SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
OF AFGHANISTAN WITH EMPHASIS ON THE RURAL ECONOMY

by Gilbert Etienne,
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While the bulk of this paper is devoted to rural problems, some comments are added on the other sectors of the economy: roads, electricity, industries.

Preliminary remarks

At the time of the fall of President Daud in April 1978, the economy was showing more healthy trends than in the early 1970s but, at the same time, severe constraints and shortcomings were obvious.

One basic defect was the weakness of the administration, i.e. the lack of a proper civil service recruited through competitive examination **/. Even at senior levels, such as a President of department in a ministry, one would come across enormous differences between high calibre and competent officers and others who were very mediocre.

The overall government policy, in spite of achievements, was affected by too much emphasis on government controls and other direct or indirect state interventions. Most major factories were in the public sector. Inefficiency combined with corruption was quite widespread, while private initiative, though not lacking in the commercial sector, among small bazaris and big merchants, was more constrained than encouraged.

Foreign aid played a dominant role covering at least two-thirds of development expenditures between the 1950s and the late 1970s but the picture was mixed. Some positive results of well conducted operations should be mentioned: the beginnings of a green revolution in wheat (mostly US aid), progress in cotton (French co-operation), the irrigation systems of the Helmand-Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA) supported by the US, and road construction by the Soviet Union and USA.

On the other side of the coin there were "white elephants" of limited return if any: i.e. Kandahar Airport (USA), the Nangarhar Irrigation Project (Soviet), Mahipur Power Station (Federal Republic of Germany), the Balkh Textile Mill (France). Many more examples of wasted resources could be added in other fields of the economy.

Afghanistan was receiving aid from a large number of countries and agencies: the Soviet Union was followed by the USA, several Western European countries, China, most U.N. agencies, among which the World Bank played an increasing and, on the whole, positive role.

**/ Many thanks to Pierre and Micheline Centlivres for their useful comments on this paper.
***/ This was in use only for recruiting diplomats.

GE.89-01344
Political factors, competition among donors, lack of co-ordination, uneven calibre of expatriates (most of which lived in the pleasant city of Kabul), manipulations by the Afghans playing one donor against the other and, last but not least, corruption which was not confined to Afghan officials... were the main defects of co-operation.

As early as 1970, Abdul Majid Zaboli (who had been one of the main architects of Afghanistan's modernization already in the 1930s) was expressing his concern in a Kabul Journal: "Our major historical mistake has been to borrow money from abroad without making an administrative reform and without mobilizing our national resources" And Zaboli to conclude on the "morphine" of foreign aid.

These defects in development policy and co-operation deserve to be emphasized because there is a risk for the Afghans and their foreign counterparts to fall again, today, in the same trap. *

1. **The overall level of the economy in 1978–1979** *{/}

**Agriculture:** Substantial progress had been achieved during the past twenty-five years: progress in irrigation, wheat, cotton, vineyards and orchards. Modern inputs such as new seeds, chemical fertilizers, more rarely pesticides, were increasingly being used in a number of provinces. Though illiterate, farmers were well aware of the advantages brought by such changes.

Progress was connected with the expansion of irrigation in several regions. As to rainfed crops (*lalmi*), mostly spring wheat, there did not seem to be any decisive progress.

Animal husbandry expanded also: sheep for meat, Karakul sheep for their skin.

National statistics (see appendix) are rather shaky but field observations gave the following data on yields which provide us with a fair order of magnitude for irrigated crops:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>late 1970s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional wheat</td>
<td>new wheat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000–1200 kg/ha</td>
<td>2000–2500 kg/ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional cotton (lint)</td>
<td>cotton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200–400</td>
<td>300–550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Imports of grain, after reaching a peak of 239,000 T in 1971/72, had fallen and practically disappeared by the mid 1970's.

As shown in the appendix, agricultural exports played a major role and grew substantially in the 1970s. First came fresh and dry fruit: 90 million US$ in 1974/75 and 75 million dollars in 1975/76 compared to 29 million dollars in 1970/71. As to raw cotton, it expanded from 8.5 million dollars to 36 million in 1975/76.

A network of new and excellent highways (2600 km) was in use, while access roads remained on the whole at a poor level.

Industries were confined to ginning and textile mills, cement, sugar mills, a factory of urea, mechanical workshops. Most factories were in the public sector, several of which were working below capacity.

Electrification had expanded in all relatively large towns, though some of them had limited supply. Electricity was practically non-existent in villages.

Banking had expanded in cities and credit facilities had appeared in the countryside, helping a limited number of farmers.

While quite substantial — though limited — such progress was helped by the oil boom of 1973. Large numbers of Afghans (300,000 – 500,000, perhaps more) went mostly to Iran to seek employment and sent their savings home. Remittances were in the order of US$300 million per year in the 1970s.

*{/} My last field studies occurred in August 1978 and March 1979. I was able to gather additional information through visits to border areas of Pakistan in 1980, 1985 and 1986.
Some major constraints or defects were however appearing very clearly:

Population pressure was becoming alarming in many areas: shrinking of holdings, rising number of landless agricultural workers, difficulties of employment in secondary and tertiary sectors.

The development of agriculture was in need of considerable improvement in order to proceed faster. Wheat seeds introduced in the late 1960s needed immediate replacement. Most irrigation systems were not sufficiently efficient to allow for further increases in crop yields. The use of chemical fertilizers needed to be improved: more balance between N and P, possibly K, often higher doses.

Other sectors: Fruit, animal husbandry also needed technical progress, research, better infrastructure and marketing to keep on improving.

The lack of reasonably good secondary and access roads was being felt. As to electricity, its lack in villages was hindering the growth of small industries.

Similar comments could be made on the industrial sector where low productivity, losses and waste were also widespread.

To sum up, after an initial phase of development the economy was entering a more sophisticated or more complex phase, more demanding in terms of technology and efficiency in order to proceed further. In addition, the weakness of the administration and the lack of reforms were creating increasing obstacles to development.

2. The main geographical areas

The following grouping of provinces is based on several criteria: geographical factors, population, present level of development and potential for further growth.

The population data are derived from the pre-census survey of 1978/79. In addition, population growth since that time, displaced persons outside and inside the country and war casualties should be taken into account.

(a) Kabul (1,376,000), Parwan */ (789,000), Logar (669,000), Maidan or Wardak (310,000)

Leaving aside a limited part of the population which belongs to the central Afghanistan (Hazarajat) the whole area relies on irrigated agriculture, mostly canals in the various valleys. Wheat is the main crop, followed by maize and some rice (mostly in lower Wardak). Orchards and vineyards are particularly important in Koh-i-Daman (Kabul and Parwan). Potatoes and vegetables were also widespread, the former yielding about 10 T/hectare. Only very new farmers would harvest 25-30 T as in Europe. There is little rainfed wheat (lalmi). Since the altitude ranges (for crops) between 1500 and 2500m, or more, usually only one crop is possible per year.

Agriculture and horticulture were already quite advanced thanks to modern inputs in 1978/79, but population pressure on land was heavy. Many families could, nevertheless, manage to live relatively well thanks to one or more members working in Kabul.
Including the only large town (Kabul, 870,000), the area had a population of 3,144,000, out of the total population of 14 million.

A considerable number of people have fled to Kabul, the population of which may be now around two million or more. A number of other people have gone to Pakistan. Resettlement of refugees will be a substantial task.

Orchards and vineyards, especially in Koh-Daman on both sides of the highway leading to the Salang have suffered much from the war. Many villages there and in the other provinces have been destroyed. The lower part of Panjshir has also suffered a lot but reconstruction has already started thanks to the level of the local leadership. Refugees from Kabul have begun coming back.

Irrigation, which was already inadequate in prewar days, needs rehabilitation works and considerable improvements in most parts of these provinces. Particular attention should be given to the possible expansion of pumps on open wells and/or tubewells. There were already a few before the war.

Some areas like Jeghatu in the upper reaches of Wardak are particularly well organized under local authorities.

(b) Nangarhar (786,000), Laghman (387,000), Kunar (323,000)

The area enjoys a climate rather similar to that of Peshawar with its monsoon pattern. The wide valley (580m altitude) around Jalalabad (Nangarhar) enjoyed an intensive agriculture with rice following wheat on the same land in one year, or sugarcane, citrus, orange orchards. Narrow valleys in Laghman and Kunar give wheat and maize or only one crop at higher altitudes.

The plain around Jalalabad (population of the town: 90,000) had experienced a substantial expansion in the 1960s and 70s: new varieties of seeds and chemical fertilizers had been introduced. As to the Soviet irrigation project in Nangarhar, an ill-conceived project, it has progressed painfully, reaching around 6000 ha of citrus and orange orchards mostly in State farms. At least until March 1989, irrigation systems were in relatively good condition.

While Laghman valley has not suffered too much from the war, the plain around Jalalabad and the Kunar valley have gone through considerable warfare and damages.

The whole area was already very heavily populated before the war, which led to temporary or more permanent labour migrations to other parts of the country, including the Northern plains beyond the Hindukush, to Pakistan and, in the 1970s, to the Middle East.

Since the war, large numbers of refugees have poured into Pakistan. Here again resettlement problems will involve a number of actions to support the returning farmers, though most refugees could come back with their own means, even walking in a number of cases.

Population is fairly heavily concentrated: 1,490,000 inhabitants, mostly in Nangarhar.
(c) Ghazni (701,000), Paktia and Paktika (706,000) */

The area is formed of valleys with rugged mountains on both sides and rare forests left. The Western side of Ghazni belongs to Hazarajat (see below) where rainfed wheat (laimi) is cultivated. There was some development in these provinces before the war, though not so striking. Irrigated crops did progress to some extent. Some pumps on wells and tubewells were introduced, if not before the war certainly during it, thanks to some foreign NGOs. Population pressure was becoming a matter of concern.

War damage has been severe around the cities of Khost, Gardez and Ghazni. In 1988 the situation was much quieter around the latter city and agriculture was picking up in some villages. Pump irrigation near Ghazni is doing well with the help of some NGOs and looks promising.

As to Paktika, this was a scarcely developed province in the past with difficult terrain; parts of it have not suffered much from the war. More destruction seems to have affected some other areas. On the whole since the fall of 1988 most areas have reverted to peaceful conditions so that reconstruction has already started: repair of karez. There is a shortage of draught animals and herds of sheep and goats have been much reduced. It seems that possibilities of tubewell irrigation exist. A very large number of refugees have fled from these three provinces to Pakistan.

Zabol province has a very light population (170,000) and few resources. I have no information on its development.

(d) Baghlan (486,000) and Kunduz (575,000)

These two provinces had gone through considerable development until the war broke out, part of it starting already in the 1930s: progress of roads, expansion of trade and cities like Kunduz and Baghlan, progress in cotton, in wheat, rice, melons. The climate enables farmers to raise one crop of wheat followed by rice in the same year thanks to a fine and intensive cropping system. New seeds of cotton and wheat, as well as chemical fertilizers had contributed to increased yields in a sizeable manner. Some progress was also noted for sugarbeet in Baghlan.

However, the canals systems depending on the Kunduz and Khanabad rivers were increasing unable to improve crops further.

In 1979, a major scheme was 90% completed on the Khanabad river in order to improve irrigation on the 40,000 ha in the Kunduz-Khanabad plain (World Bank support). Another scheme on the Kunduz river was under construction in order to improve irrigation on 22,000 ha (Gawargan Chardara Project, pump irrigation).

Further away from the irrigation plains, one comes across plateaux and slopes bearing rainfed wheat and pasture land used by nomads.

It is difficult to have an idea of the impact of the war. It seems plausible that villages near the Pul-i-Khumri-Kunduz highway and on the new asphalted Kunduz-Khanabad road have been damaged. As far as refugees are concerned, a number of Pashtuns seem to have left for Pakistan, a trend less obvious for Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens.

*/ Paktia and Paktika have belonged to the single province of Paktia. On Paktika see Salam 6 mission Report, Geneva 21.2.89.
(e) Takhar (528,000) and Badakhshan (484,000) provinces

These isolated provinces were little developed before the war. There were no good roads, the undulating plateaux near Talugan were sown with rainfed wheat giving a low yield and practically nothing in case of a severe drought. The bottoms of valleys enjoyed irrigation but few innovations had been introduced. Animal husbandry by nomads or farmers was fairly important, but there was a growing competition between land for grazing and for tillage. Under population pressure farmers tended to open to the plough more and more mountain slopes, which after a few mediocre harvests would fall victim to erosion, a phenomenon quite common in other mountainous regions.

Under such conditions, these provinces are particularly vulnerable to drought and often did not, even before the war, cover their needs in cereals. Following the drought of 1988, the situation seems serious in Badakhshan and probably also in Takhar. On the other hand, trade remains active between these provinces and the richer provinces of Baghlan and Kunduz, enabling food surplus to be shifted to these derelict areas.

(f) Samangan (275,000), Balkh (570,000) Jozjan (642,000) provinces

This wide region contains deserts in the north and irrigated areas in the foothills of the Hindu Kush around Mazar-i-Sharif (140,000) Balkh or Tashqurghan (Khulm). Plateaux bear pasture land and rainfed wheat both on wide areas. Wheat, some cotton and orchards cover the irrigated areas, relying to a large extent on canals.

Development was clearly less advanced than in Baghlan and Kunduz when the war broke out, although some new seeds and chemical fertilizers had been introduced. There had been an increase in traditional irrigation since the beginning of this century, which enabled a number of Pashtuns to settle in the area inhabited mainly by Uzbeks, Turkmens and Tajiks.

Animal husbandry, especially sheep, was important. The largest herds of Karakul sheep were concentrated in these provinces. There was also a lively carpet cottage industry.

Already before the war, irrigation was in short supply. For instance, the Nahar Shadi river not too far from Mazar was giving water to 26,000 ha, whereas the actual availability of water was adequate for 15,000 ha only. The oasis of Tashqurghan was in a similar situation, a clear evidence of population pressure reaching a dangerous point.

The same imbalance between men and resources was appearing in the growing competition between pasture land and agriculture in the plateaux, the latter expanding at the cost of the former and stimulating soil erosion.

The only big town, Mazar (140,000), offered outlets for jobs to some of the villagers.

It is also worth mentioning that, unlike in most areas surveyed so far, one came across large landlords (100-200 ha), very often Pashtun. As far as the war is concerned, much damage has occurred in several areas near the highway, in particular around Tashqurghan. On the other hand, for some years, a fairly wide area around Mazar has been hardly affected by the war and was under control of the Kabul government.

\*\* see Salam 3 report
It seems that a sizeable amount of the 220,000 T of wheat imported yearly from the Soviet Union are devoted to these provinces and to Faryab.

(g) Faryab (547,000) Badghis (247,000) provinces

These provinces had remained poor, underdeveloped and isolated. The highway connecting Mazar to Herat was far from complete. In 1979 it stopped at Shibargan in Jozjan. Irrigated valleys were covering a small area. As to rainfed wheat it was particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of the weather, because of very low rainfall.

Information is scanty about the impact of the war on these provinces. One should be inclined to think that there must not have been too severe destruction because of the isolation of the area. On the other hand, it seems that crops have recently suffered from very damaging pest attacks.

(h) Herat (685,000) Farah (306,000) Nimroz (112,000) provinces

These provinces offer striking contrasts: wide tracts of land are covered by desert and are very thinly populated. Then come plateaux bearing pasture land and rainfed wheat. Finally the main irrigated areas are along the Hari Rud (Herat) followed by the oasis of Farah.

Most areas had remained very underdeveloped and isolated except the region surrounding Herat, where progress of new seeds of wheat, expansion of cotton, both irrigated by canals and in some areas by kares were striking by 1978. Orchards were also expanding. One must, however, mention as in other provinces, the growing inadequacy of irrigation. A project of animal husbandry-cum-slaughter house in Herat had begun in 1973 with the help of the World Bank under the Herat Livestock Corporation. It stopped in 1978 after giving limited results.

The irrigated part of Herat Province was benefitting from the new highways coming from the Soviet Union and Iran, and leading to Kandahar. Another source of income for the three provinces came from the large migration of workers to Iran where they had been attracted by the oil boom. They were sending money home, and their departure had contributed to boosting wages of the remaining agricultural workers. Finally, the rather large city of Herat (140,000) and its lively bazar had some impact on the countryside in terms of job opportunities.

While most of Farah and Nimroz provinces have not suffered much from the war, Herat and neighbouring areas have been the victim of violent and repeated battles. Several of the most prosperous parts of the province have been destroyed and, on top of that, a large number of mines should be removed. Fortunately the local commander of the resistance is particularly able, not only in its military operations but also in administering the territories he controls.

In addition to a large programme of reconstruction, it will be essential to repair and improve the irrigation systems. The possibility of developing tubewell irrigation should be explored. There had been some experiments in the 1970s.
(i) Helmand (570,000) and Kandahar (699,000) Provinces

These provinces depend nearly entirely on the rivers Helmand and Arghandab which, since ages have given life to agriculture in the midst of the desert (rainfall 50-150 mm per year from south to north).

In 1946 a major project began with the help of the USA to expand irrigation and the cultivated area through a network of modern canals and the construction of two dams: Kajakai on the Helmand and Arghandab on the river of the same name. In addition, roads were constructed as well as new villages to settle nomads and farmers coming from outside.

For a long time the project was a "white elephant". However, from 1970 onwards, it took a better turn bringing much development, new land reclaimed, improved irrigation on existing farmland. The cultivated areas increased from 78,000 ha in the 1950s to 145,000 ha in the 1970s and crop yields were also raised substantially so that the area had a surplus of grain. A fairly good extension service helped the diffusion of new inputs. The Herat-Kandahar highway crossing the area, the expansion of Kandahar city (160,000), progress of trade, of some industries, all these factors resulted in a considerable increase in foodgrain production (wheat, maize), cotton, orchards, vineyards and overall economic development. A large part of the fruit was sent to Kabul or exported to Pakistan.

The irrigated valleys became some of the most advanced regions of the country except for lower Helmand valley (in Nimroz) which remained very poor and isolated.

There were, however, reasons for getting worried: the maintenance and operations of the canals were not adequate. Water logging and salinity, in spite of some progress, required further measures like better drainage. The reservoirs of Kajakai and Arghandab suffer from a high siltation rate. Population, on the other hand, was becoming heavy, landholdings tended to be divided, and the number of landless labourers was on the increase. On the other hand, large landlords (Khans) have always played a significant role in the region.

The major irrigation works do not seem to have much suffered from the war. Helmand province has not been hit too much by military operations. On the other hand, enormous damage fell on the prosperous orchards and vineyards surrounding Kandahar where very heavy fighting took place for years and is still not over. Reconstruction of orchards and vineyards will involve considerable work.

(j) Hazarajat (central provinces)

The central part of Afghanistan includes the provinces of Uruzgan (483,000), Ghor (341,110), Bamyan (285,000). In addition some adjacent parts of other provinces: Wardak, Ghazni, Parwan. The total population could have been around 1.5 million in 1979 (very tentative estimate) in an area of 140,000 sq km.

This is by far the least developed region of the country with the exception of some small areas. First comes the terrain. Few valleys are below 1800 m, a number of plateaux are at 3000 m which prevents double cropping in the same year. The so-called central road which cuts across
Hazarajat from Maidan to Herat (963 km) goes through seven passes above 3000 m. It has always been in poor condition, (average speed of a jeep 25 km per hour). Except Bamyan, most tiny cities (market centres) and villages are cut off from the outside world during the winter months, and even one valley cannot communicate with the neighbouring one.

Irrigated bottoms of valleys cover only a very small area and water is not always assured. Elsewhere rainfed wheat predominates and pasture land where Pashtun nomads used to come with their sheep in the summer months, returning towards Herat, Kandahar or Nangarhar in the fall. Since a long time the competition between grazing land and agriculture has reached the breaking point. More and more land is opened to the plough which leads to erosion.

One hardly needs to add that health centres and schools were particularly rare and ill-equipped. In 1968, for instance, there were only four to six doctors in the whole of Hazarajat.

Bamyan and its surroundings were somewhat better off with a fine oasis bearing wheat, maize and potatoes, the latter mostly sold in Kabul. Besides tourism was bringing some additional income.

Since a very long time, many Hazaras were compelled to seek jobs outside, particularly in Kabul, a clear evidence of population pressure in relation to local resources, a need which has worsened in the last decades.

Hazarajat was in no less unfavourable situation, socially and politically. It has been put under the Kabul authority by Amir Abdur Rahman in the 1880s, following tough military operations. Since then, the Hazaras have benefitted from very few investments, their valleys being in many cases neglected, lacking also educated people and influential persons. Hazara ministers have always been rare in the central government, most of local civil servants were Pashtun. The Hazaras being Shia created other difficulties for them in a predominantly Sunni country.

While the Hazaras are dominant in the eastern part of the region, in the western part one comes across Aimaks (suniti) who are no less poor.

Many areas of Hazarajat are too isolated to be of any strategic interest, so that the war between the resistance movements and the Kabul government has played but a minor role, except in a few regions, especially in Ghazni, Wardak and Parwan. On the other hand a lot of infighting occurred between different hazara groups and parties, some being supported by Iran, others not.

Other clashes, often very bloody, have occurred between Shia groups and predominantly Pashtun movements in Ghazni province.

These conditions have not prevented several marketplaces from expanding through all kinds of trade encouraged directly or indirectly by the war. Some trucks go, for instance, from Jaghori up to Pakistan and bring back goods, a situation which, as stated by O. Roy could be "very precarious". (L'Afghanistan ... Paris, Seuil 1985 p.222).

* These temporary migrations led to many tensions and abuses, the victims of which were the local people.
To sum up, the problems of Hazarajat have more to do with a development process which will take a long time, than with reconstruction and rehabilitation since war damages have not been too severe and not so many people have left their villages.

3. Some basic problems

Roads: A relatively good network of roads is a pre-requisite to a number though not all of reconstruction and development tasks. In 1960, the price of wheat varied by as much as 150% due to poor transportation. The construction of the modern highways led to a difference of only 30% */ in the late 1960s which in the 1970s had practically disappeared. The opening of the highway gave a big boost to agriculture and horticulture in several regions. It contributed also to the progress of exports.

Roads situation (1975):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Road</th>
<th>Length (km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roads of all types</td>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All weather roads</td>
<td>9,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asphalt and concrete highways</td>
<td>2,560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Nearly half of the roads were impassable in winter.

The impact of the war on the highways varies a great deal. The Kabul-Kandahar road has suffered a lot, whereas towards Baghlan-Kunduz damage is less. Other roads like Herat-Kandahar are in poor shape due to lack of maintenance.

A quick and easily made survey could give us a precise idea of the amount of work needed. According to some estimates 1000 km are in very bad condition. Thanks to a large supply of modern equipment, some first class contractors, proper expatriate staff and Afghans, the rehabilitation of the main highways could be done as quickly as possible. **

Secondary roads, earth roads, destroyed by the war could be rehabilitation through a combination of means: some modern equipment and the local manpower under food for work programmes. However, here again, what matters is speed, and a few bulldozers would better serve the interests of the concerned areas, than to rely only on the slow work of thousands of people.

At a later stage, long term projects could be contemplated: to complete the highway from Shibargan to Herat, to break the isolation of Hazarajat through a highway (all weather road) crossing the area. Then come more and better feeder roads where a lot has to be done. At present a sizeable amount of traffic is still carried by camels, horses and donkeys.


/** Many sets of equipment are needed. One set including one crushing plant, one asphalt plant, one paving machine, one roller and trucks to transport material can complete around one km of road per day. This could be less or more depending on local conditions.
Land tenure

Only in some areas of Afghanistan, especially around Mazar and Kandahar, one comes across really large landlords owning 50 ha or more. In other areas the larger landholdings would often have no more than 10-20 ha or even less. There would be a few per village. Then come various sizes of holdings, farmers reasonably well off with 3-5 ha, small farmers with 1 ha or less, and finally a sizeable number of landless peasants. We refer to irrigated land.

The lack of proper land records and reliable land surveys (except in a few areas) as well as the lack of census data on landownership and employment hinder any detailed analysis. However, it is beyond any doubt — as often referred to above — that population pressure is leading to a growing division of holdings, and a rising number of landless people.

The price of land kept on increasing. Indebtedness was widespread, with interest rates ranging between 25-30% to 50% per year.

People without land work as tenants (dehgan) usually on a share cropping basis, where the share of the cultivator follows different arrangements. For instance, when the cultivator bears most of the production costs he gets half of the crop. When he supplies only his labour, he receives one sixth. */

Other landless peasants work as agricultural labourers on a permanent basis with a large landowner or work on a daily basis. Many of them used to work in their own village, but there were also seasonal workers, such as Pashtuns crossing the Hindukush in spring in order to work in Kunduz-Baghlan until the winter. Poor nomads would also work from time to time in agriculture on a casual basis, especially at harvest time.

The land tenure system has been affected by the war, especially in areas where many farmers left their villages. It seems that, among the refugees in Pakistan, medium and upper landowners are in large numbers. There will be difficult situations when they return: land litigation with the people, often poorer, who remained behind and who may have tilled the land in their absence.

Looking at the more distant future, one wonders whether the land reform issue, often raised in the past, makes much sense. Large scale redistribution of land does not help, unless a very low ceiling is introduced. **/ Otherwise not enough land would be released for landless labourers. A ceiling around 2 ha or less might hinder production and, more important, would be unthinkable from a political angle.

*/ These types of arrangements may vary from one area to the other.

**/ Even the communist regime put the ceiling at 6 ha of the best irrigated land so that not much land was available for redistribution.
Irrigation

Practically all irrigated areas in the country need better water management and often an increasing supply of water. The existing systems have not prevented a first increase in yields of food grain and cotton. Wheat has in many places risen from 1000-1200 kg/ha to 2000 or more, cotton-lint in good areas around Kunduz has risen to 650 kg/ha in the late 1970s versus half in the 1950s. Some progress could also be observed in vineyards and horticulture.

Further increases in yields are urgently needed in view of population growth and for creating more employment opportunities. This requires a much better irrigation.

Roughly speaking, the aim should be to double again the wheat yields so that at least the more advanced areas reach about 4000 kg/ha. For that purpose better water management paves the way for other inputs: seeds, chemical fertilizers etc.

According to approximate estimates out of 2.6 million ha covered by irrigation, 51% enjoyed a more or less normal irrigation, 13% were suffering of shortage, 36% were often left fallow for lack of water or enjoyed very poor waterings. Contrary to what is stated or implied in a number of recent reports, Karez (underground canals collecting water in the foothills and bringing it down below to the fields) play but a minor role (170,00 ha approx.). The bulk of irrigation is supplied by small canals in mountain valleys or larger networks of canals in plains (2.2 million ha) then come springs (190,000 ha) and wells (16,000 ha).

The irrigation systems, except in the Helmand-Argandhab and in a few very small systems, do not rely on reservoirs where water is stored. They are thus very vulnerable to drought, which is far from uncommon. It can be due to lack of snowfall or too rapid melting of the snow, or to lack of rains which fall normally between March and early May.

What are the main task for reconstruction and development?

Repair of canals

Rapid surveys should give us a comprehensive picture of the damage brought by the war and of the requirements in terms of equipment and labour force.

Karez

If the local people are ready to repair them and, if the necessary specialized artisans are available, as much outside support as possible should be granted. On the other hand, taking a long term perspective, one wonders whether this type of irrigation will still remain. Construction and maintenance of karez are very costly and require very hard work.

Groundwater

Until now, groundwater has not been extensively tapped in Afghanistan. A number of areas unlike the Indo-Ganges Basin are not fit for tubewells. However, there are regions where tubewells or openwells with a pump have been successfully installed.

*/

*/ In Ghazni, Paktika, Logar, Herat ...
A priority task should be to conduct surveys in order to assess soil conditions, level of water table and recharge of groundwater. Teams of surveyors could be sent to the various provinces, including Hazarajat where more irrigation is badly needed.

Tubewells would be either the sole means of irrigation or give a complement of water in canal areas. As observed in China, India and Pakistan, tubewells (oil or electric engines) can be a major factor of development, relatively easy to operate, not too costly and quite quickly implemented. Such tubewells would do much better when owned by a single farmer than through co-operative systems which usually are not too successful as observed in many countries.

In a longer term perspective the completion of several irrigation projects which have been interrupted by the war will have to be considered: Gawargan, Chardara, Kunduz river, irrigation cum power. Drainage of Belmand project and maintenance of existing irrigation, Kajakai Spillway Gates Project to increase the capacity of the dam. Khanabad river. Salma dam, 175 km from Herat.

**Rainfed crops (lalmi)**

Rainfed wheat covers wide areas, around 900,000 ha which under good to very good conditions, yield 500-600 kg/ha, but can give also just 200 kg/ha or nothing.

These variations, which are much larger than for irrigated wheat, have a substantial impact on the national economy. In good years, out of about 500,000 T of rainfed wheat, a sizeable part is commercialized ²/ and what remains is consumed locally, i.e. very often in rather isolated areas. The latter are thus particularly vulnerable to drought: then not only do they lack grain, but supply from outside is hindered by transport constraints.

In the long term, one could expect some yield increases due to better dry farming techniques, but in the immediate future, not much can be done.

The variable of rainfed wheat also influences the national foodgrain balance sheet pushing imports upwards in case of drought, or enabling the country with good crops to be more or less self-sufficient.

**Food supply**

In recent years, cereal imports, mostly from the Soviet Union averaged 250,000 T per year, a level which will not be reduced for the next few years.

²/ According to rough estimates, about one million T of wheat was commercialized in the late 1970s out of which about one third would be rainfed wheat.
Agricultural Inputs

Ample supply of seeds is needed. For wheat, due to lack of renewal during the war years the early high yield varieties have degenerated. In areas where conditions are similar to Pakistan seeds could be brought from that country. The question of high altitude wheat (around 2000 m) is more delicate and requires preliminary tests, unless seeds can also be obtained from Pakistan.

The supply of cotton seeds is also rather complex and may take some time to be solved. It could be advisable to seek the co-operation of the Compagnie francaise des fibres textiles (CFDT) which had done a fine job in Afghanistan in the 1970s.

Urea and di-ammonium phosphate (DAP) are the main fertilizers in use. The urea factory in the north (using Shibargan gas) can supply part of urea, the balance and DAP should be imported.

Before the war, the distribution of seeds and fertilizers were relying mostly on governmental agencies. Should one rehabilitate them or not? In a way, it might be safer at least in certain areas to use private merchants. The key issue is to ensure ample supply of seeds and fertilizers which will reduce the malpractices which were common in the past, when officials were often getting a bakshish from farmers.

The lack of draught animals for ploughing creates serious difficulties. While importing bullocks in a first phase from Pakistan, how far should one encourage power tillers (two wheel tractors) which can be useful in such a country? A single bullock plough experimented in Wardak deserves also to be considered, or some other one bullock system.

In all those problems the main issue is the ample supply of inputs, one way or the other. As to their utilization, broadly speaking, farmers can manage since many of them are already used to them.

Orchards and Vineyards

This is an important sector of the economy as a source of income, of employment and foreign exchange. Destructions have been particularly severe in the main areas such as Koh-i-Daman, Kandahar and probably Jalalabad.

The reconstruction should be combined with new varieties of fruit which would grow more quickly and give a higher yield. For instance, at the Quetta Research Center (Baluchistan, Pakistan) 600 apple trees per acre (0.4 ha) are planted which bear fruit already after three years, whereas local trees are only 45 on 0.4 ha and give fruit after seven years. In parts of Afghanistan local apple trees may take even more time to grow with also a low density of trees. It is probable that similar "short cuts" could be taken for peaches, apricots, prunes.

As to vineyards, the traditional ones in Koh-i-Daman bear fruit after four years. The quality of the various types of grapes has always been high but yields could be much improved. There too, new vineyards should resort to better techniques to boost yields. In the 1970s Kishmishi yield was 7-9 T per ha whereas Sultana, a rather similar variety, was yielding 15-16 T/ha in Australia.
Poppy cultivation and heroin

Poppy cultivation has been traditionally practised in Afghanistan (in Badakshan, Nuristan, Nangarhar, along the Pakistani border, in Kandahar and Helmand, and probably elsewhere), as well as in the tribal areas of Pakistan. The opium was mostly exported. By the beginning of the 1970s the first workshops producing heroin in the tribal areas of Pakistan had been established. Others appeared in Herat and Kandahar. The war boosted the cultivation of poppy in both countries and the production of heroin, which is exported through Pakistan and to some extent through Iran. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan seem to have become, taken together, the major world producers of heroin.

To suppress poppy cultivation and heroin manufacture will be a very painstaking and arduous operation, as long as a strong administration is not established in Afghanistan. As to the tribal areas of Pakistan, the task will be no less difficult since Pakistan laws are not enforced in these areas and the government faces the risk of creating serious troubles with the tribes, if it tries to check these activities. (It has already happened around the Khyber Pass.)

Today the US government is indicating that they might reduce or stop arms supplies to the resistance movements, unless poppy cultivation is curtailed. Such an idea amounts to wishful thinking, since either the various movements will be reluctant to implement such measures, or, more likely, they will simply lack the means to enforce them.

It is only in a long term perspective that a reduction of poppy cultivation could be envisaged.

To sum up, one wonders whether this delicate issue should be on the priority list of actions for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Animal Husbandry

This sector can be divided into two: animal husbandry by farmers and by nomads. The farmers have cows, bullocks, possibly some sheep and goats. As listed above, heavy losses have been incurred and it will be one of the very tough tasks to replace cattle. There again, we could try to take more advantage of new technologies, such as cross-breeding which had already started in the 1970s and artificial insemination.

Nomads rely mostly on sheep sold for their meat, fat and skin and on Karakul, a kind of sheep, the skin of which is used as fur. Already before the war, nomads were having difficulties with pasture land. Various projects had been started before the war on veterinary care, water points, some new breeds but progress had been rather slow.

# For more details see Catherine Lamour and Michel Lamberti, Les grandes manoeuvres de l'opium. Paris, Seuil, 1972, chapter XI.
One must also mention the importance of camels, donkeys and horses for transportation. Pack animals have always been more common than carts pulled by animals.

I do not know how far nomads have been hit by the war. One thing is clear, in many cases, their routes and places of migration following the seasons have been cut or hindered by the war. Only special studies could give enough precisions on what can and should be done and when.

**Timber**

The reconstruction of villages will require fairly large amounts of timber for roofs. Already before the war, Afghanistan was suffering from a shortage of wood, which was aggravated by large quantities of timber smuggled or freely exported (even now) to Pakistan from the border areas. Around villages, in several regions, poplar trees are grown, often along the canals, and are used for construction purposes. The trees are cut after ten years. In villages affected by the war, many trees have been destroyed.

Imports of wood may be necessary until new trees are available. The possibility of introducing trees which grow faster than the present varieties of poplars should be explored.

Alternatives to wood beams are not many. Iron beams would be too heavy, so that, in case of heavy rains or snow falls, the walls of the houses would collapse. One could try to encourage farmers, wherever possible, to build houses in mud walls with a roof in shape of a dome also in mud, a type of house very common in western Afghanistan.

**The industrial sector**

Major industries have on the whole not suffered much from the war, but they work often below capacity. They may have lost part of their staff and workers and need repair, spare parts etc. The main factories are located in Kabul (textiles, cement, some mechanical workshops), some in Jalalabad, Pul-i-Khumri, Baghlan (sugar mill) Kunduz (cotton ginning) Mazar (textile), Kunduz (cotton ginning) Kandahar (canned fruit). For most items production has fallen since the war. Even output of natural gas (Shibargan) mostly exported to the Soviet Union seems to have declined.

Several projects were under construction or nearly completed, before the war: some textile ginning, a new sugar beet plant, cement factories. They would deserve immediate attention.

The electric network has not suffered much from the war, except some transmission lines. Rehabilitation and possible improvements of existing power houses and transmission lines do not represent a considerable task. In fact, consumption of electricity has risen, according to official data from 705 million kWh in 1975/76 to 1,170 million in 1986/87.

Several projects stopped by the war need to be completed: the Kajakai Hydro Power Plant, the power station at Bamiyan and the Herat diesel plant.
The big question for the future Afghan government will be to decide whether or not to stick to the pattern of industrialization followed in the past with its heavy bias for public sector factories or take a new road like so many other Asian countries. Many of them are now trying to make a better use of private initiative, while the Government concentrates its activities only on some key sectors, and takes measures to stimulate private enterprises in a way which is compatible with public interest.

Afghanistan enjoys a long tradition of internal and international trade. In a way, it might be good to make a better use of such forces. At the same time one could expect, as observed for many decades in India and Pakistan, that gradually bazaris would shift from trade to industry.

Foreign Trade

In spite of the war (or because of the war?) foreign trade and the bazar of Kabul have remained amazingly lively, including much smuggling to Pakistan. There should be no major obstacles to rising foreign trade as soon as the economy begins to recover from the war, but in the first few years exports will suffer from the fall in fruit production. That is why great attention has to be devoted to the rehabilitation of vineyards and orchards.
LAND RESOURCES AND PRESENT UTILIZATION

Area: 650,000 sq km

Population (rough estimate) 1977
- Total: 14 million
  - Urban: 2.5
  - Rural: 10.0
  - Nomadic: 1.5

Estimated population in Afghanistan 1987: 12 million
Total population including refugees: 17 million

1977

A. Categories of Land ('000 ha)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Land</th>
<th>Area ('000 ha)</th>
<th>Land Use</th>
<th>Area ('000 ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arable</td>
<td>7,910</td>
<td>Uncultivated</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncultivated</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>Irrigated</td>
<td>2,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated</td>
<td>4,010</td>
<td>Rainfed</td>
<td>1,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent crops</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>Tree crops</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Pasture</td>
<td>54,700</td>
<td>Grazing</td>
<td>54,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>Forest</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mountains and desert</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>Summer grazing</td>
<td>22,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winter grazing</td>
<td>16,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Agricultural</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Land Area 65,263

*/ of the irrigated land 26% is estimated to be fallowed annually while 40% of rainfed land is fallowed

B. Sources of Irrigation Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Area ('000 ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canals</td>
<td>2,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springs</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karezes</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 2,586

Consumption of chemical fertilizers 1976/77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fertilizer</th>
<th>Tonnes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urea</td>
<td>46,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAP</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superphosphate</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C. Average Crop Area ('000 ha) 1971/72 - 76/77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Irrigated</th>
<th>Rainfed</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>2,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed cotton</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar beet / cane</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil seeds</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfalfa, clover</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total under crops</td>
<td>2,603</td>
<td>1,343</td>
<td>3,946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSO

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 1975/76

A. Crops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Area 000 ha</th>
<th>Yield kgs</th>
<th>Prod. 000 tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat: irrigated</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,754</td>
<td>2,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat: rainfed</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>1,429</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar beet</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar cane</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>35,294</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil seeds</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>7,826</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>140.3</td>
<td>6,272</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Livestock

(i) **No. of Animals ('000 heads)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>('000 heads)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td>3,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which milk cows</td>
<td>1,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>20,417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which karakul</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) **Production ('000 tons)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>('000 tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cows milk</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep and goats milk</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total meat</td>
<td>161.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>61.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep meat</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goat meat</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other meat</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iii) **Other products**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>('000 units)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karakul pelts</td>
<td>1,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep and goat skins</td>
<td>6,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cow, horse and camel hides</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casings</td>
<td>3,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep wool</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Industrial Production

#### 1975/76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas</td>
<td>3,000 million cu m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton yarn</td>
<td>35 million m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton textiles</td>
<td>60 million m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayon textiles</td>
<td>35 million m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical fertilizers</td>
<td>65,000 t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>147,000 t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>705 million kWh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes</td>
<td>2,600,000 pairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>13,000 t</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 1986/87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas</td>
<td>2,425 million cu m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton textiles</td>
<td>58 million m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayon textiles</td>
<td>43 million m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical fertilizers</td>
<td>126,000 t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>10,000 t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>1,170 million kWh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>0.2 thousand t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoes</td>
<td>604,000 pairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VALUE OF PRINCIPAL EXPORTS, 1966/67-1975/76
($U.S. million f.o.b.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and live animals</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresh fruits</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry fruits</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crude materials inedible except fuel</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karakul</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other skins and furs</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil seeds</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool and hair</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licorice root</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Gas</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>46.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpets and rugs</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commodities and Transactions not classified according to kind</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL EXPORTS</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>124.5</td>
<td>159.1</td>
<td>230.6</td>
<td>235.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Provisional.
Sources: Da Afghanistan Bank and Central Statistics Office.
Map 1. AFGHANISTAN

[Map showing geographical features and cities such as Kabul, Peshawar, Shindand, Farah, Herat, etc., along with rivers, mountains, and regions like Hazarajat.]

- Rivers
- Mountains
- Roads
- Railways
- A 3923
- Heights in metres
- International boundaries

Legend:

- Kabul
- Safed Koh
- Hazarajat
- Regions
- International boundaries

Scale: 0 200 km
Seminar on the Potential for Recovery in Afghanistan

and the Role of International Assistance

Geneva, 5 - 7 May 1989

Discussion Paper No. 2

ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

By Dr. Micheal J. Casimir
ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Michael J.-Casimir

Within a total area of about 630,000 sq.km. estimates of the pasture area of Afghanistan vary enormously between 5% and 64%. In his discussion of this problem Jentsch (1973: 49-51) concludes that 25% of the total area would be a realistic estimate; in making an estimate it must be remembered that pastures without adequate water resources are not utilisable. These pastures were, and inspite of the war most probably still are, at least partly used primarily by pastoral nomads (above all Pashtuns), and also by the often transhumant agricultural communities belonging to numerous ethnic groups. It should be stressed, that such areas can not be meaningfully used for any other purpose and further, that they have always played a major role in both the local and the national economies. Pastoral products have always been an important part of the local diet, and the pastoral sphere has always provided major export items: in 1969 karakul furs fetched 13.1 million USS and carpet production brought in 6.2 million USS. Along with unprocessed wool, which accounted for 6.7 million USS worth of exports in 1969, these pastoral products made up 20% of the entire exports of Afghanistan. When drawing up plans for the future, these purely economic aspects must be kept in mind.

Estimates of the animal population (in millions) of the country are available for the years 1957 to 1982 (Ringer 1986: 414). Ringer draws all his figures till 1973 from taxation lists and must therefore be considered as too low.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheep (incl. Karakul)</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goats</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkeys</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Camels</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This average has been calculated by me.

The drought of 1970-1971 resulted in a drastic depletion of these numbers and yet, according to the FAO the overall animal population of the country apparently recovered quickly to reach the pre-drought figures (Clark 1984, Balland and Kieffer 1979). The few figures available for the post-Revolution period show a general decrease of 67% to 70% in the numbers of sheep and goat kept by agricultural households in the limited area surveyed (SCR 1981). The following figures are available for the entire sheep population in the post-Revolution period (Munzinger Archives 1987):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Karakul</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981/82</td>
<td>14.3 million</td>
<td>4.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982/83</td>
<td>14.4 million</td>
<td>4.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>14.5 million</td>
<td>4.5 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As already stated, many of the pastures are used by nomads, who subsist primarily on animal husbandry, although additional income may be derived from other sources. These nomads are obliged for the very purpose of animal husbandry to migrate regularly, usually in whole families. With an extremely continental climate and with low and unpredictable rainfall, Afghan pastoralists have to migrate between their summer areas in the central
Hindukush and winter settlements in warmer regions at lower altitudes. This is especially important for the sheep breeders whose animals are sensitive to extremely high temperatures. In the mid-seventies the number of such mobile Afghan pastoralists was estimated at one million (Janata 1975); the census of 1978-1979 indicated a maximum of 900,000 (Balland 1988: 175). Till the closing of the Afghan-Pakistan border in the early 1960s many of these nomads crossed over to Pakistan to spend the winters there: in spring 1972 Janata counted 80,000 such so-called kuchis, but their numbers fluctuated a lot according to political and climatic conditions. After the drought of 1970-71 and the very severe winter of 1971-72 herd losses in Afghanistan were enormous, and as a result for some years thereafter pressure on pastures was somewhat reduced; partly due to these reasons, and partly because of the international-border situation only 3,000 nomadic families spent the winter of 1977/78 in Pakistan (Balland 1982; cf. Balland 1988 and Glatzer 1988: 240-241 for more details).

At least since the middle of the 20th century till 1978 there appears to have been a clear decrease in the nomadic pastoral population of Afghanistan as a whole (Balland 1988). This seems, at first sight, to be in contradiction to the statements made by several botanists and ecologists over the last three decades preceding the Revolution, that an extremely large number of pasture lands were most highly degraded. One must remember, however, that the number of animals grazed and the number of herdowners are not necessarily in direct proportion to each other. As far as I am aware there are no current estimates concerning either the numbers of herd animals, or the animal husbandry practicing nomadic population in Afghanistan. We do not even know how much of this population fled the country. One of the most important tasks is, therefore, to evaluate the numbers of mobile animal husbanders now living in Afghanistan. For reasons discussed below it will hardly be possible to find out how many of them are today in Pakistan, perhaps also in Iran, and how many of these in their turn propose to return to Afghanistan as nomadic pastoralists if and when possible. Many of them have
occupied new pasture areas in Pakistan (cf. Sweetser 1988), and still others have probably developed/found new sources of income which tie them to Pakistan or Iran.

The following aspects will be of importance for any further discussion of development plans:

1. The ecological constraints of pastoralism keeping in view a balanced exploitation of pastures without continuous overgrazing which can only lead sooner or later to a collapse of the ecosystem.

2. The basic wherewithal (basic herd, pack animals, basic household equipment, etc.) with which a nomadic household starts off life.

Several regions - especially summer pastures in mountain areas - were in the years before the Revolution extremely overgrazed and some were hardly usable. Large areas which were covered with thick vegetation as late as the mid-sixties, had by the mid-seventies turned into highly eroded, nearly desertified stretches in which only non-palatable species survived (Podlich pers. com.). An essential point, therefore which we must remember right from the beginning when planning for the future is that, while helping the pastoralists, measures must also be taken to control and direct herd growth in such a manner that an upper limit is set for herd sizes well above the normal requirements of herd owners but also well below the carrying capacity of the various pastures. Perhaps taxation should be reintroduced in an effective manner, without creating unnecessary hardship for small stock owners. The contemporary state of several pastures which have not been used intensively, if at all over the last few years is probably good, and they thus provide a good basis for a new start. The exponential growth of herds in years of adequate rainfall, would however, in the long term inevitably lead to ecological disasters if precautionary measures were not taken now. Any aid project whose only aim is to help pastoralists to build up large herds as quickly as possible, without taking into account the long term ecological constraints can ultimately only
be detrimental to the pastoralists themselves. One of the reasons why traditional pastoralists in Afghanistan tended to build up large herds, was that they suffered sudden tremendous losses through epidemics affecting their animals; to prevent this and help herd owners, and also for the ecological reasons mentioned above, it would be extremely necessary to organize veterinary services for the animal husbanders. These veterinary stations should perhaps be coordinated with the tax-collecting centres.

Some basic data on pastoral economy in Afghanistan:

It is evident that there is a direct relationship between the number of animals to be grazed and the availability of fodder; the latter depends upon the gross primary productivity (GPP), i.e. the amount of plant material that regenerates each year. This is largely dependent on the biomass or standing crop, which is the total amount of plant material in a given area. The biomass depends in its turn, on soil quality as well as on various climatic factors. In Afghanistan, as in other arid regions, the main constraining factor is rainfall. The amount of plant dry matter increases with the longterm average of annual rainfall. With average annual rainfall values of 50 mm to 300 mm in most winter pastures (cf. Jentsch 1973, Lalande et al. 1973) and values between 300 mm and 600 mm for summer pastures in general we obtain biomass amounts between 0 g and 1000 g/sq.m/annum. Overgrazing takes place when more plant material is consumed than is regenerated annually. We can assume that in most areas the maximum plant production in Afghanistan is 1000 kg dry matter/ha; of this, only half should be consumed, to avoid deterioration. Therefore, if we accept the figure of 500 kg dry plant matter per animal per year advanced by several authors, at least one hectare per sheep or goat would be appropriate. It has often be suggested that goats are more destructive than sheep; this seems to be the case only when the environment is already so degraded that no fodder is available for sheep, while goats still manage to.
survive for a while and thereby aggravate the situation.

If we assume the entire pasture area of Afghanistan to cover some 25% of the entire area of the country, we could then, without claiming to calculate a general stocking rate, suggest that approximately 15,750,000 sheep or goats could be herded without running the risk of overgrazing. This corresponds to 2,250,000 livestock units (1 LU = 1 cow or 7 sheep/goats) - which is about half the amount of non-bovine livestock units in Afghanistan in the early 1980s. These units were part of a total of roughly 8,200,000 LU which Afghanistan probably had prior to the Revolution. These animals did not, however, all belong to nomads; 3,400,000 cows belonged primarily to sedentary farming households and could not and did not use the principal pasture areas, which were far from all habitation. It would be wrong to suggest that nomadic animal herders were primarily responsible for overgrazing and overexploitation of pastures in general (Casimir et al. 1980). Rather than the flexible nomads, it was mainly the sedentary population which grazed its animals year in year out, for at least a part of each year in the same area and further destroyed the vegetation through lopping for firewood. Over the years the perimeter of eroded areas surrounding most villages in Afghanistan thus expanded. Most Afghan nomads on the contrary, tended not to use identical pastures in consecutive years, but tried instead, to move to new pastures within the same region if and when older pastures did not fulfill their requirements.

In order to make realistic estimates regarding optimal herd sizes and formulate concrete plans for rangeland management and pasture development, it would be highly advisable to conduct an ecological survey of at least the principal pasture areas of the country, in order to determine pasture quality and the amounts of biomass and thereby to calculate their carrying capacity. This can be efficiently achieved by collecting botanical ground truth data and using remote sensing techniques; these have already been successfully applied once in a localised study in western Afghanistan in the mid-1970s (Casimir et al. 1980).
The Basic Needs of a Pastoral Household:

Irrespective of whether they are peasants or pastoralists the basic nutritional needs of rural households in Afghanistan are similar. In the vast majority of cases wheat flat-bread is the main source of energy; data regarding daily individual consumption range between 500 g and 2053 g, with an average of 1209 g. Among one pastoral nomadic population in West Afghanistan daily consumption per adult was calculated in 1976/77 as 824 g (Casimir 1988: 349). Wheat or wheatflour is thus a must for almost all rural households. The pastoral nomads traditionally exchanged their surplus animals (males and barren females), wool and sometimes excess milk products against the staple wheat; over the years these pastoral products were increasingly sold and the money was used among others, to buy this staple (see Fig.1). Thus the traditional Afghan bazaar system played a role in the economy of pastoralists. For an analysis of East Afghan nomad economy see Ferdinand (1969, 1970) and for details on West Afghanistan see Glatzer (1977).

Next to wheat, milk products are the most important element in the diet of Afghan pastoralists (see Fig. 2). Fresh milk is not consumed much, since most of the population can not digest milk sugar (lactase deficiency). Buttermilk which is available for about six months of the year and is a by-product of butter production, is consumed in very large amounts; another product, qurt, dried milk protein, is the second major item of the nomadic diet. These milk products provide them with essential nutrients such as the vitamins A, B2 and C, as also calcium (see Fig. 3). For a detailed analysis of the nutritional situation of Westafghani Pashtu nomads in the mid-1970s see Casimir (1986). In all development plans in addition to the energy providing staple, a constant and adequate supply of either milk products or vegetables must be ensured if malnutrition and dietary deficiencies are to be avoided.
Fig. 1 Flux diagram showing the interdependence between the three main economic sectors in western Afghanistan and their connection to some ecological factors.
Fig. 2 Seasonal distribution and availability of various food items consumed by pastoral Nuray. Intake level of a given food is indicated as follows: dots = daily intake; stars = intake about thrice per week; triangles = intake about twice per month; filled-in triangles = intake about once per week; dots = intake possible but very rare.

Fig. 3 The seasonal intake of calcium (Ca), riboflavin (B₂), vitamin C and vitamin A by pastoral Nuray nomads in western Afghanistan. The high intake of these items is due to the large consumption of buttermilk. The additional intake of Vitamin A, through ghee consumption, has not been taken into account.
The situation in agricultural households is slightly different: although sheep and goats are also kept, cattle is often more important; herd products do not, by and large contribute in a major way to their diet. The role of various vegetables and fruits in the peasant diet corresponds to that of milk products among pastoralists, although the former appear to be more vulnerable to malnutrition (Dols 1957). Meat was always a rare item in the diet of poorer Afghans, both rural and urban.

The number of cattle in the country must be sufficient to produce, not only milch animals and meat but more important, draught animals. In pre-Revolution Afghanistan not every farming household had even one draught animal; these were owned largely by wealthier peasants, and those with much land. These animals were either lent or provided by landlords under traditional conditions to their tenants in the plowing season. It would perhaps be meaningful to consider ways in which all households in a village could have equal access to draught animals.

For a viable nomadic or sedentary household animals are required for transport. At least one camel per nomadic household is essential to move camp, and at least one donkey or horse is required by farmers to transport various goods etc. to local commercial centres.

Subsistence and herd size:

As in the Middle East in general, so also in Afghanistan the minimal herd required by a household which is primarily subsistent on animal husbandry must be large enough to produce a surplus which can be exchanged or sold in order to obtain at least the staple and certain essential items of clothing and household equipment. Although there are regional differences, this minimal size lay between 60 and 100 sheep/goats prior to the Revolution. It is clear that this minimal size depends on two basic factors, namely household size and exchange rates or the market value of wheat, animals and animal products. The maximum
herd size depends largely on the number of working hands available, and this is closely related to household size, which is given as 5.6 and 5.5 persons by Glatzer and Casimir (1983: 312) and Bencist 1984: 87 in Balland 1988: 175); for a discussion see Glatzer and Casimir (1983).

Animal husbandry and current problems:

It is well established that in Afghanistan, as in many other parts of the world animal husbandry, and for that matter pastoral nomadism is not - with the exception of the Kirghiz (Shahrani 1979) - restricted to any ethnic group, nor is a nomad always a nomad, or a rural sedentist always sedentary. Not all of today's pastoral nomads were always pastoral or nomadic, nor is there any certainty that they will, or even wish to remain nomadic animal husbanders for the rest of their lives. Among most rural Pashtuns there is, for example, over the generations a frequent flow of individuals between the agricultural and pastoral sectors, and kinship ties cut across economic spheres. Thus it would be wrong to distinguish, at least among most Pashtuns, between water-tight categories of "pastoral" and "agricultural", of "nomad" and "sedentary": even in times of peace it was often observed that the father or grand-father of today's nomad was a farmer, and that if he himself lost his herd but still had farmers as kinsmen, he would revert to farming - either for the rest of his life, or may be for just a few years till he had managed to build up a new herd. His son and grand-son would, in all probability, also have a choice between herding and farming. Of course many had no such social ties and no access to land; but in times of distress even they became sedentary, largely eking out a living as landless labourers.

This flux between the two sectors is important to keep in mind when deciding a course of action to help returning rural refugees. In all likelihood, if basic herds were offered, there would be few who would reject them, and the number of those who
would declare themselves desirous of leading a nomadic pastoral life once in Afghanistan, would be remarkably high. Given their present plight, and in the near absence of all means to check and control where each of these individuals came from and what they will actually do with such a basic herd it would perhaps be unwise to aim at providing all families who claim to have been nomadic animal husbanders with flocks. There can be no doubt, that were it possible to ascertain exactly which individuals or families had been primarily nomadic pastoralists at the time they fled Afghanistan (but see Pedersen 1987) and that they had no access to land, such refugees should be presented with the minimal number of animals to start nomadising again. If these flocks cannot provide a family with enough subsistence, supplementary assistance in the form of food rations must be provided in the first few years. No special measures are, I believe, required for those Afghan families who live as nomadic pastoralists in Pakistan today; if and when they return to Afghanistan, their herd sizes should be regulated according to local economic and ecological requirements. Above all, help must be given to those pastoralists who have remained in Afghanistan: here there are two categories, those still practising animal husbandry and ex-nomads who have had to flee the countryside and take refuge in Kabul or one of the other urban centres. Help for the latter in the form of either flocks or land is urgently required, if a rapid over-population and deterioration of the towns and the growth of slums is to be avoided. For ecological reasons it would perhaps be better to give them land rather than herd animals. The existing pastoral nomads as also the farmers require urgent assistance in fusing mines. In addition the nomads may require short-term assistance in the form of grain; this assistance can be stopped as soon as both grain availability and flock sizes have reached a certain level at which the traditional exchange system can function once again. I have already recommended the setting up of veterinary services; it would be highly advisable to also try and set up dispensaries (with, as far as possible at least one female personnel) at certain points along the major migration routes. Both animal and human health services could be provided in the
same area in such a manner that not only nomads, but also peasants from many surrounding villages can benefit.

If we assume that most of the peasant refugees would like to go back to their villages, we must consider the possibility of these villages having been wiped out. Starting to build up a village afresh will be a laborious task and to begin with agriculture will be extremely difficult. We must, however, remember that even if they so desire, full nomadism and an entirely pastoral way of life is no answer to their problems in the long run. Apart from the ecological consequences of overstocking, we must bear in mind that even nomads need grain, and that grain production must be given a priority. Equally important are draught animals. It would perhaps be possible as Jurt (1988: 16) has suggested to obtain draught animals in Pakistan for this purpose; the distribution of these animals within a village will have to take into account traditional social structure as well as land distribution patterns both before and after the land reforms. To eventually diminish the effects of desertification in the vicinity of villages it would also be prudent to think of measures of afforestation; this would also in the long run provide the rural population with firewood and fodder in the form of leaves (browsing).
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TEN MAIN ISSUES TO WATCH

1. Care must be taken from the start that the ecological balance is not endangered through overstocking and excessive lopping for fuel.

   a. For this a census should be carried out in Afghanistan in order to ascertain the number of pastoralists currently living as animal husbanders, and of those who have lost their herds in the last ten years; if possible those in Pakistan who intend to return to Afghanistan and were till very recently nomadic pastoralists should also be covered by a second census.

   b. A similar census should be taken to evaluate the number of livestock presently in the country.

   c. An ecological analysis (collection of botanical ground truth data) in the various pasture areas should be made.

   d. An overall estimation of the amount of different types of pasture should be undertaken by using remote sensing techniques.

2. Assistance should be given on a priority basis to those pastoralists still in Afghanistan.

3. Basic herds and essential beasts of burden should be provided to pastoralists who have recently lost all or most of their flocks, and who in addition have no access to land resources.

4. It must be remembered that the use of many pastures is not possible as long as the mines are not fused.

5. Veterinary services should be provided at fixed points along all major migration routes.
6. Health services should also be provided for the mobile animal husbanders in particular.

7. As long as individual herding households do not have enough animals to subsist on, grain subsidies should be given to them.

8. Ways and means of developing a system of taxation should be carefully considered, in order to prevent overstocking and thereby overgrazing in future.

9. Draft-animals must urgently be supplied to farming households who have lost theirs. This is necessary to sustain agriculture and ensure grain production for all.

10. As part of village reconstruction and development projects, afforestation (e.g. of willows and poplars) in and around villages should be treated on a priority basis.
Seminar on the Potential for Recovery in Afghanistan
and the Role of International Assistance

Geneva, 5 - 7 May 1989

Discussion Paper No. 3

ISSUES ON AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND RECOVERY IN AFGHANISTAN

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University of Berkeley
Berkeley, California 94720

The contents of this paper may not be quoted without the author's permission.
The issues surrounding social and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan are complicated by a number of factors. A lack of consideration of these factors in any discussion on reconstruction renders the solutions to the problems on hand inapplicable if not altogether meaningless. Foremost among these is, first, the attainment of the minimum requirements for general security for carrying out any preparatory survey work, followed by full assessment of the findings.

It is fortunate that despite the prevailing war conditions, this approach was adopted in the survey of agricultural conditions carried out under Dr. Azam Gul by a 60-man team through the Swedish Committee. We are now in a position to receive assessment of these conditions.

Similar approaches are needed for determining the actual conditions, that is, the destruction and damages that each sector of the economy has received and full assessments of the replacement and reconstruction requirements, before any specific planning could be carried out and policy alternatives could be discussed and implemented. Some of this work can be carried out in the liberated areas before the full peace settlement by similarly organized survey teams. Such teams could survey damages to housing, schools, mosques, public and private commercial structures, the prevailing conditions in manufacturing industries, mining, and the road system. In essence, an information-gathering network is needed to organize such survey teams, train the surveyors, construct the appropriate questionnaires, process the results, log such results, and then have them assessed for planning purposes and policy formulations, as well as for purposes of raising funding for reconstruction since only then their actual cost requirements could be estimated. It seems that a very useful first step has been taken by the assessment missions that went inside Afghanistan in the latter part of 1988 from Iran and Pakistan under Operation Salam. For planning purposes, however, much more specific information and statistics are needed.

Up to the present, information of this kind, other than on agriculture, has not become available. In view of this in my discussions on reconstruction, I will not attempt to extrapolate from the scattered evidence that exists on the conditions of the other sectors of the Afghan economy. Instead our approach will be to look at some broad structural issues and some required changes in them. An assessment of factor supply conditions, particularly labor and the stock of capital, can be given. Moreover, some issues with respect to planning can be addressed in general terms. I believe that at this stage discussions or approaches to reconstruction and alternative policies are critical in order to clarify the issues before activities are undertaken. Foremost among these issues is the need to correlate concerns over reconstruction with concern over long-term development in the Afghan economy. If the processes of reconstruction are not interlinked with those of development to follow, not only significant opportunities would have been lost but there is a danger that the Afghan economy could not regain full recovery necessary for long-term largely self-sustained growth.
A second problem, in addition to the lack of information on actual conditions in different sectors of the Afghan economy, is the immense task ahead involving the mapping and removal of the estimated 30-50 million mines and anti-personnel devices sown largely by the Soviet Army throughout the country. There are continued reports of Afghans getting killed and seriously injured by these devices wherever some attempts have been made by the population to normalize their lives even in the liberated areas. These losses are intolerable in any case but, especially for a nation that has endured massive losses in population already. There is no way of knowing the costs in human lives and the direct and indirect material losses that the continued presence of such massive numbers of these destructive devices will inflict upon the Afghan society. One is reminded of the fact that years after World War II mines continued to explode in different parts of Europe. Will the Afghan population have to contend with this problem for years and perhaps decades to come? It is easy to see how such a situation would adversely affect productivity in the economy. The preliminary work by the expert teams from France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States on mine avoidance and clearing is a significant step. But it also seems that the scale of the international effort and involvement needs to be expanded rapidly before a full handle could be obtained on this problem. First hand information through personal experience indicates that the necessary information is not reaching Afghan refugees in Pakistan, or some misinformation is reaching them minimizing the threat about the mines in order not to create an atmosphere where voluntary repatriation could be impeded.

Moreover, one hears nothing about a mine "awareness" and clearing program for Afghan refugees in Iran, similar to the one in Pakistan. A continued discrepancy in this area can only lead to the obvious results—viz., lack of refugee repatriation from Iran and/or continued high losses in lives and injuries when unprepared refugees do return. Many areas of the welfare of the Afghan refugees in the Islamic Republic of Iran have not been documented similar to the documentation carried out in Pakistan by various U.N.-affiliated agencies, the government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, international organizations, and a large number of NGO's. While it has been argued that Afghan refugees in Iran have been "well" taken care of by the Iranian government in other areas that include the basic requirements, as well as education and such claims are not independently verified but, the problems that the refugees will face with respect to the presence of millions of mines on their return to Afghanistan from different parts of Iran cannot be treated at the same level of indifference. Both the U.N. and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran bear a joint responsibility in this respect toward the safety of the Afghan refugees and their resettlement in Afghanistan with security.

Finally, in this area, something must be said about the source of the problem. What one finds surprising is the fact that in over six years of indirect negotiations that led to the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan in April 1988 no mention of the immense presence of mines was made, bringing into full disclosure this problem and agreeing on a satisfactory solution in the postwar period that should have involved the full cooperation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union must face its responsibilities.
Furthermore, if that country wishes to normalize relationships with the future free government in Afghanistan and with the Afghan people, it must carry out certain first steps, and one of the first steps is to fully cooperate in the matter of the mines’ discovery and removal. The Soviet government must recognize that full economic recovery will not be possible without first solving this problem. Consequently, future Afghan-Soviet economic relations could not normalize under the prevailing conditions which ignore the needed solution to this immense problem.

Population Related Problems

There are several major problems relating to the population at large. The solutions to most of these problems will require careful planning, both for the short-run and the long-run periods. As an overall process the rehabilitation of the population at large to return to normal peacetime conditions will inevitably be part of the readjustments on the whole. However, there are certain cross-sections of the population that require special considerations. Careful planning needs to be done in the areas that affect such large numbers. Thus, a third major problem that needs to be worked on a large scale is the repatriation and resettlement of the external and internal refugees. Estimates vary somewhat on the total number of external and internal refugees. Based on the available information and a careful consideration of it has led me to believe that the basic issues of repatriation and resettlement will involve planning for a range of population that will number between 6.5 to 7 million individuals, with 5-5.5 million external refugees and the balance of 1.5-2 million internally displaced persons.

It must be remembered that these social dislocations took place over a long period, covering the years 1978-88. Repatriation and resettlement cannot be expected to take a similar period. But neither can it be expected to be accomplished in a short period without creating large logistics problems and bottlenecks in the processes of rehabilitation and recovery.

In Pakistan one gets the impression that repatriation could take a short period. In fact, I was informed by one high-ranking Pakistani official that the whole process "could take as long as six months." I attempted to convince this official and his colleague that even repatriating 200,000 Afghan refugees per month will require 15-17.5 months given an estimated refugee population of 3-3.5 million in Pakistan.

The refugee repatriating and resettlement organizations will also have to consider the flow of repatriating Afghan refugees from Iran for the same period.

Moreover, coupled with the problems associated with the return and resettlement of the external refugees there are the simultaneous problems of dealing with the resettlement of the internal refugees.
Displaced Persons

Clearly the combined repatriation and resettlement programs for the external and internal refugees require a large scale and well organized planning and implementation. Often discussions have centered on the problems of the external refugees. This is understandable since the external refugees are more easily reachable, although even here only the refugees in Pakistan are more accessible whereas the more than 2 million Afghan refugees in Iran have remained isolated due to lack of contacts by similar organizations (except UNHCR) that exist in Pakistan that serve the wide-ranging needs of the Afghan refugees. More access to the Afghan refugees are required in Iran at least by the Afghan refugee organizations to assess their situation and offer assistance. And, certainly when the processes of repatriation begins, the appropriate department, and one hopes it will be a Ministry of Refugees along with the UN-affiliated agencies, should have full access to the Afghan refugees in all countries to determine their wishes for repatriation and assist in the process.

A. Special Issues Related to the Afghan Refugees

Given the broad issues and concerns discussed above, it seems appropriate to put down a series of issues that specifically relate to both the external and the internal refugees.

(1) The optimal rate of return of the external refugees and the optimal rate of resettlement of both the external and the internal refugees require special consideration. The optimality conditions must be defined in relation to the resources available to accommodate these large-scale special relocations. The required level of assistance per refugee must be determined first and then based on the availability of all the resources the optimal rates of return and resettlement can be defined. If there is a major constraint in any one area, such as the availability of medical services or water, housing, etc., that constraint will determine the upper limits of these optimal rates.

(2) Repatriation and resettlement must be phased in such a manner as to not cause bottlenecks. Considerations of the optimal rates of repatriation and resettlement will solve some of this problem. However, there is another important consideration, viz., a distinction among the refugees as to their abilities and willingness to work. The first phase of returnees and those ready for resettlement should be those who qualify on both grounds, followed by the weaker segments of the refugee population. Clearly, a registration process is needed to accommodate these considerations.

(3) Since repatriation is voluntary, information that conditions are created for return should be given out on a selected basis so that mass exodus does not develop in a disorderly manner.

(4) Large-scale preparatory work in the areas of resettlement is needed for the necessary supplies of food, clothing, shelter, and medical care as the primary areas of concern. It will be necessary to recall that weather conditions in different parts of Afghanistan will require special
attention, particularly knowing that many parts of the country are isolated and not easily accessible at all times.

These primary areas of concern should not conceal the fact that there are a series of secondary items of concern that relate to the resources that are made available to the refugees necessary for their rehabilitation and recovery. These include funds, various necessary training programs, and in the case of farmers the supplies of farm machinery, implements, livestock animals, seed, and chemical fertilizer to mention the obvious needs.

Moreover, most adult refugees having not practiced their respective areas of expertise for eleven years need reorientation programs and adult education and training. On the other hand, most young refugees and refugee children who have not had the opportunity of being educated require educational facilities and services. Based on the expected number of repatriating refugees, their age structure, and full schooling requirements, my estimates show that a range of 4,581-4,976 primary schools and between 36,228-39,358 teachers will be needed to meet the requirements of the refugees.4

(5) Given the pre-invasion population occupational structure in Afghanistan, most resettlement will occur in the rural areas. These largely farming resettlers will face the difficult task of revitalizing lands that have been neglected for more than a decade in some cases. They will also have to worry about and contend with the mines and anti-personnel devices scattered all around the areas where the farm family will work and live. These preoccupations will take up most of the time of these families and the rural communities at large. There arises the question who will reconstruct the destroyed villages perhaps numbering between 11,000-13,000 homes numbering between 1,050,000-1,450,000, mosques, schools, private and public structures and the roads and clean-up the irrigation systems and rebuild where necessary? This question is twofold. First, who will pay for the costs of the private reconstruction in the economy? Second, where will the labor supplies come from? Our estimates are that in generating the 1975/76 Gross Domestic Product in 1987/88 there will have been a shortage of 1.593 million workers.4 Further conflict and higher national income requirements will raise the amount of labor shortage. This will probably form one of the most critical constraints on the processes of reconstruction and recovery. In the context of this analysis alternative approaches are suggested in solving this problem. These include (a) a large-scale substitution of capital for labor wherever possible; (b) encouraging a larger refugee repatriation through various incentives (separately discussed), and (c) possibly having guest workers for the period of reconstruction.

(6) A special problem with respect to the refugees relates to the urbanized refugees who are not urbanized in the normal sense of the word, but simply have fled the conditions of war to the peripheries of some cities. Relocating these refugees may present a different set of problems in the sense that they may not want to go back to the villages knowing the difficult conditions and uncertainties with respect to the existence of the
large number of mines and anti-personnel devices which are largely in the rural areas. The construction of infrastructures to accommodate refugees not returning to the rural areas may be necessary in some cases and some cities. Contingency planning is needed in this case.

(7) There is an overall issue involved in whether the refugees will be compensated for the losses they have suffered and for enabling them to have a restart in their chosen occupations. The internal refugees having received little or no assistance over the years will require more compensation. Yet, external refugees should also be compensated for the same reasons as well as an incentive to repatriate and give up their employments in the country of settlement. The refugees cannot be expected to return empty-handed and start normalizing their lives, and be expected to become productive members of a society that is in tremendous need of fast-pace reconstruction and recovery.

I have reasoned elsewhere that a compensation package is needed for the average refugee based on a compensation model (consisting of considerations of the loss of incomes, change in asset values, private costs of reconstruction, costs of transfer, disutility in displacement, and compensation during the readjustment period). But since evaluation of each of these components for each returning refugee and for every resettling refugee will be difficult and time-consuming, it is suggested that in the final analysis, the average refugee be paid a lump sum and informed that this is for these types of considerations and to enable him to restart his recovery and productive life.

The question arises— who should pay this monetary compensation given that it is agreed upon in principle and a range of payment is indicated? Our argument here is that the Soviet Union in facing its responsibilities should pay most of this compensation. This again is one of those steps that the Soviet government should seriously consider as part of the recovery process in Afghanistan and as part of an attempt to normalize relations with the free Afghan government and the Afghan people.

Deficiencies in such an area could be covered by the international community of free nations and in particular by the well-off Islamic countries.

B. Special Issues Related to the War Disabled Persons

There is a general awareness that upwards of 500,000 Afghans may have been disabled so far in the war. Estimates made based on the work done by Sliwinski and my own estimates of the population size show that there were possibly as many as 536,000 disabled individuals by the end of 1987. This includes a cross-section of the population inside the country and outside among the refugees. Critical is the fact that children have also been handicapped. There is much scattered evidence that a significant proportion of the children are adversely affected in this manner in addition to the lack of nutrition and health care during the years.
These individuals, aside from the obvious physical disabilities, will have experienced traumas of various kinds which will have affected them psychologically. The nature of these disabilities require long-term health care. It would seem, based on the experiences of other nations whose people have similarly suffered from the effects of war, that the rehabilitation of these individuals will be prolonged with long-term adverse effects on them as well as on their families and on the society, if effective assistance is not readily and widely available. In general, it is reasonable to argue that the private and social costs from the lack of effective rehabilitation programs will increase with time. The urgency and importance of planning for this cross-section of the population cannot be overemphasized. Clearly information from the experiences of other nations must be obtained. A clinical approach to planning in this area seems appropriate. A series of steps can be suggested at this stage. First, a special study including a survey is needed to determine the age structure, gender, and the nature of the disabilities, as well as the numbers involved and their area distribution. Second, since a significant number of the disabled are likely to be among the external refugees effective long-term care on a large scale (than presently available) can begin with them. Such programs can be portable so that in time they can be transferred inside Afghanistan.

Third, a series of disabled care centers might be established in conjunction with the health centers and health clinics proposed by the U.N. Even if much of the actual adjustment processes within the social and family structures among the Afghan people fall within the inner workings of the society, outside help will be needed to supplement these inner workings and to assist where such linkages are not present such as in the cases of individuals with no relations, or orphaned children.

Fourth, it seems clear that the long-term perspective should be one of returning these individuals as productive members of the society. This consideration is important for its own sake as well as the fact that we expect a severe labor shortage to prevail during reconstruction and beyond.

Fifth, special monetary compensation and subsidy payments should be considered especially in the serious cases where employment possibilities do not exist.

Finally, it seems that the art of artificial limbs has advanced beyond the use of ordinary wood and leather. A recent newspaper article (The Tribune, Oakland, Ca.) covered a story of American prosthetists who use lightweight alloys and plastics specially manufactured by Du Pont and other corporations into legs and arms. The individuals fitted can even enter some sports. A team of prosthetists, principally an individual named Herman Hittenberger from his base in San Francisco and his son along with 12 other U.S. prosthetists and manufacturers, went to the Soviet Union to help the Soviet disabled veterans of the war in Afghanistan. Hittenberger was quoted as saying "we would be happy to go to Afghanistan. This is strictly non-political, an errand of mercy." This avenue and these contacts could be explored for the benefits of the Afghan disabled in order to establish a basis for better assistance for them.
Overall Approaches to Reconstruction

The various effects of the war that have impacted the population and the functioning of the Afghan society at large should be distinguished from the structural destruction in the economy. This may be possible in some cases, whereas more difficult to achieve in others. By and large it seems that postwar reconstruction in an industrial society, where the main areas of destruction have been in manufacturing and transportation, can take on a straightforward approach, viz., rebuilding the factories and the means of transportation. Invariably reconstruction in such countries has entailed the adoption of the latest technologies.

Grants and capital borrowings from different countries and international financial organizations (e.g., IBRD) have provided the funding. Large-scale substitution of capital for labor and a cross-section of the supply of guest workers have met the production requirements. Such countries have ended up better off by having postwar restructured economies which gained higher productivity largely through the introduction of more efficient technology. Lost levels of output were caught up in a rapid pace, followed by sustained high growth rates. This seems the kind of scenario that was experienced by West Germany and Japan and to varying degrees by Italy, France, and other countries during the Second World War. However, these experiences will yield only a limited insight into the problems of reconstruction in an agrarian society and particularly in a complex society such as exists in Afghanistan. The complexities arise from the social and tribal intricacies and codes of conduct that regulate the functioning of the Afghan society during war or peace. Their understanding is a prerequisite for the infusion of outside assistance.

If we were to pick up the observable effects of the war and the series of activities required to normalize the country according to the wishes of the Afghan people, then the sequence would include the following: large-scale destruction throughout the economy, losses in the capital stock, losses in output, massive social dislocations, severe labor shortages, severe shortages of food and social services including health care, high infant mortality, a high rate of inflation and low productivity in many sectors. The general health of the population at large is probably quite poor due to the lack of the necessities as well as extreme tensions, anxieties, and uncertainties.

These complexities should not, however, be seen as unsolvable problems that might lead (1) to neglect of them, (2) superficial repairs and hoping for the best. Rather they should be seen as challenges that require careful consideration and planning, and fundamental solutions.

There are obvious solutions to the problems that exist in Afghanistan. Sequentially clearing of the mines, repatriation, and resettlement of the refugees and taking care of the handicapped must head the work orders. It is good to know that some work has begun on these major challenges. Their mention here is intended to remind us that without first solving these problems in significant ways, there can be little expectation that other major problems could be tackled. These include providing food and health services beyond the minimum requirements that
sustain a population in need. Sector by sector reconstruction that will
arrive at carrying out fast recovery and laying the foundations for
long-term growth accompanied by corrective policies aimed at revitalizing
the private sector, redirecting international trade to the free world,
retraining the civil servants, reforming all levels of education, as well
as the judicial system.

Broad Steps for Sectoral Reconstruction and Development:

Some Blue Prints

In broad terms the nature of reconstruction in the Afghan economy will
consist of the recovery of output where the fall in output levels is due
both to the damages of the productive capacity (such as land or
manufacturing facilities) and damages to the infrastructure that serves the
productive capacity (such as irrigation systems, hydroelectric power, and
transport systems, among others).

Given the prewar structure of the Afghan economy, certain broad
approaches in different sectors could be adopted as overall objectives to
accelerate the processes of reconstruction and recovery. At the same time
a careful consideration of these objectives must be part of the planning
process, where these objectives may be modified given the presence of
constraints (indicated above and others discussed below) and large-scale
distortions in the economy.

First, the basic philosophy of reconstruction in Afghanistan must
entail the idea that in order to assist the country become self-sustaining,
supporting the given population with a good standard of living beyond the
minimum level, planning should be carried out for the long term with
short-term flexibility and short-term objectives. These short-term
objectives should not be in conflict with the long-term objectives of
sectoral development and sustainable growth.

Second, as part of the processes of reconstruction and future
development of the economy, it is suggested that a number of specific
surveys and studies be carried for gathering information on the prevailing
conditions, assessment of damages to the infrastructure and productive
capacity and offer prioritizations in terms of the impacts of
reconstruction on output, employment, and regional participation in these
activities. It was pointed out that extensive survey and assessment work
has been carried out and hopefully will continue in the agricultural
sector. Here we would like to suggest a series of surveys and studies
specifically designed for the other sectors of the economy, viz.,
transportation, water resources, mining, and manufacturing. The nature of
these surveys and purposes of other studies are discussed separately below.

Third, it seems clear that a fast-paced recovery of output for the
staple products wherever possible is a priority in order to minimize the
severe shortages of agricultural produce which, despite the much reduced
level of population inside the country, has resulted in several-fold
increases in prices in important consumer items. Dependency on food
imports should be a short-term problem intended during the reconstruction period. However, longer term substitution of cash crops intended for export, for staple products that might continue to be imported until further large-scale land development takes place should not be ruled out. A priori this seems like a sensible long-term strategy.

Fourth, in the reclamation of farm lands, orchards, vineyards, and in the rebuilding of the animal stock rehabilitation should be viewed, wherever feasible, as opportunities in introducing new processes and technologies, new products and new breeds not to necessarily substitute for the native ones but supplement them and whenever possible to invigorate the existing and prewar systems. The introduction of new technologies in horticulture, in animal husbandry, in irrigation, and in land use, in reforestation all need careful considerations.

Fifth, above it was pointed out that we expect the supply of labor to be in severe shortage. Substitution of capital for labor intensive methods in view of this constraint should be a main objective of reconstruction. Rejuvenation of older and prewar technologies are useful if they turn out to be the most efficient methods. This problem may be particularly present in agriculture. But it will also affect other sectors such as transportation and mining as well as construction.

Sixth, fast recovery of output in the manufacturing sector is also essential, however, most Afghan manufacturing industries, with the exception of some such as cement, rayon textiles, chemical fertilizer, are agro-based. Therefore, their recovery will also depend on the recovery of agricultural products such as cotton, fruits, sugar beet, lumber, wool, and leather, all of which have been severely affected.

Seventh, fast recovery of output in the mining sector is essential, especially the output of coal which is used by consumers directly and in manufacturing.

Finally, in the transportation sector the critical problem is resurfacing the existing road system which clearly have suffered extensive damages.

**Surveys for Reconstruction-cum-Development**

In order to fully comprehend the short run (i.e., the immediate) and long-run requirement for reconstruction and future development, each of the sectors in the economy needs to be surveyed for these dual purposes. In essence, the requirements of reconstruction could not be fully met if detailed surveys are not carried out. Adding survey questionnaires and issue determinants in the same set of survey work will not unduly burden the process. Let us briefly discuss some broad issue-oriented frameworks for the major sectors in the economy, except farming which has already this process well underway.
Irrigation and Water Resources

A complete survey of the water resources which will include the actual and potential water resources, their regional size distribution and potentials for redistribution has not been done in Afghanistan. It seems that this is an opportune time to do so along with the process of surveying the reconstruction and repair requirements of the irrigation system as a whole.

The First Seven Year Plan launched in 1976 and abandoned since the coup d'etat of April 27, 1978, had presented plans for the long-term development of 100,000 hectares of land in northern Afghanistan deriving water from the Amu Darya that separates Afghanistan from its northern neighbor. Many of the river systems, including the Amu Darya, are underutilized. Before the war the total stock of irrigable land in Afghanistan was 5.3 million hectares. But only less than 50 percent of it was irrigated and even then merely 1.4 million hectares received the required water. Thus, a total of 3.9 million hectares of land either did not receive water at all or was given insufficient water. It is clear that the potential for raising output level from increased irrigation is substantial by increasing the supply of irrigated land in this case by 279 percent.

Simple patchwork repairs along with some reconstruction may solve the immediate problem at hand, but in reality a more basic approach is required, particularly when cognizance is taken of the fact that the same international institutions such as the U.N., the World Bank, etc., may be involved in doing this kind of necessary work at some future date. There will be savings in cost and in time if the surveys are done now rather than delayed until much later.

II. The Transportation Sector

With the exception of some air transport links for passengers and cargo before the war all of the transportation needs of landlocked Afghanistan were being met through the road systems and in some cases through railroads reaching Afghan borders.

It is clear that the primary hard-surfaced road system which connects the main cities with each other and with the borders have suffered extensive damage, particularly in the central areas around Kabul and the links between Kabul and Kandahar according to refugee reports. The full extent of the damages to the primary roads and to the secondary roads that connect larger urban areas to the rural communities and small towns are not known. Aerial surveys of the roads can provide the needed information. Since the road system is critical for reconstruction purposes and for recovery of international trade it is clear that the initial planning for this sector has to be resurfacing previously resurfaced roads and repairing others.
However, the development of the transportation system also requires longer term surveys and studies to determine the possibilities for alternative transport systems both for within the country use and for purposes of minimizing transport dependency for international trade on any single country.

During the past eleven years Afghan export and import trade as well as transit trade have largely been diverted from the free world to the Soviet Union. As much as 68 percent of Afghan exports go to the Soviet Union and some 40 percent of Afghan imports are from that country. We do not know how much of the Afghan transit trade goes through that country. But it is likely, based on some pre-invasion figures, that as much as 20-25 percent of the total two-way trade also is transited via the Soviet Union, raising the totals to near overwhelming levels of dependency. It is obvious that in the postwar period such dependencies cannot continue for independent policymaking if for no other reason. However, neither the idea of competitive rate offerings for the transit trade from the neighboring countries should be ruled out. Good policymaking in this area will maximize the economic gains subject to the basic constraint that such dependency must not be permitted to continue or develop.

For the development of the transportation sector, the Seven Year Plan had offered a major alternative in the establishment of railroads that would have connected Kabul to Islam Qala at the Iranian border. Iran was to have financed a significant part of the construction costs. Moreover, before the invasion of Afghanistan and the onset of the Iraq-Iran War, road transportation through Iran and Turkey, particularly after the completion of the bridge over the Bosphorus in the early 1970s, provided Afghanistan access to the markets in Europe. The traditional route through Pakistan cannot be ignored either with potential for further development. In brief, the development of alternative transportation systems both for long-term internal economic development, especially for the exploitation of the mineral resources, and for international trade, require full consideration and planning.

III. The Manufacturing Sector

Several issues in this sector need consideration. First, a distinction should be made between modern plant type manufacturing and small-scale cottage industries. In both areas surveys and assessment of damages are needed. For if the modern manufacturing plants have suffered neglect due to shortages of labor, materials, and power due to the war, the smaller scale industries have suffered for much of the same reasons as well as due to the large-scale dislocations. This is probably true for carpet weavings, animal husbandry that yield Karakul skins, hides, and leather and cloth weaving among other areas. It would be useful to know how these industries are affected and what might be done to help their recovery.

A second area deals with the type of ownership and control that have been exercised over the modern manufacturing plants. State ownership has been predominant in this sector. In general the existing industries have suffered from low productivity, small profit margins, and in some areas
have experienced continued losses. There arises the question of whether privatization of these industries will not serve the public’s interest better. A categoric generalization may be difficult to make for all these industries. The issue of privatization would have to be considered by the free Afghan government as part of rehabilitation.

A third aspect in this sector is a proposal for a research unit to survey and determine the feasibility of establishing new industries which might be financed by foreign private direct investment and joint stock domestic firms and private concerns. Such feasibilities will be inevitably based on the full recovery and development of the agricultural sector. But as pointed out below, they should be based on the commercial feasibilities of the development of the mineral resources in the country. Again reference must be made to the Seven Year Plan (1976) in this regard which has outlined the establishments of a number of heavy industries, including petrochemical and steel, as well as medium and light consumer oriented industries. The last World Bank report on the Afghan economy (1978) also had made a number of proposals for new industries.

IV. The Mining Sector

As in the case of the other sectors rehabilitation of this sector in terms of the kinds of minerals produced (coal, gas, oil, salt, lapis and other semi-previous stones), both for domestic consumption and production of other goods, and exports is the first order of business. However, this largely neglected sector needs much more work. We know that a collection of the surveys of mineral resources of Afghanistan up to 1977 showed the presence of large-scale deposits of a large number of minerals. The commercial feasibilities for the development of these resources were not developed with the exception of copper and some feasibilities for the major iron deposits of over 2 billion tons at Hajjag. In fact, it is surprising that the two-volume Seven Year Plan documents do not refer to the 1977 publication, Mineral Resources of Afghanistan. It seems that this publication was not made available even to the government planners.

It is likely that more resources have been discovered during the past twelve years despite the war. This deduction is based on imports of significant amounts of geological equipment from the Soviet Union that was valued at over $192 million between 1979-84 alone. Whether this new information might be made available or new surveys made by the free government in Afghanistan, the issue remains that the potential for the development of the mineral resources is highly significant and in all likelihood a major source of output and income for the country in the future.

Planning and Flow of Resources

We speak of transfers of capital and technology to Afghanistan embodied in the assistance programs under reconstruction and beyond for purposes of recovery and long-term development. The institutions must be
endogenously structured within the frameworks of the Afghan society and within Islamic principles and value systems that will in the final analysis control policymaking in applicable areas. The congruence of external capital and technology with the internally generated values and policies could form a smooth transformation of the prevailing structural damages into reconstructed ones according to the wishes of the free Afghan people. Externally exerted values, particularly those in conflict with what exists in the Afghan society, must be avoided. For even where the Afghan society is vulnerable due to the immediate needs, eventually difficult problems could arise if solutions to particular problems are not based on understanding and in agreement with policymakers in the independent Afghan government and beyond that within the society at large.

This is why it is important that actual planning and policy formulations be carried by Afghans themselves rather than given to them as accomplished frameworks ready for implementations. Past planning erred in another respect, viz., throughout twenty years of planning (1957-77) it did not involve provincial and regional priorities and their rankings. Heavy foreign (largely Soviet) participation in planning created the effect of having a centralized bureaucracy in Kabul which neglected the aspirations of the provinces and the rural economy where most of the Afghan GNP, employment, and exports were generated.

There is a danger here, at the present, of unleashing the large number of NGOs (or PVOs) to do in the rural communities what the larger external assistance organizations or the independent Afghan government cannot or might not accomplish. The danger stems from non-standardization of assistance programs, lack of control, possible misallocation of the scarce resources and possibly ineffective applications of assistance programs particularly for long-term recovery and development purposes. These programs cannot be based on the approach that seems to be taken presently, at least by some, to see which one of the current NGOs or others that might be created can gain more recognition and possibly influence in any given area. If there is this type of competition among these, especially as it affects funding, then the criterion should be result oriented defined in terms of a well designed benefit-cost approach.

A benefit-cost approach to reconstruction in Afghanistan could be applied at two different levels. One at the regional or local level and a second at the national level. Project engineers can offer estimates of costs to be evaluated by economists. Assessment of the benefits from different activities (projects) in different regions and locales can emerge from the rankings by the survey teams, which specifically would make inquiries about such rankings from the population involved. At the national level, additional rankings among different regions will minimize misallocation of assistance for reconstruction. National ranking will equate the value of benefits received in different areas. But they will also set policies, based on national priorities, for recovery and future development.
Flow of International Assistance

Given the massive destruction that has taken place in Afghanistan and the long gestation period required for some programs for recovery, it should not be surprising to state that a flow of assistance for rehabilitation and recovery will be required for a period of five to seven years before the Afghan economy can take over the process based on internally generated savings and other resources. It seems to me that in some areas twenty years of economic progress has been largely eliminated, whereas in others, such as in the livestock industry, long-term equilibrium that had been achieved through decades of production and marketing with the given structural conditions have been decimated.

We know that the Coordinator and his supporting staff have ceaselessly worked for bringing the issues on Afghanistan to the attention of donor sources. This process can be helped by the gathering of comprehensive information on the damages and destruction in all sectors. Furthermore, full costing for replacements of the destruction and damages need to be carried out under the types of assumptions that must be explored based on the objectives that a general planning system may set up. Fast-paced processes of resettlement and reconstruction are fine if they also embody the long-term objectives for economic development. Donor countries and organizations must take cognizance of the long-term nature of the reconstruction and recovery involved in Afghanistan witnessed by the long gestation periods in certain areas and in the need for laying foundations for self-sustained growth in the country.
The Amount of Financing

A priori, and based on the available information, we do not know what the amount of required financing will be for reconstruction and recovery in post-Afghanistan. This knowledge will come from the results of the surveys proposed here and the actual costings of the various projects. Nonetheless, we can obtain some idea of what is needed by the nature of the costs involved in one area.

If we assume that the full rehabilitation and recovery cost of one hectare of agricultural land is $2,600 in terms of 1988/89 prices, based on an earlier estimate of $1,600 per hectare figured in the Seven Year Plan by a World Bank team in 1977 for land reclamation adjusted for prices and long-term wartime neglect of the land, it will cost $3.25 billion to bring about the full recovery of one third of the agricultural land (i.e., 1.29 million hectares) normally under cultivation, but severely affected by the war. This, of course, covers only one aspect of agriculture. What will be required for full recovery of the livestock industry, the irrigation systems, the orchards and vineyards, reforestation and other aspects of the agricultural sector and the rural economy including private costs in the areas of housing and business and rehabilitation of the social services for this sector alone will be much beyond this estimate.

So far, the estimates of 1-2 billion dollars assumed by the Coordinator's office needed for all phases of relief, rehabilitation, and recovery are highly optimistic and in my view do not meet but a fraction of the expected costs for these activities over the five- to seven-year period required to achieve full results.
Notes


4 Author's "Reconstruction and Development in Afghanistan," manuscript.

5 For example, see Operation Salam, First Consolidated Report, February 1989, Office of the Coordinator, pp. 20-21, which reports on Herat where a large part of the handicapped in the provincial hospital were children under 15 years of age. The report cites the incredible infant mortality rate of 185 per 1,000 live births for the province of Herat. In all likelihood these conditions are repeated in many provinces throughout the country.


9 See Noorzoy, ibid., Table 1, p. 80.
Seminar on the Potential for Recovery in Afghanistan
and the Role of International Assistance

Geneva, 5 - 7 May 1989

Discussion Paper No. 4

AFGHANISTAN: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF RECOVERY
IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY

By Olivier Roy
AFGHANISTAN: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF RECOVERY
IN A FRAGMENTED SOCIETY.

by Olivier Roy

Today in Afghanistan war is the main factor of social change, through migration of refugees to Pakistan and Iran, forced urbanization (at least in Kabul), new balance of power between ethnic groups and emergence of a new leadership. The war both re-emphasised the traditional rules of power game, giving them a new expression through the political parties, but it brought also a politicization of the society, through these same parties and their political ideologies. At the same time the traditional discrepancy between central State and countryside has been considerably enlarged, added to the fact that there are presently two centers: Kabul and Peshawar.

ETHNICITY AND TRADITIONAL PATTERNS OF POWER

Afghanistan is a segmented society, with different levels of identification between an individual and segmentary groups, from extended family to ethnic identity. A gawm is the term used to design any segment of the society bound by solidarity ties: it could be an extended family, a clan, an occupational group, a village etc. Gawm is based on kinship and client/patron relationship; before being an ethnic group, it is a solidarity group, which protects its members for encroachments from the State and other gawm but which is also the scene of indoor competition between contenders for local supremacy (1). It is the basic unit of political involvement.

As far as ethnicity is concerned, one has to be cautious in using the usual ethnic maps and denominations. In fact the signification given to an ethnic denomination by somebody who accepts this denomination for himself differs from group to group. Tajik, Pashtun, Hazara, Aymaq, Uzbek, Baluch, Taymani, Pasha’y, Nuristani etc. do not designate symmetrical entities. A Pashtun is not only a pashtu speaker but somebody with a tribal identity. "Tajik" has a more restricted meaning than "persian speakers". "Hazara" bears more a religious signification than an ethnic one. It is quite impossible to define the ethnic groups as homogenous and symmetric entities, that could be conceived in political terms.
SOCIological changes

1) A new leadership

In the course of the war, a new leadership has already emerged in Afghanistan, originating mainly from the young urban middle class intelligentsia. This new leadership is made of Mujahidin field commanders, Peshawar-based bureaucrats and Kabul regime employees.

Mujahidin field commanders

The big question for Mujahidin field-commanders is to adapt to traditional society. Few of them had legitimacy according to traditional patterns (that is essentially to be the offspring of a respected family, either wealthy or religious). Hence three ways to achieve their local rooting:

- to push a new political structure, putting aside traditional notables at the risk of an open confrontation with traditional society.

- to become self-made notables along the same patterns than the former ones (that is using patronage relationships); access to weapons delivery or to humanitarian assistance is the best way to achieve such a position.

- to connect a new political structure to a traditional society, that is building a would be State from below.

Usually, the former establishment has left the country. There is no big khan fighting at the head of his tribe or clan against the Soviets. Members of the former establishment still present in Afghanistan used to join the Kabul regime. Some new governors recently appointed by the regime are former Members of Parliament from the time of the King. Big local notables feel more at ease with a regime which needs them according to the traditional patterns of power-sharing between a weak central State and strong local powers than with Mujahidin.

Among the new leadership, one has to add also the "fighting Ulemas" who head Mujahidin groups, mainly in the South, where their religious status allows them to bypass the traditional tribal segmentation. Ulemas advocate the implementation of the shariat, but not a specific political model and are more concerned with local administration than with taking the power in Kabul.

The Peshawar bureaucracy

The bureaucracy established, through foreign subsidies, by the Alliance in Peshawar is manned by the new educated middle class, opposed both to the aristocracy and to the local powers. These young urbanites either left Kabul directly for Peshawar with no or little fighting records, or have been trained in western sponsored training programs organized in Pakistan. They have the same sociological background than the Communists. Even in the "moderate" parties, the new bureaucracy is made of young educated, not of khan or ulema. But, naturally enough, most of these educated young people tend to join the radical and anti-western,
but nevertheless technocratic, Hekmatyar school of thought. Uprooted people tend to be more extremist than field commanders who are confronted with the complexity of the society.

In camps and in Pakistani towns, thousands of young Afghans are now educated either through western sponsored programs or through wahhabi madrasas. Trained as accountants, nurses, teachers, clerks, translators, mollahs or trainers in different fields, they have no future except as State employees. And there is a State in Peshawar: the parties and the Alliance.

A change also occurred in the curriculum of the Mollahs. Instead in being trained in hanafi sunni madrasas (hanafism being the more liberal islamic school of law), which have provided for centuries the afghan clergy, they are now enlisted in "wahhabi" sponsored schools, which vehemently oppose sufism and introduce a more rigid and dogmatic religious thinking. This new clergy is not in phase with the older clergy and with the traditional Islam of the peasants. The difference between both clergies is not in terms of being more or less "fundamentalist" (the traditional clergy is very fundamentalist too), but in terms of being able to adapt to the traditional society. In fact the new clergy is also an urban one.

The Kabul bureaucracy

A new bureaucracy has been built in Kabul too. I do not mean by that the PDPA party structures, which I think will not survive a Mujahidin victory, but the civil servants and employees whom the Mujahidin will need anyway. The difference between this new government bureaucracy and the former one is not so much that it has become communist, but that it is more westernized (through a soviet model) and cut from the countryside. In ten years, most of the Kabuli civil servants never went to the countryside and, free of the pressure of the traditions which was very strong ten years ago, are now used to a secular and modern way of life. This is particularly true for middle-class women. How the people will adapt to the future is not known.

In these conditions the discrepancy has grown all along the war between the government elite and the Mujahidin elite, not in sociological terms (both are urbanites) but in ideological terms. The Mujahidin elite has become more fundamentalist, the government elite more westernized.

2. Urbanization

Exile to Pakistan or Iran means urbanization for many Afghan refugees. First strictu sensu because hundreds of thousands of Afghans are living or working in cities, but also because life in camps tends to create a urban atmosphere: women are secluded, there are schools, dispensaries and administration; traditional leaders have lost their power in favour of young educated middlemen (except perheaps in the Quetta camps). People are either idle or working outside in non-agricultural activities. A refugee camp is closer to the new suburbs that are mushrooming in Third World big cities than to an afghan village. A lot of these refugees are unlikely to go back to their former villages and will probably go to Kabul, if they return.
Internal displacement inside Afghanistan also resulted in urbanization. If pro-Mujahedin cities like Herat and Farah saw a decrease in population, pro-government towns like Mazar, Farah, Jellalabad and even Kabul have been swollen up.

The question is to know whether Afghanistan is still a peasant society. Urbanites tend to be more ideologically minded than peasants. The urbanization of the Mujahedin refugees might induce a radicalization of their political and ideological stands. We might witness three attitudes:

- a fear of Kabul inhabitants (even if they are anti-soviet) facing a possible Mujahedin victory, except if the big field commanders, whose political maturity has been proved through the war, are in charge.

- a resentment of the rank and file Mujahedin against all urbanites (either from Kabul or from Peshawar), leading to harsh treatment of the captured cities and distrust towards the Peshawar bureaucrats and perhaps the returning refugees.

- a hatred, based on mere fanaticism, from militant refugees returning to Afghanistan just to fight and to occupy the big cities, under the leadership of petty local commanders or returnees, thus bypassing the established field commanders.

A last problem will be the attitude of peasants towards returning land-owners. If most of the refugees go back to the countryside, there will be not enough land for tenants. Wages and shares of the crops will fall. Let us not forget that birth rate is very high, specially among refugees: it is probable that the whole afghan population has increased in ten years despite the war casualties. It will reinforce the trend towards urbanization.

Urbanization will lessen the political weight of the field commanders and increase political instability, the main factor of stability being precisely the field commanders.

ETHNIC CHANGES

The war brought a new ethnic balance. There is a larger proportion of Pashtun among refugees. A significant part of the Pashtun who established themselves in North Afghanistan during the last hundred years (the någel) went back to the South or Pakistan. Large scale nomadism, which involved only Pashtun tribes, has almost disappeared. So the weight of the traditionally dominant Pashtun has been reduced, but not the pretentions of the Pashtun to rule Afghanistan. The opposition between Durrani on one side, and Ghilzay and Eastern Pashtuns on the other side made the emergence of an "all Pashtun" party improbable. In fact, the war meant a transfer of political leadership from Durrani to Ghilzay: most of the communist leadership is Ghilzay and Eastern Pashtun as are at least four of the seven Peshawar based Alliance leaders.
The war brought an ethnic reassertion among Hazaras, who now have their own political parties. A "new" (in terms of denomination) ethnic group might emerge: the Tajik (the term was never used by the "persian speakers" to refer to themselves but began to be introduced through foreign influence). Aymaq, Taymani, Timuri etc. who were listed as separate ethnic groups by the ethnologists do not behave differently from the other persian speakers in terms of political affiliation. Of course there are some constant patterns linking the ethnic map with the political map (3), but the key issue to understand local politics is more the gawm affiliation than the ethnic one. If ethnic affiliations might play a big role in future Afghanistan, it will not be done along political and ideological party divisions, because there is no "single ethnic issue" party: there are persian speaking military commanders in Hezb Hekmatyar and Hezb Khales, and Pashtuns in Jamiat. In Kandahar, one can find all the parties. The Harakat-i Enqelab is uniformly spread among all afghan ethnic groups, due to its clerical nature.

THE FUTURE OF THE STATE STRUCTURE

The ambivalence of the process of politicization in Afghanistan is obvious. On one hand it gives a new look to traditional segmentation, but on the other hand it introduces political references (for instance to a specific ideology, which fact is very alien to traditional society) and new structures. Field commanders have created a local administration (distinct from the Peshawar bureaucracy) using prerogatives of the former central State: there are Committees dealing with Finance, Health, Culture etc. They collect taxes and might establish their own judicial power. The notion of State-structure is no more seen as alien to the society; the communist State in Kabul is challenged by an elusive islamic State. But these new state structures do not have a head. Mujahidin have reinvented administration and bureaucracy but not the State.

On the other hand, it is not rare to see Mujahidin field commanders, mainly the petty ones, behaving like former notables and using the political fragmentation in order to express and enhance the traditional gawm segmentation. They tend to play the new political game with the old rules. The party is like the central State which is used to enhance a local status, not to achieve a nation-wide, ideologically minded project. The traditional power status in Afghanistan is an incentive to both political affiliation and political segmentation. Subordination of local notables and commanders to an amir is possible only if the leader is a charismatic and/or religious figure, or if the level of politicization is so high that discipline exists. So both external and internal divisions among the resistance parties do not come only from the passive segmentation of the society but also from the dynamic of power status.

The rooting of modern political party structures in Afghanistan could either bypass the traditional segmentation (like in the North-East) or, on the contrary (in Center North), give a new boost to infra-political, infra-ethnic, and even infra-tribal segmentation, that is the gawm level: a local petty notable, followed by some dozens of parents and tenants, could suddenly regain some power by joining a party which is rival of the dominant party and provides him with enough weapons and money to be above the new law and to act as an independant actor. These local petty
notables would not have politically expressed themselves before the war, but they now find in political affiliation an access to weapons and a new self assertion, making it more difficult for the dominant party and leader to assert themselves as a political alternative above the traditional segmentation. Such petty notables do not necessarily have a territorial basis (so they are neither feudals nor war-lords), but their simple presence as an independant network is enough to block the process of implementation of a would-be State structure. For example, petty notables will ask Voluntary or UN agencies for direct help on the ground that the local big leader is not of the same ethnic/political/religious/family/ and/or geographic background as they are; they generally find a sympathetic ear among the PVOs, which, incidentally, are as tribalized and segment as the Afghan society.

To summarize, in the North, the pattern is either large scale party structures (North East), mainly Jamiat, or collapse into anarchy (Center North); politicization could either trigger the emergence of would-be State structures or a collapse into the utmost segmental infightings. On the other hand, in the South, loose political affiliations could allow tribal areas to find some original patterns of coordination through traditional institutions and customs; traditional structures either remain untouched or, more often, tend to adapt to new patterns of organization (like shura headed by a traditional cleric).

A specific case is that of Hezb Hakmatyar which tends to carve relatively small pockets into the map of Afghanistan, East of a Kandahar-Maymana line (there is almost no Hezb West of this line); but these pockets, from where all the other organizations are expelled, are strong and homogenous. Interestingly enough, they generally correspond to local minority ethnic groups (Pashtuns in North East); as usual, qawm determinations fit with political motivations.

THE FUTURE

Whatever the future evolution of the war, there will be no State-appointed outsiders as local administrators for years, first because the war has stressed the traditional distrust of local communities against central State, secondly because the Mujahidin field commanders have established a local administration which, even when it is not shaped as a would-be State administration, will oppose any appointment made by any central government.

If we take as granted that no strong central government will be in charge for years, the reconstruction of Afghanistan has to be done at the local level, working with the de facto political authorities. It does not mean, as superficial observers used to say, that the Peshawar parties are loosing their influence, but that there is a growing discrepancy between the Peshawar bureaucrats and the field commanders, who anyway retain their political affiliation and try to combine a modern political structure with a traditionally segmented society.

The Alliance in Peshawar, either directly or through a transition government established under its auspices, pretends not only to embody the
legitimacy, but also to act as a Counter-State. This Alliance has already committees working as would-be ministries. To establish its power inside Afghanistan, the Alliance will have to deal with the local field commanders along the same patterns that any State would have followed before the communist Coup, except that for the first time a large part of rural Afghanistan is now ruled by people who think of themselves as "administrators" and "Statesmen", not as "warlords" or khans.

The contradiction today is not only between Town and Villages, traditional Notables and Intellectuals, but also between a fledgeling would-be State from below and an imported State, both manned by young intellectuals. The discrepancy between Peshawar and the inside fronts is growing, not so much politically as psychologically. Even if the Alliance takes Kabul and remains united, it will not be able to administer the country. The only possible compromise would be if the new State in Kabul, whatever it is, makes room for the field commanders, thus restraining the ambitions of the thousands of foreign based intellectuals, but creating a bitterness among the latter that could be used by foreign countries to challenge any State power in Kabul.

If field commanders and the Alliance do not find the ground for a compromise, they both will be bypassed by instability which will take the shape of tribal and ethnic feuds. In case of political chaos, most people will revert to traditional affiliations, whether on the base of the gawm or of the larger ethnic identities which the war has forged or reinforced. In case of a general crisis, communal identity is the only identity which does not prove to be controversial. But it is too soon to say now if, for example, a Pashtun from Kandahar will react as a Pashtun, or a Durrani or an Atchekzay.

In the case of a crisis between field commanders and any Mujahidin central State, based on the Peshawar bureaucracy, one of the possible scenarios might be the Lebanonisation of Afghanistan: collapse of the central State and emergence of antagonist communities whose identity is based on ethnic, religious and historic references, disguised under superficial contemporary political references. Lebanon has shown us that modern elites can lead their own country into a political collapse. But the worse case scenario is not sure in Afghanistan and it is too soon to know how ethnicity will play a role.
NOTES:


(2): Wahhabism refers in Afghanistan either to the indian muslim reformism which flourished in the XIX th Century and is now represented by the Movement Ahl-i Hadith, or by the Saudi strictly speaking Wahhabi religious school of thought. But the difference is now of lesser interest because the ahl-i hadith movement is subsidized by the Saudis.

(3): See my book L'Afghanistan, islam et modernité politique, Le Seuil 1985. The Pashtun "fundamentalist" groups are not so well rooted among Durrani tribal areas, but quite well among the eastern Pashtuns, mainly through Khaies (Zadran and Khugiani tribes; but Hekmatyar has good implantation among Shimwari); Hekmatyar won the majority of the pashtu-speaking pockets in the North-East, from Ghilzay origin, (in Baghlan, Takhar, Kunduz), where tribalism has disappeared as a social order (but not from the memory of the former tribesmen, who still retain the name of their tribe, but have given up tribal institutions like jirgha). Jamiat has the upper hand among persian speakers. Two factors are here important: sociological (tribal/non tribal) and ethnic (Pashtun/non Pashtun). Gaylani and Mojaddidi are stronger among Pashtun tribesmen in the South.
Seminar on the Potential for Recovery in Afghanistan and the Role of International Assistance

Geneva, 5 - 7 May 1989

Discussion Paper No. 5

AFGHAN WOMEN IN REPATRIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

By Inger Boesen
Danish Refugee Council
This is in memory of

Irén von Moor, my friend, who always concerned herself intensively with the life and fate of the Afghan women and families.
Foreword

We were returning from a two-weeks’ stay in Peshawar in March-April this year. My daughter and I had visited our 'Daddy', who is presently involved in rehabilitation activities, and not the least important: I had visited several old Afghan and expatriate friends as well as the Sewing Project for Afghan Refugee Women, where I had once worked, and where I still found old friends with whom I was able to discuss the future.

From the aeroplane window we saw something white on the ground - huge white expanses which could definitively not be clouds, since we glimpsed villages and rivers scattered here and there. We realized that it must be Afghanistan - and it was later confirmed by the air captain.

More than anything else, the sight of the snow-bound country gave reality to what the refugees had told me in Pakistan. This winter in Afghanistan had been the most severe for 16 years. I thought of the bombed villages, ruined fields and damaged cities, where people are living in slow-motion, suffering from shortage of food and heavy inflation, lack of fuel and firewood, bread-lines in Kabul starting at 3 AM. - and compared it mentally to a press photo which had been printed on the front page of a Peshawar newspaper only a few days earlier showing two girls sitting on a tank in Kabul, happily waving bunches of flowers.

Even now, after the anniversary of the Geneva Accords, and after the ostentative withdrawal of the last Soviet troops, still the prospects of peace in Afghanistan seem very distant. Since the beginning of this year, with the siege of Jalalabad, new refugees have been pouring into Pakistan in increasing numbers, and more are to follow. And after Jalalabad, what's next? Kandahar, Kabul? The Afghans themselves have
gloomy views about the future: "Afghanistan is not free", they say, "and God knows how many years it will take".
Still, despite the long-time perspectives of peace in Afghanistan, it is of course vitally important that the international community and the Afghan democratic authority bodies (when they come into existence) plan the eventual repatriation and resettlement of about 5 million Afghans in exile in Pakistan and Iran, as well as approx. 2 million internally displaced persons, as early as possible. And, in the planning of repatriation and reconstruction, the Afghan women and their particular problems and needs, but also their resources and potentials, must be given special attention, in order to make them visible, and to make them heard.
I THE ROLE OF AFGHAN WOMEN IN SOCIETY BEFORE THE WAR

1. The Traditional Role of a Woman

In "traditional" Afghan society (if this term can at all be used in such a changing and ethnically heterogeneous area which is called Afghanistan) the roles and status of women are basically centred around women's reproductive functions. Women are essentially considered as means of the physical and social reproduction of the male-centered (agnatic) family and patrilineal kinship structure, as producers of children - primarily sons to inherit, work, and defend the family land, and continue the lineage, as well as daughters for exchange in marriage. Marriages, which are generally linked with considerable material transactions - in the form of cash, land, or cattle - function as vital "knots" in the creation, reproduction, or change of the local social networks of kinship and alliances (or non-alliances) which is the most important frame of reference in the Afghan social and cultural universe (0). The social identity of an Afghan individual is inextricably tied to family and descent. The symbol of a family's social identity and standing is its honour, which has been termed "the immaterial family capital"(1). Just as is the case of the family's material capital (ideally house, land, or herds), the family honour is shared by every member of the household, but on the other hand, every member of the household is also responsible of protecting the family honour he or she represents. Because of the women's central role in the social reproduction of the agnatic household and lineage, and also because women are considered by men as morally weaker and more vulnerable to temptations, women's role in defending the honour they represent is particularly emphasized. The main rationale of the so called Purdah institution - seclusion, segregation, and veiling of women, seems to be the need for the males
(who are ultimately responsible for the honourable behaviour of women) to protect "their" women from contacts with the outer world (i.e. non-kin and strange men), through physical and ideological control of the women's mobility (by seclusion and veiling). The role of women as representatives of the joint family honour is largely accepted by the women, who themselves derive their social identity and status from that of the household they belong to. Of course, personal conflicts and occasional rebellion do exist against the tight control of the family of its individual members — not only by women, but also by men of the younger generation (2).

Women's productive roles and functions are mainly considered as secondary in a structural sense, despite the fact that, in most households, women's labour are an integral and vital part of the material existence and reproduction of the household. The products of a woman's labour, material products as well as the bearing and raising of children, belong to the household and should ideally (i.e. according to the standards of Purdah) be confined within the family compound. I will revert to a more detailed discussion of the division of labour between men and women in agricultural production. In a social-structural sense, women's labour as well as their reproductive potentials, are controlled by the agnatic household. In traditional Afghan society, women rarely own or inherit productive property. Their existence ultimately depends on the family. In exchange, Afghan women enjoy a comparatively secure existence, since divorce is rare in many groups, especially among the Pashtun. They are entitled to adequate provision from their husbands or the husband's family. (Among the Pashtun, rights as well as duties to a woman are transferred from her paternal family to the family of her husband at marriage). If a woman observes the rules of the social game, just as is expected from all members of Afghan society, she enjoys a high respect from the men,
especially as a mother of sons. This respect of women, expressed in
the addresses Khanum (Persian) or Bibi (Pashto) ("Madam") - or
"Mother-of-so-and-so"- is a profound feature of Afghan culture.
Personally I have experienced being able to walk freely about in the
streets of Kabul unaccosted or unhassled, and was struck by the
difference of male behaviour in other Muslim cities outside of
Afghanistan, e.g. Peshawar.

2. The changing role of Afghan women
The "emancipation" in the Western sense of the word of Afghan women
has been a slow and difficult process. Various reforms, beginning with
the policy of Amanullah Khan as part of his rash modernization
("Westernization") of Afghanistan have mainly been focused on the
creation of possibilities of education and work outside the home for
women; the abolishment of the veil as symbol of Purdah; and women's
right to vote and thus participate as citizens in their own right in
the political life of Afghanistan. Amanullah's premature
modernization efforts were blocked by conservative forces in society
who feared the destruction of traditional ways of life. Since the fall
of Amanullah Khan (1929), later governments went easy on the subject
in order to secure the support of the people of women's rights. School
and higher educational institutes for girls were gradually reopened;
King Zahir Shah in the Constitution of 1964 gave women the right to
vote; and finally at a ceremony in 1969, the veil was officially
abolished. However, it is important to remember that the
"emancipation" of women was introduced and supported by a limited
number of elite families and widely modelled on Western ideas (3).
In the mid-70-es, the percentage of women educated and working
professionally, out of Purdah, was estimated at about a mere 2% (4)
mainly concentrated in the capital and the urban center of Northern
Afghanistan, Mazar-i-Sharif. Among the Afghan people in general, there were still very ambiguous attitudes towards the education of girls.

As a conclusion, it is important to notice that even the "emancipation" - education and professional work of women - developed in accordance with the basic principles of gender roles in Afghan culture. "Modern" women were still expected to observe the rules of honour, e.g. through modest dress, even if not veiled. The school-girls in Kabul - nicknamed "taxis" - were visible mementos in the street scenery of this. They were uniformly dressed in black tunics and thick white stockings, with white headscarves - their colour scheme exactly identical to the popular 'Volga' taxis.

Even the educated and "modern" women were primarily identified with their family, and it was e.g. unthinkable that an unmarried working women would take her own apartment and live alone. The conflicts and confusion created in the minds of the young people between the two different sets of expectations are strikingly reflected in the report of a survey of "Listener's Letter" to Kabul Radio, teen-agers express their grief at being "forced" to marry their cousin instead of being allowed to marry their sweetheart from college (5).

1) AFGHAN WOMEN IN EXILE

The policies of the leftist Kabul government after the "Saur" coup in 1978 of "eradicating the oppression of women" along with the general poverty, illiteracy, and "backwardness" of Afghanistan, primarily through the famous "Decree No. 7", Oct. 1978 were, although well-intended, largely a failure, basically due to lack of understanding of the society they were dealing with and of the mechanisms of its basic institutions: religion and family. Particularly the forceful and often
crue1 alphabetization of women came to be one of the strongest sparks of popular resistance and civil war. The ideological response it created was a strong revivalism of religiosity, Islam presenting itself as the medium best suited as the cause of unity to the many different ethnic groups in the country (6). The resistance is perceived as jihad, a holy war in defence of Islam, as well as of Afghan homeland. De quin de para, de vutam de para, de namus de para (for the sake of faith, homeland, and honour) has been the major slogan of the mujahdeen throughout the war (7).

This revival of Islamic feelings go very well together with traditional concepts of the role of family and women (8). It has been the rationale of conservatism regarding the role of women, which has contributed to a strong emphasis on purdah in exile. In exile, the emphasis on women as symbols of family honour may even have been reinforced. The defence of honour and the homeland is a central concept of jihad. To this comes the physical loss of the tribal land that is such an essential element of honour in Afghan culture, which may mean that the function of women's honour to the family's social identity has become even more important than before (9).

In addition to ideological motives, the physical as well as social living conditions of the refugees in Pakistan have been effective in reinforcing purdah. Living space in a refugee village is narrow and confined, and the families live close to non-kin and strangers. This spatial pattern differs much from the rural settlements in Afghanistan, which were often a well-known social universe where most people were relatives in some way. The presence of Pakistanis within and outside of the refugee villages adds strongly to the perceived fear of contacts with strangers and need of protection of the family. - The physical manifestations of this need of privacy and protection are the
walls or screens of straw-mats or mud, which are constructed around
the compounds as soon as possible. I saw them recently being raised by
the new refugees arriving from Nangahar province, even before they had
a proper shelter.

Purdah, physical restrictions on the mobility of women, as well as the
wish to demonstrate to the local people that Afghans are just as good
Muslims as Pakistanis - all has created an atmosphere where Afghan
women are afraid of appearing in the streets of Peshawar, even fully
veiled, for fear of being harassed, not only by Pakistanis, but particu-
larly by Afghan men, who threaten or actually beat the women, or-
dering them to stay in their homes "for shame". Afghan women who do
venture out, e.g. to work in refugee women's assistance programmes,
teach in refugee schools, etc., often receive threatening letters
(ending numbers of examples of this including threats to women's pro-
grammes could be mentioned) even when the women work in complete
Purdah and all-female contexts, and provided door-to-door transporta-
tion.

The emphasis on Purdah and its accompanying negative attitudes towards
women working outside their home or engaging in gainful activities on
the part of the men and the maleks in the Afghan refugee villages has
made it difficult for women, especially single women and widows
without relatives to help them, to exist and to provide for their
children. In the streets of Peshawar, Afghan women and children are
daily seen begging - something unheard-of in traditional Afghan
culture (10). Against the odds, however, a number of assistance pro-
grammes for women also involving widows and orphans have managed to
reach the women, e.g. carpet-or quilt-making programmes, embroidery
and tailoring programmes etc., where men of the household or the
neighbourhood often act as middlemen between the women and the volun-
tary agency. The acceptance of the women's earning of incomes, also
through work in e.g. refugee schools, hospitals, or in the offices of voluntary agencies, is in most cases clearly motivated by the necessity of earning money for the family, especially if the men cannot find work. As Nancy Dupree puts it, quoting an Afghan lady: "When there is no food on the table, the men are forced to open the door". (11).

Official Afghan views of women's future role in Afghanistan

The different parties of the exile government in Peshawar hold different views of the future roles of women in Afghan society, including the right to vote and thus participating in the political formation and development of a free Afghanistan. Basically, their platforms all insist on Purdah and segregation in some form, but they seem to range from acceptance of full enfranchisement of women to complete rejection of all activities of women beyond their traditional roles in the family.

It is clear from what has been briefly outlined that the strongly increased emphasis on Purdah and seclusion or segregation of women among the majority (not all!) of the male refugees and the resistance, present rather gloomy perspectives of the future participation of women in the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

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111 AFGHAN WOMEN AND RECONSTRUCTION

1. Women's role in rural production

In rural Afghan families, there exists a clear division of labour between women and men. The contribution of each sex is complementary to and dependent on that of the other. A farming household would not, or only with difficulty, be viable without either. The division of
physical tasks is congruent with the division between the social worlds. Men and women live, work, and socialize in separate social spheres, and children are brought up from early age to fit into their future gender role. However, the two spheres are structurally interwoven through the nexus of family life and kinship network. This means that, although decisions and politics are made by men, women have numerous ways and means of influencing the men's decisions and policies, directly or indirectly, e.g. through their sons (12).

The social and spatial world of men is essentially outside the home. The farmers cultivate the land, plough, sow, and harvest, and in addition see to livestock and irrigation canals. Men control the household's economic transactions with the outer world. Male social life also takes place in the "public" sphere. They meet in tea-houses, mosques, or the guest house of some local influential landowner. Visiting takes place in the guest-rooms of family homes, which are separated from the private sphere of women and children.

The women's tasks in a farming household are many, and she works from dawn to dusk. Women's work is generally carried out within the walls of the compound, where they process the crops, prepare food, and bake bread, the everyday staple of most Afghan families. They care for children, and for the home in general including the washing and ironing of the household's clothes. As in our own society, a man's untidy dress is the blame of his wife. Water is mostly fetched by children, to allow the women to keep in Purdah, or the women go to the spring or the well at dusk (13). Moreover, women and children often keep small livestock - sheep or goats - as well as chickens, in or around the compound, and many have kitchen-gardens which provide the family with nourishing vegetables. The women in one or several related, extended households mostly work together in a warm and cheerful atmosphere, helping each other while gossiping and exchanging valuable
Rural women may also engage in tasks outside the home, e.g. participating in the weeding and harvesting of the crops. The extent to which they do so depends on the socio-economic situation of the household, as well as its demographic composition, i.e. that if there are no sons to help the husband, and the family cannot afford to hire labour, the women must help. However, this is considered as being against the norms and ideals of segregation and Purdah. The most conspicuous breach of the Purdah ideals is the case when the women of poor tenant families have to work as unpaid housemaids in the household of the landowner. This is a part of the tenancy contract called begar, which also includes a certain number of unpaid working days per week on the landlord's land by the tenant. The begar of women is particularly resented, precisely because it compromises the honour of the tenant family.

In pre-war Afghanistan, the results of women's labour basically belong to the household (cf. p. 5) - they are not for sale (except for the occasional eggs or chickens that a woman may sell for pin-money). This also includes her handicraft products. Exceptions are, of course, the carpets and rugs woven by Turkmen women, which are sold by their men.

"Marry a Turkman woman, and your fortune is made", an Afghan saying goes.

As has been discussed, these attitudes towards the gainful activities of refugee women have gradually, if grudgingly, become slightly changed, in the face of necessity.

From this very broadly painted picture it is clear that women play an indispensable part in the Afghan agricultural economy. Their future role in rural production will presumably be of a similar character.

However, as we know, the conditions of rural production are today very different from before the war. According to the extensive survey in-
implemented by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan in 1987 (15) it is estimated that the food production in Afghanistan has declined to about 45-50% of the 1978 level. The nutritional situation among the remaining population is critical, and in particular women and children are vulnerable to deficiency diseases. In general, the population seems to be less resistant against infectious diseases such as malaria and TB (16). Villages, fields, livestock, irrigations systems, and infrastructure have been destroyed on a massive scale (17). They will have to be reconstructed before the agricultural production will be able to cover the needs of the remaining population as well as the returning 3.5 mill. refugees from Pakistan and Iran.

Plans for agricultural rehabilitation all seem to envisage sending parties of able-bodied male refugees ahead, in order to prepare for the later return of families on a larger scale. What do the Afghan refugee women think of that?

From a survey conducted among 1556 refugees from a total of 90 refugee villages in NWFP, Pakistan (18) it emerges that 95.8% of the women, and 86.2% of the men (19), envisage returning as one group. This attitude was confirmed through my own interviews with women in one refugee camp: the women do not want to be left behind waiting, they want to help in the work. This, of course, would present serious difficulties regarding basic needs such as food and shelter. But despite the difficulties, and despite the fact that the restoration of houses, fields, etc. are not traditionally women’s work, the Afghan women are eager to participate in the reconstruction of agriculture as early as possible.

Assistance to rural women should aim at supporting women’s traditional functions in the rural economy. This could be in the form of assistance to kitchen-gardening and the growing of the vegetables that are so urgently needed to improve the diet; the raising of poultry and small
livestock would also benefit the nutritional situation of the population, as well as being sources of income to the women.

The design of future programmes, as well as the transfer of existing assistance programmes for Afghan refugee women, should be carefully prepared and preceded by surveys among the refugees in Pakistan, primarily women, but also men, in order to identify important factors such as ethnic origin and economic background, skills, as well as the refugee's expectations of resettlement, and their attitudes towards women-oriented assistance programmes.

On the background of traditional division of labour in rural households, coupled with the increased emphasis on Purdah among refugees and resistance, it is to be envisaged that assistance to women must assume forms that are acceptable to the men and the local authorities (jirgas and shuras). This probably means that the programmes will have to accept Purdah and segregation as well as the acting of men as middlemen in the case of income-generating programmes such as tailoring and handicraft programmes. The programmes should be compatible to kinship groups and community networks and be of limited and manageable scale.

7. The Special Problems of Widows, Orphans, and Disabled Women

The tens of thousands of widows from the civil war, orphans, and women disabled through bombing and mines, constitute a particularly vulnerable group among the refugees as well as the population remaining in Afghanistan, and their situation needs special attention.

In traditional Afghan society, widows and orphans, as well as mentally or physically disabled, were taken care of by their kinship group. As result of the civil war, this network has in many cases been destroyed or rendered unable to provide for the destitute women.
One traditional way of taking care of widows and their fatherless children in Afghan society are multiple marriages and "levirate" marriages (marriages with the brother of the deceased husband). This also seems to have been taking place quite extensively, among the refugees as well as in the remaining population. In Peshawar, there were rumours recently that Afghan men, who married a widow as second wife, would be paid a bonus of Rs.5000 by the resistance. In my own conversations with male refugees, most expressed confidence (or feigned confidence?) that the "government" or the village would provide for the widows and orphans, in accordance with Islamic obligations. It would certainly not be accepted that widows supported themselves through their own work. However, neither "the government" nor the local structures are likely to be able to fulfill this task for many years to come, in view of the present situation of the country.

On the other hand, widows themselves expressed that they were prepared to work to support themselves - to do "just any work". Particularly the widows who have been involved in income-generating assistance projects for refugees perhaps for several years, are likely to have experienced the possibility of supporting themselves and their children through gainful employment. This experience will probably be an additional motivation and incentive of participation in programmes for repatriated widows and orphans, e.g. in the form of different income-generating projects, or credit-schemes allowing the widows to establish small-scale business such as poultry, vegetables, processed milk, fruit, and vegetable products, or different types of handicraft.

3. The Urban Environment

At present, it is difficult to specify in detail the future problems
of living in the urban environments of Afghanistan. For obvious reasons, no surveys of the conditions in the cities have been made by cross-border organizations, and the only information is that provided by journalists' reports, and reports from the Afghan resistance and refugees.

It is well known that a number of cities have been severely damaged by bombardments, including Herat, Kabul and Jalalabad. Since the beginning of March this year, the capital of Nangahar province has been under siege by the resistance, and various reports tell of massive destruction of buildings by bombardment (20-30%), food shortage, and violent inflation of food prices (20). Likewise, the food situation is very serious in Kabul. Wheat is strictly rationed, and queueing for bread starts at 3 a.m. International efforts of emergency supplies have largely been unsuccessful. Fuel, firewood and electricity are scarce.

Future living conditions, above all the food supply, naturally depends entirely on the general food situation in the country, and are thus inextricably linked to the rehabilitation of agriculture and the production of foodstuffs in the rural areas.

The urban refugees, of who many are educated or have been engaged in a trade or profession, have mainly settled in the cities of Pakistan and Iran or have emigrated to third countries, mostly to the West and Australia. Of these refugees, many are probably not going to return, if the future government in Afghanistan is dominated by conservative and fundamentalist forces. In particular, educated and professional women will find it difficult to adapt to such a changed Afghanistan (cf. below).
4. Training and Education

Clearly, the training and education of the growing generation of young Afghans, girls as well as boys, play an extremely important part in the future reconstruction of Afghanistan. For this reason, the reestablishment or development of training and educational facilities must have a central place in the reconstruction planning.

However, the prospects of education and skill-training of girls and adult women face the limitations and negative attitudes that have resulted from the development of Islamic-Afghan identity among the resistance and the refugees including strongly conservative attitudes towards the education of women. These negative attitudes have been heavily inspired from the policy of the Kabul government after the coup in 1978 of enforced alphabetization of women as part of a general "liberation" of women. Precisely this policy, and its often brutal implementation, struck at the very heart of Afghan culture - the honour of women and family.

The increasing "sovietization" (21) of the Afghan educational system during the years after 1978, which included the sending off of tens of thousands of young Afghan children to USSR every year for education, has contributed strongly to the reaction of conserving and protecting Afghan cultural values on the part of the resistance as well as the (surviving) exiled Afghan intellectuals.

Unfortunately, this has had a very negative effect to the education and training of girls and women refugees.

The establishment of schools for girls in the refugee villages only started gradually several years after the arrival of the majority of the refugee population in Pakistan. In 1987, according to UNHCR, the total number of refugee schools were 729, of which 562 primary schools. Of these, 76 primary schools were for girls, and no secondary
schools. In Peshawar, one secondary school for girls, the Malalai Lyceé, has been established a few years ago, with the financial support of an international agency, and, despite threats, it is running well. A few gifted Afghan girls have managed to obtain a higher education at Pakistani colleges, e.g. Peshawar Medical College. But they are exceptions. The general picture shows that only 6% of the pupils enrolled in refugee schools are girls. And then this figure is even a paper figure - actual attendance is much lower.

Inside Afghanistan, the educational situation is even more disastrous. It has been estimated that about 70% (22) of all educational institutions have been destroyed as the result of the war. Schools have been bombed, and teachers have fled or joined the resistance. The children who have grown up in Afghanistan during the ten years of civil war grow up as illiterates - the boys learning to handle guns instead of farming tools. In order to remedy this disastrous situation, resistance groups aided by the Scandinavian-funded Afghanistan Education Committee have constructed and are running 258 schools, 12 of which are girls schools spread in all provinces of Afghanistan, and supplied by teaching materials developed by AEC, as well as teachers' salaries.

It is clear that the children remaining in Afghanistan, together with the returning refugees, are going to need education as well as practical skill-training, in order to be able to participate in the enormous task of reconstruction. This means reconstruction or reestablishment of schools for girls as well as for boys, including vocational training schools, and the University of Kabul, which is presently in a state of collapse due to the teachers and students having joined the army (23).
In addition to the lack of adequate education, the refugee children, who are born and brought up in Pakistan, being taught in a foreign language, experience a serious crisis of cultural identity. This pattern of identity crisis is well-known from other refugee contexts, where the second generation is taught and trained in an entirely alien language and culture.

When the refugees return, they will face a significant number of Afghan youths trained and educated under the Kabul government. The huge gap in levels of education is certain to contribute strongly to estrangement and antagonism within the young generation of Afghans who play such a vital part in rebuilding their country.

The reconstruction of Afghanistan necessitates skilled workers, technicians, and agriculturalists, but it also needs educated women in professions such as teachers, doctors, and community health-personnel. Trained and educated Afghan women, including the girls educated under the Kabul régime, are indispensable in Afghan society. In the interest of Afghanistan, as well as in the interest of the educated women, it is extremely important that they are supported in working and using their education, even if it will, at least initially, have to be in the form of segregation and Purdah. This will probably be particularly difficult to accept to the Afghan girls educated under the Kabul régime, having once been promised equality and full social participation.

Of the educated Afghan refugee women, many are prepared to accept working in Purdah, if only they are allowed to work. Others are negative towards Purdah, and many are extremely anxious about the future. For this reason, many educated Afghan families will probably choose not to return to Afghanistan.

I strongly agree with Nancy Duprée in her worrying about the future of urban educated Afghan women (24).
IV CONCLUSION

It is vitally important to the future participation of Afghan women in the reconstruction of their homeland that the special problems and needs of women are integrated in the rehabilitation planning from the beginning, and that women should be included in all phases of planning. As a step towards this, a special sub-committee and so-called "women's task-force" has been formed within the framework of ACBAR (Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief), the independent coordinating body of non-governmental organizations operating from Pakistan or Afghanistan who assist the people of Afghanistan with humanitarian aid (25).

It is clear that the prospects of social participation of, as well as assistance to Afghan women, depend very much on the future government in Afghanistan and its attitudes towards women's role in society. A strong central government of a conservative character is likely to be negative towards international (at least Western) assistance specifically aimed for women. If, it is going to accept the funds, it will certainly wish to be in full control of the utilization of the funds, without foreign control.

If support programmes for women are to be possible, they should, in any case, be carefully planned, respect cultural sensitivities, and be designed on the basis of studies of women's situation among refugees as well as among the population remaining in Afghanistan. Long-distance and centralized desk-planning will have very limited prospects of success.

The planning of community programmes for women in Afghanistan, as well as the eventual transfer of existing programmes for refugee women, must be carried out in complete understanding with the local community structures and authority bodies (jirgas and shuras). At least initial...
ly, segregated activities for women - at the best separate but equal will have to be accepted. The scale and structuring of the programmes should be designed to fit with existing local kinship and community networks as widely as possible, in order to function as extensions of traditional structures of support of e.g. widows, and in order to re-establish a women's network. Programme staff - e.g. teachers, trainers, and community health workers, should be Afghan - and, of course, female.

Educational and vocational training programmes involving girls as well as adult women should be an integral part of planning for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Finally, the time-perspective of women's programmes will have to be long, in order to allow for a gradual recognition on the part of male Afghan society of the benefits of education of girls, and of the development of the potentials of Afghan women to participate fully and actively in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. After all, women are half of the world - in Afghanistan, too!

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