomous power. Vis-a-vis both Prince (governmental) and Merchant (economic) endeavours to listen to those never or rarely heard and at least to offer a tribute to the unheard voices(3).

Endogenous, people centred development is self-reliance which is defined as "an expression of man's/woman's faith in is/her abilities as the driving force for human creativity(4). Self-reliance is a process of de-alienation of re-generation and development of powers that people may have lost through dependence, exploitation and subordination(5). The achievement of self-reliance requires: i) Material self reliance: resources that are required for the development of the material base, partly acquired through own efforts (maximum mobilisation of one's own resources through savings and elimination of non-productive resource use) and partly through the assertion of one's legitimate rights and claims. Assertion implies in particular to two types of actions: (a) actions to retrieve surpluses which are being syphoned away through dependency relations and unequal exchanges and, (b) assertion of economic rights such as the right to public resources(6) ii) Intellectual self-reliance: building up of an autonomous knowledge base by the people which enables them to enhance their capacity to build up their own organisation and resources to continuously sustain their own development. Such knowledge is

1. Manila declaration (IFDA Dossier 75)
2. Manfred Maxneef, DD (1979 p 73)
3. Marc Narfin (Neither Prince nor Merchant but Citizen) DD 87:1
4,5,6. Tilakaratna (ILO 1987 p 5)
acquired through conscientisation" which Paulo Freir defines as a process in which men, not as recipients, but as knowing subjects, achieve a deepening awareness both of sociological reality which shapes their lives and of their capacity to transform that reality(1) iii) Organisational self-reliance which is an autonomous ability on the part of the people to organise themselves and to undertake and manage collective actions to bring about changes in their life situation(2). Such organisations are formed by the people as a result of their conscious action and these are owned and controlled by its members. Organisational self-reliance facilitate collective actions of individuals based on their critical awareness and reflection of their action.

The above combined form of self-reliance as a process of capacitation which is essentially a process of empowerment of the people by the people, which must ultimately embrace all members of a social organisation, and not to be confined to a few selected elites.

Self-reliance or capacitation – in the above sense – is not generally developed spontaneously, nor can it be achieved through mechanical transfer or deliveries of knowledge and material inputs from outside people, needs to be stimulated and facilitated by skilled inventors entering from outside or emerging from amongst the people themselves(3). External intervention has to be geared towards people's capacitation; it should not shift people's dependence from one source to another. Such intervention must be based on dialogical interaction with the people, which must consist of the following three essential elements. Animation: assisting the people to build up their intellectual capacities and a knowledge base to be able to think, reflect and act autonomously(4). Facilitation: assisting the people to acquire practical skills (such as technical, managerial and literacy). To improve their access to material resources and finally to create space for people's actions by playing a protective or a nursing role(5). Self-liquidation: taking conscious efforts

1. Paulo Freir (Penguin, 1972) in DD 79:2, p 57
2,3,4,5. Tilakaratna (ILO 1987, pp 5-10)
to ensure a progressive redundancy in the need for external animation and facilitation.

External animators in the above sense should not be confused with project agents, project workers, extension workers, etc., as they are the people who may try to conscientise the community but they never conscientise themselves.

Animators are those members of the community who think deeper than others, who learn faster than others and analyse reality better than others and thereby they become the first to be conscientised. Once their position as real well-wishers of the people is recognised, they begin to put the social realities to other members of the community as a problem to be thought about, to be analysed and prioritised. Such investigative thinking results in people's conscientisation on the basis of which people begin to plan corrective action, they analyse the outcome of their action and feed the results back into actions which become "process of PROXIS". Such proxis lead people to sustain consciousness about their life situation which is often different from their earlier temporary conscientisation. To provide continuity and sustainability to their action, people form organisations consisting of all members of the society. Creative thinking and facilitating organisations enable people to gain what they have lost through dependence relation and exploitation. They mobilised internal resources without any external input and cut off unproductive expenditure. They also encourage savings through surplus.

The above strategy is based on practical experience identified world wide. One such experience is that of Boomi Sena, where all the above elements of the strategy are evident.

3.1 Boomi Sena

The Boomi Sena (Land Army) Movement in the Palghar district of Maharashtra State, India, is a spontaneous indigenous movement forging a bond between the Adivasis tribals and other poor groups in the region into a united force. The movement concerned itself principally with the tribal men but, as it intensified, it touched the women who within tribal society, occupied an openly subordinate
position. Over the years the adivasis gradually lost their land to the money lending Sawai. In 1970 by a collective decision of adivasis this loss was resisted and crops seized. Boomi Sena was launched. After the initial action, the movement faltered and became enveloped in a programme of technical assistance and financial paternalism. This brief flirtation failed to tackle fundamental problems and the Boomi Sena Movement re-emerged in a new phase: the adivasis were now committed to taking action themselves to tackle these problems. In 1976 the Boomi Sena took this new course and began a process which in the next three years spread throughout the district(1).

a. Exploiter Elites in Boomi Sena’s birth time:

1) Money-lender-trader (Sawkar) consist of money lenders, small traders, constructors, petty bourgeois, etc.

2) Rich peasants: composed of middle castes like Kunbis, the richer amongst them had involved themselves in mercantile activities such as trading, money lending and contracting.

3) Middle peasants: who engaged adivasis in labour during the peak season. They gained more from the adivasis though they also depended on the money lenders. The exploitation of the adivasis by the non-adivasis mainly through wages and money lending with illegal tenancy (rent) forming a small, but not insignificant part while the Kunbis tended to exploit more through wages while the others extracted more through usury and trade(2).

b. Conscientisation in Boomi Sena

The first significant step in conscientisation was the incident in Jankop in 1975, in which the people experienced their power in confrontation with the feared

1. Okley and Manderson, ILO 1984
2. (DD 79:2, pp 55-60)
Bhaiyas, who were to adivasis, the real power Palghar, coercive and answerable to none. Their capacity to transform reality dawned on the adivasis.

This awareness came through spontaneous action and remained to be conscientised through systematic reflection, systematic attempts at conscientisation started with Shibirs in 1976, which developed through experience where people recounted their experiences individually and reflected upon them collectively(1).

Boomi Sena's conscientisation is self-reliance who says:
1) We shall take decisions.
2) We shall take outside help only to our own capabilities.

c. Animators in Boomi Sena:

Animators in Boomi Sena are the leading part of the movement, the vanguards who have its own conscientisation process which is institutionalised in their periodic review session. In these sessions, which go on for two to three days, the group engages in synthesising the experience of the movement(2).

The vanguard group does not organise the people, it believes that the people should organise themselves. But it is also convinced that mobilisation by itself does not achieve much sustained gain, unless it is followed by organisations. The task of the vanguard group does not to go beyond the mobilisation and initiating conscientisation process.

The adivasis themselves create Tarun Mandals, which is an organ at the village level. These are their assemblies established to consolidate a collective solidarity that has already been experienced in spontaneous action.

The relationship between the centre (vanguards base) and the Tarun Mandal is informal, it has evolved naturally through participation in the struggle together and no necessity for any formal constitution or accountability has as yet been felt. Both the centre and the Tarun Mandal are two legs of interfacing the people.

1,2. (DD 79-2, pp 55-60)
Once born, a Tarun Mandal grows with a life of its own – like an organic cell of a body that is the Boomi Sena movement. It is interlinked with other Tarun Mandals through participation in the movement and in Shibirs and through direct exchanges of experience(1).

1. DD 79:2 (pp 55-60)
Concluding Analysis

From the discussion presented in this chapter it is evident that each of the exogenous and endogenous development strategies has its own advantages and disadvantages. Though the endogenous strategy is more effective in terms of control over local exploiter elites, the degree of influence which the exogenous development has over macro plans and policies and resources are widely recognised. The best strategy would be a type of unification amongst all useful elements of the two strategies. To ascertain useful elements of each of these strategies some of the main advantages and disadvantages of each of these are discussed below:

i Advantages of exogenous development strategy:
- It can greatly influence macro policies, plans and resources to suit project objectives
- It is designed, as such, that it can provide quick, and measurable contribution, to the national economic growth. Access and emphasis on scientific research further enhances such capabilities
- It is more reliable to external donors and therefore, it has easy access to huge external input
- It enjoys and utilises existing governmental infrastructure, and therefore, it is easily replicated.

All the above advantages of exogenous strategy makes the life easier for project workers who are an extension of government or implementing agency's hierarchy, they have very little to do with the community.

ii Disadvantages of exogenous strategy:
- It is vulnerable to elites domination at national, regional and local level, for reasons already discussed in this chapter
- It often begins on a larger scale and does too many things at once which makes it hard for people to understand the process and maintain the outcome.
- It is implemented as part of long term macro plan which does not leave enough room for adjustment with the changing local environment.
- Because of its concern about urgent, large scale, economic return, it tends to put heavy emphasis on scientific and technological input, which undermines rural people's current ability and level of understanding. As a consequence the already better off elites benefit most from such input, and the society becomes further polarised.
- It always begins with material input which either enhances dependency on elites or shifts such dependency from elites to external sources. As a consequence, the poor, instead of becoming self-reliant, become reliant on external resources. It is also hard to liquidate heavy internal input.

In contrast to its advantages, the disadvantages of exogenous strategy directly affect the poor. It is these disadvantages which has made the efforts of the past 40 years fruitless. Though, in the recent past, efforts have been made to involve the poor in the process of implementation, however, due to an understandable lack of real commitment such efforts have also failed to change the general situation of the poor.

iii Disadvantages of endogenous strategy:
- It is vulnerable to national economically based policies which either make endogenous strategy fail or put it into isolation, in which case it becomes vulnerable to defeat by locally opposing elites.
- It fails to secure external support, at least in its early stages. It also sounds unreliable to big donor input.
- It fails to contribute substantially to the national economic growth, therefore, national planners resist changing their priorities and attitudes.
- It lacks access to utilisation of scientific research and technological advantages needed for a fast increase in local products.
Advantages of endogenous strategy:

- It always begins on a small scale by people's own initiative, therefore, people understand it and can further develop and sustain the process.
- It tends to use locally produced, acquired and understood technology, therefore, all sections can equally benefit from it.
- It can easily utilise and modify if necessary, the existing traditional forms of organisations which are familiar to the people and don't require huge bulks of new skills in order to run them. People themselves make a distinction between useful leaders and exploiter elites, and utilise the former's leadership skills and qualities.
- As it begins as a conscious protest vis-a-vis unequitable distribution of resources and benefits, therefore, equitable distribution of benefits is never an issue.
- It can easily sustain and develop the pace of production and distribution.
- Withdrawal of external input — if there is any — is never a problem as it is minimum, careful and conscious.

The main areas of contrast between exogenous and endogenous strategies are; contrasts between economic growth and people's needs — macro plans and micro level autonomy — hierarchical formal structures and non-formal, horizontal networks — top, down and bottom, up — scientific knowledge and people's knowledge — and technology and human force. In all cases each of the above contrasting sides depends on each other to a larger degree. The state needs the people and the people needs the state, however, people can survive without the state, while the state cannot survive without its people. Similarly macro plans, needs people at micro level to implement it, but people at micro level can do without macro plans to guide them into the future because they can prepare their own micro plans according to their arising situation. On the other hand micro level plans that are autonomously prepared and implemented by the people require macro level supportive policy and attitude. Such micro level plans and activities need to be
united with other level plans and activities through strong networks, in order to ascertain its power over macro policies and plans.

In the conventional forms of exogenous strategy, macro plans and policies are made first and then micro level actors are expected to function within the existing framework. This situation only suited elites, because they stood between the state and the people and did not allow input and benefits to reach the poor. Measured (exclusion, inclusion) to bypass elites have also been fruitless, for reasons already discussed.

The fact that endogenous development is initiated, owned and controlled by the people make it the best strategy to cope with local elites, however, it also needs to accommodate some useful elements of exogenous strategy in order to empower itself to the level that it can overcome, not only the power of local exploiters, but also to turn national plans and policies to their advantage. Such empowerment is only possible through consciously organised, horizontal expansion to form wider networks of like-minded groups of the poor. The more it expanded, the stronger it became vis-a-vis external negative influence.

The aim of endogenous empowerment is not to replace the power of elites or the state, it is rather to transform their power to the advantage of the masses, which include the state and the elite. Such transformation takes place though what Manfred Maxneef called articulation and define it as:

"Human Scale Development is focussed and based on the satisfaction of fundamental human needs, on the generation of growing level of self-reliance, and on the construction of organic articulation of people with nature and technology, of global processes with local activities of the personal with the social, of planning with autonomy and of civil society with the state."
Organic articulation is based on biological links and feelings towards each other. Organic feelings exist in the human body, when one organ suffers, others suffer too. This is in contrast to mechanic, which means that; if one part suffers, the outcome may be affected but there is no feeling of shared pain. Organic articulation is feeling and practice of mutual inter-dependence between various parts. State can be concerned about economic growth, not for the sake of unnecessary military competition with other states but for the sake of its people's satisfaction. State must not see people as objects (to be acted upon) and financial growth as subject. On the other hand an individual can struggle to meet his/her needs and obtain their satisfaction, but cannot undermine society or the state and ultimately the globe. States can have macro plans, but such plans must be prepared on the basis of autonomous action of the people at micro level. Articulation in the above sense is not possible in the current mode of relationship, where plans, decisions and priorities go from top to bottom and information goes only from bottom to top and where communication is a mere issuing of communiques. It is also impossible, when people are deceived by vague and misleading slogans. For instance, it is voiced that people must participate, but in reality such participation is no more than a limited involvement of selective individuals who only approve what comes from the top to the bottom. Or people's self-reliance is projected as the aim of rural development, but people's ability is not relied upon. This whole policy and behaviour environment needs adjustment. For organic articulation which becomes possible through direct participatory democracy which nurtures these conditions which will help to transform paternalistic role of the state into a role of encouraging creative solutions flowing from the bottom upward.
CHAPTER 3

Recommendation for Future Rural Development Strategy/Coping with Local Elites in Afghanistan

Rural development in Afghanistan before 1979 has been considered as part of a Five Year Master Plan. Since 1979, the country lacked any plan, due to the bloody war which has completely destroyed it. On the other hand, hundreds of foreign NGO's have been engaged over the past eleven years providing emergency aid to refugees, the displaced and war victims. Some NGO's have also been involved in promotion of rural development, especially agricultural development activities. Most of their efforts are channelled through local resistance commanders and other elites.

With brighter prospects for peace, the general emphasis is gradually shifting from emergency to development activities. It is evident that in the past, present and future rural development activities, the local elites including resistance commanders stood, and will stand as a major obstacle inhibiting rural self-reliance. In this chapter an effort is made to recommend suitable rural development strategy, that should be effective in terms of coping with local elites. Experience indicates that strategies that are designed narrowly to serve one single purpose often has adverse effects on other related aspects, therefore, coping with local elites will be seen as the general context of rural development.

The general format of the rest of this chapter will be based on a brief discussion of current rural development problems, some positive points which may be considered as starting clues and recommended solutions.

However, before all comparative study of two case studies from the activities of rural development will be presented and analysed. The purpose of discussing these two case studies is to prove the importance of starting small projects based on equal partnership rather than introducing large programmes with little consideration of social realities.
1. Endogenous Development Process of Qataghan, Northern Afghanistan

The development of Qataghan was one of the most successful processes in recent Afghan history. Yet it has rarely been cited in the literature on Afghan development except for Etienne 1972. One reason Qataghan is ignored by foreign analysts is that it was developed by the Afghans with their own capital before the country became addicted to foreign aid. The Qataghan case is particularly important because of the local initiative and institution rooted in the areas spreading the benefits throughout the population.

The idea of Qataghan’s development was born in the mind of a government officer (Abdul Aziz London in 1925) knowing that Qataghan was ecologically similar to Uzbekerstan which plied most of the cotton used in Russia. There were two main obstacles specific to the area inhibiting any action by the people; first the area was in the grip of endemic malaria for a long period, a result of which, indigenous population fled to shelter in mountains. Second, the government for the past century has been transferring feuding and troublesome pushtoon tribes from the south to the north, which constantly annoyed the indigenous population who were mainly Uzbeks.

London and his colleagues managed to persuade Afghan capitalists to invest in cotton promotion and expand and almost simultaneously they managed to convince the government to introduce land reclamation. They also managed to convince the Afghan Bank at that time to provide loans and easy credit.

Thousands or acres were reclaimed, some with cover labour, and made available to farmers on liberal terms. Some of the investment came from Afghan capitalists (elites) who owned large amounts of land in the area while the other came from the bank. Co-operation amongst the above parties, together with the new settlers became the milestone in the development of the area. Indigenous population also gained courage from the new settler’s to fight both malaria and poverty, and joined hands to develop their area. Those efforts were further boosted when malaria was eradicated from the area by the people with direct co-operation from the United Nations.
The news of Qataghan's fertility and availability of land on easy terms attracted both the indigenous population who had fled and other people from all over the country. The government, in order to maintain pushtoon majority and control, again transferred more of the rebellion pushtoon groups to the area. Unexpectedly all the settlers and the indigenous hand in hand, though in competition, positively contributed to the development of the area. Though it is not known how the idea born in the mind of a government official reached every family in the area as there was no structure as such, ever existed; however, it is a fact that all the population unanimously united for one goal, the development of their masses.

Some people argue that the real force behind the case was a cotton processing, private company later called spinzer. Spinzer went through many ups and downs through changes of regime, however, the development speed remained unaffected, which proves the limited scope of the Spinzers role.

2. Helmand Valley Development Programme

The non-aligned position of Afghanistan enabled the country to continue exporting during the war, and by the end of the war it had accumulated a large amount of hard currency. Being impressed by Qataghans development progress, the government decided to assist in the development of Helmand Valley.

In 1945 negotiations began between the Afghan Government and Morrison-Knudson Afghanistan Inc (MKA), an American firm experienced in large scale projects. MKA estimated the total cost of the project at $63.7 million.

The project, apart from development objectives, had political aim such as the settlement of nomad tribes who seasonally migrated into the neighbouring country of Pakistan. In general, heavy emphasis was given on engineering work mainly due to American influence, and also to utilise the skills of the first group of engineers graduated from the first and only engineering faculty in the country. Abdul Majid Zabuli, Director of the National Economy (and the major figure in the development of Qataghan) was dismissed due to his opposition to the design of
the project.

Problems plagued the project from its start. The cost began to explode and the government's reserve was eaten up. The Afghans then turned to America for a loan of $55 million. America agreed with the condition that the project be re-organised.

Most of the money was still spent on building up huge dams mainly to produce electricity which was never used except for the provincial capital. A new canal system was built up, which was technologically advanced, but the people of the area were unable to maintain it.

In most cases, the project was run on advice from the so-called foreign experts. It was they who emphasised the settlement of nomads, ignoring the value of the nomad's sheep, using extensive seasonal grassland in Afghanistan. A closer study of nomadism of Qataghan would have revealed the appropriateness of semi-nomadism that combined agriculture and pastoralism. Transferring nomads of Helmand to successful farmers was a failed measure.

The most important failure of the programme was that the benefit as well as the input largely went into the pockets of large landowners. Tribal and ethnic feuds emerged on water distribution. Dams ecologically damaged the land. Within two years, half of the settled nomads vacated the new villages and ran after their traditional jobs.

After this rocky experience, the Afghans and the Americans put the blame on each other. The productive capacity of the region had increased mainly due to increased water sources, however, because of the continuing social and economic problems the project could hardly be judged as a success (Tudor report 1956).

3. Conclusion/Comparison

The success of Qataghan and the failure of the Helmand projects make an instructive comparison. The size of the areas was about equal and the government was the same for both. The key to understanding the differences lies in five areas. First was economic productivity. The expected return in Qataghan's
development was great and became an attractive lure to further investment. In the Helmand region the expected return of the project was always in doubt and in the end proved disappointing.

Secondly, Qataghan's development by necessity using technology that was understood and could be maintained locally. Traditionally, organised canal cleaning, water musters and local customs allowed the system to function easily in the absence of engineers and government officials who were often more concerned about their personal gains rather than real commitment towards the people. The Helmand project was an example of planning without real knowledge of the actual social realities. Such a grand project could use none of the traditional organisations to facilitate local action.

Thirdly, settlers in Qataghan mostly came to the area on their own will, and were conscious of their desire, while in Helmand, settlers came on the fake promises of the government for a better livelihood. Fourthly, land in Qataghan was sold to newcomers, though on easy terms which enabled the farmers to choose the type of land they wanted, while in Helmand the land was offered free, and thus the most fertile pieces were already occupied by elites, the less fertile was granted to the new settlers.

Finally, in Qataghan the Afghans were motivated by their own thinking to find answers for their problems while in the Helmand region, they looked for foreign aid and experts as a solution. Helmand people became addicted to foreign aid and gradually the pace of the development dropped.

4. Problems Expected During Rehabilitation and Rural Development Process

Soon after the war ended in Afghanistan and rural rehabilitation and development processes began, serious problems were expected to arise. Some of those problems include:

Note: The above two case studies are take from the study carried out by: T.J. Barfield and M.J. Fisher in "Cultural Survival", Cambridge 1980
Disputes over land ownership were expected, as over half of the country's population which has either migrated abroad or are internally displaced, began to resettle.

Future social structure was unexpected as it would be a combination of traditional structure and the present military-social structure.

Addiction to foreign aid will inhibit self-reliance. Over the past ten years the country's vast majority has relied on emergency aid provided by governmental and non-government organisations.

Constant destruction of sources of livelihood over the past decade will make it almost impossible for the rural people to carry out their rehabilitation and development process without external input.

The fragile political system will tend to label movement type slogans on the name of the poor as communism and will tend to be violently suppressed.

The traditional depressing level of literacy has become hopeless, due to ten years of heavy concentration on war.

All emergency and developmental input is channelled through heavily armed resistance commanders and other local elites. Any alternative ways of reaching the poor will be strongly opposed, unless an alternative source is found for elites.

Women in Afghanistan are traditionally subordinate and are not allowed to pursue their view on social matters, though they are not seriously exploited as it is prohibited by Islam. Any measure to motivate and educate women will be linked to the past motives of communists and will be strongly opposed by men who, by definition, are elites.

Tribal, ethnic and religious feuds may be more serious than ever before.

It is obvious that rural development in its widely recognised context cannot and will not be an answer to overcome all the above problems. It is also evident that experience elsewhere in the world will have only a limited degree of relevance, as Afghanistan in the past and present has remained as a unique isolated
society with its own problems and values. On the other hand, rural development cannot function without serious consideration of the above problem, while the current Afghan society is faced with all the above mentioned problems, it consists of some advantageous realities too. Some of those realities can be turned into the advantage of rural development activities. Some of such realities include:

- As the country is just freed from foreign invasion, during which Afghans sacrificed over a million of its population as a cost for freedom. This situation to a large extent has conscientised people about their freedom as a nation. Such consciousness can easily be transformed into a process of conscientisation about their socio-economic realities.

- Lack of an effective central government has made Afghans accustomed to a loose type of traditional de-centralised power structure. This situation makes it easier for future governments and its officials to accept decentralised and devolved form of structure and power, especially in regard to rural development.

- The country, over the past decade lacked any macro-economic plan and strategy. Future governments can have a fresh start by preparing its macro plans and strategies based on plans and strategies allowed to be developed at micro level through direct democracy and active participation of all sections of the Afghan society.

- International NGO's who are experienced, committed and enjoy reputation in promotion of people centered rural development strategy, from their involvement over the past years, have developed adequate understanding of the Afghan socio-economic realities. They are well placed to pursue people centred strategy at the grass root level and influence macro policies and strategies; provided that they are given enough opportunity.

- Individual Afghans who have accumulated huge amounts of cash will be looking for investment, therefore, they can be used as an alternative to external aid, by encouraging them to invest based on experience from the Qataghan development programme.
Based on the discussions in the previous chapter, comparative analysis of the Qataghan and Helmand experience and the problems and advantageous realities, are proposed roles for future governments, NGO's and other concerned parties, to be played in future rural development strategy in Afghanistan.

5. Policy, Strategy and Legislation

Following are some of the most important policies, strategies and legislations which future governments of Afghanistan are expected to consider in order to inhibit exploitation of the rural poor by the local elites.

- Concern about national economic growth needs to be articulated with the needs and demands of the local people. This can be achieved by creating a fair balance between promotion of cash and food crops through scientific research and technological input. Emphasis on cash crops will benefit the elite and national economy through exports, while food crops will benefit everybody. Therefore, more emphasis must be given to food crops.

- Government subsidies and concessions on import of heavy machineries must be avoided. Such machineries are ordered, afforded and utilised by the elites and will further increase unemployment amongst the poor.

- Low pricing policies aimed at the provision of cheap food to urban areas and government officials must be avoided. This will benefit small land owners who are the main producers of food crops. Small farmers and food crop producers must be allowed to locally fix their prices and measures must be introduced to enable the urban population to cope with the situation.

- Political power must be devolved to local representatives of the people who are elected through direct democracy and participatory process. Autonomous organisations at the grass-root level must be recognised as the real decision making body of the people. Traditional elites who are not accountable to the people must not be recognised as a representative of the people. This whole process may require re-orientation and training of bureaucracy especially at local level.
- Unimodal strategy of agricultural development must be pursued. It may not necessarily require land reforms. It can be achieved through regularisation of tenancy terms and conditions as well as an introductory tax system based on size and quality of land.

- Forms and procedures of attaining credit and loans from governmental and private institutions must be allowed to be formulated by the autonomous organisations of the rural poor. This will enable them to look for an alternative to their dependence on local elites especially in terms of attaining easy credits.

- Minimum wage policies must be introduced, based on recommendations from autonomous organisations of the rural poor.

- Grass-roots level autonomous organisations of the poor must be allowed easy access to information needed to facilitate local level actions.

6. Autonomous People’s Organisations

Rural development efforts must be centred around people’s autonomous organisations. They must be allowed to analyse the local problems, investigate solutions and mobilise local resources. They should decide the form and amount of external input.

How Can Such Organisations be Formed?

Experience indicates that people’s autonomous organisations are rarely formed by itself. Self-colonisation of the people and existing social set-ups often inhibit people’s creative investigation. The idea of formation of organisations that facilitate local action is often borne through inspiration from the outside world. There are many ways such inspiration, which cause internal stimulation, can take place. Following are the two most common ways in which such inspiration and stimulation can take place: i) one or more members of the community go out of their community, see other communities and societies and therefore get an idea about what can be done within their own community, and ii) some individual or
groups come to the community from outside, but the existing situation as a problem to the members of the community who critically think, analyse and realise their situation. The second stage is for them to think in the same solutions as their problems. Many alternative solutions emerge which people themselves analyse, prioritise and act. The outcome of their action is analysed by themselves and fed back to their action. This process continues and further develops.

The continued process of people's critical thinking and investigation about their problems and alternative solutions is CONSCIENTISATION. The two categories of people who are either members of the community who get inspired and stimulated by seeing other communities, or those who come from outside to stimulate members of the community are both EXTERNAL ANIMATORS. External animators are different from the conventional project workers who come to the community, tell them what their problems are and present them with ready made solutions based on an already prepared plan. In this case only elites understand the project workers and benefit from their plans. The poor can hardly follow the process and are left from the benefits. External animators lack such plans or solutions. They have rather conscientised themselves and are organically committed towards the people. Such commitment is different from signing a job contract. It is based on sharing pains and feelings.

As people within the community have different levels of understanding and thinking, some members of the community emerge ahead of others and tend to help the others. This group is INTERNAL ANIMATORS. Once the ability of internal animators is recognised by the community they emerge as their leaders. In this process one of the main tasks of external animator becomes the creation of internal animators.

When people break down their own mental barriers and become conscious of their situation, they are still far away from action. They tend to assess their resources, strength and obstacles. They reach the stage of realising the necessity of collective action for which they will need to form their own organisations.

To effectively run their organisations, members realise the need to acquire
management, accounting, recording and literacy skills. External animators can play an important role in terms of linking such organisations to external sources who can provide such skills.

Elites in this process are neither excluded nor included, they are also affected by the whole process. They either become aware of their humane link with the rest of society and tend to become a useful source of knowledge, skills and material or they stand as an enemy of the rest of society, in which the society copes with them in their own way.

In order to eliminate dependency on local exploiter elites, animators tend to facilitate the creation of a revolving fund*. Revolving fund is run and controlled by the people's organisation. Members borrow money from the fund on easy terms and invest it in productive activities. They return borrowings along with interest on a regular basis. As interest without risk is prohibited by Islam, the Afghanistan borrowing will have to be organised on the basis of (Muzaribat) where both sides agree on equal shares in loss and benefits. Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is a very good example of lending to groups rather than individuals and also the provision of help and advice on successful investment(1). The main source of funding can be members savings and Zakawat(1) and Usher(2), in which the main contributor can be the local elites.

Another important aspect of the animators role is to stimulate autonomous organisations to expanding the whole process into the neighbouring communities. Once such organisations are established in other communities, they are interlinked as a horizontal network. Interlinking and networking is an important element in survival, and further development of organisations. They tend to rely on each others experience, resource and also they are a united voice in order to ascertain their active existence in the state.

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* See Fernand Vincent, Vol.2, 1989
1,2 Islamic Obligation - Zakawat means \( \frac{1}{4} \) of cash and equivalent not used for one year, be given to poor - Usher \( \frac{1}{10} \) of harvest must be given to poor
7. **The Role of External Agencies**

Governmental Agencies, such as line ministries and NGO's can play an important role, however different from their conventional role, in the above process. Their most important role is to facilitate the creation or recruitment of external animators. The process of creation and recruitment will have to be different from the traditional methods applied in the case of project workers, agents, extension workers etc. The following recommendations are an important role in this regard:

- While recruiting animators, priority must be given to personal commitment, social background and practical experience, rather than paper qualifications or better communications with the implementing agency. In the current relief and development activities in Afghanistan, foreign NGO's tend to give priority to those who can speak the english language. Professional elitism — engineers are an elite profession — would also have to be overcome by according to equal importance to other social professions.

- Animators will have to be trained, though putting their future as a problem to them and demanding them to overcome such problems without support from trainers. Their level of conscious vis-à-vis the poor needs to be thoroughly assessed before they begin to conscientise and create internal animators.

- Animators must be trained, and be committed to report to the people rather than the implementing agency. Animators must be trained and committed to liquidise their involvement in the development process in order to allow the poor to lead their way towards self-reliance.

Other important roles of an external implementing agency is the provision of technical and expert support as required by the autonomous organisations of the poor. External implementing agencies must play an important role in protecting organisations of the poor against government bureaucrats, who, for some reason may tend to depress these organisations before they can take off the ground. Implementing Agencies can input into the revolving fund, however, such input must
be in terms of a loan which must be returned much in the similar way as the poor returns their borrowings to the revolving fund.

Both governmental and non-governmental organisations can play an important role in the implementation of capital projects such as the generation of electricity, construction of roads etc. Autonomous village level organisations often lack material and expert resources to initiate and implement such projects, however, they are the main source of provision of the labour force. Because these projects will have direct implication to the rural people in terms of benefit and employment, GO's and NGO's must articulate their plans and resources with the autonomous organisations through dialogical and interactive communications.

8. Roles Which Implementing Agencies Must Avoid to Play

- All sorts of charity input must be avoided unless absolutely necessary to save lives. Charity aids often increase local dependency and inhibits self-reliance.
- Too many hierarchal top-down structures, a speciality of line ministries must be avoided. Instead the line ministries must articulate their input with the needs and demands of autonomous organisations for the services which can be made available.
- Implementing agencies must avoid scientific discoveries and technological advancement through the pursuasion of people. Such qualities can be made available, but it must be the people themselves to discover and acquire it through their own investigation.

At last we can argue that the best way to cope with the elites is not to replace the state or the elites by the poor, nor is it to get rid of the elites through tactics conceived and implemented by outsiders. We also do not suggest that the poor should get rid of the elites through violence, as in this case, some members of the poor may emerge as a different form of elite.

The best way of coping with local elites is articulation between elites and the poor, based on mutual conscientisation where each side accepts each other as a
compliment, equal partner and with shared interest which is satisfactory to all members of society. Such roles can only be played by autonomous grass-roots level organisations, that are formed through animation by outsiders who are already conscientised and organically committed towards the poor.

Articulation between the elites and the poor cannot be successful in isolation. It has to be matched by articulation between plans made at the top and autonomy created at the bottom - between policies formulated at the top and priorities set at the bottom - between networks of organisations created by the poor and hierarchies utilised by the external agencies and finally between exogenous and endogenous.
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