ETHNOHISTORY OF THE QIZILBASH IN KABUL:
MIGRATION, STATE, AND A SHI’A MINORITY

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Date of Defense
For my love Megan
for the light of my eyes Tamanah and Sohrab
and for my esteemed professors who inspired me
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This historical ethnography of Qizilbash communities in Kabul is the result of a painstaking process of multi-sited archival research, in-person interviews, and collection of empirical data from archival sources, memoirs, and memories of the people who once live/lived and experienced the affects of state-formation in Afghanistan. The origin of my study extends beyond the moment I had to pick a research topic for completion of my doctoral dissertation in the Department of Anthropology, Indiana University. This study grapples with some questions that have occupied my mind since a young age when my parents decided to migrate from Kabul to Los Angeles because of the Soviet-Afghan War of 1980s. I undertook sections of this topic while finishing my Senior Project at UC Santa Barbara and my Master’s thesis at California State University, Fullerton. I can only hope that the questions and analysis offered here reflects my intellectual progress.

It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge my debt to a number of mentors who have guided me in my intellectual development at Indiana University, given me the necessary confidence in my abilities as a non-native English speaker, and helped me improve this study by urging me to clarify, theorize, and sharpen its arguments. My deepest thanks goes to Professors Raymond J. DeMallie, Anya Royce, Daniel Suslak, Devin DeWeese, and Ron Sela for being helpful mentors. I will always be grateful for the meticulous intellectual support that I received not only to present my ideas clearly and intelligibly, but reminding me of the importance of minorities, local histories and cultures, and state-formation that defines our interconnected world. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the staff at Departments of Anthropology and Central Eurasian Studies, my academic home for the last seven years, for their help.

I also would like to express my heartfelt appreciation to the helpful staff of the various archives and libraries that I visited over the years. I extend my thanks to Massouma Nazari, Director of National Archives in Kabul. Nancy H. Dupree, Director of Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University. Ghulam Farooq, Dean of Social Sciences, Kabul University. Huma Jawansheer, Director of Library and Archives, National Museum of Afghanistan. Sayyid Yusuf, Curator of Ziyarat-e Sakhi; and last but not least, Kabir Mushtaq, President of Afghanistan Qizilbash Solidarity Council. I would like to end by thanking my helpful interlocutors in Afghanistan, United States, and Canada for their hospitality and enthusiasm for this historical ethnography of the Qizilbash.
My daughter Tamanah and my son Sohrab still wonder why their father spends countless hours at the library or days away to attend academic symposiums. Nonetheless, both are brilliant readers and master storytellers with a keen sense of curiosity who now find my bookstands and filing cabinets as sources of excitement. I hope that one day they will read their father’s dissertation. My greatest thanks goes to my lovely wife, Megan. I deeply thank my parents, Hafiz and Najla Fazel, for raising me with the gift of reading and a curious mind. My in-laws, Mr. and Mrs. Sarwary, are the kindest people anyone could ask for. My entire family encouraged me during the stressful years of dissertation writing to ensure I still had my sanity. Megan often reminds me that anthropology and history is so captivating, but it is also important to live in the present. To which I always reply, there is no present without the genealogies of the past. On the other hand, living in the present with Megan, Tamanah, and Sohrab is a pure joy that I always treasure. So I dedicate this study to my family and mentors, because this dissertation would not have been possible without them.
Solaiman M. Fazel

ETHNOHISTORY OF THE QIZILBASH IN KABUL:
MIGRATION, STATE, AND A SHI’A MINORITY

This study explores the question of who are the Qizilbash people of Kabul. My research uses the ethnohistorical method for the study of Qizilbash history and culture. The Qizilbash history is reconstructed in a chronological and thematic manner by including data from a wide range of anthropological and historical sources that contains primary sources, memoirs, hagiographies, images, maps, participant observation, and in-person interviews. The advent of the Qizilbash coincides with the advances of the Safavid Sufi order that arose in the Iranian Plateau. This study then explains the reason behind the Qizilbash migration to the eastern frontier city of Kabul and ends by discussing the shifting Qizilbash relations with the modern state of Afghanistan. The latter part helps us better understand the Shi’a question in the context of Afghanistan, 1880-1978. This study, for the first time places the stories of a relatively small, but influential urban Shi’a group within the broader state-formation efforts that materialized in Kabul (constitutionalism, modernity, urbanization) prior to the Soviet Union invasion of 1979.

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CURRICULUM VITAE
QUOTATION

ما می‌نویسیم، پس هستیم
و فکر کنیم، جز همان

علی رضوی، نوشته در کتاب افغانستان: مقالات، نقد ها، بررسی ها و سفرنامه ها، 2001

“We write, therefore we exist
Until we are alive, we’ll write”


ا ز مرگ بری، سخن ناگفته، در خانه رضوی
صمد خویدن، محانت نشان دهنده، نگاه ناگفته

ناثنیاس، خیام

“From every sage, we learned a droplet of knowledge
Hundreds of pads worn, until we learned an iota of competence”

~ Anonymous, Persian couplet
TRANSLITERATION

In transcribing Persian (Farsi-Dari) into English. I have kept the general reader in mind. The method used for this dissertation follows the Library of Congress convention, without the diacritical marks. Exceptions are terms such as Shi’a, and Shari’a, which are spelled without the final h. The plural form of common Arabic words has been marked by an addition of an “s” to the singular, except in such cases as Ulema, where the plural Arabic form has become standard in English. The article “al-” has been omitted from last names after its initial use, which indicates a person’s place of birth or origin. Dates in this study are given according to the Common Era calendar, except when there is a compelling reason to give the Islamic hijri or the Persian solar shamsi date as well.
# ABBREVIATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKU</td>
<td>Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFGJ</td>
<td><em>Afghanistan</em>. Journal by Historical Society of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFGN</td>
<td><em>Afghan Nama</em>. A Collection of Literary and Historical Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQSC</td>
<td>Afghanistan Qizilbash Solidarity Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARI</td>
<td><em>Ariana</em>. Journal by Historical Society of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghanistan National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB</td>
<td>Bagh-e Babur Visitor Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CK</td>
<td><em>Chanda’wal Kohan</em>. Local Qizilbash Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Encyclopedia of Ariana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPGA</td>
<td>Historical and Political Gazetteer of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSA</td>
<td>Historical Society of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KM</td>
<td>Kabul Municipality. Map Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KU</td>
<td>Kabul University Library. Afghanistan Studies Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEB</td>
<td><em>NEBRAS</em>. Quarterly Journal of Afghanistan Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMA</td>
<td>National Museum of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK</td>
<td>Nasir Khusraw Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OW</td>
<td><em>Omid Weekly</em>. Weekly Newspaper Published in the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLK</td>
<td>Public Library of Kabul, Ministry of Information and Culture. The Archives in the Afghanistan Studies Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZS</td>
<td>Ziarat-e Sakhi Collection</td>
</tr>
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INTRODUCTION

“The purpose of Anthropology is to make the world safer for human differences”

~ Ruth Benedict

I. Research Objective

Afghanistan has been in an unending state of turmoil since the Marxist inspired coup d’état by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in April 27, 1978. The country’s ceaseless conflicts between 1978 and 2001 led to the loss and plunder of archival collections and an unprecedented departure of academics. The ongoing Taliban and Islamic State alliance brings Afghanistan closer to another round of Sunni-Shi’a strife (Sarwar 2015). The confluence of these calamities has either stopped or severely limited anthropological efforts to explore the mosaic of peoples, cultures, and religions that live in this country. One of Afghanistan’s influential ethnic groups who have been victims to this hindrance are the Qizilbash of Kabul.

The Qizilbash story in premodern and modern Kabul remains essentially unexplored. Accounts of the Qizilbash migration from Persia to Kabul, as the elite cavalrymen and administrators in Nadir Shah’s army are often repeated without much analysis and contextualization. The above narrative is true, but partially. The real story is more complex. This reductionist account emanates from parochial histories that were produced during the height of 20th century ethno-nationalism. Deliberate reductionism masks the changing Qizilbash ties
with the state, hides the discriminatory state policies, and covers the Qizilbash struggles for constitutional parity. It depicts them in monolithic terms, without any effort to consider their experiences and to explain the motive behind their migration to Kabul. Parochial accounts also obscures the intellectual, cultural, and professional contributions that Qizilbash have made throughout the years.

To fulfill this void in the field of anthropology, my study focuses on the themes of Qizilbash history, migration, and their significance in the formation of pre-modern Afghan dynasties. My study also focuses on the changing relations of the Qizilbash communities with the modern nation-state of Afghanistan until the armed Marxist takeover of 1978.

The goal of this study is to trace the history of the Qizilbash, explain the cultural shifts, and understand the processes of state-formation in Afghanistan from the viewpoint of this Shi’a minority. Did the Afghan state policies produce enduring biases that deepened social fragmentation rather than to homogenize the populace? How did the state’s anti-Shi’a decrees fatwa affect the collective identity of the Qizilbash? How did the Qizilbash use shrine visitation and ritual to transmit their history, preserve their customs and identity in the face of coercive ethno-nationalism?

**A. Qizilbash: A Brief Look**

Who are the Qizilbash of Afghanistan? Ahmad Mohebbi, a local historian, identifies the Qizilbash as descendants of the Oghuz Turks who migrated from Central Asia to the Iranian Plateau in late-11th century (Mohebbi 2011, 17). For
Ehsan Puzhohish, a local researcher, Qizilbash are not ethnically homogenous. He considers them as a mixed tribal confederation that initially consisted of Turkic clans who then merged with Iranians in the 16th century Safavid Persia under the Qizilbash epithet (Puzhohish 2005, 9-13). Mushtaq Kabir, President of Afghanistan’s Qizilbash Solidarity Council (AQSC), *Shura Insejam Qizilbash Afghanistan*, revealed to me in our 2014 conversations that Qizilbash people of Kabul are now Persian and not Turkish speakers. Kabir continued to mention the Qizilbash are mostly urbanites and have sizeable population in “Andkhuy, Baghlan, Badakhshan, Farah, Ghazni, Ghor, Herat, Helmand, Kabul, Logar, Mazar-e Sharif, Qandahar, and Qunduz” (Kabir 2014).

**Map 1: Afghanistan**
Roger Savory, scholar of Safavid Persia, in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (second edition) not only acknowledges the existence of a substantial Shi’a minority in “Kabul and in the high valleys of Foladi on the western edge of Hazarajat,” but also defines the term Qizilbash in the following manner, “The word is used both in a general and a specific sense. In general, it is used loosely to denote a wide variety of extremist Shi’a sects, which flourished in Anatolia and Kurdistan from the late-13th century onwards” (Savory 2006). Savory continues to write, “strictly speaking, the term Qizilbash should be applied only to those Turkmen inhabiting eastern Anatolia, northern Syria, and the Armenian highlands which were converted by the Safavid da’wa and became the disciples of the Safavid shaykhs at Ardabil. However, the term was also loosely applied to certain non-Turkish speaking Iranian tribes which supported the Safavids ... and Kurds and Lurs” (Savory 2006).

What is the population of the Qizilbash? There are no reliable statistics in the Afghanistan National Archives or in the AQSC office to confidently reply to this question. Kabir explained to me that, “Qizilbash was not acknowledged by the state as an official ethnic category in the 20th century. Qizilbash people either registered as Tajiks or as Pashtuns when identification card tazkira, was issued” (Kabir 2014). Kabir continued to explain, “the Tajik and Pashtun ethnic groups are largely Sunni Muslims. It was a deliberate state policy to understate the Shi’a population in Afghanistan” (Kabir 2014). However, there are a couple of 20th century estimates available to us from Western academics. The first is from Ludwig Adamec, who estimated the Qizilbash population at about 40,000
in middle of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century (Adamec 2012). The second estimate comes from 1960s by Vartan Gregorian, who agrees with Roger Savory, that the Qizilbash population is about 60,000-200,000 (Gregorian 1969; Savory 2006).

AQSC, however, considers today’s Qizilbash population to be larger than the estimates provided by Adamec, Gregorian, and Savory. The table below is the result of an independent survey that was conducted by AQSC surveyors’ shortly after the ratification of the 2004 constitution. AQSC clarified to me that the question marks in the table below indicate regions that are unsafe to travel to or places where people simply identify themselves as \textit{al-Tashayo Afghanistan} or the Shi’a of Afghanistan to avoid any ethnic connotation. According to the AQSC survey report, the average household has 6.6 children.

\textbf{Table 1.} Qizilbash Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Badakhshan</td>
<td>Darwaz</td>
<td>1450-1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>Pul-i Khumri</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>Mazar-e Sharif</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamiyan</td>
<td>Panjab, Waras</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faryab</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>Jeghatoo, Khawaja Umari, City of Ghazni, Ghughiani</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>Gerishk</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>City of Herat</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>District 1-6, 10, 15, and Paghman</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>Koshi, Dara-e Suf</td>
<td>Over 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>Jilalabad</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimruz</td>
<td></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruzgan</td>
<td>Tarin Kowt</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Province</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktia</td>
<td>Gardez</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td>Dah Moskeen</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qandahar</td>
<td>District 1, Toop Khana</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qunduz</td>
<td>Imam Sahib</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sar-e Pul</td>
<td>City of Sar-e Pul</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takhar</td>
<td>Taluqan</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>Day Mirdad, Hisa-i Dowom-e Bihsud, Qaria Momki</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In another conversation with Mushtaq Kabir at the AQSC headquarters, I asked about the Qizilbash arrival to Kabul. Kabir went on to say it was “during the Safavid State, 1501-1722, that the Qizilbash migrated from Persia to Kabul as part of military division to protect the frontiers and the trade routes between India, Persia, and Central Asia” (Kabir 2014). Over the course of time, Qizilbash garrison guards came to hold key political and financial positions with the pre-modern polities. The Qizilbash units “primarily held administrative and military posts within the premodern Afghan dynasties. The Qizilbash officials played an integral role in the Durranid Dynasty, 1747-1823. With some ebb and flow, the Qizilbash role in the administration remained intact until the delineation of the modern Afghan state by the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission in late 19th century” (Kabir 2014).

With the expansion of ethno-nationalism in the twentieth century, “the Qizilbash were discriminated against on two bases: their Twelver Shi’a religious beliefs and Persian language” (Mousavi 2006). From 1880 to 1978, there were several state decrees banning Shi’as from openly practicing their rituals. Shi’as remained absent from the upper echelon positions in the Ministries of Defense,
Interior, and Foreign Affairs (Zia 2014). Outside of these important institutions, a limited number of Qizilbash served in influential capacities. Regardless of the state discrimination against the Shi’a, Qizilbash remained among the country’s “intelligentsia” social class and producers of high culture until the PDPA coup in 1978 (Poullada 1973, 16-17).

The Qizilbash believe in the Doctrine of Twelve Imams *Ithna Ashari*, Shi’a denomination of Islam. According to the Shi’a interpretation of history, Prophet Muhammad’s ‘legitimate’ and ‘rightful’ heir was his son-in-law, Ali, while Sunni Muslims disagree. The Shi’a believe that twelve direct heirs starting with Imam Ali carried on Muhammad’s line of descendants. When the Sunni denomination of Islam became the ‘official’ national religion in modern state of Afghanistan, it subjected the Shi’a population to a great deal of micro-aggressions and explicit discrimination. To avoid stigmatization in school and work, Qizilbash routinely kept their religious identity secret by practicing *Taqiyya*, a method of protective dissimulation (Dupree 1979, 681). A Qizilbash elder who practiced dissimulation by changing his family name from Ali Mardan (Persianate Shi’a) to Mardanzai (Zai, customary Pashto ending that means son of) told me, “his patriotism and conformity to state policies was no longer under heavy suspicious gaze of the government” (Mardanzai 2015). It was a practical strategy for some to abandon part of their identity. Years of *Taqiyya* however had irreversible consequences on the personal identity and communal solidarity of the Qizilbash.

To understand the underlying cause of why some Qizilbash reverted to *Taqiyya*, we must turn to the story of state-formation in Afghanistan.
B. Modern Afghanistan: A Closer Look

Abdurrahman Khan was enthroned as the founder of the modern state of Afghanistan in 1880. He declared himself the “light of the nation and religion” (Barfield 2010, 147). Abdurrahman ruled “directly and autocratically without relying on intermediaries” in order to consolidate and expand the reach of the newly delineated state (Barfield 2010, 147). The dilemma of how to unite the diverse ethnolinguistic groups was a central concern for Abdurrahman Khan’s administration, 1880-1901, and his son, Habibullah, 1901-1919. Both rulers relied extensively on British aid to construct a standing army to eliminate any real or alleged threats of dissent. The Shi’a residents of the country in general saw Abdurrahman’s “iron fist” policies, invasive espionage system, and brutal torture techniques as acts of hostility. Between 1880 and 1901, large number of Shi’a households moved to Persia or to the Indian subcontinent to escape Abdurrahman’s wrath.¹

After four long decades of indirect colonialism under the protection of the British-Raj, Afghanistan gained her independence in the aftermath of the Great War in 1919. The young monarch, Amanullah Khan, initiated a rapid set of reforms, similar to those of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and Reza Shah in Persia, to launch the hindered process of Afghanistan’s modernization. Part of Amanullah’s political modernization required the ratification of the country’s first constitution in 1923. It meant moving away from the previous “iron fist”

¹ The Khavaris in today’s Iran is a group of Shi’a people with Hazara or Barbari origins. The word khavar means “east” and Khavari means “person from the east.”
approach and “creating an Afghan national-identity” in a different way (Akhlaq 2015). Amanullah’s nation-formation action gained traction with elite urbanites and with subjugated Shi’a populace who believed nationalism would advance their legal status as a collective minority.

To reduce the engrained sectarian and tribal identities, Afghanistan’s first constitution “discouraged any mention of ethnolinguistic groups by name, calling all citizens Afghan” (Dupree 1979, 680). However, it only legalized the Hanafi jurisprudence of Sunni religious law in a country with about 20% Shi’a population. To implement Johann G. Herder’s model of nationalism one land, one people, and one language, came with a steep cost. The making of ‘Afghan’ national-identity aimed to erase the identity of the less powerful ethnic groups. The parochial accounts ignored the histories and contributions of minorities. This system of knowledge creation became part of the state’s modus operandi that essentially never disappeared in the post-protectorate Afghanistan until 1978.

The Marxist revolutionaries ousted the Muhammadzai Dynasty in 1978. The military takeover forever ended the dynastic system. Despite PDPA’s fiery rhetoric of equality for all, social justice, and uprooting the entrenched ethno-sectarian pyramid model that Abdurrahman Khan had implemented, the PDPA stance toward the Qizilbash did not translate to palpable improvements. There are two reasons to explain PDPA’s behavior. First, the Qizilbash were perceived as intellectual and commercial elites, who had benefited from warm ties with

2 The German-Afghan relations began in midst of the First World War and expanded in 1920s.
the Muhammadzai Dynasty. Second, with the fall of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in neighboring Iran, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s declaration to export the revolutionary brand of Shi’ism to ostracized Shi’a groups, the Qizilbash leaders were either purged or came under the surveillance of PDPA’s notorious State Intelligence Agency, KhAD.

Civil and religious leaders, who enjoyed tremendous social capital, were regarded as Khomeini’s “fifth column.” PDPA feared that Shi’a leaders could galvanize the masses, university students, and the financial elites, who could undermine the Marxist/Leninist principles they wanted to implement. A 2013 probe by the Netherlands National Police, “The Afghanistan Death List: Afghans Killed by the State, 1978-79,” has the names of the outspoken Shi’a activists, intellectuals, and clerics who vanished in the Stalinist style of purges *hujum*, which swept through the country in the first two years of the PDPA existence. During the Marxist experiment, 1978-92, few Qizilbash joined the PDPA ranks, but most prominent Qizilbash either were silenced or became disengaged from politics as they migrated to regional or western countries as the anti-PDPA war escalated.

With the demise of the Soviet backed PDPA regime in April 16, 1992, the Pakistan based Afghan resistance groups failed to concede equal appointments for the Shi’a people in the Peshawar Accord.\(^3\) Virtually all the Mujahidin parties that were formed during the Soviet War, 1979-92, crystalized around locality or

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\(^3\) The Peshawar Accord, a peace and power-sharing agreement that established the post-Marxist era Islamic State of Afghanistan. All anti-Soviet resistance parties except for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s the Hezb-e Islami signed it.
sectarian subcultures that previously existed in Afghanistan. The Mujahidins’ refusal to compromise with one another culminated to a destructive Civil War, 1992-96 (Coll 2004). Qizilbash districts of Kabul were battered and looted. The Afshar Massacre is one episode that highlights the tragedy of Qizilbash during the Civil War (Mobashir 2014). Hundreds of women and children were killed in their own homes as they slept at night (Afsharyan et al. 2014).

The Mujahidin’s incompetent government was replaced by the extremist Taliban regime in 1996. Under the auspices of Mullah Omar, Taliban founded the Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan, 1996-2001. The Taliban, an explicit anti-Shi’a regime, soared to power with the assistance of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan (Rashid 2000). For the Taliban, the Shi’a people are not “orthodox” Muslims. Taliban banned prayer in Shi’a mosques, congregation halls Takia-Khana, and shrines. Taliban intended to reclaim “true” Islam and mounted a harsh campaign of coercion and harassment against dissidents, women, and Shi’as (Crews and Tarzi 2008, 29-30). Apart from banning visitation to shrines and Shi’a religious observances, Mullah Omar also outlawed the celebration of the Persian New Year Nowruz. Taliban viewed Nowruz as a Zoroastrian custom. Qizilbash residents of Bagh-e Ali Mardan, in central Kabul, were persecuted for celebrating the Nowruz (Mobashir 2014). The draconian Taliban policies led to another round of Shi’a exodus.

The American led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) finally dislodged the Taliban in December 2001 when Mullah Omar refused to end his so-called “hospitality” of Osama bin Laden and to distance themselves from Al-
Qaeda terror network. After 9/11, Shi’a leaders within Afghanistan and in the diaspora voiced their concerns for constitutional equality. The notion of full emancipation was not negotiable under any circumstances. Shi’as embraced the pluralistic ideals adopted by the National Unity Government *Dawlat Melli*, in the Bonn Agreement of 2001. Shi’as eagerly welcomed “the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic, and fully representative government” (The Council on Foreign Relations 2001). The Shi’a jurisprudence *fiqh Jafari*, was finally ratified in the Constitution of 2004 (unlike the previous Constitutions of 1923, 1933, 1964, 1976, 1987, and 1990). It might be suitable to quote the American Civil Rights activist, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.”

Afghanistan’s 2004 Constitution recognizes fourteen main ethnic groups: Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Baloch, Turkmen, Nuristani, Pamiri, Brahui, Arab, Gujar, Qizilbash, Aimaq, and Pashai. After years of repression, Qizilbash are now legally allowed to celebrate their rituals and have autonomy over how they document and represent their history without the fear of stigmatization or persecution by the state. In other words, Qizilbash are for the first time in the modern Afghanistan the masters of their own future. The political pendulum has swung toward the principles of power-sharing, inclusiveness, and market economy. The phrase Qizilbash even appears in the third stanza of the new National Anthem, *Sorud Melli* (Panjshiri 2011). Below is part of the broad-based National Anthem in English.

This land is Afghanistan  
It is the pride of every Afghan
The land of peace, the land of the sword
Its sons are all brave

This is the country of every tribe
The land of Baloch and Uzbeks
Pashtuns and Hazaras
Turkmens and Tajiks

With them, Arabs and Gurjars
Pamiris, Nuristanis
Brahuis and Qizilbash
Also Aimaqs and Pashayis

This Land will shine forever,
Like the sun in the blue sky
In the chest of Asia,
It will remain as the heart forever...

II. Research Significance

Data about Qizilbash history and their changing relation with the state are fragmented. Jamil Hanifi, a native anthropologist, mentions, “there is an urgent need for systematic and properly produced ethnographic knowledge about the cultural communities and relations of power in Afghanistan.” (Hanifi 2001). Ethnographic exploration has always been a complicated undertaking in Afghanistan. Access to source materials, political pressure, and official ideology have always had a decisive say in how reality is interpreted. Holistic research on minorities was, and to a lesser degree remains, a highly delicate endeavor since it closely intertwines with the techniques and strategies of power.

The state sees reassertion of ethnic and sectarian identity as a movement in the direction of nativism and ethnogenesis with little or no practical value for
the future of the country in today’s interconnected globalized age. This mindset leaves the ethnographer “in an anthropological no man’s land, condemned to a kind of analytical bricolage and wavering between fear of making points that are banal to other anthropologists on the one hand, and the temptation to draw sweeping conclusions on the basis of limited data on the other” (Reeves 2007, 18). With this dilemma in mind, the question arises why an *Ethnohistory of the Qizilbash: Migration, State, and a Shi’a Minority* appeal to other anthropologists, area studies specialists, and ethnohistorians?

There are several important reasons with palpable effects. So let us look at each one more carefully. My dissertation sets at the nexus of politics (state-formation), identity (language and religion), and history (minority perspective). It will help us arrive at a more nuanced understanding of state versus society from the vantage point of an influential urban minority group. This study is not merely an ethnographic analysis of chronological events, but a holistic study of an urban Shi’a group from the pre-modern period to advent of a Marxist state. My study is concerned with events, over the long arc of history, because they signify the outward expression of a non-pluralistic political culture.

The ethnographic present is difficult to understand without evaluation of the past. As the American social critic, James Baldwin, reminds us, history “is not the past. History is the present. We carry our history with us. To think otherwise is criminal” (Hedges 2017). With Baldwin’s excerpt in mind, my hope is to help resist the paralyzing power of anti-Shi’a attitudes. The top-down process of “nation-formation is not yet complete” in Afghanistan (Akhlaq 2015).
The predicament of national identity lies at the root of today’s social, political, and cultural frictions. Coercive identity reinforces fragmentation rather than allowing the fusion of an organic nation-state.

Lastly, my dissertation speaks to a much broader topic. The inter-Islamic difference that underpins the non-inclusive policies are in full display today in parts of the Middle East. The ongoing Sunni-Shi’a antagonism not only affects the safety and lives of Millions in the region, but also affects the diplomatic ties between Muslim majority countries and their Western counterparts, trade, and the future of the Westphalian State System. Let us now see what set of factors produced this discourse of Sunni-Shi’a animosity.

A. Sunni-Shi’a Conflict: Historical Dimension

The Sunni-Shi’a conflict that is unfolding across Middle East is political, not doctrinal. After the removal of Taliban, 2001, and Saddam Hussein, 2004, some pundits have commented on what they see as a rise of a “Shi’a Crescent,” a vast region that stretches from the eastern shore of the Mediterranean to the southern slope of the Hindu Kush south to the Gulf of Aden. Historically, the Sunni-Shi’a conflicts were not about Islam’s doctrine of monotheism tawhid, prophethood nubuwa, and eschatology qiyama. The conflicts were not over the foundational five pillars (Testimony, Prayer, Charity, Fasting, and Pilgrimage). Apart from the minor disputes over inheritance laws, ablution ritual, and call to prayers, at the heart of the sectarianism remains the political questions of:

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4 King Abdullah of Jordan first used the phrase “Shi’a Crescent” during a NBC News interview in 2008.
1) Doctrine of Imamate, the belief of ‘infallibility’ of the first twelve Shi’a imams, and
2) Succession, proper leadership qualities for temporal power and spiritual guide.

Today’s Sunni-Shi’a conflict is a byproduct of politics and market forces interwoven with age-old grievances (Nasr 2016). Its historical roots extend back to the formative period of Islam in 632-680 (Crone 2005). For Shi’as, Ali ibn abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad, was the chosen successor of the nascent Muslim community. The declaration of Imam Ali’s designation as the rightful leader happened near the Khum Pond in 632. Islam’s internal split, however, deepened at the Battle of Siffin, referred by all sides as the First Civil War fitna in 657. Islam’s internal split further intensified when Ali’s second son Husayn (the third Shi’a Imam) and his companions and family were mercilessly massacred at the Battle of Karbala (in modern Iraq) in 680, at the order of the second Umayyad Caliph, Yazid. This event is referred to as Islam’s Second Civil War fitna (Crone 2005). Shi’as belief after the Battle of Karbala, the Umayyads and the Abbasids continued to monopolize political power under the rubric of the normative center of Islam or “orthodoxy” while the ostracized “heterodox” Shi’as lived in the shadows of the Caliphate until the Mongols sacked Baghdad in 1258.

The post-Mongol period was a key period for Twelver Shi’a Ithna Ashari revival. After the Il-Khanid, 1256-1335, and the Timurid eras, 1370-1507, the Sunni-Shi’a conflict took another decisive turn in 1501. Shah Ismael, along with the steadfast support of the Qizilbash followers’ murids declared the Ithna
Ashari form of Shi’a Islam as the ‘official’ religion of the Safavid Empire, 1501-1722. The Safavids’ adherence to the Shi’a denomination was political, but it also had a religious principle behind it. Ismael derived his political legitimacy from Shi’a the “Concept of Imamate” (Jahanpour 2014). Ismael’s chief rival, the Ottoman Sultan, carried the title of Caliph, which the Shi’as did not recognize. The Battle of Chaldiron in 1514 divided the Safavid territories apart from the Ottoman jurisdictions (Momen 1985). With the breakdown of the pre-modern “Gunpowder Empires,” the imperial model of government was replaced by the nation-states (Hodgson 1974). The Shi’a communities in the Middle East and Central Asia had to take on a new identity to redefine their relations with the emerging states.

The question of old sectarian identity vis-à-vis the new national identity, as well as the representation of ethno-religious minorities in the new nation-states remain unsettled to this day. The Sunni-Shi’a struggles remains at the heart of today’s regional difficulties. The issue of “orthodoxy” and “heterodoxy” has not been finalized despite the al-Azhar University confirmation on Shi’a Islam in July 6, 1959.5

5 On July 6, 1959, Head of al-Azhar University Mahmood Shaltoot, said:

1) Islam does not require a Muslim to follow a particular school of thought Madh’hab. Rather, we say: every Muslim has the right to follow one of the schools of thought, which has been correctly narrated, and its verdicts have been compiled in its books. Moreover, everyone who is following such schools of thought can transfer to another school, and there shall be no crime on him for doing so.
2) The Jafari school of thought, which is also known, as Shi’a Imami Ithna Ashari” is a school of thought that is religiously correct to follow in worship as are other Sunni schools of thought

Muslims must know this, and ought to refrain from unjust prejudice to any particular school of thought, since the religion of Allah and His Divine Law was never restricted to a particular school of thought.
B. Shi’a Population

Today there are around 1.5 billion Muslims living in the world. That is about 20% of the world population. The majority of the Muslims are Sunnis, and approximately 10-20% belong to the Shi’a denomination of Islam (Heinz 2007, x). According to the 2009 Pew Research, there are about 154-200 Million people in the world who classify themselves openly as Shi’a. The exact number of Shi’a population remains unknown since most countries do not collect data on sectarian dissimilarities. Also, in most Muslim majority countries Shi’as do not openly express their religious identity in fear of social backlash. About 116-147 Million Shi’as live in the Middle East and South Asia and Millions more in diaspora. Countries with the largest Shi’a population are Iran, Pakistan, India, and Iraq.

Iran is home to 35% of the world’s Shi’as. India, Pakistan and Iraq each has at least 16 Million Shi’as. There are substantial Shi’a populations (meaning over one Million people) in Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tanzania, Turkey, and Yemen. Shi’as constitute the majority of the total population in Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Bahrain. The table below displays the countries with a large Shi’a populace (Pew Research Center 2009). Afghanistan now has a population of about 30 Million people and nearly 20% belong to the Shi’a denomination (mostly Ithna Ashari and a small Ismaeli community). That is approximately 3-5 Million people. Accurate statistical data on this subject is not available in Kabul, as least not when I was conducting my fieldwork. The Head of Afghanistan’s Shi’a Council, Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, agrees with the
estimate of 5 Million (Mohseni 2014).^6

**Table 2.** Shi’a Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>66-70 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>17-26 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>16-24 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>19-22 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7-11 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>8-10 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>5-7 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>3-4 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3-4 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2-4 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>&lt;4 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1-2 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>&lt;2 Million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>500,000-700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>400,000-600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>400,000-500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>~400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>300,000-400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>~200,000-400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>~100,000-300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>~100,000-300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^6 Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, a Qizilbash from Qandahar, is considered the most powerful Shi’a cleric today in Afghanistan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>~ 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>~ 100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>World Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>154-200 Million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. State System vs. Sectarian Blocs

Today’s regional powers - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey - are expanding their geopolitical reach and sectarian rivalries in the fragile societies or “failed states” of the Middle East (Noelle-Karimi 2000, 4-5). The regional geopolitical rivalry coupled with the Taliban and Islamic State resurgence has rekindled the sectarian resentments in Afghanistan. The Westphalian State System principle of non-interference is now under assault by extremists on both sides as the Middle East appears to be moving in the path of more pan-regional sectarian blocs. The policies of the regional powers is deeply intermingled with sectarian interests, which is divided into two blocs. The “east to west” bloc is under the auspices of Tehran, Baghdad, and Damascus while the “north to south” axis is maintained by Doha, Ankara, and Riyadh.

The new Saudi-Iran-Turkey regional hegemony has rekindled the deep-rooted sectarian resentments. This geopolitical situation unavoidably possesses risks for the survival of the Westphalian State System in the region as personal loyalties and collective religious identities further crystalize. The Guardian daily newspaper reported in 2016 that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is now “recruiting hundreds of Shias in Afghanistan, the Fatemiyon Division, to fight on behalf of Syrian president Bashar Asad” (Rasmussen 2016). While the Fatemiyon Unit is
fighting alongside Syrian government forces, within Afghanistan, anti-Shi’a views are no longer found in official state policy. They are, however, apparent in the form of suicide attacks, carried out by militant groups like the Taliban and the Islamic State. In 2011, President Hamid Karzai cancelled his trip to United Kingdom after the deadly blasts in Kabul’s Qizilbash neighborhood (Chindawol) and in Mazar-e Sharif during the Ashura rituals (Popalzai and Walsh 2011). It is report that 58 people lost their lives and dozens more were seriously injured (Popalzai and Walsh 2011).

Apart from the constant fear of suicide attacks on the Shi’a congregation halls, many of the Qizilbash elders whom I spoke with in Kabul think that they are “underrepresented in the sphere of politics siyasat” (Azami 2014). Having little political representation in the upper tier of the state has left them with no real power or authority other than within their own neighborhoods. Qizilbash people simply do not have the same caliber of patronage ties that Afghanistan’s larger ethnic groups have. Here is a short list of concerns that were repeatedly conveyed by my interlocutors (an in-depth treatment of the present challenges remain outside the scope of this study). 1.) Qizilbash ancestral neighborhoods and burial places are threatened by the new urban plan, 2.) Name of localities and schools founded by Qizilbash have been being renamed, 3.) The National Museum of Afghanistan has no Shi’a cultural artifacts in its ethnology display, and 4.) Books published by Ministry of Education have no discussion on Shi’a Islam. The last point is significant because students remain unfamiliar.
III. Literature Review

The Soviet invasion in December 1979 and the dislodging of the Taliban by the US and NATO allies in 2001 have led to a proliferation of scholarly and journalistic books that have added volumes to the study of Afghanistan. Most of the newer publications primarily concentrate on Afghanistan’s “institutional decay,” loss of human capital or “brain drain” (the largest human displacement since the Indian sub-continent partition, 1947), economic dependency, and rise of militant extremism under the banner of Islam (Shahrani 2010, 2002; Crews and Tarzi 2008; Rubin 2002; Maley 2001; Roy 1990).

There are also several in-depth studies by native scholars that discusses the origin and changing milieu of political, economic, and military ties between Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union (Payind 1989; Reshtia 1984). The sociopolitical reforms and cultural changes that were manifested in the urban centers of Afghanistan was enabled by sizeable Soviet and American economic and technological aid that poured in the country shortly after the Second World War. The outside aid also created a sharp split between urban and rural areas, what Thomas Barfield calls the “Two Afghanistans” (Barfield 2010). The influx of outside assistance also facilitated to end the country’s customary posture of political, commercial, and academic isolationism, which was its hallmark from the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1880 until the close of the Second World War (except the reformist Amani Decade, 1919-1929). That is the good news.

The bad news is that the post-1979 conflicts has stopped and/or severely
limited the ethnographic study of people, cultures and languages that reside in that country, a process that started in the 1950s and concluded with the anti-Western attitudes of the Afghan Marxists (Monsutti 2013). We still do not have in-depth or “classic” ethnographic studies on several social groups including the *Ithna Ashari* Shi’as, Ismaelis, Hindus, Sufis, and the diminishing Jewish population. The country’s rich cuisine, handicraft, art, dance, music (classical, folklore, and pop) have not enjoyed much attention from professional scholars. Western trained academics who conducted extensive studies before the Soviet War have acknowledged the importance of Qizilbash in their publications, but have paid little consideration to the question of who are the Qizilbash of Kabul (Adamec 1975; Dupree 1980; Gregorian 1969; McChesney 1989; Schurmann 1962). There is no recent in-depth study on the Qizilbash in the American and European anthropological circles since Louis Dupree’s (1979) article, “Further notes on *Taqiyya*: Afghanistan,” and his (1984) encyclopedia entry, “Qizilbash,” in *Muslim People: A World Ethnographic Survey*. Given this relatively bare landscape of ethnographic studies, I hope to begin to fill this lacuna.

There has been a degree of intellectual awakening in Kabul with the new freedoms of religion and expression that were ratified in the 2004 Constitution. Since 2004, we have witnessed an awakening of the Qizilbash minority through the pen. Thus far, two books that focuses on different aspects of the Qizilbash have been published. The first account is by Ahmad A. Mohebbi, *Qizilbash and Hazara amidst the Pages of Afghanistan History* (2011). Mohebbi’s book, as the title suggests, is focused on the relations between the two Shi’a ethnic groups.
He starts with the arrival of Seljuq Turks in the 11th century and ends with the coronation of Abdurrahman in 1880. Mohebbi does not deal with the advent of the modern State, nation-formation, and the question of Shi’a minority and the state. His approach neglect oral stories, and falls short of what anthropologists’ call a “bottom-up” approach.

The second book is by Ehsan M. Puzhohish, *Qezilbash of Afghanistan: History and Culture* (2005). It centers on Qizilbash in modern Afghanistan and highlights their involvement in the expansion of state institutions: education, sciences, sports, and literature. A discussion of the state to Qizilbash however, is missing. The notion of how the forces of nationalism affected the collective identity and communal organization of Qizilbash is not discussed. The role of sacred landscapes (shrines) and rituals in the preservation of Shi’a identity is not addressed. Mohebbi and Pazhohish do not take into account the wave of recent books and articles that have come out in western academic circles about the transformation and rise of the Qizilbash in the post-Timurid period. There is hardly any discussion of the development of the Safavid-Qizilbash ties. Both books suffer from the lack of anthropological research method and a theoretical framework.

One of the in-depth articles that discusses the Qizilbash-Safavid affinity in the post-Timurid period is Szuppe’s (1996) piece “Kinship ties between the Safavids and the Qizilbash Amirs in late sixteenth-century Iran.” In an earlier article, “The Ghazi background of the Safavid State,” Mazzoui (1972) discusses the prominent part Qizilbash warriors ghazis, played in the rise of the Safavids

Like Mohebbi, some of the previously mentioned scholars also engage at length with the migration of the Oghuz Turks to Persia. For example, Vladimir Minorsky, eminent Russian scholar of Persian history and culture, elaborates on the Turkish migration from eastern part of Anatolia to northwestern region of Persia: namely of the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu (Minorsky 1982). However, neither Minorsky nor any other scholar mentioned above devote any ink to the reason behind the migration of Qizilbash to Kabul. The Qizilbash movement to Kabul has not yet been closely studied. The scholarship written on the Qizilbash of Persia and Anatolia (Alevism and Bektashi Sufi Order) have not included the Qizilbash of Kabul.

Similarly, the seminal studies on Ithna Ashari Shi’a Islam have also not encompassed the history of Qizilbash in Kabul (Arjomand 1988; Dabashi 2011; Heinz 2007; Karolewski 2008; Marcinkowski 2010; Momen 1985; Mottahedeh 2000, Nakash 2006; Nasr S. H. 1988; Nasr V. 2007; Shaery-Eisenlohr 2008).

On the other hand, there is another cluster of rich scholarship that centers on the rise of modern nation-state of Afghanistan. This body of scholarship alludes to the Qizilbash but without much specificity. These studies treat the country
as a static and monolithic “buffer state” on the periphery of powerful colonial authorities – Czarist Russia and the British Empire. Any discussion of internal dynamics and historical intricacies that have shaped the country’s trajectory remain absent.

The body of literature that covers Afghanistan’s state-formation process falls into four distinct, and yet, interrelated categories. The first body is the so-called “Great Game” accounts. In the 19th century, colonial ethnographers were key informers in shaping British and Russian perspectives, which led to the delineation of Afghanistan in the second half of the 19th century. Two volumes that draw from the 19th century accounts are Peter Hopkirk’s (1992) *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia*, and Shah M. Hanifi’s (2011) *Connecting Histories in Afghanistan: Market Relations and State Formation on a Colonial Frontier*. Hopkirk describes the events that took place in Central Asia and in Persia within the framework of “containment” and “retreat” strategies. He sees the chain of developments in Kabul as derivative of the Russo-British rivalry, particularly from the perspective of the British in India to safeguard the “Jewel in the Crown.” Conversely, Hanifi’s book is not a chronological account of geopolitical proceedings in Central Asia. It is rather from the perspective of a “colonial frontier” in eastern Afghanistan. For Hanifi, the declining role of trade and finance after the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny, and the subsequent British Forward Policy takes center stage. Neither authors offer any explanation of how the colonial policies coupled with the declining commercial situation that befell on

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7 Concepts in *Anthropological Society of London*
Kabul between the two Anglo-Afghan Wars, 1842-80, affected the Qizilbash in Kabul. Hanifi treats the Qizilbash in homogenous terms and makes pejorative statements.

The second body of scholarship that discusses state-formation are the anthropologies and histories that flourished after the Truman Doctrine, which ushered in a new era in the understanding of global affairs and “area studies” (Lockman 2004). Dupree’s (1973) Afghanistan offers a thorough overview of how the country “developed from a tribal and politically unstable polity toward a system of representative government.” A detailed explanation of the Qizilbash is not the primary concern of his work. Dupree’s short article (1979), however, “Further notes on Taqiyya: Afghanistan” presents the practice of dissimulation Taqiyya, among the Qizilbash bureaucrats. It offers insights on how Qizilbash civil servants reverted to “protective dissimulation” or a de-identification tactic in order to avoid stigmatization or loss of career during the late Muhammadzai Dynasty, 1929-78. The practice of Taqiyya and the absence of legal equality for the Shi’a jurisprudence fiqh, problematizes the so-called “Democracy Decade,” 1964-73. Aside from Dupree’s Afghanistan, the other seminal book on Afghan state-formation is Vartan Gregorian’s (1969) Emergence of Modern Afghanistan. Gregorian masterfully interweaves the topics of tribe, Islam, and adaptation of modernity as he tries to situate Afghanistan within the international arena. The intensification of coercive nation-formation that transpired in Kabul after the Second World War remains outside of his positivist purview.

The third body of scholarship is less ambitious in scope and offers details
about specific historical episodes and personalities. This set is a mix of political
dictionaries and biographies that revolve around the obsolete concept of “great
men.” This type of research also flourished after the Second World War, but it
was stopped when the Soviet War erupted. The dictionaries include Ludwig W.
Adamec’s *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*, and Jamil M. Hanifi’s (1976)
*Historical and Cultural Dictionary of Afghanistan*. The monograph of the rulers
include works such as, Ganda Singh’s (1977) *Ahmad Shah Durrani: Father of
Modern Afghanistan*, and Hasan M. Kakar’s (1979) *The Reign of Amir Abd al-
Rahman Khan*. It is important to note that the state to Qizilbash interworking
are not discussed in these insightful dictionaries and informative biographies.

The final group of state-formation process is the “official” state accounts
that denied history and historicity to disempowered minorities. The parochial
narratives are guilty of selective historicism and propagating the vision of the
state. The concept of what Duara (1997) refers to as “Rescuing history from the
Nation.” Parvanta (2002) in *Afghanistan: A Country without a State* expands on
this concept. He tells us “Afghan historiography concentrated to a large extent
on representing the Afghan history as continuum that linked the present
statehood to a larger past.” The creation of primordial myths in what Benedict
Anderson (2006) calls the “imagined communities” were disseminated through
state-sponsored institutions such as, *Siraj al-Akhbar Afghaniya* weekly paper,
*Da Pashtu Maraka*, the Pashto Academy of Sciences, and the Historical Society
of Afghanistan. An example of selective historicism is HSoA (1957) anthology,
*Men and Events through 18th and 19th Century Afghanistan*, which only covers
the history and contribution of Pashtun great men.

The “official” histories have rarely confirmed, but more often contradicted the interpretation of the past as experienced by ordinary inhabitants (Dadabaev 2014). The discrepancy between accounts of the state (impersonal) and actual experiences of subgroups (personal) like the Qizilbash tell a different tale.

IV. Outline of Chapters

During my conversations with a prominent Qizilbash intellectual and author, Asef Ahang, said the following to me:

Academics should leave the comfort of university campuses and talk directly with the people. Ahistorical praise of history causes chauvinism. An objective recognition of the past deters its repetition. Scholars must uncover the past so lessons could be drawn for the present. There is no alternate path for enduring peace and progress in Afghanistan.

With Ahang’s observation in mind, below is an overview of the chapters. This dissertation is a careful examination of the Qizilbash-State ties in Afghanistan. Chapter 1 starts with a discussion of what ethnohistory is. Why and how am I using this approach for my research? Using the ethnohistorical method of the Americanist Sociocultural Paradigm enables me to integrate data from a variety of eclectic sources that includes primary sources, newspapers, hagiographies, participant observation, in-person interviews, images, and secondary materials to reconstruct the history of “the forgotten people” such as the Qizilbash. To contextualize or weave together the local stories within meta-history, I rely on the technique of “zoom-in” and “zoom-out” known as the scalar framework.
(Schayech 2016). The blend of ethnohistorical method and scalar framework not only enables me to study the Qizilbash from the bottom-up, but I also argue that it is a suitable method of conducting research in conflict-ridden societies.

Chapter 2 explores the origin, etymology, and evolution of the Qizilbash until the advent of pre-modern Afghanistan in 1747. It looks into the debate of whether Qizilbash is a specific ‘ethnic’ or a more general ‘epithet.’ because it is a topic with palpable political and social implications. This chapter integrates canonical sources and published scholarship to elaborate on the understudied themes of Qizilbash tribes, social organization, and culture. Chapter 3 explores the history of the Qizilbash in Kabul from Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1747 until the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1880. What transpired in the Qizilbash quarters, which were situated in the eastern cities, after Nadir’s murder? What roles did the Qizilbash help fulfill in the fledgling Durranid Dynasty? Why did the Durranid rulers rely upon members of a Shi’a minority to help secure their power? How were loyalties formed in middle of the 18th century? Did anything change for the Qizilbash in Kabul after the two Anglo-Afghan Wars? To answer these complex questions satisfactorily, this chapter brings into the Qizilbash discourse primary sources that were produced during the successive Durranid and Barakzai Dynasties, 1747-1929.

Chapter 4 divides the Qizilbash migration to Kabul into three distinctive, yet interrelated waves. When did they migrate to Kabul? How and why did the Qizilbash of Anatolia and Persia end up Kabul? How did the Qizilbash sustain
their lives in Kabul? What can we learn about their culture and neighborhoods – Chindawol and Murad Khani? To understand the “push” and “pull” dynamics behind their migration, I use a combination of primary and secondary sources, as well as bringing fresh data from archives and fieldwork. Chapter 4 examines their family structure and explains their education mechanism, both of which were imperative for the reproduction of the Qizilbash military and bureaucratic ethos.

Chapter 5, State and the Shi’a Question, 1880-1978, describes how the rise of nationalism affect the collective identity and the cultural practices of the Qizilbash. After the delineation of Afghanistan in 1880, the Qizilbash remained critical to the State. Given this fact, then why anti-Shi’a decrees were issued? How did the different modes of state power “interpolate” and ostracize the Shi’a Qizilbash? What were the new bureaucratic “red tapes”? Were the Qizilbash involved in the anti-totalitarian movements? Did the breakup of communities trigger the paradox of assimilation and antagonism? How did the Shi’a clerical establishment react to these deep cultural transformations that swept swiftly through Kabul? How did the Qizilbash use pilgrimage to sacred sites, including Ziyarat-e Sakhi to retain their identity?

Aside from my findings, the concluding chapter tackles the question of whether coercive nationalism moved Afghanistan toward a pathway of “political modernity” or did it unleash a cycle of grievances and violence that still burns. What are the lessons learned for today’s state-builders to improve the ideals of tolerance, inclusiveness, and pluralism?
CHAPTER 1

Ethnohistorical Method

“Rather than restricting history to written traditions or western epistemology, it may be argued that every cultural tradition, each linguistic group, has its own particular sense of the past”

~ Raymond J. DeMallie, “These Have No Ears”: Narrative and the Ethnohistorical Method, 1983

“Travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness, and many of our people need it sorely on these accounts. Broad, wholesome, charitable views of men and things cannot be acquired by vegetating in one little corner of the earth all one’s lifetime”

~ Mark Twain, The Innocents Abroad, 2010

I. What is Ethnohistory?

Ethnohistory or historical anthropology is an established sub-discipline in the Americanist school of sociocultural anthropology (Darnell 2001). It is a disciplinary hybrid, which emphasizes the synthesis of written resources and ethnographic data to study the cultures, histories, and transformations of the past and present societies. Alfred L. Kroeber, a proponent of the Boasian method of historical particularism, tells us, “Historical reconstruction from ethnographic data is a different thing from writing of history from documents extending over a range of datable time” (Kroeber 1935). Practitioners of ethnohistory, however, go beyond the direct interpretation of older manuscripts or entirely relying on ethnographic presentism. Ethnohistorians also use a
diverse array of sources that extends to the study of literature, rituals, places, oral stories, memoirs, maps, artifacts, arts, and images (Arxtell 1979). The objective of ethnohistory is to attain an in-depth or holistic knowledge of a specific human society, with stress on longue durée rather than particular events. According to Raymond D. Fogelson, a renowned scholar in the discipline, ethnohistory is about causes and effects, historical structures, and not just events that affect the lives and experiences (Fogelson 1989). An ethnohistorical method offers a systematic and substantial exploration of little known facets of culture and history, which exist outside the panoramic purview of metahistory. It is rather a humanistic way of aligning itself with the theory of studying “history from the bottom up,” which is replete with data from which value can be gained.

Apart from ethnohistory’s definition and application, Michael Harkin in, “Ethnohistory’s Ethnohistory: Creating a Discipline from the Ground Up,” tells us about the intellectual advances in this subfield since Boasian Anthropology. Harkin observes, “Ethnohistory was part of the general rapprochement between history and anthropology in the mid-to-late 20th century” (Harkin 2010). For Harkin, ethnohistory originated from the 1946 Indian Claims Act by the United States Congress to hear claims of indigenous tribes against the state to resolve longstanding territories lost as a result of broken federal treaties. Ethnohistory, therefore, appeared with a more ‘practical’ rather than a ‘theoretical’ emphasis. Since 1946, the Department of Anthropology at Indiana University has played a central role in advancing and teaching the theoretical and applied aspects of
Ethnohistory. IU was instrumental in establishing the American Society for Ethnohistory and its premier quarterly journal, *Ethnohistory* (Hickerson, 1988). Ethnohistory has remained a popular anthropology course at IU, taught by one of its prominent practitioners and authors, Raymond J. DeMallie, Director of the American Indian Studies Research Institute.

Outside the United States, ethnohistory’s geographic latitude expanded to Latin America in the 1980s, where archival resources and prospects for in-person interview, and participant observation were abundant. Ethnohistory’s scope then extended into Melanesia, a region where recent European contact with indigenous populations allowed researchers to document and explain the post-contact developments. The processes of transformation in the Melanesian society as a result of contact with the complex industrialized societies enabled scholars’ to address the deeper theoretical question of whether Melanesia was a distinct “racial” or “cultural” area. Since the early-2000s, anthropologists use ethnohistory more regularly in South Asia. Some recent scholarship uses the ethnohistorical method to trace the history of the fabled infantryman *sepoy*, in India within the military labor market (Kolff 2002). Ethnohistory was also used for understanding the formation of social identity and racialization in pre/post-colonial India (Dirks 2007).

The ethnohistorical approach is also well-suited for writing histories of what Eric Wolf (2010) refers to as “people without history.” Ethnohistory offers a practical technique to successfully link individual biographies and communal stories with broader processes in Central Asia and Middle East. It is a needed
“new direction in study of Islamic majority societies, politics, and movements rather than state and empire narratives” (Karakaya-Stump 2008). It is useful for an informed study of the urban and non-urban groups who are without a deep knowledge of their origin, history, and culture (Wolf 2010). Ethnohistory is not an exercise in the principles of ethnogenesis or primordialism, a reaction to the current economic and cultural globalization, but is rather engaged with the lasting anthropological themes of *migration, adaptation, and transformation.* It offers us a space to understand the strategies individuals and communities used to cope with changes caused by interaction with the global economic and political order. Historical anthropologists study societies to recreate the essence of a cultural system (lifeways and change of a people over time) at a juncture in its evolution before that rural or urban essence was lost by acculturation to the larger outside world (Camaroff Jean and John 1992).

II. **Research Methodology: Recollecting the Past**

For the first time in human existence, majority of the world’s population lives in cities (Lachmann 2013; Gmelch and Zenner 1988). My study primarily centers on the Qizilbash of Kabul. Kabul has been an active city in the regional commerce and transnational flow of ideologies, what the globalization theorist, Arjun Appadurai (1996) calls the “global ethnoscapes.” The rise of Kabul shows is the culmination of growth and development that involves changes effected by modern education, movement of the people, and engagement with the economic order (Kazma 2016). The people who inhabited Kabul, by virtue of their
membership in complex social and political organization have a range of
specialized roles. The presence of ranking and stratification reflects the process
of increasing social complexity. Kabul is not only the dwelling place of modern
man, but it is also a sprawling space that affects the organization, outlook, and
behavior of its inhabitants. One of the most interesting phenomena among the
residents of Kabul is the persistence of ethnic and religious identities despite
top-down nationalism and rapid cosmopolitanism. The question then arises as
to why, and how the Qizilbash have managed to keep, or lack thereof, their
identity and culture in spite of state policies. Before I can reply to this
question, my aim in the remainder of this section is to explain why and how I
pursued a historically and theoretically informed ethnography.

To begin with, there are palpable personal safety concerns in today’s
conflict-ridden Kabul for Western-trained anthropologists. To avoid any
unnecessary attention, I decided not to stay in the compound of the American
Institute of Afghanistan Studies when I visited Kabul for my fieldwork in 2014.
There was a barrage of Taliban attacks. Suicide attackers targeted the NATO
led International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and ‘foreigners’ in remote
and civilian areas. On August 5, 2014, Harold Greene, U.S. Army General, was
killed and fifteen others were injured at a military training academy in Kabul
(Rosenberg and Cooper 2014). Five days later, four more civilians were killed
and 17 wounded near the entrance of Kabul International Airport (Constable
and Hasan 2014). I was less than one kilometer away from the epicenter of this
explosion when it occurred. The blast discouraged me from going out freely in
public areas. On August 20, a NATO Sergeant “was stabbed to death on the streets of Kabul” as I was on my way to the archives of the National Museum, which is located in southern Kabul (Popalzai and Hanna 2014). On September 16, three more ISAF soldiers lost their lives “when a Taliban suicide car bomber attacked a foreign motorcade” close to the American Special Operation Base in the heart of the city (Fishel 2014).

Apart from the indiscriminate series of the Taliban suicide attacks, my fieldwork also coincided with the post-2014 Presidential Election dispute that unfolded between the opposing political camps of Ashraf Ghani and Abdallah Abdullah. The post-election dispute, which lasted for months, threatened overall institutional security in Kabul. The post-election bickering was finally mediated in a diplomatic manner by the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, to form a Unity Government. The combined dangers of suicide attacks and post-election dispute caused the United States Department of State to announce travel warnings and urge extreme caution against travel or stay in Afghanistan. Below is the travel warning that was issued by the Embassy of the United States in Kabul during the violent summer of 2014.

U.S. citizens traveling to Afghanistan despite this warning should avoid being predictable in their movements, including varying routes and times in commutes or other routine travel. The U.S. Embassy urges U.S. citizens to remain vigilant and avoid areas where westerners congregate, such as hotels and guesthouses. Do not discuss travel plans or other personal matters with strangers, or in public places. U.S. citizens in Afghanistan should regularly monitor Emergency Messages for U.S. Citizens Embassy of the United States in Kabul, Afghanistan, as well as the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs website. All U.S. citizens in Afghanistan are encouraged to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP). By enrolling, U.S. citizens make it easier for the Embassy to contact them in case of emergency.
As a naturalized U.S. citizen, prior to my departure to Kabul, I completed the online registration form, Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP), which is posted on the U.S. Embassy website. STEP sends out electronic notifications via cellphone and email in case of an unforeseen emergency. Suicide attackers, however, detonated first before an alert was received.

The next reason why I pursued a historical ethnography is indirectly related to the U.S. Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS) actions in Afghanistan. HTS was an Army support program that continued from late 2001 to December 2014. HTS employed social scientists and area studies experts with language abilities to provide the U.S. commanders with an understanding of the local population in the districts in which they were deployed. The HTS undertakings took place in the semi-rural towns and remote villages when I visited Kabul for fieldwork. Nonetheless, it added unwarranted layers of hurdles for independent trained ethnographers in almost every corner of the country. Particularly, for researchers like myself who are interested in the culture and history of Shi’a groups. HTS has made the Shi’a communities very sensitive to the idea of being subject of research sources. I was often given that mistrustful gaze of being a collaborator with the U.S. Army or a clandestine “agent” for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Thus, it took further effort on my part, with the help of my host family and local scholars, to create a level of mutual trust on the ground with my Qizilbash interlocutors. In Kabul, a “low trust society,” it is almost impossible to facilitate contact, schedule interviews with individuals, arrange talks with curators or do participant observation in any Shi’a religious
rituals.

Third, there are local factors that make research on a Shi’a community difficult. The rise of revolutionary Shi’ism in Iran has made the idea of research on Shi’a groups a very sensitive topic. Although the initial wave of revolutionary fervor, which emanated from Iran and flourished during the Soviet-Afghan War within its dependent parties such as the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, has faded away. Nowadays, “Shi’as are America’s silent partner in the Global War on Terrorism” (Nakash 2006, 9). This major shift in geopolitics was/is evident in the current anti-Taliban and anti-ISIS wars in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, in today’s Kabul the word “Shi’a” or its more formal derivative “al-tashayo” is often equated with the Iranian subsidized parties of the 1980s and 90s. Seldom, in some informal settings, Shi’a social activists or human rights advocates are referred to as Jasos Akhund-ha, “spies of the Iranian mullahs.” For ordinary residents, the words Shi’a or political Shi’ism often evokes sour memories of armed conflict, despair, and destitution that people regrettably endured in the Civil War of 1990s. The complex relationship between Iran and Afghanistan’s Shi’as makes the job of a Western trained ethnographer very difficult.

There is an additional local factor why I pursued a historically informed ethnography. Prior to the Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-89, the absence of Western academic studies on various Shi’a ethnic groups in Afghanistan was tied to the “historical accident.” European contact with Muslim societies during the “Age of Discovery and Exploitation” started with the Sunni polities of Central Asia,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Indonesia. Colonial powers interacted more with the Mughals and Ottomans than with the Shi’a enclaves living in the landlocked Afghanistan. British and Russian ethnographers, emissaries, and travelers were occupied with the physical terrain and definite political matters that were perceived as having a ripple effect. Matters emanating from the royal palace took primacy. Culture and in-depth history of smaller groups such as the Qizilbash remained largely outside the research scope of the British and Russian ethnographers in the 19th century. A trend that was repeated over the course of 20th century by many local authors who cited the 19th century British and Russian ethnographies without the proper critical analysis of why and how evidence(s) was produced (Pitt 1972).

The final reason why I am studying the Qizilbash from a historical angle rather than focusing on presentism is theoretical. Since the paradigmatic shift away from grand theory that culminated in what Marcus and Fischer termed a “Crisis of Representation” in anthropology (Ortner 1984, 126). Anthropology has shied away from exclusive theoretical accounts that are void of empirical data and cannot be supported by local accounts. The dominant examples of yesteryear were the World System Theory and the new fad of Postmodernism. Subaltern scholars like Dipesh Chakrabarty have raised questions about the universal validity of grand theories and positivism. In his book, Provincializing Europe (2000), Chakrabarty calls for a shift from theoretical tendencies toward a more empirical consideration that is in line with the views and experiences of those who are being studied. This aligns Chakrabarty’s argument with the
basic tenets of ethnohistory. As Michael Harkin reminds us, “anthropology was envisioned as a means of getting to *know* the indigenous people of the land” (Harkin 2010, 114). In addition, the “broadening of historical angle on anthropological data has brought growing awareness on the limitations of the ethnographic present” and on exclusively theoretical suppositions (Hickerson 1988, xv).

Below is a breakdown of different techniques that enabled me to recollect the Qizilbash past.

**A. Interviews**

Can oral stories *tarikh-e zinda* be taken seriously in an ethnohistorical project? For practitioners of ethnohistory oral accounts alone cannot provide a *full* and *impartial* picture. However, as Clifford Geertz once said, “oral tradition can enlarge the discourse of human knowledge.” At the same time, academics must be wary of the politics of story-telling and native discourse (Clifford and George 1986). Oral histories “can be a perplexing and time-consuming business” that is usually shaped by human experiences, desires, identification, and mentality (Basso 2001, 37). For instance, policies concerning representation is linked to a person’s view of history and politics. Sometimes it is in contrast to the political ideologies and practices of the time. The paradox between the official narratives and the local discourses remain an intellectual dilemma. One-way to verify the validity of the oral accounts is to conduct enough one-on-one and focus group interviews to establish a crosscheck
mechanism. Usually, the undeniable facts resurface in different interviews.

How did I hand factual discrepancies? I conducted follow-up interviews with the same person or focus group. If the question at hand was still unclear, when appropriate, local academics, primary and secondary texts (if available) were consulted in order to find the underlying cause of an issue. I also sought the assistance of Sayed A. Mousavi, native anthropologist, and Ghulam Farooq (Social Sciences Dean, Kabul University) who referred me to local researchers, and editor of a newspaper, Chindawol Kohan, when I encountered inconsistent accounts.

How to stay within a framework? Afghanistan has a range of subcultures that are based on ethnicity, class, language, and religion. No ethnic group lives exclusively in one province. The Qizilbash have an uneven urban population distribution in cities across Afghanistan. In Kabul, they are spread throughout the city, but some are clustered in a few specific neighborhoods mahallas. The mahallas include Chindawol and Murad Khani (among others), places where Qizilbash people have historically lived and are also sites of elaborate cultural and religious ceremonies that are deeply embedded with meaning. Residents of these mahallas share a common story of origin and transformation that makes the recognition and preservation of these neighborhoods vital. For Qizilbash, it involves the practice of “speaking with names,” of ancestors, dates, and events (Basso 2001). To link the local experiences with the broader developments, and to understand how adaptation and continuity in a mahalla worked itself out, I relied on scalar framework. Scalar framework allowed me “to zoom in and zoom
out of my bounded unit of analysis” (Kazma 2016, 19).

Although I was not born or raised in Chindawol or Murad Khani, I vividly remember my paternal grandmother taking me with her there when I was very young as she made her shrine visitation. The delightful taste and smell of halva and warm nan, that she used to feed me is still in my mouth. I visited the same places, decades later, as part of my fieldwork. It was the type of native or halfie ethnography that “breaks your heart” (Behar 1997; Altorki 1988). As Behar reminds us, site-based study is influenced by the presence of the researcher in the site of study. This ethnography, however, is not an intertwining of my own personal experiences with my study. Below is a recent Persian poem by Asad Shamel (a Qizilbash native of Chindawol who lives in San Diego) that captured my emotions as I studied these mahallas.

 Stranger  
**Stranger**  
*When I was very young I left my country  
When I returned there in my mature years  
Nobody knew me in our streets and neighborhood [mahalla]  
Kids who were playing in our streets, that same street!  
Many years ago, I also played on this street with kids my own age  
They encircled me, gazing at my face and appearance  
With surprise and mockery said: “Hey Stranger... where have you come from?”*  

Asad Shamel (Shamel 2014)
How did I conduct the in-person dialogs? I positioned myself in a semi-structured and unstructured interview format to allow for maximum input by my interlocutors. I used the “snowball and respondent-driven sampling (RDS)” techniques to move from the known to the unknown and elicit specifics about their actual experiences (Bernard 2006, 251). These interviewing techniques are in line with the “emic method” (discover and describe from within) derived from the Boasian Theory of Historical Particularism. My discussions with a rich palette of personalities were recorded, if permitted. I solicited data in both one-on-one and in-group interviews about their views of Qizilbash history, politics, and the state. I usually started the interview process after the social formalities were done. While interviewing, I listened and recorded the dialogs. I deployed the “up streaming” or “snowball” technique to proceed from one fact to another by asking related questions to get a more complete depiction (Washburn 1961). Throughout the interviewing process, I strived to be “reflexive” and within the bounds of Institutional Review Board (IRB) to protect the rights and welfare of my interlocutors (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

Below are my structured questions that I asked from my interlocutors.

1.) Who are the Qizilbash?
2.) What can you tell me about their history?
3.) What makes a Qizilbash identity?
4.) Can you describe the social markers or symbols of their identity?
5.) Were Qizilbash treated as the “other” by the state because of their belief and language Farsi Setezī? If so, how can you explain the relatively high number of them who served in the various Afghan administration?
6.) How do you see the past state to Qizilbash relations?

After the conclusion of the interview(s), I always asked my interlocutors about
any unpublished manuscripts, letters, or newspapers they might have in their private collection that could enrich my study. Afghanistan’s National Archives and National Museum do not have an archive on Shi’a heritage that can aid us understand the Qizilbash history through the lens of their own experiences.

**Figure 1.** Group Interview

**Figure 2.** One-on-one Interview
When I returned to Indiana University, I transcribed and translated my interviews to map the data of my interlocutors. I also used the content analysis practice to weave through the text collected during the face-to-face interviews. I indexed and coded key terms (events, dates, policies, and practices) and looked for recurrent themes that were examined for validation of data accuracy either through library research or through social media. I continuously used social media (Facebook), email, and phone calls to follow-up on open-ended themes by asking further clarification questions. The combination of library materials and social media were effective cross-examination method. See Appendix 2 for a complete list of libraries, online depositories, and archives that enabled my research.
Figures 4-5. Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University (Inside and Outside)

Figure 6. Kabul University Library Afghanistan Studies Collection
Figure 7. Library Nasir Khusraw
CHAPTER 2

A History of Qizilbash: Origin, Etymology, and Evolution, 1501-1747

“It is a tradition among the People of Asia who are known and named by others for the type and color of hats and turbans they wear”

~ Saeed Nafisi, A Contemporary Social and Political History of Iran, 1956

I. Origin

One of the leading developments in the early modern world was the rise of a powerful tribal confederation, Qizilbash, in Safavid Persia, 1501-1722. The Safavids with the military backing of their Qizilbash Sufi, murids, replaced the short-lived Turkic sultanates of Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu. The early Qizilbashs “shared the Central Asian Turkic political tradition and a vision of conquest rooted in the Mongol aspirations of world empire” (Balabanlilar 2007, 1). The Safavids soon adopted gunpowder technology after their loss to the rival Ottomans in 1514 (Lomazoff and Ralby 2013). Use of gunpowder enabled them to expand the polity, continue with the Shi’a proselytization policies da’wa, and form a centralized administration that would have a profound impact into the modern period.

The Qizilbash of Afghanistan share a common origin with the Safavids in Persia. The Qizilbash relations with Babur, the founder of the Mughal Dynasty, 1526-1707, and connections with the Abdali chieftains go as far back as 1588.
The sixteenth century proselytization of the Qizilbash missionaries *Khulafa* and *Naqibs*, in Balkh and Bamiyan are part of the Qizilbash history in Afghanistan, outside of the scope of this research. Similarly, the history of Qizilbash in parts of Farah, Herat, Qandahar, and Ghazni are part of the Safavid expansions. My intention, however, is to trace and situate the history of the Qizilbash in Kabul within a larger regional framework.

To understand the Shi’a question within the processes of state-formation in modern Afghanistan, we must start with the history of this tripartite expanse before the advent of the nation-state system. By revisiting the main social and political changes that occurred in the early modern era enables us to see how the Qizilbash organized, emerged, and transformed. By situating the Qizilbash in the larger regional context allows us to grasp the continuities and raptures in their culture. Before we answer the Shi’a question in Afghanistan, we begin this chapter with the question of who are the Qizilbash.

### A. Etymology

The phrase Qizilbash (also spelled as Kizilbash or Qezelbash) was used by Ottomans to denote a mix of Turkic speaking people that flourished in the vicinity of Ardabil. Qizilbash is a term that has been used by local scribes and outside travelers for more than five centuries now (Morton 1993, 227). The adjective “Qizil” translates to *red*, and the noun “bash” means *head*. Qizilbash literally translate to as redhead. Qizilbash figuratively translates to *red hat* or *crimson headgear*, which was initially worn by the Sufi *murids* as a distinctive
symbol of their firm allegiance to the Safavid Order, and not to the Ottoman
divan. The Safavid Order similar to other 14th-15th century orders “provided a
focus for collective identity whereby whole communities were brought into the
fold of Islam, with details of observance and ritual to be worked out later”
(DeWeese 1996, 188). The Qizilbash red headgear was initially not “an object of
deep religious symbolism,” but served as a communal identity marker (Bashir
2014, 379).

Map 2: Ardabil

The referent of the word Qizilbash has undergone numerous shifts over
time. It was first applied to the disciples’ murids of Shaykh Hayder’s Sufi Order
in Ardabil, 1460-88. The phrase nobility hat kolah-e fakhr, and Hayder’s Crown
Taj-e Hayderi, ensued to display the Sufis discontent with the Ottoman policies (Mirjafari 1979, 158-59). A precise depiction of who these warrior murids were is not an easy undertaking. The Sufi murids were mostly Turkmen pastoralists and semi-nomads. Ethnically, the Qizilbash were initially comprised of Oghuz Turks, but after the formation of the Safavid State merged and intermarried with Kurds, Persian tribes and notables, and to a lesser extent with influential clerics who claimed to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad Sayyids, via his grandson Hasan and Husayn ibn Ali.\(^8\)

The aftermath of Mongol and Timurid conquests fostered an ambiance of weak social, political, and economic life in Persia. By the late-fifteenth century, the Safavi Sufi Order had attracted a large number of murids, who had become subjugated to the Ottoman expansionism and heavy taxation. The Safavi Sufi Order embraced the Shi’a denomination of Islam to set themselves politically apart from the Sunni Ottomans. To legitimize their political desire vis-à-vis the Ottoman Caliphate, the Safavids drew from early Islamic history – the question of succession after Muhammad passed away in 632. Safavids vowed on removal of falsehood batil, with truth haqq. This contrast between truth and falsehood or “us” and “them” (what I label inter-Islamic orientalism) laid the foundation for the formation of a communal identity that did not exist before (Royce 1982, 12).

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\(^8\) It is important to note that in 14\(^{th}\) and 15\(^{th}\) centuries, “Sufism provided not only the organizational structures by which societal groups are being aligned, but also the terminology and discursive structure used to think about and talk about these communities; moreover, this is happening at the same time that these communities are being Islamized and herein lies one crucial “mechanism” by which Sufi Shaykhs should be understood as “spreading Islam” (a function often ascribed to them, but rarely explored more deeply” (DeWeese 1996, 188).
In 1487, Shaykh Hayder’s *murids* began to wear the red hats with twelve-fold *tarqs*. The twelve-fold hat was not a sign of the twelve revered Shi’a imams or to remember the red hairband that Ali (first Imam) wore during Conquest of Khyber in 629 (Mirjafari 1979, 160). The red headgear was the outward symbol of Sufis who had devoted themselves to the Safavid directive and authority. In 1491, Fazlullah Khunji-Isfahani, an Aq Quyunlu historian, remarks in *Tarikh-i Alam ara-yi Amini* that the word *tark*, which is differs from *tarq*, means to quit the pursuit of immoral desires (Mirjafari 1979, 159). For Khunji-Isfahani, the twelve abstentions a Sufi ought to refrain from include: 1) Jealously, 2) Spite, 3) Anger, 4) Rancor, 5) Egotism, 6) Cavil, 7) Selfishness, 8) Lasciviousness, 9) Cruelty, 10) Gluttony, 11) Sleepiness, and 12) Evils (Mirjafari 1979, 159).

Apart from the twelve moral abstentions prescribed by Khunji-Isfahani, the red hat also provided Hayder’s warrior *murids* with a practical purpose. The hat, made out of wool protected their head from enemy strikes. The edge of the hat that covered the head was tight. The hat’s interior was sown with a strip of lining to safeguard the person’s head from a rough interior. The hat gradually came tighter at the top, like a cone.

Despite the use of the word Qizilbash in numerous primary sources, its etymology remained relatively unknown in academic circles until recent times. Richard Hartmann, a German scholar, on one occasion prior to the Great War “considered the elucidation of their provenance as a task of Oriental Studies” (Roemer 1990, 27). Since Hartmann’s early 20th century comment, scholars have successfully traced the origin of the word Qizilbash, and its changes over
the centuries in the Safavid and Ottoman areas. Let us visit some definitions of Qizilbash that have surfaced since Harmann’s observation. Roger M. Savory, a Safavid historian and Iranologist, describes Qizilbash in *Encyclopedia of Islam* as:

The word is used in both a general and a specific sense. In general, it is used loosely to denote a wide variety of extremist Shi’a sects, which flourished in Anatolia and Kurdistan in the late 13th century onwards, including such groups as the Alevi. ...

In its specific sense, Kizilbash is a term of opprobrium applied by the Ottoman Turks to the supporters of the Safavid, and adopted by the latter as a mark of pride. ...

Strictly speaking the term Kizilbash should be applied only to those Turkmen tribes inhabiting eastern Anatolia, northern Syria and the Armenian highlands, which were converted by the Safavid da’wa, invitation or call, and became the disciples of the Safavid sheikhs at Ardabil. The term, however, was also applied to certain non-Turkish Iranian tribes, which supported the Safavids, for instance the tribes of Talish, Siyah-Kuh, Karadja-dagh, Kurds, and Lurs.

Hans R. Roemer agrees with Savory’s description. Roemer equates Qizilbash with the military units that constituted Shah Ismael’s main forces who could at once put 70,000 to 80,000 warriors with horse skills in the battlefield (Roemer, 1990, 29). Roemer concurs with Savory that the Qizilbash was not a completely Turkmen organization. He writes:

Not every member of Turkish ancestry was ipso facto Qizilbash. The name was also applied to others who accepted his belonging to the Qizilbash movement and was officially admitted as a member by way of bestowing upon him the red headgear - a privilege not necessarily reserved for men of Turcoman origin. There were also Qizilbash who were not Turkish (e.g., Najm-i Sani, Ismael’s famous vakil, or Kurds like the Chigani tribe).
Shahzad Bashir, a leading Qizilbash scholar, prudently traces the origin and evolution of the term Qizilbash in his 2014 article titled, “The Origins and Rhetorical Evolution of the Term Qizilbash in Persianate Literature.” He reviews a set of primary sources that were produced in 1491-1680. The table below lists the sources that were assessed by Bashir to determine when and how the term Qizilbash was used. Bashir’s assessment ends in the late-1680s because under the last Safavid ruler, Sultan Husayn, 1694-22, commissioning history writing came to a sudden stop because of two reasons: 1) internal Shi’ā schism in Isfahan, and 2) the “tribal outbreaks” on the eastern periphery of the empire.

The table below shows Bashir’s sources in a chronological fashion.

### Table 3. Safavid Primary Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Used</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1488: death of Shaykh Hayder</td>
<td>Khunji-Isfahani, <em>Alam-ara-yi Amini</em> [1491]</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1501: rise of Ismael I</td>
<td>Nimdihi, <em>Tabaqat-i Mahmud Shahi</em> [1501-02]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Khunji-Isfahani, <em>Mihmannama-yi Bukhara</em> [1509]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Khunji-Isfahani, <em>Suluk al-muluk</em> [1514]</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>1510: capture of Herat</td>
<td>Lahiji, <em>Tarikh-i Khani</em> [1516]</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1524: death of Ismael I</td>
<td>Khwandamir, Habib al-siyar [1524]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1530: death of Babur</td>
<td>Amin Hiravi, <em>Futuhat-i Shahi</em> [1530]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Babur, <em>Baburnama</em> [1530]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qasimi Gunabadi, <em>Shah Ismael-nama</em> [1533]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zayn ad-Din Vasifi, <em>Badayi al-vaqayi</em> [1538]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Husayni, <em>Tarikh-i ildi-yi Nizam Shah</em> [1545]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1544-45: Humayun in Safavid</td>
<td>Mirza Haydar Dughlat, <em>Tarikh-i Rashidi</em> [1546]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amir Mahmud, <em>Tarikh-i Shah Ismael va Shah Tahmasp</em> [1550]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1556: death of Humayun</td>
<td>Sayyid Yahya Qazvini, <em>Lubb al-tavarikh</em> [1555]</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shah Tahmasp, <em>Tazkira</em> [1561]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ghifari Qazvini, <em>Tarikh-i Jahanara</em> [1563-64]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To see how the meaning of the word Qizilbash evolved from 1491-1680.

Bashir divides his examination into three phases (Bashir 2014, 385-86):

In the first phase, the use of the red headgear in the beginning of Safavid history was a way to consolidate a subset within Turkomans around the Safavid house. Evidence from the fifteenth century indicates the headgear to have been in use as a matter of uniform prior to the wide promulgation of the term Qizilbash. This phase reflects the process of transition between the Aq Qoyunlu and the Safavids, which was gradual and extended in time rather than occurring suddenly in 1501.

Bashir’s first phase includes the era prior to the rise of the Safavid Shi’a State in 1501. Khunji-Isfahani’s (1491), Alam-ara-yi Amini, and Nimdihi’s (1501-02),
*Tabaqat-i Mahmud Shahi* volumes do not contain the word Qizilbash. Qizilbash steadily gains meaning in the Persian primary sources after the establishment of the Safavid State. Bashir writes (Bashir 2014, 385-86):

In the *second phase*, the headgear acquired greater political signification after the proclamation of the dynasty. This also led to the consolidation (if not the very generation) of the term Qizilbash, which is reflected in the progressively greater use of the term with the passage of time. The fact the term is not present universally across all sources reveals aspect of on-going negotiations surrounding identity and literary projection by various authors. In particular, it is significant that some of the earliest court historians like (Hiravi, Gunabadi) do not use the term and remains absent from Qazvini’s works that was finished as late as 1555.

The usage of the term Qizilbash in the early years of the Safavid State remains inconsistent in the Persian primary sources. Court historians from the start of Shah Ismael’s reign until the beginning of Shah Abbas’s reign in 1587 use the word Qizilbash intermittently since there is a lack of agreement on its meaning and identity. It is not until the late 16th century that the term goes from being a surface signifier to a symbol endowed with religio-historical weight (Bashir 2014, 385-86):

In the *third phase*, we see it become connected emphatically to the story of the dynasty’s origins, which became even more legendary and ideologically significant with the passage of time. Additionally, the term itself and the headgear also become associated closely with promulgation of Twelver Shi’ism as state religion, which was a major part of the dynasty’s identity. The fact that works produced during the last phase of the history such as, Iskandar Beg Munshi have greatly influenced modern research in Safavid history. It explains why it is common to see late stories about the origin of the headgear and the term Qizilbash attributed to the period of Safavid origins without problematization.
II. Qizilbash and the Fall of the Safavids

Qizilbash history and identity took on a new course with the collapse of the Safavid State. The inability of the last Safavid Shah, Sultan Husayn 1694-1722, to successfully reform the highly centralized religio-bureaucratic system to meet the changing social and economic dynamics in the eastern cities had irreversible implications. Another main reason for “the decline of the Safavids was the neglect of the army” (Lockhart 1938, 2). The Qizilbash Sufis who were instrumental in the rise of the Safavids had been relegated to provincial cavalry or frontier commanders in favor of two new cadres. The musketeers’ ghulams, who were captured and moved to the imperial capital from the Caucasus. The Perso-Turkic imperial bodyguard Shahsevans, who were devoted to Shah and not to the Sufi headmaster Pir.

The army’s top-down chain of command had eroded with the relegation of the Qizilbash. Sultan Husayn, therefore, was unable to prevent the Yomut raids into Khorasan or revive the lucrative Gilan Silk trade, which squeezed the Persian rug industry and the imperial revenues. Sultan Husayn’s inability was also revealed when he refused to curb the authority of the powerful Shaykh al-Islam, Mohammad Baqer Majlesi, who led the persecution and exile of Sufis to eastern frontiers (Momen 1985, 112). The Sunni-Shiite schism in the eastern provinces was intensified because of Majlesi’s actions. The disruptions in the province of Sistan were not dealt with in an effective diplomatic manner even though Abdali nobility of Herat and Ghilzai elites of Qandahar had established relations with the Safavids. The situation worsened under the newly appointed
Safavid Governor of Qandahar, Gurgin Khan, who reverted to excessive force, instead of conciliatory measures, to “strengthen the Persian authority in this wild region” (Axworthy 2009, 36).

The Baluch uproar was temporarily suppressed. Chaos in Qandahar and Baluchistan areas reintensified to the point where the caravan trade with India came to a standstill. Traders were concerned and ordinary people opposed the heavy-handed Safavid policies in Qandahar. Some Qandahari residents under the guidance of Mahmud Hotak, Chief of Ghilzai Pashtun tribe, took the matter in their own hands. Mahmud Hotak defeated the incoherent Safavid military in 1722, at the Battle of Gulnabad, which resulted in the siege of Isfahan. Safavid forces were under the “command of a French mercenary, Philippe Colombe,” and not the Qizilbash cavalry who had brought their ancestors to the forefront of political prominence (Morgan 1988, 149).

The socioeconomic condition neither in Qandahar nor in Persia improved with the Afghan takeover. Mahmud executed Sultan Husayn, the Safavid royal princes, and 3,000 Qizilbash Shahsevan bodyguards (Dupree 1984, 638). The destruction of Isfahan crushed the centralized bureaucratic administration and the strong office of Shaykh al-Islam. Isfahan, which had gradually become the political, cultural, and social nucleus of the Shi’as, sent shockwaves across the triangular Safavid zone of influence, which covered lands between the Tigris, Amu, and Indus Rivers. Under the short reign of the Hotakis, 1722-129, Peter the Great attained territories of Darband, Rasht, and Baku to gain maritime control of the Caspian Sea. The Ottomans marched to cities of Hamadan and
near Kermanshah without any Hotaki resistance. Mahmud Hotak also tolerated the Yomut raids in Khorasan and enslavement of Shi’as that followed (Quddusi 1960, 96). Trade and exchange with the Dutch East India Company’s posts in Isfahan, Kerman, and Bander Abbas plummeted. By 1729, it appeared as if the vast Safavid area would have the same “fate that befell Poland in the eighteenth century, partial or complete partition between her neighbors” (Axworthy 2009, xv).

Immense anti-Hotaki discontent grew in Persia. The Qizilbash Amirs and Provincial/Frontier Commanders, along with the support of some Shi’a clerics did not sit idle to witness the breakup of the state their ancestors had diligently assembled. So how did the Qizilbash react to the Hotaki takeover?

III. **Nadir Afshar, 1729-1747**

Increased discontent among the Persian elites led to action. The Safavid prince, Tahmasp II, and some Qizilbash commanders amassed an army under the guidance of a former Qizilbash musketeer *tufangchi*, named Nadir Afshar. It was a collective goal to quickly topple the Hotakis, pacify the Sistan province so trade with India could resume, and repel the Ottomans, Russians, and Yomuts from Persia.

Nadir Afshar, as a former musketeer, had captured some Yomut “raiders and slavers” in Khorasan (Axworthy 2007, 638). Nadir, thus, had a firsthand awareness of the importance of firearms (gunpowder technology), mobility, and daily training for his new army. Apart from his military skill and leadership, he
also possessed a degree of diplomatic skills. He restored political unity between the powerful Afshars and Qajars, Qizilbash subtribes. He also forged an Abdali-Ghilzai alliance in order to have a Sunni battalion in his military to manage the disorders in the eastern cities. As the commander of the army, Nadir assembled a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian military, which led to his “brilliant victories” (Minorsky 1955, 253). In about seven years, 1729-36, Nadir Afshar managed to channel the immense domestic discontent into a cohesive military movement, which enabled him to rise from the head of the military to head of the state.

In 1736, after attaining extraordinary prestige through military victories, Nadir Afshar initiated a Quriltay, political and military council, in the Mughan Plain (place in northwestern Persia near Caucuses). The commanders, chiefs, and Sayyids of Isfahan officially declared him the Shah of Persia. He replaced the Safavid figurehead, Tahmasp, as the new premier of the state. The notable Golestana family served Nadir throughout the Afsharid era (McCchesney 1983). After his coronation, Nadir signed a series of treaties with Ottoman, Russian, Mughal, and Khivan emissaries to resolve old and emerging difficulties. Nadir however, faced two formidable domestic challenges. First, how to legitimize his rule as Shah after two plus centuries of Safavid rule (Nadir’s ancestry did not extend back to Muhammad). Second, how to garner enough taxes to maintain the military machine he had assembled.

Nadir Shah also distanced himself from the late-Safavid religious policies that had caused its downfall. By lessening the sectarian issue in the periphery, he was able to focus on modernizing Persia’s military. To have a mobile cavalry
with firearms, he mounted cannons on horses and camels to traverse the rocky terrains of the Iranian Plateau. Next, he established a maritime presence in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea to defend against the European fleets. A robust naval existence would also allow Persia to become part of the growing maritime trade and not entirely relying on the fading Gilan Silk Trade and the unreliable overland “Silk Road” routes.

**Figure 8.** Mounted Gun Apparatus  
**Figure 9.** Zamburak Canon

To diminish sectarianism, Nadir reduced the influence of the rigid Shi’a clerics by confiscating their endowments *waqf*. As a result, some of the leading clerics moved to Najaf (site of Imam Ali’s mausoleum). He sent an edict all over the empire, enforcing the cessation of *sabb*, cursing of the first three Caliphs (Abu Bakr, Omar, and Osman) which was offensive to the Sunni denomination of Islam (Tucker 1994, 163). Moreover, he introduced the Jafari *Madh‘hab*, to the Ottomans in order to express his criticism of the anti-Ottoman millenarianism that had occurred before Shah Ismael, 1501. Nadir Shah’s
rapprochement with the Ottomans consisted of five points. 1) Recognition of
the Jafari Madh’hab as a fifth school of Islam, 2) construction of a pillar in the
Ka’ba to honor its official existence, 3) appointment of Shi’a hajj caravan leader
without any harassment, 4) exchange of emissaries between the Ottoman
Sultan and himself, and 5) release of Shi’a captives and prohibition of
enslaving more Shi’as (Tucker 1994, 167).

The influential Ottoman Shaykh al-Islam, however, rejected Nadir Shah’s
suggestion. He “issued a fatwa condemning the Jafari Madh’hab as a heretical
innovation” (Tucker 1994, 171). The question of “orthodoxy” and “unorthodoxy”
therefore remained unsettled between the two leading centers of Islamic power
(Ottomans and Afsharids) in 1730s. By middle-to-end of the 18th century, both
the Persian Shahs and the Ottoman Sultans turned their attention to a new set
of insurmountable challenges that the British and Russian expansions in the
region presented. Reaction to European military superiority and ‘modernity’ will
be discussed in Chapter 5. Let us now respond the question of how to garner
enough revenues for his military-administrative system.

A. Indian Expedition

Nadir Shah seized the eastern commercial city of Qandahar after Husayn
Khan capitulated in 1737. During the siege of Qandahar residents “from Kabul
also had offered their help because they were angry with Husayn Khan” who
had ravaged the overland caravan exchange (Floor 2009, 66). Nadir “spared the
lives of Husayn Khan and leading Qandahari families at the intercession of the
former’s sister,” Zainab (Floor 2009, 78). To make sure the “Silk Road” stayed open from any future disorder, he reverted to the old practice of ‘resettlement.’ Resettlement was an effective tactic that became part of Nadir Shah’s internal policies (Axworthy 2007, 643). He relocated a large number of Abdali families from Nishapur and elsewhere in Khorasan to Qandahar oasis and offered them fertile farmlands that previously belonged to the Hotaki Ghalzais. The Hotakis were relocated from Qandahar to the lands vacated by the Abdalis (Lockhart 1938, 120).

Nadir Shah then conscripted both Abdali and Ghalzai men were in army. He also freed Ahmad Khan and his older brother Zulfiqar Khan from the Hotaki prison. He appointed Ahmad Khan on his staff as a yasawal, orderly officer. He employed Zulfiqar as a government officer in the Mazandaran region. While in Qandahar, Nadir appointed Abdul Ghani Khan to govern Qandahar in place of the unreliable Husayn Khan. Other Abdali chieftains were designated to govern the semi-urban places in Farah, Helmand and Nimruz. The Abdalis, who relied on the military assistance of the Qizilbash garrison, already oversaw Herat. The relocation and empowerment of the Abdalis in the eastern cities was vital in the later formation of the Durrani Dynasty. To Durrani-Qizilbash affinities to be discussed in Chapter 3.

During the year and half-long siege of Qandahar, Nadir Shah ordered a new small city, Nadirabad, to be built close to the river for his troops to survive the hot weather (de Planhol 2010). While in Nadirabad, he finalized his Mughal Campaign, and also received an Ottoman emissary led by Mustafa Pasha who
carried a personal letter from Constantinople in response to the proposal of the Jafari Madh’hab. The Sultan offered:

- Excuses for his inability to recognize the Jafari sect or to agree to the erection of a fifth pillar in the Ka’ba. The Sultan also stated that the sending of the Persian pilgrims to Mecca via Syria might give rise to trouble. He concluded by begging Nadir to excuse his acceptance of the first two points. In regard to the third point, he suggested that the Persian pilgrims should proceed to Mecca via Najaf (Lockhart 1938, 121).

The Najaf to Mecca route for Hajj pilgrimage was not under the control of Shi’ā clerics in Hilla seminary. Nadir was not pleased with the reply of the Ottoman dignitaries. He sent Ali Mardan Khan Shamlu with the Ottoman envoy back to Constantinople. He instructed them to ask Sultan Mahmud I to reassess his views on the Jafari proposition by the time he returns from Mughal India. As Nadir left for Delhi, he left behind a sizeable garrison of Qizilbash musketeers and arms in Nadirabad. Along the path to Delhi, Nadir Shah also left behind trustworthy Qizilbash battalions in Ghazni to guard the communication and supply routes, preserve order, and collect taxes.

When Nadir Shah reached Kabul, he sent an envoy headed by Shahbaz Khan to Muhammad Shah in Delhi. He accused the Mughals of instigating the Baluchistan and Qandahar uproars under the umbrella of curbing the Safavid Shi’ā growth (Tucker 1998, 212). The Mughal emperor, however, did not reply to him - a breach in diplomatic etiquette. Nadir Shah left a division of “12,000 man Qizilbash garrison in Kabul” (Dupree 1984, 639). The Qizilbash division established an administrative base in districts of Afshar and Chindawol, rear
guard, which remains to this day. The Qizilbash strongholds were established on the outskirt of Kabul. When Nadir arrived in city of Jalalabad, “he sent his treasurer, Mirza Mohammad, as an ambassador to the Mughal court” (Floor 2009, 80). Once again, Nadir did not get an official diplomatic response from the Mughal court in Delhi. The Mughals diplomatic negligence was understood as a signal of refuting his legitimacy as Shah of Persia.

The diplomatic negligence confirmed Nadir Shah’s decision to launch a campaign against the Mughal Emperor. In 1738-39, his forces quickly defeated the Mughals at the Battles of Khyber and Karnal (Axworthy 2007). The Russian General Kishmishev called Nadir’s defeat of the Mughals in the rugged terrain of Khyber Pass as “a masterpiece in the History of War” (Axworthy 2007, 642). His fast victories over the Mughals were partly due to the use of gunpowder, mounted cannons and muskets on camels, zamburak. Nadir did not attempt to stay in Delhi for extended period of time, but “the khotbah was read and coins were minted in his name ... gifts and taxes from far and near were pouring in ... then rumors spread in Delhi that some mishap had befallen Nadir. Mobs began to attack parties of the Qizilbash” (Avery 1991, 40). Nadir responded in a heavy-handed manner.

Nadir ordered the punitive massacre and sacking of the jeweler quarters, which was responsible for spreading the false rumor. With all the war spoils, he then gave his army six months’ pay and exempted the provinces in Persia from taxes for the next three years. In addition, Nadir Shah “demanded the hand of

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9 There are still neighborhoods and families in Kabul who call themselves Afshar and/or Nadiri (Afshar 2014).
the Emperor Aurangzeb’s great granddaughter for his son, Nasr-Allah” (Avery 1991, 40). He returned to Kabul with lots of treasures, “including the fabled Peacock Throne and the Kuh-i Noor Diamond” (Tucker 1998, 207). Nadir’s war plunders were carried back on “1,700 elephants and ... 30,000 camels” (Floor 2009, 87). After Nadir’s Indian expedition, Indus River became the new agreed-upon boundary. The Mughals forever lost control of trade routes that passed through Qandahar and Kabul.

Within the newly acquired cities and towns, the term Qizilbash was used in reference to the Persian or Iranian military contingents that were positioned in these locations (Adamec 2012, 359). This is sharp contrast vis-à-vis how the Ottomans and early Safavid sources had used the term. The Turkic origin and Sufi characteristic of what defined the early Qizilbash had become less visible by 1740.

**B. Central Asian Expedition**

After sacking Delhi, Nadir Shah led another aggressive military campaign in Central Asia in 1740. The news of the Mughals’ crushing defeat had reached the Governor of Balkh, Abu’l Hasan Khan, who was ready to capitulate. Nadir’s forces defeated the Janid ruler of Bukhara, Abu’l Faiz Khan, whom he reinstated. He annexed Charju, with its river crossing, and all the land south of the Amu Darya (Avery 1991, 43). Later in 1740, Nadir directed his attention to the Khanate of Khiva and his old nemesis, Ilbars Khan. The Khivan oasis had descended into a land that sold slaves. Khivans regularly captured people who
practiced Shi'ism and confiscated their property. Ilbars pleaded for peace, but Nadir refused. He executed Ilbars Khan and twenty of his top commanders on the eve of seizing the Khanate of Khiva to send a strong message to those who encouraged anti-Shi'a sentiments. Nadir Shah released numerous Shi’a and Russian captives from Khiva (Avery 1991, 43). Similar to his previous action in Qandahar, he enlisted “the young Khwarizmi men into his service and returned to Persia” (Floor 2009, 89).

Soon after his Central Asian conquest, Nadir issued a farman, decree. His decree entailed that the “khotbah and in writing requests to him he should not be addressed as Vali Ne’mat anymore, but as King of Kings, the Command giver of Persia, Throne giver of Hindustan, Khwarazm, and the land of Uzbeks” (Floor 2009, 90). Nadir moved his capital to Mashhad in 1741. Mashhad was not only the home of his own Afshars, but also closer to the Qizilbash forts that he had left behind in what later became known as the countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mashhad was near the formidable mountain fortress of Kalat-i Naderi, which provided a natural barrier in face of an onslaught, which Isfahan did not have.

Once in Mashhad, Nadir did not receive another reply from the Ottoman Sultan. Nadir ordered his troops to strike water wells in Baghdad and prepare 80,000 mashks, large leather water sacks (Floor 2009, 90). Nadir and his chief Qizilbash generals finalized the military plans to go after the Ottoman Sultan in their own capital city of Constantinople for rejecting his Jafari Madh’hab deal. Nadir Shah’s main motivation was to expand the realm of Memleket-i Qizilbash,
Qizilbash Country, from the Indus River to the straits of Bosporus and from the Central Asian oasis to the western side of the Persian Gulf. This was proved to be a difficult mission that Timur or any of the Safavid Shahs were not able to accomplish.

Map 3. Nadir Shah Afshar

C. Ottoman Expedition

The news of Nadir Shah’s conquests in India and Central Asia reached Constantinople. Murad I, the Ottoman Sultan, initiated his groundwork for a defensive stand against Nadir’s enormous military. At its zenith, Nadir Shah’s army comprised of “60,000 Turkmen and Uzbeks; 70,000 Afghans and Indians; 65,000 troops from Khorasan; 120,000 from western Persia (Kurdistan, Fars, Hamadan, Lorestan, and Khuzestan); 60,000 from Azerbaijan and
the Caucasus; and Persian *javanmard* from the country-side (Axworthy 2007, 639-40, 42). In 1743, Nadir Shah declared war on the Ottoman Sultan under the pretext of rejecting his Jafari *Madh’hab* suggestion.

This round of Ottoman-Qizilbash War lasted from 1743-46. Below is a description of the army that Nadir had built in 1743 (Axworthy 2007, 635):

The 375,000 strong Persian army of Nader Shah stood poised to invade Ottoman Iraq. It was the first in Persian history to be comprehensively equipped with up-to-date gunpowder weapons, for both cavalry and infantry, and included a powerful new artillery train of nearly 350 cannon and siege mortars ... This large army was disciplined, well-motivated, well-supplied, regularly paid and fed, and included veterans of Nader’s successful campaigns in India and Central Asia. It had beaten the Ottomans before and would do so again. It is no exaggeration to say that at this date, it was not only the most powerful single force in Asia, but possibly in the world.

In a deliberate act to undermine the Sultan’s authority, Nadir summoned Sunni and Shi’a jurisprudents from Persia, Baghdad, and Central Asia to Najaf. In the shrine city of Najaf, Nadir convened “a formal council to ratify the Jafari *Madh’hab* idea” (Tucker 1994, 171). At the Najaf Council, he told Abdullah al-Suwaydi, Ottoman jurist, that “in my realm there are two areas, Afghanistan and Turkistan, in which they call the Iranians infidels. Infidelity is loathsome and it is not appropriate. There should not be in my domains one people who call others infidel. Now I make you my representative to go and remove all of the charges of infidelity” (Tucker 1994, 171). A half-hearted treaty was finally ratified to avoid any retribution between Nadir Shah and the Ottoman officials in 1746. The fruits of this treaty was not yet fully reaped when a tragedy befell on *Memleket-i Qizilbash*. 
D. A Qizilbash Tragedy

In a period of about quarter of a century, Nadir Afshar, who arose from a modest Qizilbash origin, “built an empire across Iran, India, and Central Asia” (Tucker 1994, 163). Nadir weakened the Chinggisid Khanate System Khan-bazi, in Central Asia by disregarding the power of the tribal chieftains in what James L. Gelvin, a historian of the Middle East, calls the “military patronage-system” (Gelvin 2015). The decade-long presence of Qizilbash in Balkh was another key turning point. The Qizilbash brought with them the centralized Perso-Islamic model of governance that had at its core a well-oiled bureaucracy. Local amirs became incapable of forming any effective resistance, allowing the mullahs to inculcate anti-Shi’a attitudes. To abate the authority and influence of the local amirs and mullahs, and to minimize the likelihood of a revolt under the egis of heresy, Nadir conscripted local men to serve in his diverse army. For example, a contingent made up entirely of new Uzbek recruits crushed the Badakhshan Revolt 1746. Nadir Shah’s policy of continued reliance on locals enabled his expansion goals.

Domestically, Nadir Shah’s failure to institute legitimacy among the loyal Safavid clerics haunted with him until his assassination. The hefty taxes and enforcement of death penalty for those who did not pay caused much distress. The prominent pro-Safavid “Shi’ite clergy, which he had deprived of its material advantage, especially felt itself wronged. In the Shi’ite books, Nadir’s conducts are described as monstrous for erecting towers of skulls” (Minorsky 1955, 254). Members of his inner circle killed Nadir Shah, 1747. If Nadir could have ruled
with the support of the pro-Safavid clerics, “the drive to pay for his successful army could have transformed the Persian state administration and economy,” along the lines of European mercantilism (Axworthy 2007, 642). Nadir’s policies of social diversity and religious tolerance could have transformed the Persian polity into the modern state era. A robust state might have stood firm against colonial interventions and economic domination that Persia underwent in the nineteen and parts of the twentieth century. Lastly, the fate of the Qizilbash officers and officials living in the eastern cities of the polity might have had a different trajectory.

Once the news of Nadir Shah’s demise reached Balkh and Bukhara, the Qizilbash officers withdrew because of rising political uncertainty and rupture in the military chain of command. Persia in 1747 witnessed a short-lived period of political vacuum. Balkh regained a degree of autonomy when the Ghilzai and Rahim Bi’s forces defected. Haji Bi Ming, amir of Maymana, took advantage of the interregnum by seizing control of Balkh. The Qizilbash retreat was seen by the amir of Maymana and Qunduz as a political opening to restore their realms and claim the titles of Khan and Wali-yi Balkh. The resurgence of tribalism or “tribal outbreak” ensued in the eastern frontier after Nadir’s death (Lee 1996, and Lockhart 1938). Balkh became a site of conflict between Mangit authorities in Bukhara and Ahmad Shah Abdali’s rising power in Qandahar.

After Nadir Shah’s assassination, large number of Qizilbash officers and officials merged forces with Ahmad Shah. The Qizilbash-Ahmad Shah alliance will be discussed fully in Chapter 3.
E. Primary Sources

In this section, my objective is to show how the word Qizilbash was used in leading primary sources that were compiled during or shortly after Nadir’s reign. How did the meaning of Qizilbash change after the fall of the Safavids in 1722, or not? It is worth mentioning that there were no manuscripts that were commissioned during the Hotaki era, 1722-29, or when Nadir commanded the military under the shadow of the last Safavid Shah, Tahmasp II, 1729-36. With this fifteen-year gap in the Persian primary sources, our data and knowledge of the Qizilbash for the period (1722-36) until the rise of the Abdalis in 1747 and the rise of the Qajars in the late-18th century derives from the following four sources:

Table 4. Afsharid Primary Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1733-59: Source covers</td>
<td>Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Khan Astarabadi, <em>Tarikh-i Jahangosha-ye Nadiri</em> [1750s]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759: death of Astarabadi</td>
<td>Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Khan Astarabadi, <em>Dorra-ye Nadera</em> [1759]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness to Nadir’s campaigns</td>
<td>Abdul Karim Kashmiri, <em>Bayan-i Waqi</em>, also called, <em>Tarikh-e Naderi</em> or <em>Nadernama</em> [1784]</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kazim Marvi’s (1788), *Alamara-ye Naderi*, is the most complete biography of Nadir Afshar. It is a rich three volume history of events that transpired from 1722-47. The first part is about the rise and fall of the Hotakis, 1722-29. This volume informs us about the sociopolitical milieu that existed in Khorasan until Nadir’s coronation in 1736. Marvi, however, does not defend Nadir right to rule.
(Tucker 2012). The first volume is based on eyewitness accounts of those who were present or participated in what transpired while the last two volumes are largely based on Marvi’s firsthand observations. Interwoven throughout the ethnohistorical text are Marvi’s childhood memories in the city of Merv as a Qizilbash youth, with a Tatar mother. The author is a descendant of the Qajar Qizilbash subtribe whose forefathers lived in Tabriz before they were resettled in Merv in 1631 as part of Shah Abbas’s relocation policies to divide and weaken the Qizilbash confederacy (Astarabadi 1759, 131). Alamara-ye Naderi informs us about the anti-Shi’a attitudes and slavery that Tatars in Merv conducted in the early decades of the eighteenth century. The enslavement of Shi’as persisted until Nadir’s brother, Ibrahim Khan, relocated the Qizilbash back from the Merv oasis to Meshhad, including Marvi’s own family in 1727.

While living in Mashhad as a young man, Kazim Marvi, attended school when Zulfiqar Khan Abdali invaded the city in 1730 (Marvi 1788, 156). His family continued to live in that city until 1736. In 1736, Marvi and his father traveled to Tabriz where he joined Ibrahim Khan as a junior court official. Since then, Marvi recorded events such as, Nadir Afshar’s coronation in the Mughan plain and the ensuing triumphs and setbacks until his death in 1747. Marvi praises Nadir for saving Persia from foreign domination, “he believed that the execution of Shah Tahmasp II, along with his family, sealed Nadir’s fate (Tucker 2012). Without further discussion of Marvi’s career, let us turn to Alamara-ye Naderi, to observe how the word Qizilbash was used by the Qizilbash author himself.
Marvi uses Qizilbash and its derivative in different contexts: *Qizilbash* (Marvi 1788, 356) *Sepah Qizilbash* and *Ghazian Qizilbash* (Marvi 1788, 1045), and *Qizilbashi* (Marvi 1788, 1048). The passage below is an example of the first usage, and its English translation is done by myself.

> Whenever the Country of Azerbiajan is Qizilbash and remain captive to Rum [Ottoman Anatolia], why not take complete vengence on those hostile Rumis?

In the above context, Marvi uses the word Qizilbash in reference to a Qizilbash territory, specifically country of Azerbiajan, which changed hands during the Ottoman-Safavid wars.

> They said, the Qizilbash Sepah, meaning corps, has the determination to move forward and seize the fort (Fazel 2015).

In this context, Marvi uses the word Qizilbash in reference to a separate unit, Qizilbash Sepah, within Nadir Shah's army.

> Those four people entered the military camp in Qizilibashi uniforms (Fazel 2015).

In this sentence, Marvi reveals two insights. First, the Qizilbash cavalrymen or palace-guards had distinguishable uniforms. Second, not anyone was allowed to enter the guarded encampment where Nadir and his generals resided unless they were wearing the distinctive Qizilbash uniforms.

***
Unlike Kazim Marvi, who writes in simple and direct language, Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Khan Astarabadi was an eminent court scholar of Nadir Shah who wrote under the penname *Kawkab* Star. Astarabadi was a trained bureaucrat who in his youth was appointed to the Safavid court in Isfahan (Perry 2011). In 1729, after Nadir Shah’s capture of Isfahan, he wrote him a congratulatory letter for retaking the capital from the Hotakis. For the next seventeen years Astarabadi served as Nadir Shah’s *munshi al-mamalik*, Head Secretariat. Astarabadi was personally present in Nadir Shah’s discussions with the Mughal emperor and he also accompanied Nadir Shah’s embassy to Constantinople in 1747. After Nadir’s assassination, Astarabadi resigned from public service work to complete the historical and philological works he had been compiling for decades. *Jahangosha-e Naderi* was completed in 1750 three years after Nadir died. Astarabadi has several influential works. We will only examine his two history books that mention the word Qizilbash: the prosaic *Jahangosha-e Naderi* (1750s), and the ornate *Dorra-e Nadera* (1759). Below is a short passage from *Jahangosha-e Naderi*:

> قرار نیچن یدولت عثمان یایاو و اول انیم نکهیمشعر بر ا دیگشته بود رس نییبه سفارت روم تع نیمحمد رضا خان قبل از اطرف به قزلباش تعلق داشته باشد نیو ا یکه ممالک واقعه در آن سمت رود ارسیهی رومی و قزلی به تعریف قزلباشیت خدمش داشتی میشد.

Before Muhammad Reza Khan was designated as the Afsharid ambassador to Rum, an agreement was formed with the Ottoman government. Territories that are on the north banks of the Aras River belong to Ottomans and lands on the south side of the river belong to the Qizilbash (Fazel 2015).

Astarabadi similar to Marvi uses the word Qizilbash in reference to land. In this
specific example from *Jahangosha-e Naderi*, lands located on the southern bank of the Aras River. On the other hand, *In Dorra-e Nadera*, Astarabadi uses a derivative of the word Qizilbash fortune (Astarabadi 1759, 131).

***

Unlike Marvi and Astarabadi, Abdul Karim Kashmiri was not in Nadir Shah's company from the beginning. Kashmiri was living in Delhi until Nadir's entry in 1739 (Ahmad 2011). After sacking Delhi, Kashmiri joined Nadir’s court as a fiscal officer, *motassadi*, and accompanied the Qizilbash forces to Kabul, Central Asia and Persia (Levi and Sela 2009, 260). Abdul Karim Kashmiri wrote a book titled, *Bayan-e Vaqe*, in 1784, which is also known as, *Tarikh-e Naderi* or *Nadernama*. Kashmiri’s book deals with Nadir Shah’s expeditions and includes details of the cities and countries visited by the author in both central and south Asia in the middle of the 18th century (Levi and Sela 2009, 260). It is said to have rich geographical, social, and economic data that is divided into five chapters.  

IV. Tribes

The elevated territory of the Iranian Plateau is part of the larger Eurasian landmass. The Iranian Plateau lies between the Zagros Mountains to the West, the Caspian Sea to the North, the Persian Gulf to the Southwest, and the Indus River to the East. This vast landmass not only contains some of the world’s
most rugged mountain ranges, barren plains, parched salty deserts, and freshwater rivers, but is also home to a mosaic of ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. This heterogeneous cultural archipelago covers what is now the modern states of Iran and Afghanistan. Its terms of peoples and cultural diversity, the Iranian Plateau is unsurpassed in the wider Middle East and Central Asia. It is home to roughly 40% of the Ithna Ashari Shi’a population (Pew 2009).

There are several reasons for the presence of the Shi’a denomination in the Iranian Plateau. The main reason goes back to the Mongol invasion when Baghdad fell to Hulagu, 1258. The era between the annihilation of the Abbasids until the start of the Shi’a Safavid State in 1501 can be summarized into three epochs: “the fairly stable period of Il-Khanids, the highly disordered period of post-Mongol successor states, and the attempted settlement of the Near East by Timur,” (Mazzaoui 1972, 79). Timur’s descendants unsuccessfully tried to retain a degree of control with their “decentralized” policy over western Persia. However, the Jalairid Sultanate, 1382-1410, and the Turkmen tribal coalitions of Qara-Qoyunlu (northwestern Persia) and Aq-Qoyunlu (parts of Persia) stayed autonomous.

The expansion of Shi’ism in the Iranian Plateau is tied with the Safavids. The Safavid Sufi Order founded in Ardabil, shortly after the Mongol conquest by Shaykh Safi al-Din, 1252-34. The Safavid Sufi Order was a “peaceful and contemplative order similar to countless Sufi orders which sprang up almost in every corner of the Muslim world” (Mazzaoui 1972, 82). The Mongol rulers of
Persia, Il-Khanids, placed the Sufi organization and its leaders of numerous followers under their protection. The city of Ardabil soon became an important center of religious pilgrimage for the murids, which brought economic benefit to the Safavid Sufis. Shaykh Sadr al-Din, 1334-93, expanded the activities of the Safavi Sufi Order. Khawaja Ali, 1393-29, extended the message, da’wa, of his order, tariqa, through the Sufi network into Syria (Sham) and Anatolia (Rum). Khawaja Ali got the freedom of some Turkmen captives from Timur after the Battle of Ankara, 1402. Khawaja Ali then sent the newly freed Turkmen back to their kin in areas of Rum and Sham to “preach the word” (Mazzaoui 1972, 83).

In 1467, the Turkmen tribe of Aq-Qoyunlu defeated the Timurids. This marks an important event because the Safavi Order evolved from a “nonviolent” Sufi network into a “militant” sociopolitical movement. Under leadership of Junayd, 1447-60, and Hayder, 1460-88, the, murids, followers of the Safavi Sufi order “became the ghuzat-i sufiyeh,” Sufi Warriors (Bayat 2000, 41). These ghazis participated in many military expeditions with their distinctive red headgears. In 1458, Uzan Hasan, chieftain of the Aq-Qoyunlu, gave his sister in marriage to Junayd. A few years later, Junayd’s son and successor, Hayder, married Uzan Hasan’s daughter, who was the mother of Shah Ismael. These marriages solidified the kinship ties between the Sufi order and the Turkic tribal confederation. It also extended the reach of the Safavi da’wa. Although most of the Aq Qoyunlu had become murids, it was not until Shah Ismael’s reign that the central tribal structure of the Aq-Qoyunlu ceased to exist (Mazzaoui 1972, 89). Aside from the incorporation of the Aq-
Qoyunlu, the Ottoman policies in Anatolia, “sought to control the tribes closely and subject them to regular taxation,” which prompted the various Anatolian tribes to move in Persia (Karakaya-Stump 2008, 17). Thus, Qara-Qoyunlu (Black Sheep) and Aq-Qoyunlu (While Sheep) then became the main recruiting ground for the expanding Safavi Sufi Warriors.

The Turkmen ghazis under the guidance of Junayd and Hayder received spiritual and military training. Before the rise of the Safavid State, they became devoted fighters known as the Qizilbash. With few military successes, Qizilbash expanded their movement into what is now the northern part of Syria, eastern Anatolia, southern Caucasus, and northwestern area of Persia. They were the leading reason for the rise of Shah Ismael to power and the establishment of the Safavid Dynasty in Persia, 1501-1722. Apart from the military support of the Qizilbash, four other reasons contributed to the continuation of the Safavid Empire: 1) Charismatic leadership, 2) Centralized bureaucracy, 3) Gunpowder technology, and 4) Institutionalization of Shi'ism. The early Safavids rewarded the Qizilbash ghazis with ample land grants. Thus, Turkmen acquired a degree of vested interest in the overall stakes of the empire. One question arises, who precisely were these tribal ghazis or “devotee-soldiers” who took part in the rise of the Safavids?

The main tribes, oymaqs (or tayifah), which helped the Safavids rise to power, belonged to Rumlu, Ustajlu, Shamlu, Dulgadir, Tekelu, and the Qajar. The lesser-cited oymaqs are the “Versaq, Turgudlu, Chapni, Baiburdlu, and Ispirlu” (Roemer 1990, 28). Within each oymaq there were leadership posts that
comprised the upper echelon of the tribal hierarchy. It is difficult to find in the early primary sources mention of Turkman, Afshar, and Bayat or mention of subtribes like Gunduzlu, Purnak, Warsak, Baharlu, and Ansarlu (a branch of Bayat). In fact, Shamlu, Ustajlu, Zulqadr and Turkmen are not one single tribe, but rather confederations. During Shah Ismael’s rule the Shamlus, under the headship of Husayn Khan Shamlu, was the most powerful entity in the Qizilbash confederation. Later, the Afshars, Bayats, and Qajars became the main supporters of the Safavid Shahs. The smaller tribes and subtribes were divided into two groups: 1.) One group formed the Shahsevan cadre, and 2.) the second group was relocated to southern parts of Persia. The latter was mixed with local Persians and some Arabs and a newer large coalition was formed known as the Qashqae (Nafisi 1955).

Iskandar Munshi, author of *Tarikh-e Alam Arai-e Abbasi* (1616), himself a Turkmen, names the tribes that comprised the Qizilbash Confederation in the early seventeenth century. Munshi lists the following tribal names: “Shamlu, Ustalju, Qajar, Afshar, Turkoman, Asirlu, Rumlu, Qara Daghlu, Bayat, Talash, Aalyaot, Jigarlo, Qazaqlu, and Baibadolo” (Munshi 1616). *Tarikh-e Alam Arai-e Abbasi* tells us that the last tribe that merged with the Qizilbash Confederation was the Persian tribe of Talash. Each main tribes had a territory on which a Beylerbeyi, Governor General, governed on behalf of the Safavid Shah. In terms of their geographic distribution, the Ustajlu were positioned in Herat. The Qajar were in Qarabagh and Shirvan. Zulqadr were in the Pars region, the Tekkelu in Syria and in northern Iraq, the Shamlu in Khorasan. The Afshar branch was in
Mazandaran (later relocated to Khorasan and Kerman). Karamanlu were mostly in Ardabil, and the Bayat were in Nishapur (Munshi 1616).

The Safavid revenue partly came from taxation of the agricultural goods in the Qizilbash autonomous areas. The overall Safavid economy revolved around agriculture, pastoralism, and the Persian rug industry, which Shah Tahmasp established in the sixteenth century.

The origin of some of the oymaqs is indicated in their tribal names. For example, the names Shamlu, Rumlu, Baharlu consist of a place-name with the addition of the possessive particle – lu. Others such as Afshar, Warsak, and Zulqadr are the old names of the various Oghuz subgroups. Shamlu, Rumlu and Karamanlu indicate places names in Syria, Anatolia, and Persia (Afshar 2014). The term Qajar means “nomad” and Bayat means “Knight” or “Cavalier” (Afshar 2014). The meaning of clans such as, Ustajlu remains obscure. The phrase Shahsevan means “adherents of the Shah” (Tapper 1974). Shahsevan are a heterogeneous group of Turkic and Persians, who were brought together in a coalition during the reign of Shah Abbas, 1587-1629. The Shahsevan was formed when some leading Persian bureaucrats married into Qizilbash families in order to counter the domestic court tensions that existed between the sedentary Persians and the nomadic Turkmen. Shahsevan were used to quell any domestic rebellions and the phrase “shah-i sevan kard” gained usage (Tapper 1974). Apart from marriage, loyalty between Persian viziers, senior officials, and Qizilbash amirs was acquired by ahd, vow, paymaan, oath, and bai’ah, allegiance (Mottahedeh 1980). The notion of living in the same locality
also provided the basis of social cohesion.

**A. Organization and Transformation**

The leadership of the Safavi order was comprised of a *Murshid-e Kamil*, Supreme Spiritual Guide, and *Khalifat al-Khulafa*, Secretariat for Sufi Affairs (Savory 1965, 497). The Sufi organization intended to disseminate the Safavid message to their *murids*, followers. The Sufi order was controlled through the office of *Khalifat al-Khulafa*, who was also the Supreme Military Commander and *nayib*, Deputy of *murshid-e kamil*. The chain of knowledge transmission, *shajara*, “a document of deeds and family line,” was used to select the *Khalifat al-Khulafa* (Szuppe 1996, 80).

A Qizilbash filled the office of Khalifat al-Khulafa. He appointed his representatives, *khalifas*, in constituencies where the Sufi, *da’wa*, message, was active. The *Khalifas*, usually local tribal chiefs who had their subordinate *pir*, elder. His task was to train and successfully incorporate the new disciples into the Sufi order who were recruited by a *naqib*, missionary (Morton 1993, 244). The *Khalifa* served as the overseer of justice to the ardent followers of the Safavi Sufi path who offered their devotion and compliance to *Murshid-e Kamil*. The *Khalifas* also provided the *Murshid-e Kamil* with a number of equipped tribal warriors in times of war.

In 1501, the Safavi Order with the help of the Qizilbash instituted the Safavid State. It was a very “carefully planned and cautious campaign run by wise old commanders” (Anooshahr 2014, 3). The Qizilbash commanders set up
the military institution. The Safavid government was divided vertically into the crown, *khassa*, and the provinces, *mamalik*. The bureaucracy was divided horizontally, along ethnic lines between the Qizilbash and the Persians (Savory 1975, 168). The Qizilbash considered it suitable to fill the principal offices of the central government, military, and provincial governments. The strategic offices that the Qizilbash came to hold included *wikalat*, vizierate, *amir al-umara*, chief army commander, and provincial *Khalifas*. The first Safavid vizierate was given to Husayn Beg Shamlu and other Qizilbash elites filled the military ranks. The army commanders were, *savars*, cavalrymen, who took pride in the red hat, “badge of honor” that were bestowed upon them. Thus, the Safavid State became synonymous with the expressions: *kalamraw-i Qizilbash*, Qizilbash Realm, and *mamlikat-i Qizilbash*, Qizilbash Country. At the same time, the person of Shah was not only the *Murshid-e Kamil*, but he was now also referred to as the *Padishah-e Qizilbash*, or the Qizilbash Shah (Munshi 1616, 206).

The first Safavid Shah, Ismael, became both the supreme spiritual guide (religious) and the sovereign of the state (political). He transformed the *murid-pir* relationship from an exclusively religio-military tie into a political one. Shah Ismael faced the dilemma of how to incorporate the Sufi order into the Persian bureaucracy (Haneda 1989, 57). The relations between the Shah “and their Anatolian followers” was still maintained and managed through the mediation of the Sufi convents (Karakaya-Stump 2008, iv). Shah Ismael superimposed the Perso-Islamic administrative model. The post of the vizierate, *wakil*, enabled
him a degree of control and persuasion over the decentralized Qizilbash. The expression Sufi probity *sufigari*, was used if one desired to become an officer in the state. *Sufigari* was coupled with sincere loyalty *ikhlas*, and unquestioned obedience *itiqad*, to the Shah as the head of the Sufis and the State. Being an upright Sufi was considered equal to being loyal to the *Murshid-e Kamil* and to the State. On the other hand, the term *na-sufigari*, failure to follow Sufi orders, was viewed as an act of a punishable crime against the state. This new and substantial change did not exist before Shah Ismael’s ascendency.

Under Shah Ismael the Safavid reach expanded in the Khorasan area. In 1510, he geared up Herat as the second city of the empire, which became the seat of the heir-apparent. The prince was in charge of the Qizilbash Provincial Governor while the latter in his capacity as *lala*, tutor, was “responsible for the moral and physical safety of the heir-apparent and his ward” (Savory 1975, 175). It was up to the *lala* to ensure the prince was wisely trained in hunting, horsemanship, and more notably statesmanship before he would assume the burden of the Shah. Safavid heir-apparent learned directly from the provincial governor about diplomacy and state affairs.

Shah Ismael’s western expansion to Anatolia came to a crushing defeat at the hands of the Ottomans (who had adopted the gunpowder technology) in the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 (Lomazoff and Ralby 2013). After the Safavid defeat, Shah Ismael adopted the epithet sinner *Khata’i*. Below is a Shah Ismael poem *ghazal*, which was translated by Minorsky. In this poem, Ismael uses his adopted pseudonym. His poem displays some of the themes and symbolism we
have discussed thus far, the Safavid claim to power and their Qizilbash murids. Let us evaluate Ismael’s ghazal. For example, in the opening line he alludes to himself as “the leader of all these ghazis,” to legitimize his political position. In the next lines, he displays his ‘sacred family’ genealogy by referring to himself as Fatima and Ali’s descendant or “of Hayderian essence.” In doing so, Ismael masterfully sets himself, the founder of the Safavid State, as the guardian of truth haqq, over falsehood batil. He invoke the name of the second Umayyad Caliph, “Yazid,” whose army defeated the third Shi’a Imam, Husayn ibn Ali, in the Battle of Karbala. He similar to Husayn proclaims to follow the “path of the Muhammad Mustafa,” and not of the Yazid. It is not until the last stanza where he calls himself “Khata’i,” a servant of the Shi’as.”

My name is Shah Ismael. I am God’s mystery. I am the leader of all these ghazis
My mother is Fatima, my father is Ali; and I am the Pir of the Twelve Imams
I have recovered my father’s blood from Yazid. Be sure that I am of Hayderian essence
I am the living Khidr and Jesus, son of Mary. I am the Alexander of my contemporaries

Look at you, Yazid, polytheist and the adept of the accursed one, I am free from the Ka’ba of hypocrites
In me is Prophethood and the mystery of Holiness. I follow the path of Muhammad Mustafa

I have conquered the world at the point of my sword. I am the Qanbar of Murtaza Ali
My sire is Safi, my father Hayder. Truly, I am the Jafar of the audacious

I am a Husaynid and have curses for Yazid
I am Khata’i, a servant of the Shi’as

***
Shah Tahmasp succeeded his father, Ismael, in 1524. The Qizilbash took advantage of his youth and assumed total control of the state. Their pledge to the charismatic nature of Ismael, as their *murshid-e kamil*, had been shattered by the latter’s loss at the Battle of Childiran, 1514 (Matthee 2011). Under Shah Tahmasp, Qizilbash reverted to their traditional tribal loyalties. This led to a multiyear Civil War as the Qizilbash *oymaq* fought one another for political supremacy. Between 1526 and 1533, either single tribes or bloc of tribes ruled the state without much input from the Persian bureaucrats. The Governor of Herat, Qazaq Khan, “acted independently of royal order, exercising oppression, *zulm*, and agreed to personal treaties with the Uzbeks” (Szuppe 1996, 83). State power became nominal in the peripheral cities while at the capital each of the competing Qizilbash tribes tried to outperform his rival(s) in order to acquire the privileged position in Tahmasp’s court. The main objective was to maximize their share of distributed land grants, *tayyal*. In 1530-31, the Tekelu tribe, in an unprecedented way, tried to capture the Shah Tahmasp, but other *oymaq* and Muhammad Khan Tekelu (Tahmasp’s *lala*) rallied to Shah’s defense. (Szuppe 1996, 81).

After the Qizilbash Civil War, Shah Tahmasp reasserted his power and remained in control of the state affairs. There were two high-ranking offices whose functions were mainly military: *amir al-umara* and the *qurchi-bashi*. The *amir al-umara* office declined in importance. It was superseded by the new office of *Qurchi-bashi* (Matthee 2011, 112-13). The *qurchis*, praetorians, were not “allowed to marry without permission form the Shah (Morton 1993, 229).
Tahmasp took the first measure toward reducing the power and influence of the Qizilbash. He introduced a nontribal third force to the political scene. It was comprised of Armenians, Circassians, and Georgians, who formed a cadre of *ghuleman-i khassa-yi sharifa*, Servants of the Royal Household. These men were taken prisoner in Tahmasp’s battles in the Caucasus between 1540-41 and 1553-54 or were offspring of women who were captured during the war (Savory 1995, 598). Moreover, after the first vizierate, which was offered to Husayn Beg Shamlu, the next five appointed wakils were Persians.

The exclusion of the Qizilbash from the vizierate and the royal household were calculated measures to curb their power in the face of imminent Ottoman and Uzbek threats. Tahmasp, and his immediate successors (Ismael II and Muhammad Khudabanda), however, were ineffective in resolving the triangular enmities between the Qizilbash tribes, the new cadre of *ghulams*, and the old Persian bureaucrats.

The Safavid state became relatively centralized in the latter years of Tahmasp. It was never able to overcome the political and ethnic fragmentation. Persia’s ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity formed a major impediment to central control. The bureaucrats wanted ‘real’ administrative power. The army officers never fully became subordinated to pens of urban scribes, bureaucrats. Qizilbash wanted the Persian officials to look after the *diwan*, court business, and not to interfere with troops in the field. This era was a period of confusion. The job description of state officials, *arkan-e dawlat*, remained ambiguous. There was extensive overlapping of power that caused tension and personal
animosities among the state officials. In 1555, after the Treaty of Amsaya with the Ottomans, the inflow of “orthodox” Shi’a clerics from Lebanon, Jabal Amal, was underway (Abisaab 1994, 104). The Shi’a scholars eventually became an integral part of the bureaucratic elite with opinions on state affairs. However, it was not until the rule of Shah Abbas I, who finalized Tahmasp’s centralization policies. Abbas transformed the decentralized and fragmented tribal society of the time into a patrimonial-bureaucratic empire (Matthee 2011, 36).

Despite the distraught times for Persia, Shah Abbas I (1571-1629), took command of Safavid politics and the army with the support of a Qizilbash amir, Quli Khan Ustajlu. Abbas was skeptical of the Sufis. He launched major top-down reforms to expand the power of the state and to make the tax system more efficient. Abbas’s centralization policy included the replacement of the Qizilbash elements in the military, which operated on a “pattern of political and social promotion [and not] on the basis of personal merit” (Szuppe 1996, 95). Sufis were dismissed from their high-ranking posts and appointed as janitors and executioners. Abbas sought to appoint qualified administrators such as, the Persian “vizier of the Supreme Diwan, Hatim Beg, in command of the army” (Savory 1975, 169). Hatim Beg wanted to build a strong land-based army “with troops equipped with modern weapons” that could keep up to the formidable foreign threats: Ottomans and the Portuguese in Persian Gulf. With the counsel of Hatim Beg, Abbas formed a potent “gunpowder empire,” which comprised of ghulams. Ghulams were helpful in ending the Portuguese coastal invasion and had no indigenous loyalties in Persia except to the Shah (Haneda 1989, 59).
The modern military of Shah Abbas included cavalry, *savars*, armed with muskets, *tufangchis*, and artillery, *topchis* (Haneda 1989, 58). *Ghulams* became the new military mainstay whereas the *Qurchis* represented the older cavalry. When “Turcoman tribes entered under the command of *ghulam*, the Qizilbash began to lose their identity and the *qurchis* alone represented the purely tribal elements” (Haneda 1989, 81). Nonetheless, Shah Abbas’s reign was a period of massive changes for the Qizilbash.

At the same time, under Shah Abbas, some children of the Qizilbash amirs “received their education principally at court (Savory 1975, 173). The young Qizilbash were admitted to the royal *haram*, where they were entrusted to the care of scholars in the royal library. They received a thorough education in statecraft, arts, and military training. Some even accompanied the Persian envoys in their diplomatic missions. The young cadre of Qizilbash bureaucrats were not only politically reliable, but were better educated than those who stayed with their tribal kin. As a result, these Qizilbash bureaucrats had the proper training and the ability to take on statecraft jobs at the Shah’s wish, in areas that hitherto had been exclusively preserved for the Persian. Shah Abbas’s new cadre of Qizilbash became known as *muqarrab al-hadrat* (Savory 1975, 173). This class produced many noblemen *mirzas*, scribes *katibs*, and scriveners *kitabdars*, for the new bustling administration in Isfahan and for the frontier posts that were under the Safavid suzerainty. Abbas even appointed Salmon Khan Ustajlu, a Qizilbash bureaucrat, who quickly climbed the ranks and became the vizier of the empire. Salmon’s obligations included:
The head of the bureaucracy, in charge of the large staff of the *daftarkhani-yi humayun*, or Royal Secretariat. Although the technical business of preparing and auditing the budget, assessing the taxes was carried on by the Controller-in-Chief of Finance, *hisab-dar*, and his department, the vizier also had the overall responsibility of financial matters.

Shah Abbas hardened the loyalty and stability of the *muqarrab al-hadrat*. The Safavid Shah “aimed at forming marriage alliances with key members of the political circles at court and in the provinces” (Szuppe 1996, 79). Many of the Qizilbash officers became “tied even more closely to the Shah by marriage to member of the royal household” (Savory 1975, 174). The interethnic marriages between the Qizilbash “men of sword” and the Persian “men of pen” abated domestic friction. The practice of mixing politics with marriage is what the Safavid historian Rudi Mathee calls “sexual politics.” The importance of royal-in-laws and royal-cousins led to formation of a new aristocratic social class. The royal cousins from Safavid mothers were considered to be part of the dynastic family and, if men were given the right to use the esteemed title of Royal Prince *Mirza* (Szuppe 1996, 79). Matrilineal royal descent was also vital; however, paternal lineage took precedence. Under Abbas, loyalty to the Safavid household was no longer exclusively religious or political. For the Qizilbash, the preservation of the Safavid Empire was related to the preservation of their own heritage.

Shah Abbas’s profound reforms certainly curbed the power of the semi-independent Qizilbash. It should not be said that he “crushed” them. They lost their dominant military position within the state. Abbas’s reforms required not
their destruction, but their continued existence in an urban environment that would not jeopardize the existence of the empire. The urbanization process of the Qizilbash actually began in the early part of the sixteenth century under Shah Ismael, but it accelerated over the course of seventeenth century. By the early eighteenth century, there were only few semi-nomad Qizilbash tribes. The Qizilbash had become sedentary. The powerful tribal amirs were scattered in “different parts of the country” through either land grants or relocation (Szuppe 1996, 95). Some were moved “to border areas to provide a line of defense” while some settled in the capital city of Isfahan (Kondo 1999, 540-42). The Qizilbash amirs who stayed “loyal to the Shah allowed the ruler greater control over the tribal society than before” (Haneda 1989, 81). The increased state interventions created a degree of internal rifts as the habitual role of the tribal chiefs waned. The changes in Qizilbash social organization took place not only because of the reforms, but also, also to a lesser degree, because of the muqarrab al-hadrat political contacts with the outside world. This transformation can been seen “in their engagement in artistic and literary activities” (Szuppe 1996, 95). Overall, Shah Abbas’s reforms effected the Qizilbash transformation from largely semi-nomadism to sedentary participants.

The decrease in the political importance of the Qizilbash is also tied with the development of a more rigid Shi’a orthodoxy. Under Shah Abbas, orthodox Shi’ism was decisively established. The Safavid religious policy was carried out on four fronts: 1) eradication of millenarian extremism, Ghulu, 2) persecution of Sufism, 3) suppression of Sunnism, and 4) dissemination of Shi’ism. The
consequences of this became obvious when the title Sufi, could no longer be tolerated in the city of Isfahan and fell into disrepute (Savory 1965, 498). With the decline in the status of the Sufi masters and Sufi congregation halls, the sociopolitical power of the Khalifat al-Khulafa plunged. Sufi orders either died out or moved to northern regions of the Indian subcontinent under the intense pressure that came from the Shi’a orthodoxy. Sufis who stayed in Isfahan sank into being sweepers of the palace. Their public “rituals were maintained to the point that they continued to meet Thursday evenings for dhikr meetings” (Savory 1965, 502). Despite their unfathomable demotion, “food and lodging were provided for at the order of the Shah” (Mirjafari, 1979, 163-64). This gesture may have been a suggestion given to Shah Abbas by his Qizilbash vizier Salmon Khan Ustajlu.

The prestige of Sufis continued to decline amongst the people even after Shah Abbas’s long reign. The development of Shi’a rituals and remembrances gained social traction. In the early eighteenth century, about “two hundred years after Sufi fervor had brought the Safavids to power, it was possible for a mujtahid to denounce Sufism” (Savory 1965, 502). As the mujtahids continued to extend their influence in the court, the Sufi concept of the Unity of God and Man became sidelined. “Orthodox” Shi’a scholars, outright rejected the concept of Unity of God and Man. For Sufis the Unity of God and Man was “considered to be an emanation of God, displaying God’s attributes” (Mirjafari 1979, 158).

Under the reign of the last Safavid Shah, Sultan Husayn, 1694-1722, who was greatly swayed by the rigid mujtahids, Sufi orders “stopped holding
any sessions or gatherings in the Sufi circle, towhid khaneh, ... all Sufi leaders were exiled from Isfahan” (Mirjafari 1979, 165). By the end of the Safavid era, most Qizilbash had become enthusiast Ithna Ashari Shi’as. A new military office, Sepahsalar-i Iran, Commander-in-Chief of Persia, which commanded all ethnic groups, had replaced the once powerful Qizilbash post of Khalifat al-Khulafa (Savory 1995, 600-01).

B. Culture

One characteristic that the Qizilbash people retained was their personal names. Qizilbash used the Turkic tribal names that commonly ended with Quli, slave of (Khan Jan 2014). Another Qizilbash naming convention was titles like tutors/guardians, lala, and qurchibashi. The titles preceded the first and tribal names. Shah Ismael’s tutor, for example, was Lala Husayn Khan Shamlu, and Abbas’s guardian was Lala Chah-Quli Sultan Yakan Ustajlu. Let us look at the first example a little closer: lala means tutor (Khan Jan 2014). Husayn is a common Arabic name that Shi’as mostly use to express their devotion to Imam Husayn. Khan is the tribe’s chief, and Shamlu is the tribal designation. In this example, Sham is also the historic word for Levant, which in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries included Anatolia.

In terms of language, the Qizilbash people were bilingual in Turkish and Persian. To a lesser extent, Kurdish and Luri dialects of western Persian were also used. At the time of their ascendancy in 1501, the vernacular language of the military, court and administration was Turkish. Persian, however, stayed
as the official language of the empire, especially in terms of formal consular 
“correspondence, literature, and historiography” (Mazzaoui 2002, 86). Persian 
was the medium of communication with the Mughals and used in “diplomatic 
correspondence with Turkish speaking states, such as the Ottoman Empire 
and the Uzbek state” (Savory 1975, 169-70). Persian was inscribed on Safavid 
currency, pottery, tiles, and textiles. Arabic stayed the medium for scholastic 
religious works, but the translation of canonical religious literature into Persian 
picked up steam under Safavids. This is despite the fact that “Shi’a scholastic 
learning that had become the modus operandi [and the chief ideology] of the 
state” (Dabashi 2007, 36). In 1684-85, the travel diary of a German physician 
named Engelbert Kaempfer, tells us “the mother tongue of the Safavids is 
Turkish and this language is used at the court.” Dr. Kaempfer writes, “Turkish 
language was propagated in the houses of top civils servant and important 
characters of the State and one must say if somebody wants to obtain the favor 
of the Shah, he must know this language” (Rahbar 1997, 56-70). Although, 
Shah Ismael made Persian the official language of the empire, but he himself 
composed poetry in Turkish and in the high Persian literary format.

Among the Qizilbash, the Quriltay, a grand political and military council 
of khans and chiefs that was founded by Genghis Khan and continued under 
Timur, was used. Quriltay was used as the starting point for army preparation, 
and as a method for consensus formation to give titles, and appoint leadership 
positions. The Qizilbash continued this Turco-Mongolian system, but added the 
coronation of the Safavid Shahs to it. Under Ismael, the Quriltay of Erzincan
was commenced in which the Qizilbash responded to Ismael’s summons and crowned the charismatic Sufi leader as their Shah (Erzincan is the name of a city in Anatolia, presently in Turkey). Similarly, the Quriltay of Mughan Plain (on the banks of Aras River in northwestern Persia), was initiated under Nadir Quli Beg, 1736, where prominent political and religious figures attended and crowned Nadir Quli Afshar as the Shah of Persia (Floor 2009, 1).

In the early decades of the Safavid era until Abbas’s military reforms, the Qizilbash carried a formidable arsenal of weapons such as bow, lance, sword, dagger, and battle-axe. The source of their fighting inspiration *ilham*, stemmed from their devotion to the Safavid message and keeping the Safavid household in power. Qizilbash warriors shaved their beards, had long mustaches, placed forelocks on their shaved heads, and wore the symbolic red wool headgear until the military modernization when the wool headgear was replaced with a metal helmet.

**Figure 10.** Safavid Qizilbash Cavalryman  
**Figure 11.** Helmet
When the Qizilbash won a battle, the site would be named after the location where victory took place. That evening in the elaborate imperial tents, which were usually round in shape, a festivity would take place. A mystic troubadour called *ashiq*, would play music *saz*, and recite epic poems, accompanied the celebration. Poetry recitation played a key role in the spread of Persian language to new frontiers. The heroic poems that praised Qizilbash valor and chivalry *javanmardi*, inscribed under different sociohistorical settings than the Persian literate prose that were patronized by the Safavid court.

The Qizilbash have prided themselves in being part of the rich artistic culture that flourished under the Safavids. The Safavid artistic expressions are apparent in a variety of forms ranging from the intricate tilework inscriptions to elegant architecture, cities, bazaars, gardens, miniature painting, books, glass, rugs, and metalwork (Canby 2000). Safavid art reflects an underlying sense of symmetry, elegance, and intricacy. A manifestation of Safavid art is *Maidan-e Naqsh-e Jahan* in Isfahan. The most revered (high culture) art form was poetry. With Persian poetry’s strict insistence on meter and rhyme, it remains more than mere expression of human emotions. Poems holds subjective truth and conveys wisdom from the past. Sometimes it also functions as a medium of sarcasm and social commentary on the theme of injustice *zulm*, by masterful use of metaphors and allegories (Afshar 2014).

As stated earlier, Shah Ismael was a classic ruler-poet, who composed odes and quatrains. Ismael composed a number of eulogies in praise of Ali and some graceful poems about music. Below is one of Shah Ismael’s well-known
quatrains where he sees music saz, as a positive human virtue:

\begin{quote}
Today, I embraced my Saz  
My song is being echoed by heavens  
Four things are required for the life:  
Conscience, speech, respiration, and Saz
\end{quote}

By the end of the 16th century, numerous Qizilbash amirs had become interested in artistic endeavors. A vivid case is Musayyib Khan Tekelu of Herat, a talented musician, composer, and calligrapher in nasta’liq (principal style in Persian). Nasta’liq calligraphy is still used by the Qizilbash in Kabul for writing poetry and as a form of visual art. Musayyib Khan’s father, “Muhammad Khan Tekelu, encouraged some cultural activities and was a patron of the historian Amir Mahmud B. Khwandamir and the painter Aqa Hasan. Musayyib is known to have surrounded himself with poets, and his own son, Mustafa Khan, was said to have equaled his father in all of the artistic skills, but that of music” (Szuppe 1996, 88). Music, poetry and calligraphy continue to play a big role in the lives of the Qizilbash (Ahang 2014).

Alexander H. Morton, on the other hand, draws attention to a Qizilbash ritual that is no longer practiced. In his article, “The Chub-i Tariq and Qizilbash Ritual in Safavid Persia,” Morton describes the rites of passage in which ritual beating with a wooden stick took place. The unusual nature of the practice are considered to stem from the thirteenth century Sufi tariqa, path or way of life. Evidence of this ceremony is “not very abundant in the Safavid period” (Morton 1993, 226). The Chub-i Tariq rituals are not acts of self-flagellation like the Shi’a folkloric practices that takes place during Ashura. It is not a measure of
retribution or compulsion typically applied in schools and family. *Chub-i Tariq* is a “voluntary submission to the commands of a hierarchy and its leader, or, alternatively, to the more of a community ... with the willing confession of the person beaten” (Morton 1993, 226). In other words, it was part of the initiation rituals to join the Sufi fraternity. Morton offers an insightful summary:

The company gathered in a room, sitting in rows from one end to the other. After praise of God and an hour of dhikr, remembrance, that was chanted. It was followed by recitation of poems that praised the Safavid Shahs and condemned the Ottoman Sultans. Those who were present in the room were called individually by khalifa to make a monetary contribution. Next was the beating. This was followed by dancing and a meal, which brought the proceedings to a close (Morton 1993, 229).

The *Khalifa* that applied the *chub-i tariq* stroke was known as the *tariqchi*. As for the qualification of the *tariqchi*, “he must be sound of spirit and without selfish motives, must respect the *tariq* and not act with levity” (Morton 1993, 233). The beating was a single stroke of the stick called *chub-i tariq*, which is described as:

The *khalifa* has a substantial wooden stick, and begins from the first to the last, one by one they all come for love of the Shah to the middle of the room and stretch themselves on the ground. And the *Khalifa* with the stick gives them a most mighty blow on the behind, and then the *khalifa* kisses the head and feet of the one he has given the blow, then he himself gets up and kisses the stick, and thus they all do, one by one...because Shah has ordered it so.

Apart from new murid’s receiving a single blow when joining the Sufi brotherhood or veteran Sufis committed of doing a *na-sufigari* action, the *Chub-i tariq* practice remained in use at the Safavid court until their demise in 1722.
The late Safavid Shahs used it when appointment of certain category of officials took place. In an administrative manual, *Dastur al-Muluk*, written during the reign of Sultan Husayn, 1694-1722, the appointment of *muqarrab al-hadrat* is described by Morton in the following manner:

After the Shah had bestowed the position on him, he used to make him lie down in Shah’s presence and, with the jeweled stick, *daganak*, which he held in his hand, strike him three times. After he got up, he would give him another stick, he would take that stick and kiss it, this meaning that he had been honored with the said position.

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With an overview of the Qizilbash origin, etymology, changing roles in the Safavid and Afsharid States, and their culture in Persia in this chapter, let us know turn to the question of what happens to the Qizilbash garrisons in Kabul after Nadir Shah’s assassination.
CHAPTER 3

A History of Qizilbash in Kabul, 1747-1880

In Kabul, “history is replete with moral tales from which value can be gained”
~ David B. Edwards, Before Taliban, 2002

“At the core of Kabul’s identity is a rich cultural landscape centered around places of deep historical significance”
~ Tyrell Mayfield, Kabul: A Different View, 2015

I. Aftermath of Nadir Shah’s Assassination

After eighteen years of multidirectional warfare within and outside of the Iranian Plateau, Nadir Shah became morose and uncertain. His unbearable tax policy to fund his army and navy depleted the Persian treasury and hampered the efficacy and reach of the bureaucracy. A number of insurgencies occurred in different regions of the empire including one directed by his nephew, Ali Quli Khan, in the impoverished province of Sistan. After Ali Quli’s rebellion, Nadir became suspicious of some elite courtiers (Lockhart 1938). To project authority and leadership, Nadir ordered the trusted Ahmad Khan Abdali to eliminate the alleged suspects, mostly Afsharid noblemen (more about Ahmad Khan later in this chapter).

Ahmad Khan promised to execute the cabal of prospective plotters. The order included prominent men like Muhammad Quli Khan, First Commander
of Palace Guards, and Salih Khan, Superintendent of the Royal Household. The conversation between Nadir and Ahmad, however, was “overheard by a spy who divulged it to Muhammad Quli Khan” (Singh 1977, 21). June 20, 1747, a small group of dissidents led by Quli Khan and Salih Khan set out for Nadir’s room (Tucker 2006, 103). Out of sheer panic, some plotters withdrew from the assassination plan of a man with Nadir Shah’s stature, known as the “Savior of Persia” (Axworthy 2010, 43). Of those men who stayed, Salih led the rush into Nadir’s room and with the sharp blade of his sword “cut off one of his hands, and before Nadir could return the attack, Muhammad Khan dealt him a deadly blow that cut his head off” (Astarabadi 1750, 461). With the assassination of arguably the world’s most powerful man of his time, the situation of Qizilbash garrisons in the eastern highlands and frontier cities took an irreversible turn.

What happens next to Qizilbash in Kabul?

II. Rise of Afghans

On June 21, 1747, during early morning hours, Ahmad Khan received the shocking news of Nadir Shah’s assassination from an Afghan harem wife, Bibi Sahiba (MacMunn 1929, 54). Ahmad rushed to the palace with the intent “to avenge the murder of their fallen master” (Singh 1977, 21). Despite the resistance of the assassins, Muhammad Quli Khan and Salih Khan Ahmad managed to pierce through the palace guards who were under the command of Salih. He then stood next to the decapitated corpse while confusion and chaos swirled in the imperial compound. The beheaded body of Nadir Shah remained
unattended while the plotters raided the treasury and showed hostility to the smaller force of Ahmad Khan. Ahmad was indeed outnumbered. He was able to remove “take possession of Koh-i Noor Diamond” (Singh 1977, 22). Ahmad left the capital city of Mashhad for Qandahar, adjacent to the tumultuous region of Sistan.

Ahmad Khan and his skilled cavalrymen, who were equipped with mobile zamburak guns, departed for his stronghold in Qandahar. When in Mashhad, Ahmad feared the Qizilbash elites would probably blame his smaller forces as a scapegoat (Dupree 1973, 639). Ahmad’s decision not to avenge Nadir’s death is explained in three different ways. First, the pro-Safavid Shi’a clerics would not have confirmed Ahmad Khan’s legitimacy since his genealogy (like Nadir’s) did not extend back to Muhammad. Second, it was unlikely that Ahmad would have revived Sultan Husayn’s “policy of appeasement” toward the Shi’a clerics at the expense of his own lineage and base of support. Third, the devastation of the Hotaki siege in Isfahan was still fresh in memories of Persian elites and ordinary residents. So attaining the throne in Mashhad would have faced stern opposition. With these matters in mind, the post-Nadir interregnum witnessed the rise of several short-lived polities (Balland 2011, 547).

The succession struggles between Nadir’s brother, grandson, and nephew compelled the Afsharid provincial governors to institute their own autonomous principalities. In Shiraz, Karim Khan Zand laid the basis for another pro-Shi’a administration. In Georgia, Heraclius II declared himself the de facto ruler. In Balkh, Haji Bi Ming, proclaimed himself as Wali-yi Balkh. Kabul’s Governor,
Nasir Khan, sided with the Mughal ruler since both sides had vested financial interest in the overland trade between India and Central Asia. In Qandahar, Ahmad Khan would soon declare his own autonomy.

Upon his arrival to the Qandahar oasis, Ahmad Khan shared the news of Nadir Shah’s assassination with the local chieftains. With the succession crisis in Mashhad, and the intensified fear of Maratha prominence near Kabul and a Baluch havoc in Sistan, security of Qandahar and its commercial trade roads became a high concern. The chieftains of Qandahar knew that without a legit military leader it would be very difficult, maybe impossible, to keep order and maintain the tax system in the eastern highlands and cities. At this juncture, a Mughal caravan “transporting Nadir Shah’s taxes back to Persia” reached one of Qandahar’s caravanserais (Rubin 2002, 45). The caravan consisted of “three hundred camels and elephants, which carried two Crores [20 Million] rupees in money, diamonds, and shawls” (Singh 1977, 29). Ahmad Khan’s public criers jarchis, publicized the news of Nadir’ assassination and the succession fight that had engulfed Isfahan. Ahmad seized the caravan imports from Mirza Taqi Khan, and offered him and his Qizilbash men positions in Qandahar. The cash and goods were distributed among his cavalrymen, and also used to lure in the allegiance bai’ah, of rival tribal chiefs in Qandahar.

On October 1747, four months after Nadir’s assassination, the question of political succession and future of Qandahar was resolved. The Afghan tribal council Jirga, ultimately reached an accord near the shrine of Shaykh Surkh. A highly venerated Sufi Pir, Sabir Khan Kabuli, from the Chishti Order, proposed
a solution. Sabir chose the twenty-four year old Ahmad Khan from the smaller Abdali clan as the new ruler. He placed some barley-shoots and tucked them into his turban. Sabir said, “may this serve as the aigrette of your crown” (Ali 1958, 60). Ahmad acquired the admired title of Shah. The symbolic coronation legitimized his authority. From that point forward, Ahmad became known as Pearl of the Pearls Durr-i Durran (Gulistanah 1977, 74-5). The Abdali tribe of Qandahar became known as Durrani. The city of Qandahar was referred to as noblest of cities Ashraf al-belad, a honorary title which stayed in use until the dynastic Barakzai-Durrani political struggle of 1801 (Bosworth 2012).

Ahmad Shah’s sovereignty was symbolized by customary Perso-Islamic traditions. Silver and gold coins were minted to acknowledge his ascendency. The customary congregational Friday sermon in the mosques were attributed to him. Ahmad Shah’s official seal, used for decrees farman, had the image of the Peacock Throne, which was similar to the genealogical hallmark of the Mughal emperors and Nadir Shah (Gallop 2009). The diverse tribal council and Sabir Khan Kabuli formalized Ahmad’s rise to the throne. The question of how to consolidate and run daily affairs of the administration in Qandahar remained unanswered.

A. Political and Military Consolidation

The eastern half of the Afshar territory, which included the area west of the Indus River, would soon fall under Ahmad’s suzerainty. Ahmad’s decade long of involvement and closeness to Nadir Shah had equipped him superb
leadership and military skills. Ahmad’s military success not only added to his charisma, but also was instrumental in his rise to the throne. Military victories and not a sacred ancestry to Prophet Muhammad or Chengis Khan provided him with political legitimacy, “a belief which he was to pass on to his successors” (Lee 1996, 80). Ahmad framed his administration on the Perso-Islamic model that Safavids and Afsharids had used (Gommans 1995, 50). The sovereign or Shah, was regarded by his viziers, armed forces, sepah, and subjects, rayhat, as the God’s Shadow on Earth.

It was a government model that not only guarded against any internal rebellion, fitna, but also presented familiarity to the prominent chieftains of Qandahar and to the Qizilbash forts. He appointed Wali Khan as his Grand Vizier, Ashraf ul-Wuzara, and Jahan Khan, as the Supreme Commander of Troops, Sepah-Salar (Husayni 1753, 11-12). Similar to Shah Ismael and Nadir Shah’s Qurultais, there was also an advisory council, majlis, of chieftains and generals to strategize and analyze the campaigns. Kinship ties of the advisory council was paramount for the political consolidation and military alliances of Ahmad Shah’s burgeoning polity.

Unlike the Afsharids, Ahmad Shah’s administration faced the absence of an established bureaucracy, an established seat of power that could propagate the centralized policies to the various corners of the polity. The highlands of the Hindu Kush, including Qandahar, historically, were part of the bigger regional empires that had their administrative and cultural epicenter located in Persia, India or Central Asia (Barfield 2010, 66). Thus, this tripartite region was under
the influence of three various “cultural areas” (Kroeber 1963). Unification of the numerous independent minded tribes, local elites, and merchants to pay taxes and join the infantry in times of war was a significant impediment for Ahmad Shah.

To fill this void, Ahmad Shah chose to employ Qizilbash bureaucrats and cavalry who had no tribal kin in Qandahar, which in turn made them ‘loyal’ to him. The Qizilbash bureaucrats installed a patrimonial bureaucracy rather than a merit-based system. With the hire of the Qizilbash officials (mirzas, munshis, mostofis, and hesabdars), Persian stayed as the official language of the Afghan royal court. Both the administration affairs and the nonfiction books (history) were produced in Persian. Orientation toward the Persian language was also evident among the “noble Abdalis who not only preferred to speak in Persian,” but also sought to adopt the style of Afsharid military organization, tanzimat-e nezami (Tanner 2009, 114). Since Nadir’s military prowess in its glory days was thought of as unrivaled by Ahmad Shah.

To avoid a renewal of sectarianism that flourished in the late-Safavid era, Ahmad continued Nadir’s religious policy. Similarly, he “incorporated Shi’ism into the more universalistic mainstream of the Sunni tradition” (Gommon 1995, 50). Ahmad not only showed tolerance for the Shi’as, but he conscripted Mirza Taqi Khan’s cavalry with his own forces. Taqi Khan, from an influential Shirazi household, then encouraged the Qizilbash strongholds of the eastern cities to join Ahmad’s cavalry. The Qizilbash units were experienced warriors, who were familiar with the commercial roads that connected Bukhara-Delhi-
Qandahar. Qizilbash warriors during this period were the principle military power in the area, known as *sahib-saif*, men of sword (Noelle 1997, 241). Apart from the regular Qizilbash cavalry, *asaker-e monazam*, the various chieftains also provided Ahmad with an irregular infantry, *senf-e peyada*. The government in return paid each chieftain a fixed sum of the plunder based on the number of the allotted men, and give out land grants for their alliance if the campaign was successful. Many landless people joined Ahmad Shah’s irregular forces in hope of an income under the slogan of expanding the frontiers of Islam.

The size of Ahmad Shah’s forces reached “forty thousand men” before he and his Qizilbash cavalry looted the Marathas and the Mughals (Gulistaneh 1977, 36). After the battlefield wins in the Indian subcontinent, Ahmad Shah collected the spoils and gifts, which provided the bulk of his administration’s revenue. Military triumphs allowed him to expand his rule and not to enact a regular system of taxation (except on caravans, revenues from customs), which later backfired when the Age of Conquest, *futuhat*, of the “gun powder empires” ended with the expansion of the British and Russian empires in Central Asia, Persian Gulf, India and the Caucasus (Hodgson 1974).

The Governor of Kabul, Nasir Khan, refused to recognize Ahmad Shah as the legitimate successor of Nadir Shah (Singh 1977, 36). He had formed close ties with the Mughal Emperor. Nasir did not want to lose the tax revenues that he collected from the lucrative horse, dried fruit, and spice trade, which passed through Kabul (Gupta 2012, 365). Ahmad was “able to work out agreements with the Safavid Qizilbash forces” (Champagne 1981, 29). The Tajik residents of
Kabul did not contest Ahmad Shah’s sizeable military. Nasir fled to Peshawar to put an army of primarily Hazara and Uzbek traders, who also had financial interest in the Delhi-Orenburg commerce.

The takeover of Kabul added an important geostrategic city to Ahmad’s polity. With the Russian and Manchu expansion in Central Asia, the east to west, meaning Kashgar-Constantinople trade enterprise shifted to a new north south, Orenburg-Delhi orientation. The newer commerce route passed through Kabul’s caravanserais, pasturelands and bazaars. Ahmad further enhanced the north-south transportation by encouraging the annual *hajj* pilgrims to travel to the Arabian Peninsula from the new port near the Indus River delta (Gommons 1995, 37). The increased commercial and private travels brought new ideas and economic benefits to the Qizilbash and other residents of Kabul.

Ahmad Shah’s strategy was to control the key financial hubs directly. He incorporated them into his administration and left the areas that were regarded as unprofitable or of little geostrategic value to the locals (Barfield 2010, 68-69). His annexation of Mashhad improved the overland trade from Astarabad to Multan, which passed through Qandahar. The silk trade between Mazandaran, Gilan and the Ottomans “stayed undisturbed and served as a source of wealth” production for Ahmad (Gommons 1995, 2). Ahmad decided that direct rule of contested areas such as Punjab and Peshawar was not necessary nor feasible with the expansion of the Marathas. Ahmad Shah, however, depended on their cooperation to avoid raids on the passing caravans. Therefore, it was easier to negotiate a mutual pact with local chiefs, who held position of authority and
considerable “social capital,” than to forcefully integrate them (Bourdieu 1984, 114).

Similarly, Ahmad reached an agreement with the Governor of Balkh, Haji Bi Ming, who defected after Nadir Shah’s assassination to keep the warhorse, spice, and dried fruit business intact (Lee 1996, 83-85). Ahmad Shah retained his veneer of influence in all these commercial hubs neither through a system of provincial government nor a set of written laws that would last. The absence of permanent institutions and uniform laws, which homogenizes people as one nation, never crystalized in all the corners of his diverse polity. Ahmad Shah’s rule was created on a federal structure model, comprising essentially large and small independent federation of local rulers (Mousavi 1997).

Ahmad Shah’s decision not to directly integrate the peripheral areas into the Perso-Islamic structure proved costly. When the Durraniids faced the issue of political succession, tribes in Punjab and Peshawar regularly switched their allegiances and sided with the British Army. Moreover, his administration barely interfered with the lifeways of the eastern Pashtuns who had a distinctly egalitarian structure communitas that centered on noble lineage and kinship (Turner 2011, 360). To preserve a degree of unity, Ahmad Shah, “used Islam to legitimate his power and relied on a feudal system,” which means that the day-to-day authority fell in the hands of local ulema, who with the help of the local khans created an atmosphere that kept the status quo (Mousavi 1997, 3). With the absence of provincial government, the ulema wielded power through the patronage networks that regenerated the same sociocultural milieu. Khans
enhanced their influence by acting as a link between the local people and the ruling Perso-Islamic structure.

Ahmad’s government in reality was a superstructure that was laid on top of social groups. Each social group has its own different internal interworking. It was a centralized bureaucratic-military power that was governed by a thin layer of elites without the formation of a unified nation with a common national interest. This high autonomy model of the government led to the ruling class’s separation from the society’s daily needs and concerns. In other words, it was the creation of a system where the state was detached from the various social groups.

B. Abdali-Qizilbash Ties: Ahmad Shah’s Early Years

Ahmad, the younger son of Zaman Khan Abdali and Zarghuna Alikozai was born in Multan, 1722 (Husayni 1753, 11). Zaman Khan was the appointed Safavid Governor of Herat who died a few months after Ahmad was born. To get protection for her children in the aftermath of the Safavid collapse, Zarghuna offered the hand of her daughter to a relative, Haji Ismael Khan Alikozai, who had become the new provincial governor in Herat (Morgan 1988, 149). Ismael Alikozai sent his brother-in-law south “towards Sabzawar and Farrah” (Singh, 1977, 16). We do not hear about Ahmad’s childhood in the available primary sources until the defeat of his brother, Zulfiqar Khan, in Farrah by Mir Husayn Ghilzai, 1732. Mir Husayn, Governor of Qandahar, imprisoned both of Zaman Khan’s sons (Morgan 1988, 149-50). After a period of over six years behind
bars, the fate of the two Abdali brothers drastically changed with Nadir Shah’s siege and (re)annexation of Qandahar in 1738.

Prior to recapturing Qandahar, a number of noteworthy developments had taken place between the Abdalis and the Qizilbash. In 1588, Shah Abbas first brought the Abdalis into political prominence. The Abdali-Safavid relations continued throughout the Safavid reign. The traditional alliance of the Abdalis with the Persian court was renewed when Abdalis assisted Nadir Shah to defeat the army of Ashraf Hotaki at the Battle of Damghan, 1729. Apart from helping with the takeover of Isfahan, Abdalis also joined Nadir in the Daghistan Battle, 1734-35. Nadir Shah held the Abdali nobles and troops in high regards. Nadir “promised to grant any boon that they asked of him” (Singh 1977, 16). With this in mind, the Abdali Chiefs (Allahyar Khan Sadozai and Abdul Ghani Khan) asked to have Qandahar under their control (Tucker 2006, 36-39). Abdalis over the years had lost control of Qandahar to the Ghilzais. In 1738, Nadir delivered on his promise. He sent off the beaten Mir Husayn Ghilzai and his affiliates as prisoners to Mazandaran while freeing the Abdali brothers (Astarabadi 1750s, 324-9). Nadir Shah treated Ahmad and Zulfiqar sympathetically. Nadir also appointed Abdul Ghani Khan as the new Governor of Qandahar.

Nadir Shah offered Zulfiqar an administrative post in Mazandaran. He appointed the sixteen years old Ahmad “on his personal staff as a, Yasawal, orderly officer” (Ali 1958, 59). As an inner member of Nadir’s team, Ahmad then joined and participated in the Nadirian Wars, Jangha-ye Naderi, which lasted until 1747. Ahmad Khan quickly “distinguished himself by his meritorious
services and was raised to the office of Khazanah Bashi, Chamberlain” by Nadir (Singh 1977, 18). Nadir openly praised Ahmad by often saying that “he had not met in Iran, Turan or Hindustan any man of such laudable talents as Ahmad Abdali possessed” (Singh 1977, 18). Over the course of time, Ahmad Khan became commander of his own cavalry. Nadir kept his trusted protégé, Ahmad, and his “four thousand brave and seasoned Abdali horsemen near the second tent of the Royal Palace” (Husayni 1753-54, 9).

Ahmad showed fidelity towards Nadir’s descendants once he ascended the throne. He married the sister of Abbas Quli Khan, who was then moved to Kabul. To solidify his ties with the Qizilbash in Kabul, Ahmad’s daughter was married to Abbas Quli’s son. Some years later, Ahmad’s eldest son, Timur, who assisted Nadir’s grandson, Mirza Shahrukh, out of gratitude gave Timur the hand of his daughter. Thus, the first two Durranid rulers had Qizilbash wives (daughters of military men). The practice of “sexual politics” remained alive in the Durranid court. Kindly treatment of Nadir’s descendants in Mashhad, as well as toward the Qizilbash garrisons in the eastern highlands continued until the Durrani-Barakzai. In 1798, a Qizilbash Amir in Qandahar with supporters of Payinda Khan Barakzai unsuccessfully tried to dethrone Zaman Shah who was ready to invade India. Payinda’s sons retaliated by blinding and removing Zaman Shah from power. The Barakzai hostility enhanced the process of the dynasty’s breakup (1823), which set the ground for the British intervention. After Zaman’s removal from power, 1801, the Durrani-Barakzai rivalry was rekindled until the ascendency of Dost Muhammad Khan Barakzai in 1826.
The Barakzai-Qizilbash relationship, within the context of colonial encounter, will be discussed in upcoming section. Let us now turn to Timur’s relocation of the capital to Kabul with the assistance of the Qizilbash.

C. Transfer of the Capital to Kabul: Role of the Qizilbash

A succession crisis between Wali Khan, Grand Vizier, and Ahmad eldest son, Timur erupted in 1772. This is despite the fact that Timur Khan was the designated heir apparent when Ahmad was alive. As soon as Ahmad died, Wali Khan, sought to position Sulaiman, his son-in-law, who was Ahmad’s youngest son, on the throne in place of Timur. When Timur and his Qizilbash cavalry arrived from Herat, he claimed the imperial seat regardless of the desire of some chieftains and nobles. Shah Wali provoked an uncle of the late Shah, Abdul Qadir Khan, to raise a revolt. The second son of Haji Jamal Khan Barakzai extinguished the riot (he had four sons: Rahimdad Khan, Payinda Khan, Haroun Khan, and Bahadur Khan). To distance himself from succession quarrels within the Pashtun tribal aristocracy and to consolidate his power in the thriving city of Kabul, Timur relocated the capital from Qandahar to Kabul in 1773-75. Timur Shah “made use of 12,000 non-Durrani Iranian Qizilbash cavalrymen, the descendants of those left on the eastern highlands at Nadir Shah’s death, for part of his army. His reliance on these Shi’a Iranians alienated his Durrani followers” (Champagne 1981, 33). Timur appointed the Qizilbash Amirs in high-ranking positions and distributed parcels of lands to them in Kabul (Mirza 1856-7, 47). A year later, with the help of the Qizilbash,
Timur chose Peshawar and not Qandahar as his winter capital that further alienated the Pashtun elites of Qandahar.

With the relocation of the capital to Kabul, Timur Shah not only lost his father’s social base, but also estranged some of the influential Pashtun tribal aristocrats. Moreover, he executed his father’s Grand Vizier, Wali Khan and exiled his uncle Abdul Qadir. Timur Shah found himself caught between the Qizilbash world of the sahib-saif and mirzas, who he needed to run his Perso-Islamic government, and the elusive cooperation of the challenging chieftains. Timur increasingly “looked for support less from the Pashtun tribes and more from the urbanized Tajik and Qizilbash elements, whose influence was increasing in the army and administration” (Balland 1983, 548). After Timur’s death in 1793, the head of Afghan and Qizilbash such as, Fateh Khan, Sarfaraz Khan Barakzai, Amir Aslan Jawanshir and Jafar Khan, placed Zaman Khan on the throne (Mirza 1856-7, 52). An extended period of succession wars engulfed Kabul, which lasted until 1823. Accordingly, Herat became quasi-independent. Balkh and Kashmir were lost.

It was not until 1863, when Dost Muhammad Khan was able to re-claim Herat (Champagne 1981, 449). It was not until 1892, when another Barakzai ruler, Abdurrahman, was able to defeat the Uzbek army who were commanded by Muhammad Sharif Khan Ming to re-claim the region of Balkh (Lee 1996, 213). The southern border emerged after Muhammad Yaqub Khan signed the Treaty of Gandomak with British-Raj in 1879. The modern state of Afghanistan with Kabul as its capital was born in the aftermath of the Second Anglo-Afghan
War, 1880. The process of nation-formation under the British-Raj protectorate, 1818-1919, and then as a sovereign nation-state, 1919-1979 will be discussed in chapter 5. Below is a map of the Iranian Plateau from 1814. However, how do the primary sources written during the Durrani era depict the Qizilbash?

Map 4. Persia 1814
D. Primary Sources

**Table 5: Durranid Primary Sources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Term Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1723-1773: Source covers</td>
<td>Mahmud al-Husayni bin Ibrahim Jami, <em>Tarikh-i Ahmad Shah-i</em> [1770s]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1761: after the Battle of Panipat</td>
<td>Ahmad Shah’s letter to Mustafa Salas Usmani, [1761-62?]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diary/Journal</td>
<td>Azizullah Bokhari, [1783]</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travelogue</td>
<td><em>The Memiors of Khoja Abdul Karim</em> [1788]</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1797: Source covers up to</td>
<td>Imam ud-Din Husayni, <em>Tarikh-i Husayn Shah’i</em> [1798]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Shah’s removal of Safavid Dignitaries</td>
<td>Muhammad Reza Bernabadi, <em>Tazkera</em> [1806-11]</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the key primary sources of the eighteenth century is Mahmud al-Husayni bin Ibrahim Jami’s, *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shah-i*, written sometime in early 1770s. Mahmud Husayni, a student and colleague of Mirza Muhammad Mahdi Khan Astarabadi, entered Ahmad Shah’s imperial court as a *munshi*, secretary, after annexation of Mashhad, 1753-54. Husayni’s book is a chronological description of Ahmad’s power consolidation and conquests until his death in 1772-73 (Husayni 1753-54). The introductory chapter predates the events of 1747, which is crucial for understanding the Qizilbash-Abdali ties. It also discusses Ahmad’s family genealogy. Husayni draws heavily from his own first-hand observations, news communicated to him by other court officials, and incorporates a wide range of documents.
In terms of presentation style, Husayni’s book matches Astarabadi’s, *Tarikh-i Jahangosha-ye Nadiri*. This source is a rich combination of elegant prose that is sprinkled with Persian poetry and Arabic expressions. The word Qizilbash is used throughout *Tarikh-i Ahmad Shah-i*. Qizilbash appears twice in the introduction chapter alone. In the context of explaining the reasons behind Nadir’s assassination and Ahmad’s intent to avenge his murder (Husayni 1753-54, 51). Husayni’s book is not a detailed study that centers on Qizilbash, but is very helpful in understanding the Qizilbash role in Ahmad’s campaigns and in his new Perso-Islamic administration.

The other canonical primary text of the late-eighteenth century is Imam ud-Din’s, *Tarikh-i Husayn Shah’i*, written in 1798. *Tarikh-i Husayn Shah’i* was originally intended to be a regnal account of Shah Zaman’s reign, 1793-1801. Its author joined Shah Zaman in Lahore in 1796-97. Imam ud-Din then accompanied Zaman to Peshawar, where he authored the history of the third Durrani ruler. Upon his return to Lucknow at the eve of the royal dualism in Kabul, he enlarged his initial account to include the reigns of Ahmad Shah, 1747-1772, and his successor Timur Shah, 1772-93. This expansion was made possible on the basis of materials he received from his Sufi Pir, Khoja Husayn Chishti. The book is named after his Sufi master. Imam ud-Din traces Ahmad Shah’s ancestry, covers the major events in the Durrani realm until 1797. Of particular interest for my research are the sections discussing the relationship between Qizilbash and the first three Durrani rulers.

Prior to the publication of *Tarikh-i Husayn Shah-i*, Ahmad Shah sent a
letter to the Ottoman Sultan, Mustafa III, in 1762. The actual manuscript is preserved in the Imperial Archives at Istanbul, but a comprehensive commentary was authored by Ghulam Jailani Jalali and published by HSoA in 1967. In his commentary the word Qizilbash appears three times as Jalali contextualizes the letter (Jalali 1967, 78, 81, 82). Jalali’s work starts with the transformations of the late-Safavid era and ends with Ahmad Shah’s sixth campaign against the Mughals. Below is part of the letter that explains the process of transition from Nadir Shah to Afghans (Jalali 1967, 8-9).

According to the self-existent destiny, Nadir Shah rose from valley of Abivard [old city in northern Khorasan] and gradually conquered Khorsan, Iraq, Fars, Azerbaijan, as well as Iran, Hindustan and Turkistan; and ceased the self-soverignty of elders and tribal leaders of Iran; his encouragement threatened the Afghan tribe and he controlled with force.

On the other hand, an insightful source that is accessible is Ali Quli Mirza’s, *Tarikh-i Waqa’i wa Sawan-i Afghanistan*, which was written in 1856-57. Ali Quli was one of Fath Ali Shah Qajar’s sons, who was influenced by the European intellectual and cultural movement, Renaissance. He served as the Chancellor of Persia’s *Dar ul-Funon*, the first modern Iranian university that was established in 1851. *Tarikh-i Waqa’i wa Sawan-i Afghanistan* covers the events after Nadir Shah’s assassination from the perspective of a Qajar official until the events that unfolded in Afghanistan after the conclusion of the First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839-42. Ali Quli Mirza’s books ends with a chapter on
British, and to a lesser extent French colonial cartographers, who were involved in drawing the maps of the region until 1850s. Ali Quli Mirza uses the terms Qizilbash in two way. First, in reference to a person’s surname. An example of a person’s surname is Jafar Qizilbash, who was an Ayshyk Agassi Bashi, Head of the interior court and royal harem, of the Grand Vizier, Fateh Khan. Jafar Qizilbash assassinated Shah Shuja near the Lahori Gate in Kabul (Mirza 1856-7, 123). Second, the word Qizilbash is used in reference to collective unit. The words Qizilbash and Qizilbashia are used interchangeable in terms of a distinct social group. For example, Afghans, Ubzeks, and Turkmen were hostile toward Qizilbashia (Mirza 1856-7, 34).

III. Colonial Encounter

The hostility between the Pashtun monarchs and the Qajars over Herat territory began in 1801 and continued until 1863. It had a detrimental effect on the Qizilbash living in the eastern side of the border. Mahmud Shah Durrani was unable to respond to the Qajar ambition in Khorasan because of his own weak position in Kabul. His Grand Vizier, Fateh Khan, was tangled in a power struggle with Mahmud’s political rivals. Fateh Khan relied on the Qizilbash to subdue the uproars. He stressed defending the Qizilbash despite of the riots that flared up against the Qizilbash in Kabul.

The Kabul Conflict of 1803-04 erupted for two significant reasons. First, the Qizilbash cavalry was protecting Mahmud Shah from his enemies. Second, the Qizilbash were regarded as sympathizers of the Shi’a Qajars. Fateh Khan
adamantly argued that persecution of Qizilbash cavalry would not only weaken Mahmud’s most capable fighters, but would endanger the allegiance of other Shi’as who lived in the polity. Fateh’s steadfast support for Qizilbash led to his own demise as the Qajar-Durrani enmity over political boundary spun into another Shi’a-Sunni war (Champagne 1981, 63). In 1807, an Uzbek mullah in the vicinity of Herat, named Sufi Islam, along with the Head of the ulema of Herat, Haji Mullah Musa, declared a Holy War against the heretic Shi’a Qajars. Under the heretic ploy, enslavement and trade of the Shi’as continued in Khorasan. The British-backed Shah Shuja (first reign 1803-09, second reign, 1839-42) did not denounce the enslavement of Shi’as or the anti-Shi’a decree of 1807. Shah Shuja tolerance negatively affected the Qizilbash of Kabul.

In midst of the so-called sectarian war, Napoleon Bonapart, the French general emperor, sends the embassy of General Gardanne to Qajar court, 1808. Napoleon intends to end the monopoly of the British East India Company with the collaboration of Qajars. To protect its monopoly, military garrisons, and the lucrative opium trade in South Asia, the British quickly reacted to create a zone of influence in Kabul, embassy. Mountsturat Elphinstone was dispatched to go and see Shah Shuja in Peshawar later in 1808. Shuja signed the Treaty of Eternal Friendship, which marks the entry of Kabul into modern western politics – the international state system.

A valuable result of Mountsturat Elphinstone envoy was the production of a book. Elphinstone’s (1815) text, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, and its Dependencies in Persia Tartary, and India: Comprising a View of the Afghaun
“Nation, and a History of the Doorannee Monarchy” was published in London. He refers to different ethnic groups as “nations,” with the following population size (Elphinstone 1815, 80). It remains unclear if Elphinstone placed the Qizilbash population with the Persian or the Tatar population. Elphinstone, the Scottish political leader and historian, estimated the population of Kabul Province (not city of Kabul) at fourteen Million.

Table 6: Population of Kabul 1815

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Population Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>4,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baloch</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars of all descriptions</td>
<td>1,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persians (including Tajiks)</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians (Cashmeres, Juts, and Others)</td>
<td>5,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Tribes</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,000,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mountsturat Elphinstone begins his description of Qizilbash as “members of that colony of Turks which now predominates in Persia. I call them by this name, which is usually given to them at Kabul” (Elphinstone 1815, 320). He further writes (Elphinstone 1815, 321-2):

> The Kuzzilbauches generally inhabit towns, except about Heraut, where they are also to be found in the villages. There are said to be ten or twelve thousands of them in the town of Caubul, who settled there in the times of Naudir and Ahmed, and who are still in many respect a people entirely distinct from those around them. They speak Persian, and among themselves Toorkee. They are all violent Sheeahs, and their zeal is kept up by the necessity of a certain degree of concealment, and by their religious animosities with the Soonness, among whom they live. The Kuzzilbauches in Afghanistan partake of the character of their countrymen in Persia; they are lively, ingenious, and even elegant and
refined; but false, designing, and cruel; rapacious, but profuse, voluptuous, and fond of show; at once insolent and servile; destitute of all moderation in prosperity, and of all pride in adversity; brave at one time and cowardly at another, but always fond of glory; full of prejudice, but affecting to be liberal and enlightened; admirable for a mere acquaintance (if one can bear with their vanity), but dangerous for a close connection.* (I speak from what I have seen of the Kuzzilbauches of Caubul, and of a good many Persians whom I have known in India. The character, however, is chiefly applicable to the inhabitants of the towns; the country people are not so bad, and the Eliaut, or shepherd tribes, are something like the Afghauns).

The Kuzzilbacuhs at Heraut follow all trades and pursuits; the rest are mostly soldiers; some are merchants, and these are the best of the class; and many are tradesmen and servants; the Umlah, or bodies of armed men who attend the great, are generally formed of them.

Most of the secretaries, accountants, and other inferior ministers, are Kuzzilbauches, and almost every man of rank has a Meerza, secretary, a Nazir, steward, and perhaps a Dewaun, master of the household, of this description of people. Most of the King’s Peeshkhedmats, and other servants immediately about his person are also Kuzzilbauches. Some of these are persons of high rank and office, and some of the military chiefs of the Kuzzilbauches are also men of consequence, though always subordinate to the Dooranaunee officers. Some of the Kizzilbauches particularly those in the Gholaums, or King’s Guards, have estates, and even castles, granted by the crown or purchased; but, except about Heraut, they generally live in towns, and let out their lands to Afghaun or Taujik tenants.

Besides the seven Terehs, or tribes, into which all the Kuzzilbauches are divided, those of Caubul have other peculiar divisions, as the Chendawuls or Jewaunsheers (the first of which names means the vanguard, and the second is a title), Moraud Khaunees, so called from the Dooranaunee lord who first commanded them.

Mountsturtat Elphinstone’s chapter five describes the “religions, sects, mullahs, superstition, and etcetera.” He writes, “the unlearned part of the Afghan nation certainly considers a Shi’a as more an infidel than a Hindu, and have a greater aversion to the Persians for their religion” (Elphinstone 1815,
200). In the same chapter, he writes, “The Shi’as are more discountenanced than any other religious sect; yet, all the numerous Persians in the country are Shi’as and many of them hold high offices in the state and household. Their religion allows them, and even enjoins them to dissemble, when in heretic or infidel countries; and consequently, they are put to no inconvenience by the restrictions imposed on them. Those restrictions prevent their praying in the attitude peculiar to their sect” (Elphinstone 1815, 206).

On the other hand, the ethnographies in *Journal of the Ethnological Society of London*, an academic society that was established in 1843 and lasted until 1870s, does not offer data on the Qizilbash of Kabul. For example, Major V. C. Roseberry (1869) article “On some of the Mountain Tribes of the N. W. Frontier of India” does not discuss the Qizilbash.11

**A. Anglo-Afghan Wars, 1839-41 and 1878-80**

The British engagement in Kabul from the Treaty of Eternal Friendship in 1809, until the conclusion of the War of Independence in 1919 could be divided into three overlapping phases: 1) Encounter and retreat, 2) Direct involvement, 1839-80, and 3) Protectorate state, 1880-1919. With this periodization in mind, the question arises of how the period of direct British involvement transformed the dynamics of Qizilbash-to-Barakazai ties in Kabul.

The Afghan political rivalry, known as “royal dualism,” drove the downfall of the Durranids in 1823 (Saikal 2012). With the collapse of the Durranids, the

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11 Appendix 3 is a chronological list of 19th century British sources.
sociopolitical situation for the Qizilbash minority worsened in the three years of interregnum, 1823-26. To help establish a level of stability, the Qizilbash cavalry facilitated Dost Muhammad Khan’s rise to power in 1826-39 and 1845-63. It is important to note that Dost’s mother, Zainab Begum, came from the prominent Qizilbash family of Jawanshir. Dost then married a Qizilbash wife (Afzal Khan and Azam Khan’s mother) to expand and strengthen his kinship bonds and to alleviate the anti-Shi’a sentiments that had emerged after the riots of 1803-04. By forming closer ties with the influential Qizilbash families, Dost also sent an indirect message to his political rivals (Noelle 1997).

Dost wanted to form a European style army to lessen his reliance on the tribes who supplied him with irregular infantry in times of war. In addition, the conflict with Qajars in Herat, and the struggle with Ranjit Singh in Peshawar, demanded the use of a standing army. Dost preferred a modern army to regain the Durranid lands that had been lost. At the same time, the British policy was to abate his territorial ambitions by increasing the Pashtun tribal politics near Khyber Pass. British aid to the independent tribal chieftains was intended to buy influence and create a “buffer zone” that would stand to Russian imperial desires. Now that the prior Franco-Qajar threat vanished, and the Napoleonic Wars had ended in 1815, Dost faced the spread of autonomous tribal politics in his domain, which blocked the type of center-periphery relations necessary to restore the glory of the early Durranids (Noelle 1997).

Unable to recover Peshawar from the Sikhs on his own, Dost Muhammad Khan allied himself with Russia. In 1837, Dost’s son, Wazir Akbar Khan, and
his forces retook Khyber Pass from Ranjit Singh (Noelle 1997). The British Governor-General Lord Auckland repudiated this attempt. In 1838, Auckland sent the troops to overthrow Dost from his throne in a preventive attempt to ward off any further Russian expansion. In this instance, “groups of Qizilbash and others who opposed any [Barakzai] Afghan government in power supported the British” (Dupree 1984). In the late-1830s the Qizilbash of Kabul were split into two camps: those supporting Dost, and those supporting Shah Shuja. Map below is Kabul Province before the first Anglo-Afghan War, 1838.

Map 5. Bukhara, Kabul, Baluchistan 1838

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12 The 600 cavalry who supported the British interference, left with the British army after the war. They settled in British India and became influential in the army, bureaucracy and commerce both before and after the 1947 partition (Dupree 1984).
B. Anti-British Uprising in Kabul

The British regime-change undertaking led to the reinstatement of Shah Shuja, 1839-42. War subsequently erupted in Kabul. Dost’s army battled Shah Shuja. Muhammad Sharif Qizilbash rallied his men against the British forces. Wazir Akbar Khan fought with the British garrison in Kabul. The British forces aimed to weaken and disperse the residents of Kabul by relying on sectarian tactics (Mohibi 2011, 381-2). Sectarian schemes did not succeed. Qizilbash forces were able to retake the stockpile *azoqa* facility, Shah Bagh, and Qala-e Muhammad Sharif. At the same time, the British burnt residential areas where Tajiks lived. Tajiks had no place to stay, took shelter in Qala-e Mahmud Khan Bayat. Anti Shah Shuja sentiments gained more momentum. Before the end of the fourth day, McNaughton, Elphinstone, and Shelton observed that Qizilbash were wearing body armor, helmets, and reciting epic poems.

After two months of battle, the British forces lost the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1838-42. A man named Jafar Qizilbash assassinated Shuja. Dost’s son, Wazir Akbar Khan, governed for nearly three years, 1842-45. Dost Muhammad Khan’ second reign lasted from 1845-63. Thirteen years after the conclusion of the First Anglo-Afghan War, Dost signed the Treaty of Peshawar in 1855. The British Governor-General referred to him as the Governor or “*Walee* of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession” and provided him with steady subsidies (Noelle 1997). In return, Dost gave up on his territorial claims to Peshawar and he did not interfere in the Indian Mutiny of 1857. This was a key shift in Dost’s policy, from reliance on Russians to receiving aid from
British. With the aid of British subsidies, he was able to bring about a level of compromise with the eastern Pashtun tribes and annex Herat on the western frontier in 1863.

Dost’s reign was followed by his third son, Amir Shir Ali, 1863-79 (except 1866-68). Shir Ali was influenced by Sayed Jamal ud-Din Afghani, who stayed in Kabul, 1866. Shir Ali initiated the modernization of government institutions. He laid the foundation of the modern centralized government with a ministerial cabinet, a consultative council, and provincial administrations. To pay for the standing army, Shir Ali funded light industrial complexes *machine khana*, in Kabul. Young men, including Qizilbash, were sent abroad to India for technical education and vocational training (Sarwary 2014). Shir Ali also setup a modern postal service system, the first public school, and newspaper *Shams Al Nahar* (Gregorian 1969, 87). In 1863-66, he launched the Shirpur Project to expand and modernize the capital city, Kabul, with the aid of the Qizilbash. To pay for his modernization initiatives he enacted a tax system that was not received well by the autonomous eastern tribes.

Dost’s eldest son, Afzal Khan, made claim to the Kabul throne based on seniority. In-house conflict, “royal dualism,” continued for two years until Shir Ali was finally able to reclaim his power. This episode of royal dualism depleted the already weak treasury. The polity’s overall economy, which had not entirely recovered from the famine of 1870-71, was further devastated. It put Shir Ali in a tough spot, known as the “weak government syndrome” (Raofi 2007). Shir Ali could not defend the territorial integrity of his domain in the face of the second
British invasion.

In 1875, with the rise of Tories in London, British colonial policy known as the “Forward Policy” was adopted. Proponent of the Forward Policy wanted a permanent establishment in Kabul rather than a subsidiary, but the residents of Kabul perceived this as another preemptive British aggression. The “Forward Policy” led to the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1878-80. Despite the vast British military might, one of Shir Ali’s sons, Ayub Khan, defeated the British forces at the Battle of Maiwand. Kabul, however, paid a heavy price for it: its key bazaar Char Chata was scorched, the Shirpur Project was left without a new building standing. Shir Ali’s other son, Yaqub Khan, signed the Treaty of Gandomak in 1879. It ended the Second Anglo-Afghan War. However, Yaqub relinquished the country’s foreign policy to British-Raj for an insubstantial amount of subsidies (Gregorian 1969). Yet again, residents of Kabul rallied under Ayub Khan and abdicated Yaqub’s reign. Yaqub took refuge with the British-Raj. While in India, he told the British Viceroy, “I would rather work as your servant, cut grass, and tend your garden than be the ruler of Afghanistan” (Raofi 2007).

In 1880, Liberals regained power in London. This meant the British-Raj adopted a new policy toward Kabul, indirect rule. The protectorate state lasted in Kabul from 1880 until 1919, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

C. Primary Sources

Two primary sources that were authored during the Barakzai period have not been studied fully in relation to the Qizilbash transformations. One is Shah
Shuja’s 1842 autobiography, *Waqehat Shah Shuja*, which covers the chain of events from 1801-39. The second book is Mirza Yaqub Ali Khafi’s, *Padshahhan Mutakhir-i Afghanistan*. The first book has been overlooked because Shuja in the recent history of Afghanistan is perceived as the epitome of a servile Shah, a power hungry prince who sided with the British Governor General in India, Lord Auckland, to ascend the throne. Shuja is remembered by the Qizilbash residents of Kabul as the person who entered the city with the military aid of Elphinstone and Macnaughten. The second source is often neglected because of the author’s use of vernacular language. It does not have the ornate prose that regnal histories are known for. The second reason on why Khafi’s book is overlooked has to do with the author’s reliance on *controversial* oral narratives after he was exiled.

**Table 7:** Barakzaid Primary Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Used</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forced exiled, 1826-1901</td>
<td>Mirza Yaqub Ali Khafi, <em>Padshahhan Mutakhir-i Afghanistan</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>Shah Shuja, <em>Waqehat Shah Shuja</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>?</td>
<td>Mirza Ata Muhammad Khan Shekarpuri, <em>Nawa-e Maharak</em></td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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In *Waqehat Shah Shuja*, the word Qizilbash is used frequently within the context of events that transpired in 1801-39. It is used both on individual basis (as a surname) and on collective basis. Collectively it refers to the cadre of tax collectors, bureaucrats, cavalrymen, and communities. For example, Shuja uses the term Qizilbash within the context of *Ghulam-khana Qizilbash Shi’i*,
the Shi’a Royal Palace Guards (Shuja 1842, 14). Mahmud Shah in 1803-04 deployed the powerful Qizilbash cavalry to subdue the disorder in Kabul. His rivals then channeled the anti-Mahmud views into anti-Shi’a attitudes in order to mobilize the Sunni inhabitants against the Qizilbash Palace Guards (Shuja 1842, 14). Sadly, ordinary Qizilbash, rather than the Palace guards, payed the price with their lives and properties in the Kabul Conflict of 1803-04. In another section, Shuja uses the word Qizilbash in relation to the fidelity and bravery of the mirzas, bureaucrats and savars cavalry, toward the descendants of Ahmad Shah (Shuja 1842, 230).

While Wagehat Shah Shuja was authored by a Shah Shuja, Padshahhan Mutakhir-i Afghanistan, was written by a mid-level Qizilbash bureaucract who was exiled to Samarqand once Abdurrahman Khan ascended the throne, 1880. The book was authored by Mirza Yaqub Ali Khafi sometime between 1901-04. It covers the events from end of Shah Shuja’s reign in 1842-1901. Apart from his own personal experiences and participation in many key events, he draws from a rich palette of letters, oral accounts, and peppers them with Persian poems. His father, Ahmad Ali Khafi, served as a munshi, to Dost’s son-in-law, Abdul Ghani. His father then became a tutor lala, to Abdul Ghani’s son, Abdul Aziz. When Abdul Aziz reached the age of nineteen, his father joined the services of an old Qizilbash friend, Shirdil Khan, in Afghan Turkistan. When Dost died, Amir Shir Ali succeeded him in 1863. During Shir Ali’s reign, Ahmad Ali Khafi and Yaqub Ali Khafi were appointed as court officials mamoor pesh-khana, in Kabul. Yaqub Ali served as an officer before the Anglo-Afghan War, 1878-80.
Yaqub Ali actually participated at the Battle of Shash Gow, when Abdurrahman manipulated and made false promises to the Qizilbash cavalry, after vowing to the Qur'an, who were under the command of Shirdil Khan (Shahgaci 2014).

In Padshahhan Mutakhir-i Afghanistan, Khafi raises a complex question in the introduction: Why his homeland watan, has seen with so much calamity and misfortune. He speaks highly of the relative progress, inclusiveness, and light industrialization that were made during Amir Shir Ali’s time (Khafi 1901-04, 15). For Khafi, elite factionalism or fratricide, nifaq, padar kushi, baradar kushi, coupled with absence of a clear succession mechanism jadal janesheen, are the dominant reasons behind all the distress in Kabul and in Afghanistan. He sees the issue of social divisiveness and the lack of progress as byproducts of failed leadership by self interested rulers who were detached from the needs of the people and the country. Khafi’s book also has rich insights about: 1) The royal court, services and disservices of the courtiers. 2) Personal character and behavior of the Shahs, Princess, Amirs, Hakims, and other dignitaries. 3) Court letters, decrees, fatahnama, and titles that were in use, 1842-1901. Lastly 4) Information on industrialization and commerce in Kabul during the same time period (Khafi 1901-04).

Of interest for my study is the word Qizilbash. In Padshahhan Mutakhir-i Afghanistan, Khafi uses it only once in the context of tribe gawm, in reference to Shir Ali’s attempt to retake Kabul from his older brother Azam Khan, 1868. (Khafi 1901-04, 366). He names two Qizilbash of some influence, Habibullah and Muhammd, sons of Shirin Khan - the Amir of Qizilbash, who defected and
joined Shir Ali’s forces. The history of Qizilbash will be continued in chapter 5.

The following chapter, however, turns to the history of Qizilbash migration to Kabul and their neighborhoods and lifeways in Kabul.
CHAPTER 4

Qizilbash Migration to Kabul, 1504-1880

“What did these migrant have to offer, though, that made them so welcome in a variety of environments?”


“Historians and Social Scientists alike have been faced with the difficulty of imputing motives and interests to people who undertake religious, political or economic migration”


I. Kabul

Kabul is the largest city in Central Asia. It is a leading financial center in all of Central Asia, and the fifth fastest developing metropolitan in the world (Blackburn-Dwyer 2016). It is home to mausoleum of rulers, shrines of saints, and warriors who are long gone, but their legacies continue to shape current politics (Lee 2009). Kabul has a distinct mix of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ areas. The historical districts *mahalla*, are home to families who have lived there for many generations. The historical zones are places filled with amazing stories and rich subcultures, which are often omitted from non-urban ethnographies and state sponsored parochial histories. Two of Kabul’s historical districts are Chindawol and Murad Khani, ancestral Qizilbash neighborhoods.
To situate Chindawol and Murad Khani *mahallas* within broader trends, this part focuses on three different aspects of the Qizilbash migration to Kabul. The first aspect is the timing, extent, and the “push” and “pull” factors behind their migration to Chindawol and Murad Khani (Lee 1966). The second aspect is what could be learned about the Qizilbash from micro-histories in Chindawol and Murad Khani. Third, what cultural practices did the Qizilbash retain after their migration from Persia to Kabul? Apart from the above-mentioned themes, what bearing did this eastward Qizilbash movement have on state-formation in Afghanistan?

II. **Migration: Push and Pull Factors**

The migration of Qizilbash to Kabul is linked with the rise and expansion of the Safavids and the Mughals in the early sixteenth century (Puzhohish 2005, 36). The Qizilbash relocation is separated into three distinct, and yet related, waves: 1) The post-Babur era, 1504, 2) The Nadir reign, 1739, and 3) The post-Ahmad Shah era, 1747. Although the reasons behind the Qizilbash movement to Kabul changed over the decades, one thing stayed constant as Sanjay Subrahmanym, a historian of early modern India, points out, “From Basra to Bangkok and even beyond, migrant Iranians were men of substance in the early modern period. In the court-chronicles, they appear to us as administrators and state-builders” (Subrahmanym 1992, 350). In the trading records “as ship-owners and fierce competitors of Europeans” (Subrahmanym 1992, 350). Trade, security of commercial routes, and politics were inseparable
for the early Qizilbash migrants. With this fact in mind, the question becomes when and how did the city of Kabul become a node of commercial activities in the early modern era?

Before the destruction of pasturelands and underground water channels by the Mongols in 1219-21, Kabul had been the base of a frontier garrison and army assembly point known as the “Gate to India” for the Ghaznavid Dynasty, 977-1186. After the Mongol conquest, Kabul was depopulated and turned into an insignificant peripheral town until Babur, founder of the Mughal Dynasty, transformed it to his capital city in 1504 (before going to Delhi in 1526). Under the first six Mughal emperors (1504-1707), Kabul developed into a noticeable agricultural area with a thriving overland trade between the prosperous polities of India, Central Asia, and Persia (Subrahmanyam 1992, 340). Toward the end of Babur’s reign in 1530, Kabul had become a vital overland port. Kabul basin’s prosperity combined with its pleasant weather, fertile agricultural lands, and formidable natural barriers made it into a desired “alternate center of political power, drawing the Mughal center of gravity away from Hindustan” (Alam and Subrahmanyam 2012, 22).

The flora, fauna, and people who lived in Kabul’s fertile basin during the first three decades of the sixteenth century are described in Babur’s memoir, Baburnama (he called it tarikh, history, which was translated from Chagatai to Persian under Akbar, 1590). Baburnama is not just a diary of an emperor, but it can also be studied as an ethnographic account since it is based on Babur’s direct participation in many events. In terms of people, Babur acknowledges
and carefully describes the ethnic and linguistic cleavages that resided in this fertile basin. Below is an example (Babur 2009, 41).

In the country of Kabul, there are many and various tribes ... in the city the population consists of Tajiks. The villages and districts are occupied by - Pashais, Parachis, Tajiks, Berekis, and Afghans. In the hill-country to the west, reside the Hazaras and Nukderis ... There are eleven or twelve different languages spoken in Kabul: Arabic, Persian Turki, Mughali, Hindi, Afghani, Pashai, Parachi, Geberi, Bereki, and Laghmani ... 

Baburnama also reveals information to us about the Safavid-Uzbek wars over Khorasan. To weaken the Uzbeks, Shah Ismael provided troops sepah-e imdadi Safavi, to Babur in his efforts to gain control of Central Asia (Puzhohish 2005, 36, Mohebbi 2011, 298). Babur was unsuccessful in his attempts. After his decisive defeat at the Battle of Gizhduvan in 1512, Babur and his Safavid aids, who were from the Beharlu tribe of the Qizilbash, withdrew to Qizil Qala in Badakhshan (later renamed Bandar-e Shir Khan) before moving further south to the Kabul valley. For Babur and his Qizilbash supporters, Kabul was important because of its distinct geographical location. The mighty Hindu Kush Mountains (east-to-west) served as a formidable barrier between the landmass of southern Eurasia and the Indian Subcontinent (continental divide). Kabul is located on the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush. Its soaring snowcapped peaks have only two travel passes - Shibir and Salang (Palka 2004, 70). Kabul River provided another barrier of natural security from threats emanating from Babur’s northern nemesis.

The Kabul River has cut a deep valley between two mountain ridges in Kabul: Koh-e Asmai and Koh-e Shir Darwaza. It was between these two ridges
that Babur initially setup the bedrock of his empire, which also became home to future Qizilbash communities.

**A. First Wave: Post-Babur, 1504**

The question then becomes on when does the Qizilbash migration to the city of Kabul (and not to the amorphous **Kabulistan** region) actually begin. We have already pointed to the Ismael-Babur alliance, in which, the Baharlu tribe of the Qizilbash (Bayram Khan’s father and grandfather who were key figures in the Mughal court) assisted Babur (Thackston 1996, 169).

After the eventful reign of Babur, Shir Shah Suri exiled Babur’s son, Humayun, the second Mughal emperor, from Delhi in 1544. Humayun took refuge in Persia. Once again, his Safavid allies responded by providing military and bureaucratic help to Humayun so he could regain his throne, 1555 (Ansari 1989; Dale 2012). On Humayun’s return from Persia, about three hundred Qizilbash families stayed in Kabul (Mahmud 2011, 144). Twenty-one of fifty-seven important dignitaries in Humayun’s court were Persian **Iranis**, including the high-ranking positions of **mir bakhshi**, **mir munshi**, **diwan**, and **mir saman** (Subrahmanyam 1992, 345). Tahmasp’s help to Humayun had several lasting consequences for the Qizilbash: 1) The essence of the high culture in Mughal court permanently changed from Chagatai to an Indo-Persian style. 2) Political marriages influenced the trajectory of future political and commercial hires in Kabul. 3) Shah Tahmasp weakened the power of the Qizilbash in Persia, but expanded the extent and influence of the Safavid **murids** in the east.

The service of Persian dignitaries continued under Akbar, third Mughal
emperor, 1556-1605. Eleven out of Akbar’s 40 Provincial Governors, subadars, were Iranians, which included the positions of wazir and mir bakhshi (Subrahmanym 1992, 345). It must be noted that the word Irani, refers to the place of origin, Iranian. It comprises both the Qizilbash and non-Qizilbash elements in the Mughal court. During Akbar’s reign, however, families of the Mughal dignitaries were relocated from Kabul to the Delhi court once the foundations of the empire solidified in India. Excessive power and authority were given to the Iranian bureaucrats and cavalry under Jahangir, 1605-27.

Apart from the bureaucratic skills and warfare abilities that the Persians possessed, the Mughal emperors did not trust in their own relatives. Most of Jahangir’s leading officials were Iranians including all three of his wakils, six of his diwans, all his mir bakhshi, and mir samans (Subrahmanym 1992, 345). Jahangir’s wife, Nur Jahan, was Persian. Her grandfather, Khwaja Muhammad Sharif Tehrani, had been an important fiscal officer under Shah Tahmasp. Nur Jahan’s first husband, Ali Quli, was from the Ustajlu Qizilbash tribe. Jahangir’s son, Shah Jahan, 1628-58, continued with appointing Iranians to high-ranking administrative and financial posts.

Another episode of Qizilbash arrival to Kabul occurred when Shah Jahan appointed Ali Mardan Khan as the new Governor of Kabul, 1641-52. During Ali Mardan’s time in office that the bazaar of Char Chata, as well as the Bagh-e Ali Mardan, and Shahrarah were constructed. Char Chata improved Kabul’s status as a key overland port in the Silk Road commercial enterprise (Mahajan 2011, 144). In the mid-seventeenth century, there were “7,000 zat and 7,000 savar”
in Kabul under the command of Ali Mardan Khan (Richards 2011, 144). Shah Jahan extensively used the garrison that Ali Mardan’s forces built in Kabul in his quest to annex Qandahar during the Safavid-Mughal Wars of 1648-53.

In the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth century, the sixth Mughal ruler, Aurangzeb, 1658-1707, noted for his pro-Sunni beliefs, did not in any significant way displace the Iranian element. On the contrary, he was receptive to the exiled Sufis from Persia. The expulsion of Sufis from Isfahan, which took place toward the end of the Safavid period, 1694-1722, led to another Qizilbash movement. Tension within the Safavid religious hierarchy created a hostile and tense atmosphere in Isfahan. To avoid state persecution, which was headed by the rigid-minded Shaykh ul-Islam, a religious exodus ensued. Reports of Sufi gatherings that were established in Kabul that lasted until 1890s by the exiled Sufis of Isfahan and Kerman still resonate in the communal memory (Hashim 2014). People in general venerate the learned Sufi Pirs and hold the mystical or Sufi genre of Persian poetry *adabyat irfani* or *ashaar irfani*, in very high regards (Langary 2014).¹³

There are no formal Sufi *tariqas* or Sufi *khanaqas* in today’s Qizilbash neighborhoods (Nastrati). The lack of *tariqas* is explained by the previous state actions. Abdurrahman’s attempts in 1890s “to convert forcibly the Qizilbash to Sunnism. Those who refused were forced to wear red turbans. Partly because of the blatant discrimination, many Qizilbash outwardly accepted Sunnism but

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¹³ Three non-Shi’a Sufi orders are prominent in Afghanistan: Naqshbandi, Qadiri, and the Cheshti. Among the Naqshbandi, there is a *Khanaqa* in *Shor Bazar* district of Kabul. Many Naqshbandi are linked with the Mujaddedi family.
practiced *taqiyya* (secretly remained Shi’a)” (Dupree 1984). His policies forced the Qizilbash to observe their rituals in secret at their houses. However, similar to a Sufi *Khanaqa*, Qizilbash today gather in elaborate ritual halls or modest houses *Takia-Khana* (Arabic *Imambarah*; Persian *Tekyeh*; Turkish *Tekke*; Urdu *Tazia-Khana*) that are decorated with banners to commemorate the martyrdom of Husayn. The *Ashura* observances start on the first day of Muharram (Islamic calendar, first month) and lasts until *Arba’een* that correspond with 20th of Safar (second month). Apart from the Ashura ceremonies where partakers beat their chests in a rhythmic motion for piety, people gather in *takia-khanas* (houses of piety), for prayers, religious holidays, funerals, and education (Afshar 2014). Another regular ritual that is held at *takia-khanas* are the recitation of elegiac poems *manqabat khani*, which often entail themes of worldly injustice (Afshar 2014).

It was within the secret confines of *Takia-Khana* that Qizilbash were able to produce so many skilled bureaucrats and warriors in the era prior to the rise of the public education system. John F. Richards, a Mughal historian, explains this subject by focusing on the primacy of the family, or the institution of *khanawada* (Richards 2011, 148-50):

Jahangir often employed the term *khanazadgi*, meaning devoted, familial, hereditary service in his memoirs. *Khanazads*, born to the house, formed a large component of the nobility, if not quite a majority. All viewed Mughal service and preference within that service as their prerogative. *Khanazadgi* retained the central values of discipleship: loyalty, devotion, and sacrifice in the emperor’s service, but lacked its intensely emotional aspect. From boyhood each *khanazad* was imbued with a code of aristocratic and military honor. The honor of the warrior was compatible with dignified subordination to the emperor.
Khanazads were fully assimilated to the polish and sophistication of Indo-Persian courtly culture in its elaborate Mughal version. The ideal khanazad was dignified, courteous, and well-mannered. He understood the intricate rules for comportment in all social encounters – from the most informal gathering of friends engaged in drinking wine to the most rigid of grand public ceremonies at court. He valued and often quoted Persian poetry, and appreciated Hindustani music, painting, and other arts nurtured at court.

Punctuating the life and career of each khanazad were moments of personal attention by the emperor... the emperor nurtured and rewarded khanazadgi. Nobles, on the birth of a son, sent a gift to the emperor with a request that he name the child. The emperor was informed of and gave his approval for the marriage of the children of his nobles. At maturity all sons of an amir were enrolled as mansabdars in the emperor’s service.

Richard’s explanation of Khanawada applies to the Qizilbash conditions until the end of Shir Amir Ali Khan’s era. The Qizilbash situation alters drastically with the rise of the modern nation-state in 1880 – a topic to be discussed in chapter 5.

B. Second Wave: Nadir Shah’s Reign, 1729-47

The transfer of Qizilbash in the eastern cities ensued with Nadir Afshar’s rapid expansion into the eastern Iranian Plateau (Dupree 1975, 388). Over the course of Nadir Shah’s campaigns in India and Central Asia, sizeable groups of Qizilbash were placed at Qandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul to protect the supply routes, maintain order, and collect taxes. Qizilbash forces were also positioned to quell uprisings within the Afsharid Empire to avoid repetition of what arose in the 1720s. The second wave of Qizilbash’s migration to Kabul happened in 1738-9. Nadir’s Throne Takht-e Nadir, was constructed in Afshar mahalla of Kabul. Takht-e Nadir was Nadir’s political base. The walls of Nadir’s citadel are
still standing, but most of it is now part of the complex that houses the Afghan National Police (Afshar 2014).

**Figure 12.** Nadir Afshar Citadel

While Nadir’s military contingents (bureaucrats and warriors) were based in the *mahalla* of Chindawol and a nearby area that in 1772-75 becomes known as Murad Khani. The Afshar *mahalla* was comprised mostly of his own Afshari relatives and a place where I spent a considerable amount of my fieldwork time (Afshar 2014). Chindawol was a varied mix, settled according to the Qizilbash tribal divisions and places of origin back in Persia. The Qizilbash contingents who were ordered to stay in Kabul were tasked to oversee the state affairs in this former winter capital of the Mughals.
The following is an excerpt from Faiz Muhammad Katib’s (1912) *Siraj al-Tawrikh*. Katib, an ethnic Hazara, served as a court historian, calligrapher, and scholar during Habibullah’s era, 1901-19. Robert D. McChesney, a historian of Afghanistan, and Mehdi Khorrami translated Katib’s monumental history, *Siraj al-Tawrikh*, into a six volume English set in 2012. Katib informs us about the number and Qizilbash tribe composition that accompanied Nadir Shah during his Indian campaign. He writes (Katib 1912):

نادر شاه افشار چارا انجا شد که چارواشی چارون و جزیره و یکگان و اپلی گان اهالی و اتیو کرد و بیاریو بخت ریشان سات و جوانش حمل داده، در هرات و رانی فان این متمرد تهد هیحراست مملکت و تنب یو خواف را با عائله و اسلحه برا رازیش و ثغور مملکت فرمود رحدوکابل امر اقامت و حفاظت سینقدهار و غزنو.

Nadir Shah Afshar relocated twenty thousand warriors and combatants from the tribes of Shahsevand, Jawanshir, Bakhtiari, Kurd, Bayat, Reka, and residents of Shiraz and Khawf with their families and weapons for custody of the country from the threats of Afghans to Herat, Qandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul and ordered them to stay and protect the borders and frontiers.

The above passage, translated by Solaiman Fazel, tells us about number of key changes. First, the obvious absence of the word Qizilbash. Katib is a court historian for Habibullah, son of Abdurrahman Khan. He is aware of the anti-Shi’a state measures that Abdurrahman had issued. He is also aware of the retaliatory Qizilbash stance of 1893 where the Qizilbash “refugees in Mashhad declared a holy war on Abdurrahman” (Dupree 1984). It is because of these prior events that Katib refrains from using the word Qizilbash but mentions the names of major branches. Second, the slight variation from the original Safavid *Shahsevan* to *Shahsevand*. Whether it was intentional or not remains unclear. However, Shahsevan are now vernacularly referred to as *Shahsaman* (Shagaci
Lastly, the Bakhtiaris is now added to the list of those who accompanied Nadir to Kabul in 1739.

As Katib tells us, the vast majority of the Qizilbash who arrived to Kabul in the second wave, possessed military and administrative skills. Apart from being archers, cavalrymen, and tax collectors, many also had entrepreneurial skills. The Qizilbash warriors blurred the sphere of commerce *tujjarat* and politics *siyasat* in their new environment (Bakhtiari 2014). Those who migrated to Kabul likely continued to maintain close links with Persia. Through kinship ties, the military men encouraged the relocation of artisans like the Bakhtiaris and those fleeing the Safavid persecution. The eastward flow of talent expanded and transformed Kabul into a center of Persian culture that was not under the scrutiny of the dogmatic pro-Safavid jurists.

This raises another interesting question, were the first and second waves of Qizilbash connected in any way? In the course of my interviews with elders in Murad Khani, I was reminded that the first and second waves of Qizilbash migrant were connected in several ways. First, Qizilbash who had established themselves and became prosperous in Kabul, remitted money and commodities (indigo, *nile*, myrobalan, *halela*, and Kashmiri shawl, *pashmina*) to their kin in Persia. Second, personal visits were made continually to families and relatives back in Persia when the few Qizilbash made pilgrimage to shrines in Mashhad, Najaf, or Karbala. Third, Qizilbash sent their annual *khums*, 1/5 or 20% tax in person to the endowment *waqf* that officially represented them since there were no reputable institutions in Kabul at that time. Finally, Qizilbash men travelled
to parts of Persia to seek a spouse since most Sunni families did not want their daughter to be married to an emigre Shi’a (Adil 2014).

**C. Third Wave: Post-Ahmad Shah, 1747**

There is little or no disagreement among scholars that the formation of the Durranid Dynasty bore the stamp of the Perso-Islamic influence. A Sufi Pir crowned Ahmad Shah, with the consensus of the Durrani tribal chiefs and the Qizilbash commanders in Qandahar. Ahmad’s administration relied on his close contacts with the Qizilbash units in the eastern cities to expand the base of his power. For example, Mirza Hadi Khan was his rais daral-neshai, Head Secretary. Mirza Ali Reza Khan became his Mostofi, State Accountant (who also served under Timur Shah. Taqi Khan Shirazi enlisted close to three thousand Qizilbash in Ahmad Shah’s new army, who partook in the peaceful Conquest of Kabul, 1747. Once in Kabul, Ahmad Shah designated Wali Muhammad Khan Jawanshir (son of Lutf Ali Beg Jawanshir) as the Chindawol Bashi (succeeded by his son, Gul Muhammad Khan Jawanshir). Before Ahmad’s first campaign to India, there were fourteen thousand paid Qizilbash cavalrymen in his army who were distinguished by their body armor and headgear known as savar zara posh (Mohebbi 2011, 249, 307). The Qizilbash unit of Kabul was explicitly known as Chindawolan (Husayni 1753-54, 470).

The prolific court historian, Katib, writes the following in his Seraj-al Tawarikh, about Ahmad Shah and Qizilbash alliance (Katib 1912, 143-44).

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14 The street Kocha, Ali Reza Khan, near Shor Bazaar is named after him.
And also Ahmad Shah Afghan Sadozai, a Yasawal of Nadir Shah, who reached the ranks of a commander, detached Afghanistan from Iran and formed an independent monarchy. Some of Nadirs upper class courtiers, which he had good relations with and served in Nadir’s court together, who lived in Sabzavar, Isfahan, Khorasan, Shiraz and other places were invited to Afghanistan. The affairs of the country, organization, bureaucracy that Afghans and others residents of Afghanistan did not know about were specified to them as their responsibility.

Katib once again does not use the explicit term Qizilbash in this passage. He uses the phrase “upper class courtiers,” whom Ahmad Shah had come to forge close ties from his decade long service in the Afsharid State. Perhaps, Katib in this passage is referring to influential men such as Mirza Hadi Khan, Mirza Ali Reza Khan, Taqi Khan Shirazi, Lutf Ali Beg Jawanshir, and Wali Muhammad Khan Jawanshir. The latter two served as the Chindawol Bashi in Kabul.

When Ahmad Shah arrived to Kabul in 1747, Kabul had three residential quarters: Chindawol, Bala Hesar, and Payin Bala Hesar. Ahmad Shah erected a defensive wall that encircled all districts from any unforeseen attacks (Mahmud 2011, 136). In the eastern side of the city, the well-known fortress of bala hisar, stood on Shir Darwaza Mountain. Below the massive fortress, there were many structures, barracks, arsenals, shops, stables, and a prison. The southern part of Kabul was known as bala hisar-e payin (Ahang 2008). The Qizilbash mahalla was situated on the western side of the city.

In 1772, Gul Muhammad Khan, Amir of Chindawol ulus, is the person
who received Timur Shah’s letter as he ascended the throne in Qandahar. The third episode of Qizilbash settlements in Kabul took place after Ahmad’s death. Kabul was given a new life when Timur with the aid of the Qandahari Qizilbash cavalrymen transformed it into the new capital of the Durrani Dynasty, 1773-75 (Dupree 1980). The Qizilbash palacegaurds became an indispensable part of Timur’s imperial power. Apart from the Ottomans, “the Durrani Empire was the greatest Muslim state of the second half of the eighteenth century” (Dupree 1984). The Qizilbash cavalry benefitted from the royal favors Timur bestowed upon them because of their loyalty. Mirza Ali Reza Khan was appointed Mostofi Diwan, who received and disbursed the annual revenue for the empire. Timur married the daughter of Sharbat Ali Khan Jawanshir (Shahzada Sultan Ali is their offspring). As we learn from Maria Eva Subtelny article, “The practice of polygamy served to augment the ranks of potential contenders by maximizing the number of male offspring” (Subtelny 1989). Timur’s Qizilbash forces were granted land to settle in Kabul. The Rekas settled in the vicinity of Bala Hisar (Puzhohish 2005, 33). Others settled in the underpopulated section of the city that became Murad Khani (named after Sardar Murad Khan Popalzai).

The third Qizilbash migration to Kabul was a result of the fact that Timur presented better socioeconomic opportunities than those available in Qandahar or Mashhad. In addition, both the Qizilbash of Qandahar and Kabul had given their allegiance to his father, Ahmad Shah. Timur is believed to have been born and raised in Mashhad. With the eastward flows of knowledge, art, culture, and institutions, Timur Shah’s court in Kabul was under the Persian bureaucratic
and cultural influence. Political relations were further reinforced by this official
language commonality. The Qizilbash helped lend the city a more vivid Persian
cultural tone. As Qizilbash continued to fill the civil and military posts, a sharp
cleave developed between the Qizilbash migrants, the Kabuli natives, and the
Pashtun chieftains of Qandahar who found themselves mostly shut out of the
high-ranking social and political positions (Puzhohish 2005).

For the Qizilbash there was no tangible differentiation between “civil” and
“military” employment. All officials provided service to the polity. However, each
officer did have a definite rank and ordinarily maintained a reliant cavalry for
times of need. Officers received their rewards in cash payment or in the form of
land grants *teal (zaman)*. Officers made their own arrangement to cultivate
their land. In addition, this reciprocal blend of wealth and rank enabled the
Qizilbash to build businesses and houses to support their kin and to maintain
their rituals. Some of the older *takia-khanas* were either attached to the
nobility’s houses or were modest self-standing buildings (Khan Jan 2014).
Successful officers commanded a cluster of dependents. They were sons,
nephews, uncles, and other relatives. Other, non-kin, patron-client ties linked
the officers with those without much sociopolitical influence. Social bonds
made the state and the society function.

The relocation of the capital led to another population increase in Kabul.
Kabul continued to grow. New structures were built to house the bureaucrats
and troops. Kabul expanded into a center of consumption, for which the supply
networks to Persia, India, and Russia saw extra trade activities. The Qizilbash
arrival was a sporadic stream from Persia, who came unaccompanied or with families to seek their fortune in the prospering capital. Kabul was bustling and industrious. A small-scale metal industry developed. Iron, smelted from local mines and molded into shovels, horseshoes, swords, axes, daggers, and other articles of war (Gregorian 1969, 55). Trade, more than court service and land grants, formed the basis of prosperity for the new migrants. On the outskirts of the residential areas in Murad Khani, artisans set up guilds, such as copper quarter bazaar misgara-ha, shoemakers quarter rasta-e kafash, and ironsmiths quarter rasta-e ahangara. Trade and the free exchange of commodities bound people together as this new community formed its identity (Adil 2014).

In Zaman Shah’s reign, more than 10,000 Qizilbash families from the Afshar, Bayat and Kurd tribes were relocated to Herat, Qandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul. The Bayat tribe mostly remained in Ghazni. Other Qizilbash settled in the districts of Afshar, Chindawol, Bala Hissar, Qala-e Mahmud Khan, Wazirabad, and Zinda Banan (Mohebbi 2011, 311-12). The Qizilbash also had a vivid presence in Zaman’s army. Katib in, Seraj-al Tawarikh, estimates the Qizilbash cavalry at 12,000 men (Mohebbi 2011, 310). This number does not include the number of irregular cavalrymen.

During Mahmud Shah’s reign, the regularly paid Qizilbash cavalry in the army stayed at about 12,000 (Puzhohish 2005, 53). In 1815, Mahmud decided to build a silk industry in Kabul once the Durranids lost control of Nishapur to the Qajars in neighboring Persia. Again, the Qizilbash kinship ties were key in attracting weavers from Herat and Mashhad to Kabul who could hand dye the
silk. The silk industry *shawl bafs*, turned into a profit making initiative, which produced quality turbans *lungi*, in the Chindawol area. By the late 1830s, there were a few dozens of active looms in Kabul (Khan Jan 2014). The artisans also tried to develop glass, but its quality was poor.

The Qizilbash population of Kabul reached 18,000-20,000 in 1830s. In Kabul, their households made up “more than half of the population” (Masson 1844, 260). The residents of this diverse city were on relatively peaceful terms with each other during Dost Muhammad Khan’s first term, 1826-1839, except the faction who wanted the continuation of the Durrani dynasty. During this period, outside travelers stressed the general atmosphere of religious tolerance “to a degree that was rarely seen in a Muslim country” (Lal 1846, 74). Before the First Anglo-Afghan War 1839-42, Kabul left on visitors an impression of cordial cosmopolitanism where the mixed population of Tajiks, Pashtuns, Jews, Hindus, Armenians, as well as Qizilbash coexisted, not necessarily living in the same districts (Lal 1846). The exact population size of each ethnic groups is not available (Kabul Municipality 2014).

By the late-1830s, luxury commodities from Great Britain (via East India Company in Bombay) and ceramics objects from China were sold in bazaars of Kabul. Kabul merchants themselves had agents and negotiators in places like India, Persia, and Central Asia. The destruction of the Kabul’s coveted bazaar, *Chat Chatah*, was a key financial blow during the First Anglo-Afghan War. After the war, Kabul merchants experienced a long period of economic stagnation, which lasted until the conclusion of the Second Afghan-Anglo War, 1878-1880.
Despite the economic sluggishness, the city’s population increased to a little over 140,000 people according to the 1876 census, which was carried during Amir Shir Ali’s reign before the start of the Shirpur Project (Kabul Municipality 2014).

To alleviate overcrowding Shir Ali Khan decided to expand and construct a new administrative city on the north bank of Kabul River - Shirpur Project. Shirpur was intended to be the locus of where all the government tasks were to be implemented. Shir Ali, according to the Qizilbash historian, Sayyid Qasem Reshtia, embraced Sayyid Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani’s reform plans (Gregorian 1969, 86). Part of the reforms were to build a new military camp at the foothills of Tapa Bimarhu. Kabul, however, was trapped in the geopolitical rivalry of its two powerful neighbors: the Russo-British “Great Game.” The Shirpur Project was not completed, but then demolished when the Second Anglo-Afghan War erupted. After the war, Kabul’s economy was near collapse.

The Qizilbash maintained a strong influence in the Afghan court until the end of Amir Shir Ali’s reign. After the demarcation of the modern nation-state of Afghanistan 1880, the Qizilbash have not always been in agreement with the state-builders. There are two main reasons. First, due to the explicit anti-Shi’a decrees. The Qizilbash were “accused of supporting the Shi’a Hazaras” (Dupree 1984). Second, the implicit state discrimination or “structural violence” (Farmer 2004). Congregation halls, Takia-Khanas, became spaces for outright protest against oppressive rulers when the notions of social justice adl, and fairness insaf, were severely neglected. Amir Abdurrahman Khan ordered the demolition
of the congregation halls, which he labelled the “idol sanctuary of the Shi’as” (Afshar 2014). Abdurrahman Khan replaced the Qizilbash royal guards with a newly formed cadre, *ghulam bachas* (Dupree 1984). Their military dominance waned with the creation of a new standing army. The Qizilbash then turned to other occupations and careers *maslaks*. Some populated the mid-to-low level state institutions as scribes and functionaries while most became involved in commerce, education, and technical fields (Dupree 1984, 641).

In 1893, Sayd Mahdi Farrokh, a Qajar emissary and historian who was in Kabul, writes the following passage in *Afghanistan’s Political History*, about the situation of the Qizilbash in Kabul (Farrokh 1893, 80):

This tribe according to census reports of Hayat Khan in the year 1893 were twenty thousand household who lived in Herat, Ghazni, Kabul and Peshawar. All the government matters, especially *Mostafi*, state accountant, *Mohaseb*, chief accountant, and *Afwaj* (plural of *fowj*) military regiments, were in the hand of this clan, but since Abdurrahman Khan’s time with the instrument of coercion and hardship many fled to Russian Turkestan, Khorasan and other unknown destinations. Currently, in all of Afghanistan there are no more than ten to twelve thousand Qizilbash households.

The assessment of the Qajar emissary tells us about the forced relocation of the Qizilbash from Afghanistan to surrounding places and their relegation from the state affairs during Abdurrahman Khan’s reign. However, it remains uncertain from Farrokh’s observation how the local Qizilbash neighborhoods in Kabul were impacted. Let us now turn to the subject of Qizilbash neighborhoods.
III. Qizilbash Neighborhoods

Prior to the rapid urbanization and expansion of city of Kabul in the mid-twentieth century, the Qizilbash people lived in a few specific communities. The Qizilbash ancestral districts *mahallas*, in Chindawol and Murad Khani are two places with a rich cultural landscape that anchors the Qizilbash to their past, and also provides a unique vantage point to the key sociopolitical developments that swept through Kabul. The Qizilbash neighborhoods give us a sense of the endless realignments among the various Afghan royal family contenders for supreme power, which according to the political scientist, Amin Saikal, became the character of the country’s pre-modern and modern political culture (Saikal 2012). The royal dualism came at the expense of lessons of history and limiting the society’s growth potential. The weak and often unstable crosscutting ties created a complex network of loyalties to charismatic individuals rather than constructive ideals.\(^{15}\)

A. Chindawol

The historic neighborhoods of Kabul *Kabul-e Qadim*, are going through a rapid phase of renovation and reconstruction. Residences that were demolished or severely damaged in the destructive Civil War, 1994-2001. As indicated in the introduction, it is imperative for families who have lived in Chindawol for

\(^{15}\) Apart from Chindawol and Murad Khani *mahallas*, Qizilbash people continue to live in the following communities: Afshar Nanakchi, Afshar Tepa, Bila Hisar (mix), Gozar-e Ali Reza Khan, Gozar-e Reka-khana (Sunni Qizilbash), Qala-e Ali Mardan, Qala-e Fatullah, Qala-e Hayder Khan, Qala-e Qazi (Sunni Qizilbash), Qala-e Nobirjha, Qala-e Shuhada, Wazirabad, and Zinda Banan.
many generations now to keep its history and culture alive (Khan Jan 2014). There is a collective belief if this historic *mahalla* loses its culture then its residents may lose their identity in the dustpan of history (Hayder 2014). To get a good sense of the residents’ attachment to their neighborhood, below is a rhythmic *ghazal* poem that was published in Chindawol’s local newspaper *Sokhan-e Jadid*, New Talk, back in 2013.

**Legendary Chindawol**

Blessed is Chindawol and Chindawolis
Land of legends, forthright
Don’t you know what it is called Chindawolish?
From the start, it was the land of the brave
If Kabul becomes a ring
Its beautiful stone is Chindawol, oh Dears
Chindawol land is blessed
It has an embedded culture of happiness
Hasn’t slept a night in its blessed land
Anyone who has sold the fatherland
Scent of the devoted troops [refers to Qizilbash]
Are to be found by the lovers in Chindawol
The *ghazal* expresses the pain of lost glory. Chindawol in its peak was a place where the dignitaries, cavalrymen, and entrepreneurial personalities of the time lived. The *ghazal* also remind us of Chindawol’s history by positing a rhetorical question on the third line. Let us resume with Chindawol’s history and culture as its inhabitants remember it.

The Qizilbash military units settled in Kabul and formed the Chindawol area in 1738-39. It was a fortified area. Chindawol was and remains a visible Shi’a neighborhood. It had its own bazaar, mosques, congregation halls, baths, workshops (silk, wool, shoemakers), stables, shrines, gardens, and walkways (Khan Jan 2014). *Chindawol* is a Turkish military word that means rearguard (Hayder 2014). It refers to the army units that traveled behind the main pillar, *afwaj*, of the cavalrymen (Hayder 2014). The Qizilbash units who accompanied Nadir Afshar settled in Chindawol according to their tribal division or place of origin in Persia. For example, Chindawol’s smaller districts are named, Sepah Mansur-ha, Shah Samand-ha, Shah Aghasi-ha, Bakhtiari-ha, Kibri-ha, Lur-ha, Qurt-ha (Hayder 2014). It is believed that the first settlers of Chindawol were from the Jawanshir Qizilbash sub-branch, which was made up of the Qajarlu, Mahmudlu, and Kangarlu families. The other main family was the Shahsevan (vernacularly referred to as the Shah Samand). Amir Aslan Khan and Jafar Khan are remembered as the first leaders of Chindawol.

The location of Qizilbash settlement in Chindawol depended on three key factors. 1) Closeness to water, 2) arable land, and 3) the existence of a natural barrier. Chindawol *Mahalla* is between the foot of Shir Darwaza Mountain and
Kabul River. Chindawol was divided into two parts - the outer and inner space. A defensive wall encircled the outer space. Its eight entrances that were always guarded (Hayder 2014). The northern wall had three doors, the southern wall had three more doors, and the eastern wall also had two doors. Shir Darwaza Mountain, situated on its western side, provided a natural line of defense. The outer limits of Chindawol was adjacent to Gozar-gah on one side, and mahalla Ali Reza Khan on the other. Its western side extended to Demah-zang, which included Bagh-e Alam Ganj (Garden of Alam Ganj) and Jow-e Shir (name of a creek with fresh water).

The residents and the cavalrymen regularly used the outer gateways. The main northern door known as, darwaze cudkhuda-ha, aldermen entrance, was directly across the street from the Mosque of Shah-e Do Shamshira. Once you exit from the main northern door, on your right are the walls of Baqir Khan’s fort Qala-e Baqir Khan, and after two blocks, Qala-e Hayder Khan is on your right. Other doors led to Jada-e Maiwand (The Maiwand Road, named after the British defeat), Chub Foroshi (Wood Sellers), and Ashiqan wa Arifan (Mystics and Sufis). The southern doors led to the foot of Shir Darwaza Mountain were a military watchtower burj deebdani, once stood to survey the surrounding areas, including a better view of the battlefield in times of war (Khan Jan 2014).

Outer Chindawol, home to hundreds of Qizilbash families, vanished with the 1950s urban expansion. The Masturat Hospital and Soviet Union Embassy were built where Mostafi Muhammad Husayn Khan’s house once stood. Other Qizilbash dignitaries who lost their houses due to the urban expansion project
included the renowned physician Safar Ali, *Dabir* Muhammad Hasan, and Haji Saleh Muhammad, who was a Qizilbash community elder.

Inner Chindawol had its own entrance doors and layout. It has two main roads. The first road connected the main northern door *darwaze cudkhuda-ha*, to main south entrance (Khan Jan 2014). A smaller east-to-west road crossed the main road, which led to the Say Dokan entrance. The other main road started from Qala-e Hazara, intersected the north-south road at Sar-e Chahar Suq, and ended at the eastern door (Khan Jan 2014). The two main roads split the inner Chindawol into four units of a larger rectangle. Each area then had a number of smaller streets *kochas*. Similar to outer Chindawol, the inner space had its own water stream, Jow-e Asia. The Jow-e Asia creek was used to water the flowers, yards, and used for bathing. This stream split into two at Sar-e Chahar Suq. One provided water to Jawanshir-ha and Khafi-ha. The other passed through Qal-e Baqir Khan and Bagh-e Khan Shirin Khan and then it flowed into Kabul River. In inner Chindawol about 1,500-2,000 households lived in smaller areas *ghozar*, and forts *qalas*, which were named after different Qizilbash subtribe *taifa/yel*.16

Both outer and inner Chindawol had numerous stores and shops. There was a series of stores on both sides of the road from *darwaze cudkhuda-ha* to Say Dokan. Stores in Chindawol included the tailors, weavers (Ustad Barat Ali

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16 Here is a complete list of the different *ghozars*: Khafi-ha, Jawanshir-ha, Sepah Mansur-ha (Char suq), Shamlu-ha, Shahsamand-ha (Shahsevan-ha), Qurt-ha (Kurd-ha), Kibri-ha (Kablu-ha), Kalar-ha (kula khud-ha), Kocharlu-ha, Kashmiri-ha, Qazi Shuhab, Sar-e dokan, and Shahenchki-ha. The *qalas* comprised of Qala-e Shirazi-ha, Qala-e Hazara-ha, and Qala-e Baqir Khan.
Khan workshop known for fine silk turbans), saddlers, gunsmith, goldsmiths, coppersmith, blacksmith, locksmith, construction supplies, engravers, tile-makers, charcoal store, drapery carpentry, grocery, dairy, bakery, and butcher shops. The Say Dokan bakery was known for its tasty cookies (Kulcha, kulcha birinji, and root) and sweets, shir-pira, and qanadi. There were places that sold delicacies such as, porridge haleem-pazi, ice-cream faloda-pazi or melahi-pazi, lamb-head kala-pazi, fish and Jilabi mahi-o-jilabi foroshi (Hayder 2014).

B. Murad Khani

Murad Khani is another significant Qizilbash neighborhood. The Kabul River, Bazaar Kah-Foroshi (Straw Sellers), and Pul-Kishti separate Chindawol and Murad Khani. The history of Murad Khani starts when Timur Shah moved the capital from Qandahar to Kabul in 1772-75.17 Once Timur settled in Kabul, the unused lands that were close to the Bala Hisar Palace were given as gifts to the Qizilbash dignitaries, cavalry, and royal guards. Murad Khani was given as a gift to one of his elite commanders, Murad Khan Popalzai, son of Hanza Khan Popalzai. Murad Khan then gave his Qizilbash cavalry smaller parcels of land to build their barracks and residential compounds (Malakzada 2015). Murad Khani is where Kabul’s custom Ghomrog, kettledrum negara-khana, firefighting aatash neshani, and the grand kotawali structure were constructed.18 After the

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17 Before Timur Shah’s transfer, this area is known to have been home to about three hundred Jalaru households who lived in the vicinity. The Jalaru family was one of Nadir Afshar’s chosen deputies to oversee Kabul.

18 Kettledrum negara-khana, in mornings and in the evenings the city drum would sound, based on the late eighteenth century tradition in Kabul.
death of Murad Khan, the Qizilbash nominated Mehr Ali Khan and Qurban Ali Khan Qizilbash as their new leader.

Recent wars, negligence, and urban expansions has altered the size and appearance of Murad Khani. Currently, 65 houses and structures are standing. Turquoise Mountain Foundation is renovating the historical houses (Malakzada 2015). Despite all of the prior mishaps and calamities, Murad Khani is home to the popular shrines of Ziarat Abul-Fazl and Ziarat Panj Tan. According to the guardian of Ziarat Abul-Fazl, it is named after Abbas ibn Ali, Imam Husayn’s half-brother, who is remembered by Muslims for his loyalty to the Household of the Prophet and for his bravery during the Battle of Karbala. Ziarat Panj Tan, on the other hand, is an Islamic term that according to the shrine-keeper and community elders, it literally means the People of the Cloak Aal al-aba. It refers to the five venerated figures from the formative years of Islam: the Prophet, Ali, Fatima, and their two sons Imams Hasan and Husayn. These five people are given special consideration by virtue of the Surah al-Azhaab in Qur’an (33:44) and some Hadiths. According to the shrine-keepers, today over 5,000 women visit these sites on Wednesdays for pilgrimage, and about 10,000 men visit these shrines on Thursdays and Fridays.

Murad Khani’s commercial district still has a number of the older style public baths, teahouses, and small specialty shops. Historically, Murad Khani stores were the shopping destination for the Afghan royal family, where court executives and the harem women purchased exquisite jewelry, luxury fabrics, leather shoes, and visited the city’s finest tailors (Adil 2014).
According to the locals, when the British shattered the Palace of *Bala Hisar*, during the Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-80, Abdurrahman Khan built a new Royal Palace *Arg*, close to the northern edge of Murad Khani. The construction of the *Arg* had an irreversible effect on the communal organization of Qizilbash. In 1895, Amir Abdurrahman exiled a number of the Qizilbash households to Mashhad, and a year later, Pashtuns of Kohistan region were moved in. His son and successor, Habibullah Khan, ordered the construction of new government buildings close to the *Arg*, but the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919, the Civil War of 1929, the economic sluggishness of the early-1930s, and the Second World War 1939-45, slowed the pace of urbanization near the *Arg.\(^{19}\)

It was not until the Premiership of Daud Khan, 1953-63, that another vigorous urbanization project was launched, which heavily affected Murad Khani. It was during Daud’s Premiership that Kabul’s iconic city square, *Jad-e Maiwand* and Nadir Pashtun Boulevard were constructed. The latter bisected Murad Khani into two halves: northern and southern. In 1958, the northern part of Murad Khani was demolished to build the Ministries of Justice, *adlia*, Finance *Mallia* and Mines, *Mahdan*. The National Bank *bank melli*, Bureau of Communication and Intelligence *riyast mokhaberat*, Khyber Restaurant, and Cinema Aryana were built in the northern Murad Khani. In 1959, hundreds of residential and commercial buildings that existed in the southern Murad Khani (identified as *lab-e darya-e Murad Khani*) were demolished as part of the Kabul

\(^{19}\) The creation of a new administrative center in the 1920s took place in Dar ul-Aman area and not in Murad Khani.
River Construction Project. The Kabul River Construction Project entailed the addition of stonework walls on both banks of the river to hinder flooding. It also reduced to width of the natural river, which added the height of the water flow for aesthetic purposes.

Germans initially designed Kabul’s urban master plan in 1920s as part of their geopolitical rivalry with the British. It restarted in 1950s-70s under a new partnership between Afghans, East Germans, and Soviets. The new urban planners destroyed multiple shrines and cemeteries that were in or adjacent to the outskirts of Murad Khani. Many dervishes, small jewelers, and shopkeepers were not only displaced, but also lost their livelihoods without any reparation. Some of the Qizilbash houses that were in Murad Khan since Timur Shah’s era were demolished. The natives Qizilbash people interpreted this form of urban expansion as deliberate anti-Shi’a actions.

When Daud Khan regained power in 1973-78, he decided to leave Murad Khani alone because of the Shi’a uproar his previous urbanization had caused. In 1977, however, Municipality of Kabul Sharwali Shar Kabul, replaced the old public baths hamams, with modern apartment buildings. The modern buildings were not all finished when the Marxist inspired coup erupted in 1978. Kabul’s entire master plan was placed on hold during the Soviet-Afghan War, 1979-88. After the Soviet withdrawal, the western side of Murad Khan was destroyed in the Mujahidin Civil War of the 1990s. In 1994, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami was relentlessly attacking from the Bala Hisar region, and Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Jamiat was launching constant rockets from the Wazir Akbar Khan
neighborhood. In 1994-2001, the Taliban made a street that separated Murad Khani’s historic music bazaar where more artisans and shop owners lost their livelihood.

In 1990s, Mujahedeen commanders removed the beautiful handmade fretwork doors and window frames *moshiba-kari*, to burn and keep warm in the bitter winter cold of Kabul.

**Figure 13.** Fretwork Door Kabul Museum

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Historically, inbound and outbound caravans would pass through the famed Pul-Kishti Bridge prior to stopping at Murad Khani’s customs *ghomrog*, to pay taxes on their cargos. The custom officials and the military officers *sepah*, received their education and training here. Murad Khani also had a number of homeschools where aspiring bureaucrats learned the art of
penmanship and calligraphy before they could be employed by the state. At the zor-khana, house of strength, lalas, mentors, trained young boys in fencing, horsemanship, spear throwing teer andazi, target shooting with muskets nishan zani, wrestling, and how to use a wooden baton. The military’s horses were kept and shoed at these stables.

According the local residents, Murad Khani’s residential area had flat-roofed houses. The fancier and elegant houses were made out of baked brick, concrete, stonework, fretwork doors and windows. Ordinary mud and straw kahgel, were used in humbler houses. The houses had unusually small short doors where an average person could not walk in without bending their knees and head. The small short doors were designed to safeguard the dignitaries and warfare equipment from unexpected raids by horse riders. A network of underground tunnels connected some of the commanders’ houses where a cache of arms, food, water, and supplies were stored. The supplies could last for weeks. Normally, Qizilbash elders protected these areas when men were away (Adil 2014).

The narrow winding streets kochas, had dark tunnels where horsemen could not freely ride. On top of the tunnels were small rooms called sara-cha, where armed neighborhood guards resided. Some wider kochas had doors on each side, which could be locked in case of a sudden crisis. High walls built around the inner courtyard where private life was hidden from Kochas. Sharp wall dividers teqh, separated the houses between neighbors and streets. There were hardly any windows under the eye level in both the fancier and humbler
houses.

Once you enter the compound of a Qizilbash notable through the elegant fretwork door, right on top of the main entrance was the servant’s *nazer*, room. The servant typically lived there with his family. On each side of the courtyard there were one or two story buildings called *aftab rukh*, facing the sun, and its opposite *sahe rukh*. The main courtyard had four rectangular flower gardens with a decorative water fountain placed at the intersection. When you passed the courtyard, and went through another door, where *mayman khana*, guest room was situated. The guestroom was slightly raised for formality. It is in this room where guests are greeted. Guestrooms are usually furnished with quality rugs. Floor mats *doshak*, and pillows with decorative gold and silver *popak*, are always there to rest your back or place your elbow on.

The ceilings and interior windows are elegantly patterned. Built-in wall shelves *taqcha*, are filled with books. The Qur’an, tales of the prophets, *Qasis al-Anbiya*, and some Persian classics such as, *Diwan-e Hafiz*, Sadi’s *Golistan* and *Bostan*, Ferdwosi’s *Shahnamah*, and Rumi’s *Masnavi*. There are also some decorative accessories, *faghfur*, *janan*, and *yishm*. A vase of flowers or a bowl of quince were normally kept inside because of their nice fragrance. There were a number of other rooms called family room *nishiman*, back room *pas-khana*, storage room *sandoq-khana*, and kitchen *ashpaz-khana*. During hot summer nights, people eat outside on the courtyard *souf*, elevated terrace. *Souf* usually faced the greenhouse *gul-khana*, where flowers, plants, and singing birds like canary, nightingale, and pigeons were kept.
Houses of the dignitaries also had their own bath *hamam*. Interior walls of the *hamam* were covered with stones and ceramic tiles. While most ordinary people used the public baths, which were comprised of three sections. First is the section where clothes and personal items are kept. It is a locker room, but a number system *nishani*, is used rather locks and keys. Second, is the haircut stations and places to receive a message. This section is warmer. The barbers and the message therapists wear the traditional *lung*. Third section is the big interior room, which is steamy hot and used for body washing. After leaving the *hamam*, street vendors sell different types of hot soups and fresh fruits. One of the distinctive bath foods is *Shol-e sar-e hamam*, usually served to a groom by his closest friends on his wedding day (Azami 2014).

**IV. Culture**

The Qizilbash notables are cognizant of and like to reflect on their Perso-Turkic heritage. It is important for them since their Perso-Turkic past displays their culture. Several aspects of the Qizilbash society have remained the same, other dimensions have undergone profound changes as they transitioned from a *traditional* setting to a *modern* context. It must be stated that Qizilbash share the same ceremonies, customs, and rituals as other inhabitants in Kabul. The only visible difference, to an outside anthropologist, is in their Shi’a religious observances, to be discussed in chapter 5. The rest of this chapter discusses the different aspects of the Qizilbash culture – family, food, leisure activities, and education that I gathering as part of my fieldwork.
A. Family

Family *khanawada*, is the fundamental social and economic unit for the Qizilbash. Traditionally, nuclear families combined into extended families that consisted of the man’s parents, unmarried sons, and married sons with their families. Each unit of the extended family occupied an independent quarter of a house facing the courtyard.

Choosing a spouse is seldom a matter concerning only two individuals. Marriages often involves the groom and the bride kin whose approval must be given to avoid social isolation and not be cut off from inheritance. Compatibility is normally judged based on prior affiliation, conducts, and class. In spite of the recent trend amongst the urban educated to avoid cross-cousin marriages, there is general preference among the older generation for marrying paternal or maternal cousins. Matrilineal cross-cousin marriage integrates more firmly the loose socio-political structure, and binds families. Outside of the usual practice of endogamy, political marriages between different elite families also take place to cement an alliance or to end a cyclical stalemate. Although family pedigree is traced through the father’s bloodline, the social eminence of maternal uncles and grandfather is also given heavy consideration.

Qizilbash families are commonly patriarchal. The wife conforms to her husband in front of the children and in the public sphere, but in private she musters ample decision-making authority. Commonly, the father is the main disciplinarian and guide while the mother is the emotional bedrock. The wife is a mediator between her children and husband, and between her husband and
her own family in case of an incongruity. In the father’s absence, the eldest son assumes the role of the guide of the family. Sons are taught and expected to be polite, *ba adab*, and chivalrous *dilayr*. They are the *de facto* vanguards and the guardians of family prestige *hayzat*, the nexus of which are lineages, humility, and social reputation.

Other important family values are generosity and hospitality. Generosity *jawanmardi*, is expected from those who have the financial means. Being frugal and socially isolated is considered pathetic. The influence of a knowledgeable relative *kalan*, over a younger *khord*, is such that the youth (presumably less experienced) must consult *mashwara*, with elders in matters of personal and commercial initiatives. In addition, the elders resolve disputes within the family or in the neighborhood by use of rationale and power of persuasion, but could not streamline their authority into permanent coercion over others or create institutionalized power that could be passed on. Within this family structure model, the youngest children rarely take responsibility or blame if the family somehow miscarries *aberu-reezi*. Below is a statement from my fieldwork that displays the type of values a father wishes to pass on.

"I am raising my children to be brave, resolute, and industrious. Nobility and caring for the destitute are my inheritance to them. May God grant them faith and chivalry."
**B. Food**

In pre-modern era Qizilbash cavalrymen maintained a simple diet while travelling. A full breakfast and dinner was normally served so it did not disturb the movement of the cavalry. Breakfast was typically comprised of bread *nan*, tea *chai*, prepared with cheese *panir* or butter *maska*. Dinner was usually more substantial. Soup *ash*, might be prepared, which is a noodles made with dried salty yogurt *quroot*, lentil or red beans, dried mint, garlic with oil, and ground meat. Other simple travel dishes were *shorba* and *qurooti*. If a warhorse was injured, it would be slaughtered and roasted on fire as kabob. Sheep meat was normally dried *ghosht qagh*, for travelling. After dinner, dried raisins and nuts such as, almonds, pine nuts, pistachios, and walnuts would be consumed with hot tea. Occasionally, dried mulberries with ground walnuts and sugar were mixed into a blend *talkhan*. Between the morning and evening meals, Qizilbash troops ate a popular dried fruit called *sinjed*, and various types of cookies *root* and *kulcha*, which are usually made from flour, butter, and sugar.

Today, the Qizilbash no longer practices the long journeys for purposes of conquest and migration. Thus, most of the caravanserais in Kabul have been replaced with contemporary structures. The one exception is the newly repaired caravanserai at Babur’s Garden, part of a public museum that is open to the public. One of the old-style institutions that has survived into the present-day is the teahouse *chai-khana*. Elders sometimes spend time there for socialization and leisure purposes rather than to really drink tea with sugar almonds *nuqol*, or rock candy *nabat*. With the development of social stratification in the second
half of the twentieth century, most urban educated Qizilash shied away from *chai-khanas* and *zur-khanas* (traditional gyms, house of strength). These two places became sites where the lower social strata - meaning the unemployed and the uneducated, would spent a lot of time.

**C. Leisure Activities**

The once favorite hobbies of wrestling, horsemanship, and hunting have faded away. One of the favorite pastimes that has survived the powerful forces of modernity are family gatherings during the holidays. During winter nights, close families in every district gather in an elder’s house for food, dialogue, and entertainment. After dinner, poetry recitation usually takes place, by those with a nice voice. Children also engage in poetry recitation or in chess competition. Classic, couplets, ghazels, and popular odes were narrated. Poems from Sufi and epic literary masterpieces such as, Rumi’s *Masnavi* and *Diwan-e Shams*, *Shahnamah*, *Diwan-e Hafiz*, and Sa’di’s *Bostan* and *Gulistan* are recited. Poems were then discussed and analyzed in family circles in the presence of women, elders, and children. Almost every extended family and *Mahalla* had well-known *Shahnamah* reciters, who read the poems in an epic chant called *razmi*. The *Shahnamah* characters, battles, and stories of heroism was revered and memorized by the Qizilbash youth. Some would essentially accept them as the history of their ancestors. These family gatherings also inspired eloquence and composition of their own poetry collection.

Outside of private homes, well-known reciters would read portions of the
aforementioned poems in a congregation hall for the public. Reciters were often joined by one or two erudite elder men, who sat at the foot of the pulpit *minbar*, to offer nuanced commentary and clarify the more difficult concepts, allegories, and historical details for the audience. Both the mystical and epic poems were closely listened to, and often memorized by, members of the audience. It is not unusual to repeat parts of, or the entire poem, in appropriate times during a conversation. Poetry was and remains part of the Qizilbash high culture.

**Figure 14.** Munbar Takia-Khana Afshar
Apart from the mystical and epic poetry recitation, another popular form of public recitation was the religiously inclined chants and praise lyrics called *manqabat khwani*. People would listen carefully to stories of the bravery of Ali, the valor of Husayn, or devotion of Abul-Fazl. One of the most popular Shi’a heroic odes *qasida*, is *Hamla-y Hayderi*, or Ali’s Conquest, amassed by Mirza Rafi Khan Basil, son of Mirza Muhammad. *Hamlay Hayderi* is recited in *razmi* chant. It starts with praise *naht*, of the Prophet and other Shi’a Imams, but it actually focuses on the virtues and sacrifices Imam Ali made for Islam until his assassination in 661. By the time the reciter ends *Hamlay Hayderi*, the public in the congregation hall have reached a state of communal ecstasy. The heroic poem underpins how the family of the Prophet or the Shi’as of Ali in general were mistreated in the formative years of Islam.

**D. Education**

Before the establishment of the public education system in Afghanistan, tutelage of children was a high priority for the Qizilbash bureaucrats, troops and officials.20 Qizilbash districts had *madrasas* in mosques, congregation halls, but most children were homeschooled. Madrasas were opened to both genders and students were enrolled between the ages of 5-7. A monthly fee was paid to the instructor and before the Eids and the Persian New Year holidays; a bonus installment was paid to the head teacher. The madrasas taught students

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20 Habibiah High School founded, 1903. The German-funded Amani High School, French-funded Lycee Esteqlal, Agency for French Education Abroad, in 1920s, and Kabul University in 1932.
basic mathematic, literature, calligraphy, medicine, and the religious canons. Students first learned the Perso-Arabic alphabet in qahayday Baghdadi before they would be able to recite the Qur'an. Persian poetry was steadily introduced to advanced students. Madrasa hours lasted from 8-12 in the morning for boys and 12-1 in the afternoon for girls. After the lunch hour, students spent time on their homework and practiced their penmanship. There were no new lessons taught on Thursdays. Thursday was review of the week’s materials and day of the weekly exam. Tactics of humiliation and physical punishment were seldom used on students who did not keep up.

Unlike the modern educational system, madrasas did not have numerous equipped classrooms with certified instructors. Student sat on the floor in a semicircle facing the teacher. Each student, based on his or her ability, was at a different level. Advanced students learned directly from the head teacher while the newer students learned from advanced students. Working families would stop sending their children to school once the student had learned how to read and write in Persian and could recite the Qur’an properly. If the head teacher had poor penmanship, then a calligrapher master would teach the art of how to sharpen a reed pen and make ink before mastering the advanced styles of nastaliq, shekast, and naskh.

To conclude, some of the Qizilbash court secretaries, calligraphers, and officials of the eighteenth and nineteenth century were products of the above education system. Below is a list of their names, occupational title, and when their work was published. This older education system ended with the rise of
public education system that flourished in Kabul in 1920s. According to elders, some of the best teachers in the public schools came from the Qizilbash areas.

**Table 8: Qizilbash Notables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title of Work or Occupation</th>
<th>When</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shah Abdul hakim Khorasani</td>
<td>Tazkira Mardum-Deda</td>
<td>Timur Shah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shah Shuja</td>
<td>Wajeihat Shah Shuja</td>
<td>Shah Shuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasan Ali</td>
<td>Habib ul-Qulub</td>
<td>Dost Muhammad Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirza Muhammad Sadiq</td>
<td>Qanon Askari; Treatise for Refutation of the Wahhabi Creed</td>
<td>Amir Shir Ali Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safdar Ali</td>
<td>Calligrapher</td>
<td>Amir Shir Ali Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaqub Ali Khawfi</td>
<td>Padshahhan-e Mutakhir-e Afghanistan (exile)</td>
<td>Amir Abdurrahman Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mir Husayn Husayni</td>
<td>Calligrapher – student of Safdar Ali</td>
<td>Amir Abdurrahman Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Ali Attar</td>
<td>Calligrapher (moved to Herat, died in Mashhad)</td>
<td>Amir Abdurrahman Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zubaida, daughter of M. Amin Khan Munshi (Mastura Afghan)</td>
<td>Poet – no known published work, but known for her patriotic poems</td>
<td>Habibullah Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaykh M. Reza Khorasani</td>
<td>Reyaz-e Illalwah</td>
<td>Habibullah Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirza M. Jafar Qandahari</td>
<td>Calligrapher</td>
<td>Habibullah Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirza M. Jafar Qandahari</td>
<td>Editor</td>
<td>Amanullah Khan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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CHAPTER 5

State and the Shi’a Question, 1880-1978

“States and their futures matter because, at the outset of the 21st century, they remain, by far, the most significant repositories of power and resources in the world”
~ Richard Lachmann, States and Power, 2010

“The history of Afghan reforms and the study of the development and intellectual genesis of the Afghan modernist movement, as well as of the process of social change in Afghanistan, have not received the attention they merit from American and West European sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, Islamists and historians”
~ Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 1969

I. Revival of Identity Politics in Afghanistan

Despite the expansion of transnationalism and globalization in the post-Cold War world, nation-formation and identity politics remain at the center of political discourse in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Representation of ethnic and sectarian identity has resurfaced as an important political subject based in the shared experiences of injustice. These debates strive to redefine the rights and histories of minorities. At the same time, identity politics challenges the model and legacy of twentieth century state-formation and ethno-nationalism with the goal of greater self-determination.

The previous dynastic elites, 1880-1978, used the state apparatus and
bureaucracy as a vehicle for production of authority and spreading its cultural policies over rest of the society (Feldman 2008). Afghan state elites claimed to be the nation, the sole proprietor and defender of the country, and the source who decided on inculcation and “construction of other” (Said 1994). Afghan nationalism was articulated in the political-cultural ethos of the dynastic elites, often masked under the rubric of modernity. State elites used the material and ideological apparatus of the state, and often relied on a clerical and Loya Jirga rubber-stamp to attain the legal basis for proposed state activities (Althusser 1988). Apart from the aspirations of modernization, nation-formation was also achieved through the creation of an “imagined” primordial identity (Anderson 2006). Selective historicism by the state-sponsored cadre of writers was at the core of the Afghan ‘national’ culture edifice.

The merger of the modern state with nation has a long complex history in Afghanistan. The unification of the state with the nation as one ethno-cultural ethos began in 1901, when Mahmud Tarzi returned from Turkey. Tarzi formed the Young Afghan coalition and founded the state publication, *Seraj al-Akhbar* weekly. The homogenization of Afghanistan’s ethnicities occurred under a blend of coercive policies, and to a lesser degree, volunteer assimilation. The Afghan state was the largest employer and offered upward socioeconomic opportunity for the newly educated professionals and neo-urbanites. The change of identity transformation, mainly for socioeconomic motives, is what John L. and Jean Comaroff call “ethnicity incorporated” (Comaroff 2009). minorities were enticed to bring their skills in the state institutions at the cost
of discounting their own identity.

This chapter looks into the Qizilbash question in Afghanistan by focusing on the relationship between state policies and the Shi’a minority. Specifically, it explores how state elites embraced the idea of constitutionalism to consolidate their power and then homogenize their ethno-cultural strategies. This chapter closes with how remembrance and shrine visitation were used by Qizilbash not only to preserve their religio-cultural identity, but to resist the homogenization process. How did this paradoxical process of assimilation and resistance affect the Qizilbash social cohesion and identity? Before we answer the Shi’a question vis-à-vis the Afghan state, let us begin with a concise overview of the European state model and its arrival in Afghanistan.

II. European Nation-State Model and Minorities

The subfield of political anthropology is the study of policies, institutions, and organizations from within or bottom-up (Das 2003). Political anthropology studies political themes, practices, and processes within and outside of state institutions (Aretxaga 2003). The state is where “transformation of all the major forces happens within a territory” (Tilly 2004). The concept of the nation-state is a rather new creation that has come to govern the world (Lachmann 2010). Over the course of twentieth century, virtually every habitable place on earth became an independent modern state, which replaced the previous models of polities, empires, city-states, tribal confederations, and theocracies that ruled over human societies for generations (Lachmann 2010).
The nation-state model expanded across the globe either by voluntarily duplication or through use of military force during the pinnacle of European colonialism, 1800s-1945. Colonial powers considered it an effective and a safer system for social transformation of the peripheral lands toward modernity. In a Weberian perspective, feudalism and patrimonialism in the peripheral regions were “chronic conditions,” which hindered progress, and were fundamentally incapable of being transformed through their own internal dynamics. The state model further expanded in the period of de-colonization, 1945-60s, once the native elites unquestionably embraced the notion of linear history and rational choice theory. The elites sided with the “rule of experts” without much regard to the domestic subtleties of their own society (Mitchell 2002). Therefore, the European state model was accepted as a successful political system that could supplant the outdated patrimonial bureaucracies in the global south. But, how did this sociopolitical evolution originate in the European heartland?

The inception of the European nation-state model extends back to the Peace of Westphalia, 1648 (Wolf 1982). The Westphalia treaties formed the foundation for self-determination by ending the ambiguity of the nation (a large community of people) and its relation to the state (a sovereign political territory, known as a country). State power gradually increased with the dual practices of mercantilism and the rise of bureaucratic rationality. State bureaucracies, became efficient in collecting taxes, rallying the forces, and governing the lands of the state. States recognized the national identity of their people in a political-territorial way. The European state-model initially ignored the ethno-religious
and the ethno-linguistic claims of minorities living within its defined contours.

The state systems created the belief in a territorial being that Thomas Hobbes, in *Leviathan*, declared a practical paradigm that is capable of saving human societies from destroying one another. Years later, the enlightenment thinker Jean Jacques Rousseau, popularized the theory of “social contract.” Rousseau called on rational individuals to submit their natural rights for the protection and privileges offered by the monarchical state. The advent of the American Revolution (1765-1783) and the French Revolution (1789-99) mark two other momentous breakthroughs in the evolution of the state system. The U.S. Constitution formed a check and balance mechanism for an equitable distribution of power between the central administration, provinces, and the people. The French Revolution resulted into common people supplanting the hereditary aristocratic elites that paved the path for the inevitable creation of republics and democracies around the globe.

After the Peace of Westphalia, major ethno-linguistic groups/nations in Europe claimed territories for themselves. Each nation established its political institution with a shared goal. It was for and on behalf of each nation that the state was expected to function and legitimize its rule (Sheth 1999). Each state began to solidify and defend the nation’s interest internationally vis-à-vis other ambitious states and domestically by subduing dissenters. State authority and national ideology were used in conjunction to homogenize the societies into cohesive units. State-builders shrouded their actions in the mask of national defense and “under the guise of public interest” (Abram 1988, 400). In the
process, the nation became synonymous with the notion of the state. When a population became ethno-linguistically uniform, the state did not discriminate among its inhabitants. People came to be treated with dignity as citizens. The state acknowledged the existence of the un-homogenized groups (religiously, racially, linguistically) within its defined contours and declared them to be as non-nationals. This dichotomy, at times, led to conflict or social unrest among the “major” versus the “minor” groups.

After the conclusion of the Second World War and the ratification of the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights in 1948, minorities could coexist as distinct demographic groups within the nation-state model. In the second half of the twentieth century, European states tried to accommodate the rights of the minorities as part of their inalienable rights. Which meant that minorities could preserve their culture, tradition, and organize their own political parties or support their desired political party. Minorities, however, could not live by a different set of laws that would undermine the written laws of the nation or engage in activities that would pose an imminent threat to the state. Since the inception of the state-model in 1648, it has successfully grown into a political system where minorities’ rights are protected. Minorities are treated as equal citizens and are an integral part of the rationale state, in what Foucault calls “governmentality” (Foucault 1990).\(^\text{21}\) Let us see how the state model turned out in Afghanistan.

\(^{21}\) Governmentality, governance through willing participation rather than the disciplinarian form of power.
III. The Nation-State Model in Afghanistan

The nation-state model has functioned quite differently in the newer and much weaker states of the global south, such as Afghanistan. The state model was implemented under different sociocultural and historical conditions, which were strikingly different from those that gave rise to the early industrial states in Western Europe. The early twentieth century anticolonial demands of Afghan nationalists for self-rule harped insistently on the present as the temporal horizon of action. The post-protectorate state, which started in 1919, was weak from the onset. The state in Afghanistan became an arm of the dominant ruling ethnic group (culturally and religiously), the Barakzai Pashtuns. The principles put forward by the Barakzai state elites were assimilation and construction of a national identity.

The state attained a majoritarian-cultural ethos that sustained itself by overpowering minorities. Nation formation led to actions where minority groups found themselves detached from the processes. Minority groups were pacified, controlled, and transformed via the dominant state culture endorsed by elites, which were articulated through “hegemonic” tactics (Gramsci 1971). Minority rights and representation were perceived as divisive thoughts that would abate national determinations or lead to the disintegration of the state. The top-down policies created a turbulent ethno-sectarian strife that triggered a sequence of regime changes, exiles, and assassinations that last from 1901-78. According

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to Robert Canfield, an anthropologist of Afghanistan, the paradox of peoples versus the state was never really settled, only interrupted by the Soviet War, 1979-89, and ensuing Civil Wars, 1989-2001.

By studying processes of nation-formation, we can now see why people in Afghanistan have become so susceptible to conflict and distrustful of the state. Dynastic elites due to their control over the press and education system had an impact disproportionate to their numbers. State elites (aristocrats, courtiers, provincial dignitaries, intellectuals, and emerging bourgeoisies) were the main advocates of nationalism. State funded intellectuals were also vital in molding the national identities and cultures for which the state elicited loyalty.

Two policies that the state deployed for its assimilation goals according to my interlocutors were: 1) Obligatory Military Conscription, more than any other policy, indoctrinated men to see themselves as part of the fatherland nation. 2) Official Language, the medium for instruction in public schools, armed forces, and employment. People had to know the official language in order to obtain a state issued identification card *tazkira*. The Qizilbash were often discriminated against based on their personal names and language. Shi’as are usually named after members of the *Ahl al-Bayt*. Names such as Ali, Fatima, Zaynab, Abbas, Hussein, Hasan, Mukhtar, Jafar among others are prevalent (Afshar 2014).

In addition, the official language was used for the development of national anthem, literature, and international correspondences, which upheld the claims of Afghan nationhood. Language, in addition to fostering a national identity, helped fabricate image of the primordial past. Histories of minorities
and archeological evidences fell under the influence and censorship of the new primordial narrative. State-approved interpretation of the past, in what Duara calls “Rescuing History from the Nation,” was in full practice by the elite state-builders in Afghanistan (Duara 1997).

Unlike the European nation-states, where most emerged with a dominant ethnic group, Afghanistan is a country of minorities. There is no overwhelming majority. The dynastic elites were themselves in fact a linguistic minority. The pre-modern Durrani polity was a Perso-Islamic superstructure laid on top of a diverse population. Each ethnic region had its own internal organization and a unique subculture. Pre-modern monarchs retained their power neither through institutional bureaucracy nor through Weberian notion of monopoly of physical force, but by their ability to balance the groups beneath them. It was often in the best interest of the Shahs and Amirs to have a heterogeneous population.

Pre-modern Afghanistan was a pluralistic society rather than a uniform nation. The Durrani polity was a collection of autonomous locales held together by dynastic kinship and patronage bonds under the flag of Islam. Each local ruler was a de facto head of a smaller polity who paid tribute to the Shah. The person of the Shah deferred much of his nominal regions to local rulers, with whom he shared revenues and authority. In other words, tribal chiefs were allowed to self-direct their areas, and were paid protection money khifarah, for their compliance. Local customs thrived in the absence of an overarching code of law. In the sedentary regions, elites held positions of considerable strength. Governance of the cities was in the hands of wealthy landowners, traders, and
state-backed clerics who often reminded people that men are better off under the worst government than in anarchy, the concept of fitna. The aristocrats wielded power through family patronage networks and served as intermediaries between the locals awamm, and the head of the pre-modern polity.

**A. Protectorate State, 1880-1919**

The issue of minority rights has a long, complex history in Afghanistan. The central motif of the modern state was assimilation. This meant the cultural marginalization of minority communities within the state. A careful effort was not made to preserve the heterogeneity of cultures and histories that defines Afghanistan. Identification of a person as a minority decreased in importance while membership in a larger social unit increased. It is important to mention that minorities in Afghanistan are not new immigrant populations who needed state accommodations. The minority communities, however, began to perceive themselves as a lesser group when they felt deprived in the context of the new state, especially when equal opportunity and access to decision making were not within reach. Peoples’ demands for constitutional equality were therefore reinforced as more cases of discrimination were convincingly made against the totalitarian state. There are several episodes when Shi’a rituals were outlawed.

After the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-80, the pre-modern Barakzai polity was transformed into a new territorial state, first as a protectorate state through indirect colonial rule (1880-1919), and then as a sovereign state after the Third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919. Amir Abdurrahman Khan returned from
Tashkent to Kabul when his rival Amir Shir Ali Khan left Kabul at the onset of the British invasion. Abdurrahman was a self-interested monarch, who gained territory and power with the help of British firearms and money. He used the British aid to intimidate and defeat his rivals. His régime relied on his kinsmen for military purposes, while the civil and financial administration remained in the hands of the old Persian-speaking bureaucrats. Despite his enthusiasm for a new state, his acceptance was partial. Often a display was made of imitating institutions in order to impress the British Viceroy that the Afghan polity was transforming into a modern state. It was a transformation without attention to minority rights.

Apart from impressing the British subsidizers with his “iron fist” policies, Abdurrahman Khan’s other domestic motivation was to advance the interest of the ruling class at the expense of minorities. This meant appeasing the Sunni orthodoxy at the expense of Shi’as. Shi’a intellectuals argue that the ethnic and sectarian character of the state placed them at a dire detriment with enduring consequences. Abdurrahman Khan did not acknowledge Shi’a jurisprudence; it marginalized the Qizilbash Shi’as in public affairs, and devalued their Qizilbash identity. The two-decade long reign of Abdurrahman Khan, 1880-1901, was the darkest period for the Shi’a people in Kabul and beyond. Hojat, a Shi’a scholar from Chindawol and a Qizilbash from his mother side, writes, “Abdurrahman intensified the ethnic and sectarian difference and pitted one ethnic group against another” (Hojat 2003, 19).

In Kabul, Shi’as who fought the British were first demilitarized and then
marginalized. Prominent Shi’a Hajis, Karbalais, and Zawars, such as, Mullah Agha Baba and Sayyid Ali Ghowar Agha, to name a few, were imprisoned and tortured in the notorious underground prisons Sia Chah (Hojat 2003, 70). Shi’a religious commemorations were banned. People observed them secretly, in their homes and basements in the middle of the night. The Qizilbash community in Kabul was on the verge of extinction. The Shi’a elders, however, slowly started an anti-state campaign, after their repeated requests for equality were ignored by the state.

After the peaceful coronation of Habibullah in 1901, the Shi’a situation slightly improved. But, they were still banned from running their congregation halls takia-khana. Shi’a congregation halls were seen as spaces for outright disturbance against the state. Congregation custodians like Hematyari Khan of Chindawol was killed and his takia-khana was turned into a state-run mosque (Hojat 2003, 71). Shi’as could not have their own prayer call or commemorate religious holidays. Habibullah appointed Sunni Imams to give the sermons and to lead the prayer in the Shi’a takia-khanas. Shi’a people did not attend the Sunni led prayers because when Shi’as pray, they place their forehead onto a piece of clay tablet from the soil of Karbala mohr, the place where Husayn was martyred, instead of directly onto a prayer rug, which the Sunni state imam outlawed. Sometimes Shi’as perform their prayers back to back, (1-2-2, fajr on its own, Zuhr with Asr, and Maghrib with Isha) instead of praying five times a day with a break in between the prayers. Shias, like the followers of the Sunni Maliki School, hold their hands at their sides during prayer and do not cross
their arms - right over left. Consequently, Shi’as were accused of not praying and being irreligious, which lead to a renewal of social stigmatization.

Habibullah deployed Shia’s units (Qizilbash of Ghazni and Hazaras) to quite the Pashtun revolt of the Mangal and Solomon Khel tribes in the eastern provinces. This strategy turned to be a major miscalculation that widened the sectarian strife. To escape from the strident social realities, approximately 600 Shi’a households (Qizilbash and Hazara) wanted to flee to Persia, but they were stopped at the border in 1914. Influential Shi’a families of Kabul became under close surveillance to avoid travels outside the country. Domestic pressure from the progressive faction _Junbish-i Mashrutyat_ or The Constitutionalist Movement led to amnesty. Habibullah returned the confiscated Shi’a lands. Shi’a people returned to their customary life and paid their taxes to the state without having any direct influence. My interlocutor in general belief that the old Qizilbash and Hazara bureaucrat represented the state’s interest rather than advocating for equality.

**B. Constitutional Monarchy, 1919-46**

In the aftermath of the Great War, Kabul’s political ambiance was divided between _Junbish-i Mashrutyat_, modernizing forces who favored the principles of secular nationalism similar to those of Ataturk, and conservatives who desired a continuation of the status quo. The status quo meant continued dependence on the British-Raj, who relied on the subservient Habibullah in Kabul to keep the influence of Russian revolutionaries (1917) on the north side of Amu River.
The mounting political tension between the two sides ended with Habibullah’s assassination on February 20, 1919. A Shi’a killed Habibullah when it became clear for modernizing forces that Afghanistan’s “hopes for independence would not be realized” (Roberts 2003, 39).

The assassination brought to the throne “an advocate of the modernist faction” (Vogelsang 2002, 276). The new leader, Amanullah, had a nationalistic outlook, who sought to unite the diverse country under the banner of progress and nationalism. Amanullah promised to transform Afghanistan from a “tribal, authoritarian, patrilineal and patriarchal country” to an accountable country (Dupree 1973, 464). Members of the intelligentsia, who rose to power in 1919, noticed that Afghan society was in need of accountable institutions that would respond in a non-discriminatory way to the needs of all the people.

Mahmud Tarzi brought the model of secular nationalism to Afghanistan. Tarzi, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Amanullah’s father-in-law. Tarzi, who had spent a substantial time in Turkey and had become a firm supporter of the modernizing ideas advocated by the Young Turks. With Tarzi’s guidance, Amanullah was able to engineer policies that covered a wide range of political, social, and economic issues. The rapid political reforms of Amanullah included unprecedented transformation that alienated the non-urban masses and social conservatives. One of the major changes was the ratification of a Constitution Nezam Name-i Asasi, in 1923, which addressed sociopolitical issues outside the scope of the Qur’an.

Most of the social conservatives’ delegates were alarmed by the reforms
that were proposed in the Constitution 1923. The new codes decreased their socioeconomic power, which negatively affected their feudalistic lifestyle that was partially tied to the British-Raj subsidies. Moreover, the abolition of Shi’a slavery, bribery, polygamy, forced labor, begging, and honorary titles generated an uproar among the social conservatives. Ending servitude helped the Shi’a population. Basic rights were extended to people who were previously sidelined. Shi’as were permitted to travel, observe, and practice their religious traditions freely. To further tilt the political balance in favor of the modernizers, the new constitution gave voice and influence to women. It promoted equal inheritance, eliminated gender segregation, outlawed mandatory veiling, and the practice of underage marriage. The new laws enforced taxes on polygamous marriages and condemned the ill-treatment of women by their male counterparts (Poullada 1973). The new laws mandated that the parliamentarians wear European-style suits. The objective was to symbolically alter and modernize the image of the country’s professionals.

In 1928, with the opening of social space, Shi’a scholar, Ayatollah Hojat, returned to Kabul from Najaf. Although the Shi’a jurisprudence was still not recognized by the State. Shi’as were still in poor economic positions because of the prior policies, 1880-1919. Hojat delivered his first sermon in Murad Khani at Sayyid Mir Jan’s house. He was not a revolutionary. Hojat pursued a mild method to engage the state and the Sunni ulema in hopes of achieving a better socioeconomic status for the Qizilbash Shi’a people of Kabul and beyond.

Afghanistan’s social conservatives construed Amanullah’s rapid reforms
otherwise. They argued that secular nationalism would soon be followed by “immorality” and “uncontrollable freedom,” which would diminish the role and teaching of the Qur’an. Amanullah’s reforms became the center of controversies that eventually led to his forced exile. His decision to modernize the country by decreasing the social and economic influence of the conservatives caused great resistance. The anti-Amanullah factions received assistance from British. They directed a propaganda “campaign condemning the personal life and his modernization programs as anti-Islamic” (Dupree 1980, 450). Shortly after, the social conservatives initiated a series of uprisings. In 1928, the Shinwari tribe burnt down Amanullah’s winter palace in Jalalabad. Another insurrection took place in Koh Daman (north of Kabul) under the command of a former army deserter, Habibullah Kalakani. Kalakani entered the Arg in Kabul and “claimed the throne of the Amirate of Afghanistan” (McChesney 1999, 1). He restored the old posture of traditionalism in 1929.

In the wake of the 1929 international financial crisis, Kalakani’s regime crippled the already weak Afghan economy. Kalakani’s nine-month rule was dominated by “anarchy, pillage, and terror” (Roberts 2003, 99). The “bandit” leader built a religious movement composed mostly of Sunni clergy, relatives, and friends. The advisors he employed demonstrated no aptitude for economics or governance of a state. His religiously oriented cabinet reversed Amanullah Khan’s progressive reforms. Kalakani’s regime closed the women public schools and recalled all the students studying abroad. Museums and public libraries, fruits of modernization, were plundered. The country’s educational and judicial
institutions “were again run by clerics” (Vogelsang 2002, 282). His conservative measures faced a degree of internal opposition.

The modernist and nationalist groups wanted a civil society without the enactment of absolute religious laws. Pashtuns did not think that Kalakani, a Tajik, would champion the cause of an autonomous Pashtunistan. The Shi’a people, who enjoyed a relative degree of freedom under Amanullah Khan, also opposed the reinstitution of discriminatory laws.

Without any foreign aid and little means of raising funds domestically, Kalakani reverted to “extortion and plunder” (Vogelsang 2002, 99). The trade caravans between Kabul and Delhi were interrupted by looting in the eastern provinces. Kabul merchants endured a sharp decline in their import-export transactions. The non-existent custom levies plunged the country into scarcity and unmanageable inflation. Kalakani’s policies put Afghanistan onto a path of financial dependency and traditionalism that was contrary to his predecessor’s plan.

Kalakani’s intrusive policies in Central Asia brought Afghanistan to the brink of a full invasion by Soviet forces in 1929. Ramsey MacDonald’s cabinet in London recognized the possibility of a Soviet military invasion on a weak and impoverished Afghanistan. One proven method of curtailing any Soviet invasion was to establish another pro-British zone of influence in Kabul, a government that would refrain from provoking anti-British sentiments in the autonomous Pashtunistan, and refrain from supporting the Uzbek separatist, Ibrahim Beg, in Central Asia. The British Viceroy and Governor General of India, Lord Irwin
(Edward Fredrick Lindley Wood) were involved in reinstating a non-interfering “buffer-state.” British officers did not want to see a powerful Afghan state that would pose dangers to the stability of the wider region. The idea of a weak state stemmed from the lessons learned from the prior Anglo-Afghan confrontations. Previous experiences made the notion of direct British interference and having a permanent base in Kabul impractical. Lord Irwin instead preferred indirect influence. The challenge of this arrangement for the British was in locating a trustworthy person who would abide by their mandates.

Recognizing the gravity of the situation, the British formed alliances with exiled Afghan officials in France. Sir Francis Humphry, British Minister in Kabul, recommended Muhammad Nadir Khan. Nadir Khan’s contacts with the British officials had grown closer during his long stay in Paris. Both parties shared a mutual frustration for Kalakani. British officials held Nadir Khan in high regards. He was considered the best prospect for their interest in Kabul and Afghanistan. Nadir, who was Amanullah’s head of the armed forces, and his two brothers Hashim Khan and Shah Wali, were issued visas to travel to Peshawar “in spite of objections from Kalakani’s government” (Rahimzai 2014). With the aid of the British, the Musahiban Brothers sailed from France to Bombay and then to Peshawar.

In Peshawar, the Musahiban Brothers circulated an anti-Kalakani newspaper *Islah*, Reformation. Sir Richard Maconachie, the subsequent British Minister to Afghanistan, met the Musahiban s in Peshawar before giving them permission to enter Afghanistan. The brothers entered the Afghan province of
Khost with the “sums collected from friends in India” where they joined Shah Mahmud, a fourth brother, who had defected from the Kalakani regime (Fraser-Tytler 1967, 226). The British officials paid “funds to key frontier leaders and rewarded hose who helped Nadir Khan take the throne” (Roberts 2002, 57). To find military support for an advance on Kabul, Nadir Khan promised booty and authority to the Pashtun tribesmen from eastern Afghanistan who formed the backbone of his army.

On October 10, 1929, Nadir Khan and his three brothers, with the help of the Pashtun tribes, seized Kabul. Nadir Khan waited in silence while peoples’ houses, presidential palace, and other official buildings were stripped of every article of value (Fraser-Tytler 1967, 226). To avoid further chaos and damage, the residents of Kabul “was willing to submit to any ruler” (Adil 2014). Nadir Khan Muhammadzai thus became the first Shah of the Musahiban Dynasty, 1929-1978. Nadir’s earlier promise of restoring Amanullah Khan back to power turned out to be a ploy to rally the modernists and nationalists factions behind him. The failure to bring back Amanullah earned him the notorious title of Nadir the Treacherous Nadir Ghadar.

Why did Nadir Khan eliminate the important figures from Amanullah’s regime? Nadir established an absolutist regime that depended on an alliance with the old conservatives and the new Pashtun tribes who helped him. His reliance on Pashtun tribes over other ethnic and religious groups reinstated the antagonistic ethno-sectarian rift. At the same time, Nadir Khan instigated the dual regressive position of global isolationism and selective modernization. The
monarch’s isolationist attitude barred the entry of enlightenment philosophies from abroad that were essential for formation of civil society and more. Nadir’s ‘closed door’ stance meant the isolation of the society from the outside world.

Nadir Khan installed a multipronged domestic policy. It encompassed the forced relocation *naqilin*, of eastern tribal Pashtuns into strategic non-Pashtun lands, execution of Amanullah’s followers, and the incarceration of outspoken reformers. Sultan Muhammad Khan of Murad Khani was imprisoned without a trial for speaking against Nadir’s treachery. Nadir upheld order through heavy-handed measures. Rosita Forbes, an English traveler, who visited Kabul in the early-1930s, said, “The Afghan government is an autocracy vested in the hands of one family, ruthless with regard to its political opponents” (Forbes 2001). The exclusion of political opponents in Nadir’s régime deepened the ethno-sectarian undercurrent within the country.

Nadir Khan’s rise presented a political opportunity to formulate a state apparatus that would embody all the ethnic and religious minorities living in Afghanistan. The chance to form a pluralistic society based on tolerance and civil rights vanished. Nadir instead assembled a “ten-man cabinet mainly from among his kinsmen” and endorsed the customary Pashtun system. He went to great lengths to “secure the strong support of the Fazl Omar Mujaddidi, also known as the *Hazrat Sahib of Shor Bazaar*,” the country’s leading Sunni cleric (Sykes 1940, 325). Moreover, Nadir funded the newly formed Council of *Ulema* in Kabul, which was comprised of Sunni theologians, who did not speak or act in favor of Shi’a equality. This council not only interpreted and administered
the religious laws, but Nadir consulted with them on political, judicial, and educational policies that affected the future of the Millions of residents.

The state approved Council of Ulema embarked on the Islamization of modernity rather than focusing on the equitable modernization of the society. Tribal elders with the support of the Council of Ulema furthered their personal status with the restoration of honorary titles while the society regressed to the old practices of forced labor. Women’s schools remained closed and the dated posture toward women was restored. Nadir’s increased state religiosity created a deep rift with the Shi’as and the reformers, both groups were sidelined. Any dissenter critical of Nadir Shah’s regime was brutally silenced.

To subdue the sociopolitical situation in Kabul, Nadir quickly issued a ten-point policy declaration that showed the attitude of the new government. The new policy appeased the tribal forces and the religious establishment while alienating the Shi’a population. The Hanafi jurisprudence was acknowledged as before and “complete autonomy of Sharia courts was guaranteed (Gregorian, 1969, 305). The Sunni clerics occupied the judicial branch of the government. The civil and criminal codes were brought in line with the norms of the Hanafi laws. This principle subjected the country’s other minorities like the Hindus, Jews, and Shi’as to the Hanafi interpretation. The Qizilbash reverted to the practice of taqiyya until Shah Mahmud’s liberal interlude after the Second World War. The first of Nadir’s ten-point policy reads:

Government was to be conducted according to the commands of Islamic law of Hanafite interpretation. The presidium of the national council and the Ministry of Justice were to be
responsible for the enforcement of Islamic law throughout Afghanistan. The department of *ihtisab*, which supervised the strict adherence of Muslims to the moral code of Islam, was to be organized. All Afghans were declared equal in Islamic brotherhood and no one was to enjoy any special privileges. Women were required to be veiled.

Two years later, the 1931 Constitution solidified the *Musahiban* power and Afghan nationalism. Nadir Shah’s legal charter, *Usul Name-i Assasi*, was a mix of Pashtun tradition with “a hodgepodge of unworkable elements, extracted from the Turkish, Iranian, French and 1923 Afghan constitution” (Dupree 1980, 464). In contrast to the anti-hereditary standard of Islamic law, the 1931 Constitution states, “the noble Afghan nation, therefore, agrees that the crown of Afghanistan will be transferred to the family of this king, who desires the progress of the country...” (Constitution 1931, Article 5). Progress revolved around the principle of nationalism. The constitution declared, “all persons in the kingdom of Afghanistan are called Afghan subjects without any distinction of creed and religion...” (Constitution 1931, Article 9).

There was a noticeable gap between the impersonal state policies and the biased institutional practices. Shi’as were treated as “subjects” rather than as “citizens” (Khan Jan 2014). For instance, when Kabul University was opened in 1932, Shi’as were not allowed to enroll. A year later, Nadir was assassinated by a Shi’a named Abdul Khaliq. Nadir’s brother, Hashim Khan, the Prime Minister of the time used the opportunity to imprison and intimidate rivals (Sarwary 2014).

Under Hashim Khan’s Premiership, the Musahiban ethno-nationalism
expanded into the realms of language, military service, and education. In 1937, Hashim Khan banned Persian in favor of Pashto from the education system. Due to the shortage of textbooks and educators, he reversed his decision after the country’s students lost an entire academic year due to his shortsighted course of action. To produce textbooks in Pashto, he created the *Pashto Tulana*, Pashto Academy in 1940. Two year later, the Historical Society of Afghanistan was established with the aid of the régime for the purposes of disseminating the views of the state and international prestige.

At about the same time, to resist the absolutist policies of the state, the Shi’a people did not sit idle. Ayatollah Hojat established the country’s first Shi’a seminary *houza*, at a private house in Behsud 1936 (Wardak Province). A year later, Ismael Balkhi arrived to Herat after the completion of his education in Mashhad. Hashim Khan banned Balkhi from coming to Kabul because of his strong anti-government opinions. Hojat did not have the same type of critical views as Balkhi held. Thus, he was able to receive approval from the state to establish a congregation hall in Chindawol, *Takia-Khana Omomi* (near *Takia-Khana* Mir Akbar Agha and *Takia-Khana* Mir Faqir Husayn).

*Takia-Khana Omomi* became a public space for the Shi’a residents to gather and collectively commemorate their rituals without any inflammatory anti-state rhetoric. On the other hand, despite the travel restrictions, Balkhi secretly toured Qandahar, Kabul, Central, and Northern Afghanistan. Balkhi, who was an exceptional orator, spoke openly against the absolutist measures of the state. In 1945, Hashim ordered the closing of *Takia-Khana Omomi*, which
stayed closed until the seventh of Muharram of that year. It was opened once Hojat assured Zahir Shah that Takia-Khana Omomi was not the site of any anti-state undertakings.

In 1946, Ismael Balkhi with the help of activists from various parts of Afghanistan (Abdul Qhafar Baydar, Latif Jan Sarbaz, Sayyid Hayder Shah Qutb, Sarwar Joya, Ali Asghar Bashir Herawi, Sayyid Fazlullah known as “Mir Agha Herati”, Akhundzada, and Abdul Husayn Munjim-bashi) started Hizb-e Irshad or the Party of Enlightenment. Hizb-e Irshad sought to alter the electoral laws in the Lower House so people could choose their own candidates and they demanded the release of the political prisoners. This was a period of intense political activities. To avoid the situation from getting out of hand, Zahir Shah replaced Hashim Khan with his other uncle Shah Mahmud Khan (Ayoubi 2014).

C. From Cold War to Soviet Invasion, 1946-79

The history of Qizilbash took a different turn after the Second World War. The brutal reign of Hashim Khan’s Premiership ended in 1946. The Qizilbash saw Hashim’s resignation as a positive step (Ayoubi 2014). His successor, Shah Mahmud, however, did not move swiftly to meet the demands of the reformists. Hizb-e Irshad was busy amassing armaments and attracting prominent people from the ranks of civil and military to topple the state in a military style coup, but a clandestine agent by the name of Gul Jan Wardaki exposed the plot to the authorities in 1949. Soon, Balkhi and eleven other Hizb-e Irshad members
were arrested from *Takia-Khana* Mir Akbar Agha. Next day, there was a peaceful protest of about 10,000 people (including Sunnis and liberals) who marched from Chindawol to the Arg, the Shah’s Palace. The protestors demanded an end to the isolationist policy from the outside world, amnesty for political prisoners, and direct representation through free elections. Shah Mahmud reacted quickly to meet the demands of the outspoken protestors before it could escalate into a nation-wide upheaval (Ayoubi 2014).

In 1949-52, there were direct elections held for urban mayors and for the country’s national assembly (Kaker 2011). In 1950, a permissive press law was passed. Freedom of expression led to the spread of political publications, the importation of major political works from abroad (mostly translations via Iran), and social commentary/satire by the liberal intelligentsia. With the expansion of liberal press, the reformists became very outspoken. The Awakened Youth Movement started at Kabul University by Hasan Sharq, Ishaq Usman, and Abdulwahi Sarabi to show the college students an alternative route to social transformation was possible than Balkhi’s militarism. In 1950, *Hizb-e Watan*, Homeland Party, under the guidance of intellectuals such as, Sarwar Joya, Asif Ahang, Ghulam M. Ghobar, and Amin M. Farhang started the country’s Second Constitutionalist Movement, *Junbish-i Mashrutyat Khawan*. Zahir Shah and his Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud felt defenseless to continue with their liberal press experiment (Dupree 1980 494-98). Conservatives Sunni clerics and tribal chieftains, however, wanted Shah Mahmud gone. To appease the conservatives Zahir appointed his first cousin and brother-in-law, Daud Khan, as the next
Prime Minister of the country in 1953.

Daud Khan favored an authoritarian social progress. He was opposed to structural and cultural changes within Afghanistan’s political system, or what David Apter refers to as theory of “political modernization” (Apter 1965). Daud favored the preservation of the established social order at the cost of individual freedoms and progressive “public sphere.” Once Daud Khan took office, the newspapers ceased publication. Political parties ceased public activity. Rigged elections for the national assembly were held. In 1957, Daud ordered the arrest of Abdul Malik Abdul Rahimzai and a number of Qizilbash notables such as, Mir Asgar Shuha, Mir Ali Ahmad Shamil, Mahdi Zafar, Asif Ahang on flimsy charges of coup and corruption (Rahimzai 2014). Daud and his conservative backers closed the sense of progressivism that had prevailed in the aftermath of WWII from 1949-52.23

On the other hand, under Daud Khan’s authoritarian reign, expansion of the state’s education system (K-12 and universities), state controlled radio and television took place. Non-compulsory removal of the veil occurred in 1959 to keep a lid on the reformist discord. To finance his reforms, Daud gravitated towards the Soviet Union after his repeated attempts to form closer bonds with President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration fell upon deaf ears. He relied on Nikita Khrushchev’s aid to finance his Pashtunistan ambitions. As a result, Soviet aid and political ideology entered the Afghan army institution. Marxist

23 The impact of FDR’s Four Freedoms and Truman Doctrine on Afghanistan’s liberalization in 1949-52, are outside the scope of this study.
and Leninist ideologies penetrated the urban social fabric. In 1959, Abdul Baqi started to introduce some disenfranchised Shi’a youth to Marxism (Sarwary 2014).

By early 1960s, Zahir Shah was alarmed by the level of Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Daud’s insistence on Pashtunistan issue brought the country to the brink of a war with Pakistan. General Ayub Khan and the U.S. had become close allies. Pakistan was perceived in the U.S. as an integral bulwark against Communism. Zahir Shah lastly replaced Daud with a popular liberal politician, Dr. Muhammad Yusuf. Yusuf’s two immediate goals involved normalization of relations with Pakistan, and political modernization of the dynastic apparatus. Yusuf formed an inclusive government in 1963. In the following year, Yusuf pushed through the ratification of a new constitution by the Loya Jirga, which transformed the Afghan state from an absolutist monarchy to a constitutional monarchy.

The 1964 Constitution excluded members of the royal family, including paternal uncles and cousins, from entering politics. The national assembly, provincial assemblies, and municipal councils were to be directly elected by the people. Zahir Shah was to nominate members of the cabinet, but they were to be confirmed by a vote in the national assembly. People were guaranteed the right of free expression, of peaceful assembly, and of association. The police could neither make arrests nor enter private homes or confiscate property without warrants granted by the courts. Furthermore, individual freedom was guaranteed, except for those found guilty of crimes in the courts (Constitution
Islam stayed as the state religion. The state was to conduct its affairs in accordance with Hanafi law, which in the eyes of the Shi’a people belittled their faith, as did the previous two constitutions (Khan Jan 2014). Moreover, Shi’as interpreted this constitutional article as a way of conveying that Afghanistan’s top politician could not be of the Shi’a faith. Shi’as must abide by the Hanafi law in the country’s judicial system. Moreover, the word Dari and not Farsi was inserted in article 3, without the vote of the country’s Persian speakers. Aside from the imposition of the word Dari, below is a list of articles that Shi’as found to be problematic in the 1964 Constitution:

- ARTICLE 6 - In Afghanistan the King Personifies Sovereignty
- ARTICLE 8 – The King shall be an Afghan national, a Muslim and a follower of the Hanafi doctrine
- ARTICLE 13 – Royal expenditures shall be fixed in the state budget according to the law of the royal expenses
- ARTICLE 15 – The King is not accountable and shall be respected by all...
- ARTICLE 16 – The succession to the throne of Afghanistan shall continue in the House of his majesty Muhammad Nadir Shah, the Martyr, in accordance with the provisions of this constitution.
- ARTICLE 18 – On the King’s Abdication or death, the throne shall pass on to his eldest son. If the eldest son of the King lacks the qualification set forth in this constitution, the throne shall pass on to his second son and so on

Despite its explicit and implicit biases, the 1964 Constitution in reality found traction in elite and ordinary social circles. The legal charter introduced women rights and civil rights. Dr. Yusuf exonerate political prisoners who were held without trial, among them was Balkhi (Hayder 2014). Balkhi gave his first potent speech, in over a decade, in Chindawol at Takia-Khana Mir Akbar Agha.
The state-owned press and media reduced their censorship. Shi’a scholars were able to speak and write without the state obstruction. Several political parties materialized under the free association article of the legal charter (Constitution 1964, Article 32).

The Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the Maoist Democratic Current (Shole Jawid), the Islamic Association (Jamiat Islami), and the Afghan Social Democratic Party (Afghan Mellat) were able to recruit student and non-students, urbanites and non-urbanites to their political camps. Apart from the above political parties, Balkhi established another Takia-Khana in the district of Behsud. His two primary goals were social justice and constitutional equality for Shi’as (Afshar 2014). Both goals were articulated under the aegis of a new phenomenon, religious nationalism. To prevent the Shi’a youth from joining the growing leftist parties, the Guardian Movement (Nezat-e Pasdaran) was launched in 1968 to “awaken” the Shi’as (Afshar 2014). Five years later, another Shi’a activist party (Group Mostazahefin) The Powerless Group, formed. Group Mostazahefin sought social justice, which included the systemic neglect and underdevelopment of Shi’a muhallas that had occurred for many decades across the country.

The representatives elected to the national assembly in 1965 and 1969 came from the liberal, leftist, and social conservative factions. Representatives mostly failed to agree on issues to authorize the much-needed legislation. It contributed to a state-level gridlock. As a result, student discontent and social agitation grew when royal nepotism, corruption, and the Muhammadzai-led
social hierarchy was not supplanted with meritocracy. Hardly ever Shi’a and other ethnic minorities were given the chance to study abroad (Afshar 2014). In 1973, with the assistance of leftist military officers, former Prime Minister Daud overthrew his cousin’s monarchy and declared Afghanistan a Republic. Daud, this time around, launched an era of progressive measures to tackle the dilemma of underdevelopment and uneven development. When Daud became too close to the Soviet orbit, Jamiat Islami, plotted an unsuccessful overthrow in 1976. Daud, with advice from Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, began an effort to loosen ties with the Soviets. PDPA military officers seized the opportunity and overthrew him in a bloody coup in 1978.

The Marxist-inspired officials started a Stalinist style of purges once they grabbed power. Several Shi’a scholars, dignitaries, business elites, and clerics forever vanished (The Afghanistan Death List 2013). In Kabul, some of the Shi’a congregation halls were transformed into sites of adult literacy program. PDPA had an anti-religious attitude, which stemmed from Karl Marx’s famous phrase that “religion is the opium of the people” (McKinnon 2005). The PDPA literacy initiative focused more on indoctrination of Shi’as in their ideology rather than sincerely educating the masses. The state purges continued under Taraki and Amin reigns without any reasonable explanation other than petty rivalries and personal or familial retaliations.

The first anti-PDPA demonstration in Kabul in which more than 100,000 urbanites participated started in Chindawol in 1979. PDPA reacted with more purges, confiscation, and intimidation. According to one of my interlocutors in
Kabul, “the Communists made a grave mistake by threatening people. Didn’t they realize anti-coercion and martyrdom are part of the Shi’a cultural fabric?” Whether the Marxist revolutionaries understood this or not remains uncertain. One thing is certain, an armed opposition group known as Party of Unity (Hizb-e Tawid) was formed in 1979 in response to the PDPA actions, which targeted the Soviet supported Afghan officials.

IV. Culture

The political autonomy and power of the Qizilbash has varied since the rise of Afghan dynasties in 1747. The modern state did not offer the Shi’as with same constitutional equality, 1880-1978. Shi’a people could not openly disclose their identity and practice their religious observances in public because of the hegemonic ethno-nationalistic state policies. Thus, most Qizilbash turned to dissimulation Taqiyya, by changing their name, hiding their place of origin, and when possible marrying outside of their own social community. Extended years of Taqiyya, however, alienated individuals from their ancestral muhalla and culture. The policy of inculcation created the phenomena of inter-generational conflict or a sense of anomie.24

Qizilbash community life was noticeably weakened by 1978. With this in mind, what were the some of the strategies that the Qizilbash depended on for the preservation of their identity? Did visitation to shrines and rituals play key roles in the preservation of Qizilbash identity? The Ithna Ashari Shi’as consider

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24 The concept of inter-generational “sociolinguistic problem” is outside the scope of this study (Suslak 2009).
sites associated with *Ahl al-Bayt*, Shi’a Imams, reputable saints and scholars to be sacred places and highly visible cultural practices. Shi’as see shrines as an embodiment of their collective religious identity, as well as quiet locations for redemption and transmission of necessary knowledge in the face of coercive state policies. To understand the importance of shrine visitation, remembrance of Ashura and celebration of mid Sha’aban, it is essential to hear the Qizilbash stories.

**A. Pilgrimage**

Most Qizilbash of Kabul, in fact, seek to visit Mecca and Medina once in their lifetime, but visiting the nearby *Ziyarat-e Sakhi* (in Karte Sakhi previously known as Aliabad) is more practical and affordable. *Ziyarat* is a borrowed word from Arabic in the Persian lexicon that means to *visit*. *Sakhi* has two meanings: *generous*, and is one of the *honorable titles* bestowed upon Imam Ali. Qizilbash rationalize their visit to *Ziyarat-e Sakhi* by referring to a verse from the Qur’an, which enunciates, “no reward do I ask of you for this except to be kind to me for my kinship with you” (Qur’an 42:23). The shrine-keeper of *Ziyarat-e Sakhi*, a middle-aged man from the Chindawol named Sayyid Yusuf, responded to me with, “The Prophet himself used to visit his uncle Hamza’s grave. Shrines are considered a source of blessings for the visitor” (Yusuf 2014).

The shrine-keeper tells me “there are two other categories of pilgrimage sites: 1) *nazargahs*, sights of seeing, and 2) mausoleum of revered saints and scholars” (Yusuf 2014). The grave of a saint *awliya*, is a point of contact with
the saint where the conventional relations of cause and effect are suspended. Awliya are seen as having a close relationship with God. Pilgrims approach them as intermediaries. People even desire to be buried near awliya who are known for their piety so the time between death and resurrection (barzakh or purgatory) should be spent in a nazargah or near an awliya.

Pilgrims regularly visit shrines in the hopes of being the beneficiaries of divine favor in some palpable way tawassul. The experience of pilgrimage is also comforting taskin, and heart-opening dilbaz. If a request is granted, then it may be celebrated publicly through donation or food. Shrine visitation takes place in quest of seeking nearness to God and His receiving blessings barakat, which gives the pilgrim a degree of spiritual merit sawab. Yusuf, the shrine-keeper tells me, “Shi’as send salutations salawats, to Prophet Muhammad and the Ahl al-Bayt.” When visiting, a pilgrim is not only keeping the memory of that person alive, but also the mixture of donation, food, and salutation strengthens and re-institutionalizes the fundamentals of the Shi’a cultural identity.

The shrine-keeper of Ziyarat-e Sakhi then asked me a rhetorical question, if things such as Ziyarat and Tawassul were innovations then why the Prophet himself did not prohibit people from visiting graves in his lifetime or kissing the scared black stone hajarul aswad, in the Ka’ba (Yusuf 2014). The curator then recited a hadith of the Prophet Muhammad that says, “He who visits my grave will be entitled to my intercession” (Yusuf 2014). Our conversation ended, when Yusuf said to me, “scared memorial is where the living and the dead encounter
each other every day, and it helps keep a person humble and balanced.” I thought about his statement for a long time on that day, after the silent pause, I asked Sayyid Yusuf if he could tell me about the history of Ziyarat-e Sakhi.

B. A Glance at Ziyarat-e Sakhi

If Najaf is the famed site of Ali ibn Abi Talib’s mausoleum, then why is the shrine-mosque complex in Kabul referred to as Ziyarat-e Sakhi? This subsection traces the creation, evolution, and function of Ziyarat-e Sakhi based on my conversation with Sayyid Yusuf. The origin of Ziyarat Sakhi is associated with the Prophet Muhammad’s Kherqa Sharif. Kherqa is a cloak that is believed to have been sewn by the Ahl al-Bayt, and worn by him toward the latter years of his life. Muhammad made a will, wasiya, to Ali and Omar to give his Kherqa as a gift to Weiss Qarni (Shahrani E. 2001). Weiss Qarni who had converted to Islam without ever being in Muhammad’s presence. After the Prophet died, his companions gave the cloak to Weiss, who guarded the sacred cloak diligently. After Weiss died, the cloak was transferred from Yemen to Cave of Hira in Hejaz until the Abbasid Caliph moved it to Baghdad. The Prophet’s cloak remained in Baghdad until the defeat and capture of Sultan Yildrim (Referring to Bayazid bin Sultan Qara-Usmanlu) by Timur in the Battle of Ankara in 1402.

Timur became the cloaks protector after his campagains in the Levant in 1401-02. Timur took the sacred cloak and brought it back with him to the seat of his power in Samarqand, where it remained for years (Yusuf 2014). Some of the later power-holders attempted to relocate it to Delhi for their own personal
motivations, but it remained in Samarqand by the orders of Governor of Balkh. In 1691, the Kherqa was transferred to Badakhshan (Shahrani E. 2001). The Governor of Balkh built a sanctuary in Juzgon, where following sentence was etched, “Sunday 24 Muharram al Haram 1109 Hijri Qamari [August 11, 1697], because of the blessings of this noble cloak, Juzgon is renamed to Fayzabad” (Yusuf 2014). Fayzabad means the Blessed Bode. The Prophet’s cloak stayed in Fayzabad until mid-18th century, when Ahmad Khan Abdali the founder of the Durrani Dynasty relocated to Qandahar via the Kabul route (Yusuf 2014).

Ahmad Shah decided to relocate the Prophet’s cloak from Fayzabad to Qandahar for the purposes of deepening his political legitimacy. He appointed Shah Wali Khan, Etimad ul-Dawlat, along with a unit of Qizilbash cavalry with the task of relocation. On their way back from Fayzabad, Shah Wali placed the Prophet’s cloak in an unsoiled and non-residential district of Kabul for the residents of that city to come and see it in person. After two consecutive busy days, in the third night, Shah Wali Khan and the Qizilbash saw a charismatic person who was wearing green attire and praying next to the cloak in their dream. After the prayer, the person in the green attire took his sword out from its sheath and placed it on top of a rock that is now located behind the main structure. It was obvious from the spilt tip of his sword that the person in their dream was Ali ibn Abi Talib. Shah Wali Khan and the Qizilbash told about their dream to Ahmad Shah. He ordered those responsible for the relocation of the cloak to construct a mausoleum there. Shah Wali Khan raised a banner at the spot they saw Ali pray, which is now at the central court of this shrine complex.
to mark it as a *nazargah* of Ali. After that night, the carriers of cloak noticed that the rock on which the Commander of the Faithful had placed his sword had cracked in the middle. Since that day, the rock has been called *Sang-e Zulfiqar*. The cloak remained in the newly built dome for eight months before it was transferred to Qandahar (Yusuf 2014).

**Figure 15. Ziarat Sakhi Single Dome**

Amanullah Khan’s mother, Hayat Begum, made a vow on the eve of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, 1919. If Afghanistan was victorious, she would build a second dome and renovate the entire interior and exterior of *Ziyarat-e Sakhi.*
After Afghanistan’s victory, the Qizilbash residents of Chindawol received an official approval from Amanullah to bury their loved ones near this complex (Afshar 2014). The approval was given for several reasons. 1) Amanullah Khan wanted to end the anti-Shi’a stance of his two predecessors. 2) Amanullah wanted the Constitutionalists *mashruta khawan* some of them who were *Ithna Ashari* Shi’as on his side. 3) He wanted the children of Qizilbash bureaucrats and officials to be trained and inculcated as parts of the new cadre of civil servants and professional that the state needed. 4) Amanullah wanted to give some land back for the Qizilbash lands and burial places that were taken for the urbanization expansion of Kabul.

**Figure 16.** Ziarat Sakhi Double Dome
Despite Hayat Begum’s expansions, *Ziyarat-e Sakhi*'s courtyard remained small until the liberal Premiership of Shah Mahmud Khan, 1946-53. Ayatollah Hojat discussed this issue with Zahir Shah. With the monetary contributions of the Qizilbash Shi’as, Hojat purchased about 10,000 square meter of land in the vicinity of *Ziyarat-e Sakhi*. In the newly purchased lands, the shrine’s courtyard was expanded and the Mosque of Al-Ali that can hold up to 1,000 people was built (Hojat 2003). In the expanded courtyard, the arrival of Persian New Year, *Nowruz*, which corresponds with the spring equinox on March 20, is annually celebrated on a grander scale. On Nowruz, a special characteristic is the ritual of raising the banner *jindah* that is symbolic of Ali’s banner. The main emblem on the banner is the word *taiyba*, Army of the Righteous. Since Ali had always been the defender and flag bearer of Islam, this banner is raised in his honor. While the banner is being raised, people harmoniously chant, “Ya Ali Madad, Ya Ali Madad.” This ritual from the very beginning of *Ziarat-e Sakhi* has been conducted every year with the volunteer help of Kabul residents. At this ritual, thousands of Sunnis, Shi’as, and state dignitaries participate. At the beginning of the ritual, some Qur’anic verses are recited. Afterward, a number of Sunni and Shi’a *Fuqaha* give talks about the arrival of *Nowruz* and the remembrance of Ali’s heroic life. State dignitaries usually take this opportunity to underline national unity and prosperity.
Below is the calendar of events in *Ziyarat-e Sakhi*. The events are divided into three categories: days of celebration, remembrance, and mourning. Shi’as observes these days.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Explain</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eid Fitr</td>
<td>Marks the end of fasting during the month of Ramadan</td>
<td>Shawwal 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eid al-Adha</td>
<td>Marks the end of the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca</td>
<td>Dhu al-Hijjah 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eid al-Ghadir</td>
<td>Marks the anniversary of the Ghadir Khum, when Muhammad announced Ali's Imamate</td>
<td>Dhu al-Hijjah 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laylat al-Qadr</td>
<td>Anniversary of Qur'an's revelation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mawlid</td>
<td>Muhammad's birth date. Unlike Sunni Muslims, who celebrate the 12th of Rabi' al-awwal as Muhammad's birthday or death-day. Shias celebrate Muhammad's birthday on the 17th of the month</td>
<td>Rabi’ al-awwal 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali</td>
<td>Birthday</td>
<td>Rajab 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatima</td>
<td>Birthday</td>
<td>Jumada al-Thani 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashura</td>
<td>Commemoration of Husayn ibn Ali's martyrdom</td>
<td>Muharram 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sham-e Ghariba</td>
<td>Evening of Ashura</td>
<td>Muharram 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arba’een</td>
<td>Commemorates the suffering of the women and children of Husayn ibn Ali’s household.</td>
<td>Safar 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahdi</td>
<td>Birth date of the 12th and final Twelver Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi</td>
<td>Sha'aban 15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 9.** Shi’a Holidays, Celebrations, and Remembrances
CONCLUSION

“The Qizilbash are a classic example of a cohesive group tossed about by history and split among several nations, losing their cohesion and influence but never their ethnic pride – in spite of the fact that many must practice taqiyya in order to survive.”

— Dupree, “Qizilbash” in Muslim People: A World Ethnography Survey, 1984

The major findings of this multisited study on the Qizilbash of Kabul are as follows. First, the effective utility and application of ethnohistorical method for minorities such as Qizilbash. Second, the Qizilbash writers and intellectuals in Kabul agree that Qizilbash is a Turkic compound word, which initially meant those wearing a distinctive crimson headgear. The Ottomans used this marker in a disparaging way toward the seminomadic Turkmen tribes (Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu) who steadily became dedicated murids of the Safavi Sufi Order. The Qizilbash constituted the military bloc of the Safavi Sufi Order, and helped Shah Ismael institute the Ithna Ashari form of Shi’a denomination in Persia in 1501.

During the Safavid Empire, 1501-1722, the Qizilbash (Turk) merged and intermarried with Persian, Kurdish, and to a lesser extent with principal Shi’a academic families from Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon who built the Shi’a religious institutions in Persia and started to take part in the Safavid state affairs. At the same time, Safavid Shahs enacted wide-ranging reforms to consolidate and to expand their power by lessening the military muscle and
communal cohesion of the Qizilbash. The land grant initiative of the Safavids caused the semi-nomadic Qizilbash to become sedentary. Shah Tahmasp ordered the massacre of the Tekelu tribe on account of their irreligion *ilhad* who openly declared him the Mahdi. The institutionalization of the *Ithna Ashari* Shi’a denomination led to persecution, exile, and transformation of the Sufi religious identity. By end of the Safavid period, Qizilbash were mostly located in the main urban centers of the polity or concentrated in frontier forts across the Iranian Plateau as key border protectors.

Third, my primary source findings suggest the Qizilbash migration to Kabul predates Nadir Shah’s India expedition in 1739. The Qizilbash arrived to Kabul in successive waves that extend back to the early 16th century. A unit of Safavid forces (Baharlu tribe) arrived in the mountainous frontier city of Kabul with Babur, founder of the Mughal Dynasty in 1504. After the construction of Kabul as Mughal’s winter capital, more Qizilbash cavalrymen and officeholders arrived when Humayun with the assistance of Tahmasp’s Qizilbash forces, who were under the command of Bayram Beg (later Khan who enthroned Akbar the Great as *Shahanshah*) and nobles, reinstated the Mughal power in 1554. In the same year, Humayun’s son Mirza Muhammad Hakim became the Governor of Kabul province. Kabul stayed in the hands of the Mughals until Nadir Afshars reign. Another wave of Qizilbash arrival took place in 1738, when Nadir Afshar positioned his logistical base in Chindawol *rearguard*. Nadir Shah ordered part of his Qizilbash units to avoid a blindside attack by the Baluch or the Ghilzai, maintain order, and collect taxes from residents of Kabul.
Primary sources further reveal that after Nadir’s assassination in 1747, additional Qizilbash cavalry and officials relocated to Qandahar. The Qizilbash of Qandahar supplied steadfast security, especially against the rival Pashtun tribes, and filled key posts within the fledgling court of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the founder of the Durrani Empire, 1747-1823. Ahmad Shah also reached an agreement with the Qizilbash of Kabul. The last Qizilbash migration to Kabul occurred when Timur Shah, Ahmad’s son, relocated the imperial capital from Qandahar in 1773-75. While in Kabul, Timur Shah offered plots of land to the Qizilbash royal guards and court officials to further cement their loyalty. The new settlement, located on the north side of Kabul River, near the Chindawol district, became known as Murad Khani.

The Qizilbash remained a vital part of the Durrani Empire up until the Succession Crisis between Timur’s sons and the rival Barakzai Pashtuns in 1793. When tensions between Fath Ali Shah Qajar and Zaman Shah escalated over Herat in 1798, the Qizilbash of Kabul supported the Durranids because of their mutual material interest in the survival of the polity. However, because of their origin in Persia and religious relations with Shi’a Islam the anti-Durrani factions in the Kabul Riots of 1803-04 looted and damaged their properties. The inter-Pashtun dynastic rivalry _badal_ resulted in the loss of key territories to the expanding British and Russian powers, including access to the Indian Ocean (1813-1907, the “Great Game”).

The Succession Crisis finally resulted in a dynastic shift from the Abdali branch of the Pashtun confederacy to the Barakzai, 1826. The Barakzai ruler,
Dost Muhammad Khan (1829-39, 1845-63) was not able to entirely end the domestic inter-Pashtun antagonism. In his first tenure, Dost depended on local strongmen to avoid further fragmentation of the polity. This policy caused the power of the monarchy to become relatively decentralized and prone to colonial intervention. The fear of a Napoleon-Qajar pact or a Russian expedition toward Delhi enticed the British to enthrone Shah Shuja, a friendly monarch in Kabul. This action led to the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1838-42. It had a devastating economic effect on Kabul’s Qizilbash and non-Qizilbash residents. British armies burnt Char Chattah (the main financial bazaar of the city) and Shirpur Project (the new administrative capital), which led to years of socioeconomic stagnation until Amir Shir Ali Khan’s reforms, 1863-79. Shir Ali’s modernization projects coincided with the rise of Tories to power in London. Tories started the tactical “Forward Policy,” which aimed to establish a permanent British establishment in Kabul to prevent any Soviet expansion. This preemptive move led to another costly war for the Qizilbash residents of Kabul – the Second Anglo-Afghan War 1878-80.

Within few years after the war, the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission delineated the Barakzai polity’s internationally recognized borders in 1886. The new state of Afghanistan became a “buffer state” under British protection until 1919. The Delhi-based British Governor-General managed the external political and commercial affairs of the state. British officers facilitated the coronation of a Barakzai prince, Amir Abdurrahman Khan, and rewarded him for accepting the controversial Gandomak Treaty of 1878 and the Durand Line of 1893. He
then used the subsidized cash and weapons provided to him by the British-Raj to centralize his power and rule Afghanistan with an “Iron Fist.” Abdurrahman quieted his real and imagined political rivals in a brutal manner. His political advice to his successors is compiled in an autobiographical publication (1886) titled, *Pandnama Dunya wa Din* (Book of Advice on the World and Religion). This book had a lasting impact on the political culture of the new state. Based on my interviews, his shortsighted policies sowed the seeds of ethno-religious strife for generations to come. The period 1883 to 1946 was an era of intense *taqiyyah* dissimulation and economic difficulties for the Qizilbash (except for Amanullah’s reign, 1919-29).

My next crucial finding is that Abdurrahman killed or exiled the Qizilbash military elites who were supporters of his predecessor and rival, Amir Shir Ali Khan. Shir Ali had exiled Abdurrahman Khan to Bukhara. The elimination of Qizilbash military elites was decisive in the collapse of the Qizilbash as a main military force. In 1883, Abdurrahman Khan declared the Shi’as of Afghanistan “infidels” and “enemies of the state” for their refusal to pay hefty taxes for his domestic war campaigns. He claimed to have been God’s Shadow on Earth as he implemented his “policy of pacification” to enslave the Shi’as and subjugate them after the First Chindawol Uprising 1883. His son, Habibullah, succeeded him peacefully in 1901. Habibullah relaxed Abdurrahman’s anti-Shi’a policies, reformed his notorious intelligence network, and dismantled the underground *Siah-Chah* dungeons, as the interrelated concepts of Afghan nationalism and Constitutional Movement *mashruta*
Khahan picked up steam in Kabul.

After the War of Independence in 1919, Amanullah Khan who was under the influence of nationalists (Mahmud Tarzi) and constitutionalists launched a rapid modernization program to bring a degree of progress in the country after four decades of isolationism. Unlike Abdurrahman, he did not claim to be the divine protector and propagator of Sunni Islam. He made official visits to Takia-Khana Mir Akbar Agha and Faqir Husayn in Chindawol to bridge the gap with the Qizilbash. Amanullah aligned himself with the growing urban nationalists until a progressive constitution nezamnama-i asasi was ratified in 1923. The constitution’s principle of equal rights ended the legal ban on public Shi’a commemorations. Amanullah’s government opened modern schools, and sent many students (boys and girls) abroad for education. The Qizilbash youth took advantage of his education reforms. In 1928, Ayatollah Hojat, a Shi’a scholar, returned to Chindawol from Najaf. The modernization period, however, did not last long because the lives of ordinary citizens in rural areas did not experience any significant progress. The social conservatives that the British supported eventually ousted Amanullah in 1929.

Many Qizilbash elders belief the British-Raj opposed Amanullah in part because Afghanistan turned into an independent and self-reliant modern-state with zero budget deficit. Afghanistan could have become a successful model for other colonies and protectorate states in Africa and Asia. This development was dangerous for the British Crown since it disproved the Victorian conception of social evolution or civilizational hierarchy, popularized by Kipling’s White Man’s
Burden in 1899. Amanullah’s warm ties with Vladimir Lenin and the Bolshevik revolutionaries was not something the British-Raj favored. The Amani era was another critical missed opportunity for equitable political modernization.

The overthrow of Amanullah Khan by the counter-reformation forces of Habibullah Kalakani plunged the country into a Civil War, 1929. The Qizilbash initially refused to pay allegiance to Kalakani. Abdul Razzaq raised a flag with Amanullah’s emblem with the help of 400 residents of Kabul, but Kalakani had him hanged and issued an anti-Shi’a fatwa that resulted in Kalakani attacking Chindawol. Reza Shah sent an Iranian mission to aid the Shi’as of Kabul after Kalakani’s men looted Qizilbash homes, shops, and raped women. This awful event created a backlash by the Hazaras. To prevent the situation from turning into a sectarian war, the Qizilbash elders of Kabul finally paid their allegiance to Kalakani. Soon after, Kalakani sent Faiz Muhammad Katib, Nur al-din Agha Jawanshir (a Qizilbash from Kabul), and some Qizilbash elders to Bamiyan to negotiate with the anti-Kalakani Hazaras. At the same time, to heal the wounds of the Qizilbash in Kabul, Kalakani quickly appointed Kaka Muhsin Qizilbash as Governor of Hazarajat and Mirza Mujtaba Khan as Minister of Finance. In spite of these measures, Kalakani restored the authoritarian political culture in Kabul by weakening the nationalists and constitutionalists. Kalakani sought a docile society that did not reward institutionalization or allow men and women to participate in a representative form of government.

The Civil War concluded when Nadir Khan defeated Habibullah Kalakani. Afghanistan came to be ruled by another branch of the Barakzais, this time the
Muhammadzais, who established the last Afghan monarchy, the Musahiban Dynasty, 1929-78. Similar to Abdurrahman, Nadir Khan ascended the throne with the help of the British. Nadir’s Ten Point Guideline overturned Kalakani’s conservatism, but set the country on a trajectory of selective modernization for decades to come. He constructed state authority through custom and tradition of the state elites, which kept regular individuals away from the enlightenment values. Nadir Khan had a complex relationship with the Qizilbash. To avoid a pro-Amanullah takeover, Nadir and his successor, Hashim Khan, did not allow the Qizilbash to hold positions of power in the Ministries of Defense, Interior, or Foreign Affairs. Shi’a students were not allowed to study past sixth grade, and not allowed to enroll in Kabul University. Nadir’s constitution did not advance the legal or the socio-economic standing of the Qizilbash. A dire situation for all the Shi’as that lasted until the end of the Second World War.

After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union became more and more involved in Afghanistan. The mixture of external financial help and domestic pressure (Hizb-e Irshad 1946, Hizb-e Watan 1950, and the Awakened Youth Movement that started in Kabul University also in 1950) led to an era of relative stability, which lasted until 1978. In early 1950s, Shah Mahmud Khan reformed Nadir’s conservative policies and isolationist posture. The Qizilbash youth were amongst the leading beneficiaries of Shah Mahmud’s reforms. The subsidized university education produced a new urban middle class. The state provided the new Qizilbash professionals with jobs, mobility, and security in hopes of political quiescence. At the same time, Afghanistan’s post-WWII liberal
autocracy created a patronage system that turned professionals, intellectuals, and entrepreneurs into semi-depoliticized dependents. Personal ties, *Waseta bazi*, and not democratic forms of civic engagement to build trust between state and Shi’as remained the norm until Dr. Muhammad Yusuf’s Constitution in 1964.

The Qizilbash professional class consisted of white-collar civil servants, physicians, engineers, teachers, nurses, and other educated specialists that filled the society’s basic needs. Professions that the state considered apolitical. The middle class struggled to rectify the enormous economic disparity that had developed between the elites and themselves. Some of the more affluent middle class families were able to send their children abroad for advanced training and education. The above social class was also receptive to exogamy as they moved out of their ancestral neighborhoods. Another layer of complication was added to the Musahiban -Qizilbash relations when ancestral Qizilbash neighborhoods became zones of mandatory relocation for Kabul’s urbanization. The expansion of the city broke down the spatial solidarity of the Qizilbash. The relocation led to a split between the new middle class and the untrained urban workers who remained in the older areas. The latter group, mostly traders and merchants, forged closer ties with the Shi’a clerics.

In conclusion, on the eve of the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan coup in 1978, the Shi’a Qizilbash identity had remained one distinctive aspect of individual and communal identity among the Qizilbash residents. A singular aspect among many new identity markers. The manifestation of identity politics
is an anthropological phenomenon that ebbs and flows with political breezes in Kabul. Lastly, the Qizilbash perspective of state-formation helps us understand Afghanistan’s previous political culture and its legacies. Legacies that are at the heart of the recent rise of identity politics.
GLOSSARY

A

Abdal - Class of saints, rare, noble, righteous, and pious people
Abed - Devout
Adam Forosh - Seller of men. Qizilbash revile the Uzbeks for this practice and apply to them with great disgust the appellation
Adl – justice, social justice
Afwaj (singular Fawj) – Main pillar of the cavalry
Ahd - Vow
Ali Mardan Khan - A Persian nobleman, who built monuments and magnificent gardens in the area from Mashhad to Delhi
Ajaq-zah - Children of the Safavid dynasty
Al-Tashayo – The Shi’a, used when people do not want to reveal their sectarian identity
Akhtarmah - Booty, war spoil
Ashklik - Wooden pipe placed through finger and pushed on to cause pain
Alga - Property, land or area of commonage that government used it to settle a tribe
Arkan-e Dawlat – State officials
Amir al-Umara – Chief army commander
Amir Sanjagh - The brigade commander
Arba’een – Or the 40th day. Shi’a religious observance that occurs 40 days after Ashura
Arg – Royal palace
Asaker-e Monazam – Regular Qizilbash cavalry
Ashura – An Islamic holiday that observed on the 10th day of month of Muharram. Among Shi’as, it commemorates the death of Imam Husayn
Ayshyk Agassi Bashi - Head of the interior court and harem.
Azoqa – Food
Baad-pa - Fast horse
Bai’ah - Allegiance
Balla Hissar - A formidable fortress and spacious castle on the foothills of Shir Darwaza Mountain in Kabul, the occasional residence of the Shah and where some nobility lived. It is only located in the west side of the Kabul River, from one side offers a panoramic view of the city, has some splendid halls, and pleasant gardens. It is now much neglected and discloses signs of decay.
Bar Salar - Head of the caravan or convoy
Batil - Falsehood
Baihaq - Old name of Sabzevar
Bazaz - Cloth-dealer, draper

Cartel - An invitation to war
Charkhchi – Skilled archers in front of the legion as part of the warders
Chindawol – Rear-guard, camp follower
Chindawol Kohan – Ancient Chindawol, name of a local newspaper publication
Cudkhuda - A townsman chief who manages all transaction between the trade and the government. Had no power, but what he derives from the Shah, which is mostly concerned with the collection of the revenues and the calling out of the militia. He has enough weight to determine trifling disputes, but all-important matters are referred to the Governor or to Qazi

Dabir - Secretary, clerk
Dasta Saf Shekan – Special Forces
Da’wa – Invitation
Dawlat Melli – Nation Unity Government
Dhikr (Zikr) - Remembrance
Diwan - Court, or the sum of the lyrics
Diwan Begi - Title of administrative position equivalent to chief justice of the Safavids
Dostaqchi - Warder
Dorbash - Front and escort officers

F

Fakhr al-nisa - Queen
Fanous - Lighthouse, a light place that holds candle
Farash - Porter, servant, valet
Farman - Royal decree, edict
Farsang - Older unit of distance in Persia that equates to 3.5 miles
Fatha-nama - Victory proclamation
Fatwa - Religious decree or ruling made by a scholar
Fiqh - Jurisprudence
Fitna - Civil Strife

G

Gazargah - Place to wash, laundry
Gazmah - Watchman, warder
Ghazal - Rhythmic poem sharing the same meter
Ghazi - Warrior
Ghomrog - Customhouse
Ghozar - Small commercial area
Ghulu - Extremism

H

Halva - A popular sweet food in the wider Middle East
Hanafi - The dominant Sunni denomination of Islam in Afghanistan
Haqq - Truth
Hayzat - Honor, prestige
Hesab-dan - Accountant

Hamam - Public baths with rooms heated to different temperatures and in the hottest, the bather is scrubbed until every particle of dirt and death skin tissue is cleared off his skin

Hindu - Represents themselves to be emigrant from India. The prohibition against taking interest makes most of the business of banking fall into the hands of the Hindus. They are often employed about the court in offices connected with money or accounts. The duty of steward and treasurer is exercised either by a Hindu or by a Persian.

Hujum - Purge

I

Ilham – Inspiration
Iklas – Sincere loyalty
Insaf - Fairness
Ithna Ashari – Twelver denomination of Shi’a Islam

J

Jabba Dar-bashy - Commander of cache of weapons
Jabba Khana - Cache of weapons
Jafari - Dominanat form of Shi’a Islam in Afghanistan
Jarchi – Shouter, trumpeter, herald
Javanmardi - Chivalry
Jirga - The hunting grounds were surrounded for royal hunting, also an assembly. Afghan tribal council
Junbish - Movement

K

Kalamraw-i Qizilbash – Qizilbash realm
Kashknjyr- Stone castle with a catapult to throw
Katib - Scribe
**KhaD** – PDPAs State Intelligence Agency

Khalifat al-Khulafa – Person in charge of overseeing Sufi affairs

**Khan** - Chief of the ulus. He is always chosen from the older family of the Ulus. In most cases, the selection rests with the Shah, who can remove a Khan at pleasure, appointing one of his relatives in his place. In some cases, the people elect the Khan. In both cases, some attention is paid to primogeniture, but more to age, experience, and character. In tribes that are obedient to the Shah, the Khan derives much influence from his employment of collecting the royal revenue and raising the militia, and indirectly, from the emoluments attached to those duties. The position of wealth, by enabling him to keep numerous retainers and to confer obligation on the heads of his Ulus, greatly strengthens his power. The fighting men receive no pay, but in some tribes, if a horse is killed, the owner receives the price form a fund formed by fines, and by a tax on the tribe. The Khan does not tax the Ulus for his own benefit and the Khan appropriates the customs collected on merchandise passing through the land of the Ulus

**Khanate** - Commercial caravanserais in the city, which was a separate market

**Khanawada** – family, household institution

**Khaqan** - King and the title of Shah Ismael

**Khassa** – Crown

**Khata’i** - Sinner

**Khavari** – Referred to Shi’a people who migrated from Afghanistan to Iran

**Kherqa** - Some clothes or garment to the consecration of the Sufi masters to disciples after the conduct covered

**Khotbah** – Religious sermon

**Khulafa** – Qizilbash missionaries

**Kishikchi** - Watchmen who are posted on different guards in the town under the supervision of the *Mirshab*

**Kitabdar** – Scrivener

**Kocha** – Small street

**Kolah-e Fakhr** – Nobility hat

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Page 228
Kotaval - Keeper of the fort

L

Lala Bashi – A guardian, trainer, or teacher of young boys
Loya Jirga – Grand Afghan tribal assembly
Lungi - Turban

M

Madh’hab – An Islamic school of law
Mahalla – Neighborhood
Majlis – Advisory council
Manjaniq - Catapult used to throw stones or fireballs
Manqabat Khani – Recitation of elegiac poems
Mansabdar - Person with a ranking post or office mansab
Mamalik - Provinces
Mashk – Large leather water sacks
Maslak - Occupation
Mir Miran - Title given to the prominent division leaders of the military
Mirza – Nobleman, royal prince
Modaris - A Mullah selected for his learning to instruct students at the royal mosque
Mohtasib – An officer whose duty it is to superintend the public morals. He enforces the regular performance of prayer and it is considered impious to refuse to conform to the Sharia. It is enforced by the municipal law, who punished the omission of it or the breach of any other religious precept. The police of the towns in managed under the Sirdar by the Mirshab, the Mohtasib, and the Darogha-i Adawlat (supervisor who fixes the prices) of the Bazaars
Mostofi – State accountant
Motassadi – Fiscal officer
Mufti - Give their religious law opinion supported by quotations from books of
authority

**Mullah** - Are generally restrained to censuring the more important breaches of religion and morality, and, in many parts, they have no power at all. Mullahs do not hold offices; have pensions from the Shah or lands assigned to them by the crown or by the charity of individuals. Mullahs are numerous and are found in every rank, from the chief courtiers and minister to the lowest class in the poorest and wildest tribes. When mentioned as a body, they are usually called the *Ulema* or learned. Mullahs preach an austere life. There are no corporate bodies of Mullah and they are not under command of any chief or subject to any particular clergy

**Munshi Bashi** - Head Secretary (write and read letters to dignitaries with striking distinctness and elegance

**Munshi Mamalik** - Secretary, chronicler of events

**Murid** – Devout Sufi follower

**Murshid** - Sheikh, guide of the straight path. *Murshid-kol*, refers to Shah Tahmasp

**Mushrif** - An accountant, chief administrative or financial officer

**N**

**Nan** - Bread

**Nasaq** – Order and arrangement

**Nasaqchy bashi** - Head of the security and military responsible for order and arrangement

**Naqib** - Head and a caretaker of a tribe

**Nayib** – Deputy

**Nazargah** – Sight of seeing, sacred place

**Nazer** – Servant

**Nifaq** – factionalism

**Nishan Zani** – Target shooting

**Nowruz** – Persian New Year that is also celebrated in Afghanistan

**Nubuwa** - Prophethood
O

**Oymaq** - Clan or tribe, also live in today’s western Afghanistan

P

**Padar (brother) Kushi** - fratricide

**Pa-kar** - Unarmed trooper or a doer

**Paymaan** – Oath

**Pir** – Honorary title for Sufi spiritual guide

**PDPA** – Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan

Q

**Qabaq andaz** – Derby

**Qala** - Fort

**Qanun-mardan** - Gentlemen agreement

**Qaravol** - Sentinel, watchman, patrol, warder

**Qaravol-khana** - Guard houses

**Qarvarahchi** - Army unit to burn the castle

**Qasida** – Long poem, heroic

**Qawm** - Tribe

**Qazi** - Appointed by the Shah at the recommendation of the *Imam* of the household, *peeshnumauz*. The usefulness of the Qazi’s courts is in a great measure destroyed by the corruption, which prevails in them, and in towns and their neighborhoods, just is further impeded by the power and influence of the great. Jirga, and when a crime is not acknowledged by the accused most frequently decide on acknowledged crimes, then it is referred to the Qazi. Qazi have deputies in all places except in areas that are in open rebellion.

**Qiyama** - Eschatology

**Quli** – Slave of

**Quli Aghassi Bashi** - Head of the royal servants

**Quloq** - Place of sowing materials
Qur - Shah’s troops with firearms
Qurchi - Special agent for prevention and escort, praetorian
Quriltary – Political and military council
Qushun - Old word for army, corps, host, legion, troops, reinforcements

R
Rayhat - Subject

S
Sakhlo - Garrison, barracks, some local soldiers who are assigned to guard
Saqa - End of the army
Sardar – Commander-in-Chief, post
Saraf – Person who exchanges money
Saram - Monastery, place where the dervishes gather
Savar - Cavalrymen
Sayyid – Descendent of Prophet Muhammad
Senf-e Payada – Irregular infantry
Senor-namah - Sign contract over the delineation of the border
Sepah – Armed forces
Sepah Salar – Commander-in-Chief, Supreme Commander of Troops
Sepoy - A guard of a few hundred, which mounts at the gate of the Haram. Volunteer cavalry for the British-Raj
Shabband – A strap that ties the sword to the waist
Shabgeyr - Depart after midnight
Shahnamah Khans - People whose profession is to recite the epic or heroic poems of Ferdowsi with proper emphasis and action
Shahsevan (Shahsaman) – Perso-Turkic imperial bodyguards
Sham – Historic word for the Levant
Sharaba - Tassels strings that hang from the side of the sword
Shaykh – Person respected for his religious learning or piety
Shelan – Royal feast
Shura Insejam Qizilbash Afghanistan – Afghanistan’s Qizilbash Solidarity Council

Siyasat - Politics
Soroon - Command to start a war
Sorud Melli – National Anthem
Subadar – Provincial Governor
Sufigari – Sufi probity

T

Taifa - Subtribe
Takia-Khana – Congregation or ritual hall for Shi’a people
Takht-e Rawan - Horse wheel-carriage or palanquins. Not for ordinary people, the most common way of travelling for both sexes is on horseback. The Shah himself often travels on an elephant while the royal women often travel in palanquins. In a region, destitute of navigable rivers, and not suited to wheeled carriages, commerce is often carried on camels.
Tarikh - History
Tarikh-e Zinda – Oral Story
Tariqa – Sufi order
Tarkash - Bag in which to put arrows
Tanooraha - Portable heaters and stoves
Taqiyya – Reservation to reveal full identity, to dissimulate
Tawhid – Monotheism
Tayyal – Property, land or water that had lost its king to make use of revenue. Land grants
Tayyal Dar – Administrator who deals with money and treasure
Tazkira – State issued identification card
Teer Andazi – Spear throwing
Topchi – Artillery
Tufangchi – Musketeer
Tujjarat – Commerce, business
U

Ulema - Religious scholars
Ulus - Means clan and it is applied either to a whole tribe or to one of its independent branches. Internal government of the Ulus is carried on by the Khans and by assemblies, Jirga, of the heads of divisions.

V

Vadi – Valley between mountains
Vazier Azam Sadr al-mamalk - Chief Minister, representative of provincial forces

W

Wafq – Endowment
Wikalat – Vizierate

Y

Yak Toman Lashkar - Unit of ten thousand troops
Yaml Basta - Troop lines of four by four

Z

Zamburak - A small canon without wheel mounted on the camel
Zarad-khana - Arsenal or armory
Zarb-zadan - Type of equipment for piercing the walls of the castle
Zabangeran - Spy
Ziyarat - Shrine, a sacred or holy place
Zoobeen - Short spear thrown at the enemy during battles
Zulm – Oppression
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## APPENDIX 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1250s</td>
<td>Mongols destroy the Qanats and pasturelands in Kabul, causes depopulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1258</td>
<td>After the Mongol invasion, the Twelver Shi’as experienced gradual ascendancy on the Iranian Plateau during the reign of Il-Khanids, 1256-1335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Century</td>
<td>The phrase Qizilbash was first used by the Ottomans to denote a variety of groups that flourished in eastern Anatolia and Persia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1334</td>
<td>Safavid Sufi Order became an increasingly decisive political force in the Turkmens Aq Qoyunlu Dynasty 1378-1501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1386</td>
<td>Timur relocated a large number of Turkmen from Anatolia to the Iranian Plateau - Khorasan region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1405</td>
<td>Timur dies, decline and eventual partition of the Timurid Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1405-1510</td>
<td>Rivalries among the Timurids. Decentralization and struggle with the Qara Qoyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu Turkmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1405-1447</td>
<td>Timurids unable to extend power on permanent basis in Anatolia despite a number of expeditions. Turkmen tribes of Aq Qoyunlu moved from Anatolia and upper Mesopotamia to Persia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1458-1467</td>
<td>Persia remained divided between the Qara Qoyunlu and the Timurids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1461</td>
<td>Mirza Abu Sa’id (great-grandson of Timur) in control of most of territory that is now Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1467-1473</td>
<td>At the pinnacle of Aq Qoyunlu power, Uzun Hasan puts Abu Sa’id of Timurids to death. His own son was killed in a battle with the Ottomans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1469-1502</td>
<td>Mirza Abu Sa’id appoints Mirza Ulugh Beg II (4th son) as Governor in Kabul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1478-1503 Succession Crises in the Aq Qoyunlu Dynasty as the power of the Safavid Sufi Order expands. The Twelver Shi’a scholarship develops freely in Hilla (central Iraq)

Mid-15th Century Ardabil was epicenter of Safavid Sufi Order designed to keep the leadership in close contact with its Qizilbash followers, murids. The Safavid Sufi Network was managed through the office of Khilafat al-Khulafa

1480-1514 Phase One of the Ottoman Persecution of the Qizilbash, who refused to pay taxes and accept the expanding control of the Ottoman Dynasty

1488 Shaykh Hayder married the daughter of Uzun Hasan. During Hayder’s rule, the Turkmen tribes adopted the distinctive crimson headgear that became known as Taj Hayderi. Hayder’s son, Ismael, mobilized murids of the Sufi Order

1494 Babur at age eleven inherits his father’s appanage at Ferghana, but challenged by his uncles Sultan Ahmad Mirza of Samarqand and Sultan Mahmud Khan of Tashkent

1494-1505 Babur involved in wars and struggles, forms alliance with Shah Ismael Safavid. Ismael sends Qizilbash aid to Babur

By end of 15th Uzbek under the leadership of Shaybani Khan, enter Central Asia from Dasht-i Qipchaq area, eyeing the rich province of Khorasan

15th Century Qizilbash Murids combined Sufism with a militant form of Shi’ism, which gave birth to the Safavid State

1501-1722 Rise and fall of the Safavid Empire

1501 The Qizilbash formed the backbone of Ismael’s military who pronounced Twelver Shi’ism as the official religion in Persia. This event marks a major turning point in history of Islam

1501-1524 Shah Ismael invited Shi’a scholars from Bahrain, Lebanon and Iraq (Hilla), who built religious institutions and started to partake in state affairs. Shi’a institutionalization was predicated on the removal of batil, fabrication, with haqq, truth.
1501-1524 The urbanization of Qizilbash started under Shah Ismael

1502 Ottoman Sultan, Bayazid II, relocated large number of Shi’as from eastern Anatolia to the Greek city of Morea to weaken the Qizilbash

1504 Shah Ismael’s missionaries, Naqibs, dispatched to Balkh and Bamiyan to proselytize

1504 Babur arrives in Kabul, which was under the rule of infant heir of Mirza Ulugh Beg II. This event restores the strategic significance of Kabul as a frontier military base. Kabul’s garrison served as an assembly point

1508 Babur’s son, Humayun, is born in Kabul

1509? Powerful earthquake rattles Kabul, new structures built by Babur

1510 Safavid Conquest of Khorasan. Shah Ismael defeated Shaybani Khan at the Battle of Marv. Herat becomes the second largest city of the empire and seat of the heir-apparent. The heir-apparent was placed under the tutelage of Qizilbash Governor General, who in his capacity as lala or atabeg, was responsible for his moral and physical welfare

1511 Pro-Safavid uprising known as the Rebellion of Baba Shah Quli in Qaraman erupted against the Ottomans. Khilafat al-Khulafa directed these anti-Ottoman activities

1512 Sultan Selim I acceded the Ottoman throne and crushed the Qizilbash in central Anatolia to reestablish order. Qizilbash (40,000) were massacred while thousands were imprisoned and exiled

1514 Ottomans defeated the Safavids at the Battle of Childiran. Shah Ismael retreated from extravagant claims. It was in this context that the Shi’a jurists began to shape the legitimacy of the State with an understanding of orthodox Shi’ism that eventually replaced the blend of Sufism and militant Shi’ism known as Qizilbashism

1524 Qizilbash took advantage of Shah Tahmasp’s inexperience and assumed control of the State
1524-1533  Qizilbash rivalries for power led to a Civil War. Tahmasp ended the Civil War in 1534. Under Tahmasp’s reign, not all Qizilbash belonged to the Sufi Order

1526  Babur’s Conquest of India takes place with the help of Qizilbash

1526  Babur in Delhi, the Lodi nobility lost the Delhi Sultanate to the Mughals. This loss disqualified the Lodi from future leadership over Afghans

1530  Babur dies and his son Kamran Mirza inherits Kabul

1531-1532  Shah Tahmasp ordered the massacre of the Tekelu Qizilbash tribe because of their irreligion, ilhad

1532-1555  Ottoman-Safavid War

1540-55  While Humayun was in exile in Persia, his son, Akbar, was raised by Kamran. Akbar married Ruqiya Sultan Begum in Kabul

1548  Ottoman Fatwa of Abu Su’ud equated the Qizilbash with apostates

1554-1555  Tahmasp put down the heresy of a Sufi group who declared him the Mahdi

1554  Humayun with the support of Tahmasp’s Qizilbash forces, who were under the command of Bayram Beg (later Khan) and noblemen, restored the Mughal power in Delhi

1554-85  Humayun’s son Mirza Muhammad Hakim becomes Governor of Kabul

1555  The Treaty of Amsaya signed between Tahmasp and Ottoman Sultan, Suleiman

1556  Akbar enthroned as Shahanshah, King of Kings, by Bayram Beg. Akbar relocates wife and her family from Kabul to Delhi

1560s-84  Kabul under Mirza Muhammad Hakim becomes a Naqshbandi Sufi hotbed. Naqshbandi Sufis held some administrative positions and kept ties with rulers in Central Asia
1571 Ottomans exiled some Qizilbash to Hungary and Balkans

1574 Qizilbash Civil War allows Ottomans and Uzbeks to make inroads in Persia

1576-1577 Shah Ismael II clashes with the Qizilbash, who remained loyal to Khalifat al-Khulafa and to the Shi’a jurists from Jabal Amel

1577-1587 Qizilbash factionalism continued and appeals were made on Shah’s behalf to the Sufigar, Sufi probity

1580-1590 Second Phase of Ottoman Persecution of the Qizilbash. The Qizilbash marriage contracts were not considered legal. Their repentance after captivity was not accepted. Ottomans seized the Qizilbash wives, children and property

1581 Akbar seizes Kabul from his brother Mirza Muhammad Hakim, put his sister Bakht Nisa Begum in charge of Kabul, 1581-85. Begum (women) and Nawab (men) upheld the sovereignty of the Mughal and the administration in Kabul

1586 Akbar and Abdullah Khan Shaybani reached an agreement. Mughals would remain neutral in the Uzbek raids of Khorasan. Uzbeks would not support the Afghans to rise against the Mughals

1588-1629 Shah Abbas enthroned with help of a Qizilbash Amir, Quli Khan U斯塔jlu. However, Abbas never trusted the Qizilbash Sufis. Status of Sufis continued to decline

1588 Shah Abbas brings the Abdalis (founder of Afghanistan) into political prominence

1588 Shah Abbas instituted a number of administrative reforms to ensure the Safavid State

1590 Peace of Istanbul: Second phase of Qizilbash persecution ended. The more militant Qizilbash tribes had either been eliminated or migrated to Persia. People begin to give their land as endowment, Waqf, to the Shi’a jurists (Sayyids and Mujtahids) to avoid confiscation - Emergence of aristocratic jurist landowners

1595 Mughals take Qandahar with the aid of two Safavid officials, Rustam Mirza (Safavid Prince) and Muzaffar Husayn
(Governor of Qandahar), who were unhappy with the reforms of Shah Abbas, which weakened the power of the Qizilbash

By end of 16th

Qizilbash Confederacy was being deliberately broken up and relocated in strategic areas of the Safavid State

End of the 16th

“The Great Flight.” Central Anatolia lost many inhabitants except for Haji Bektash, whose settlement contained the shrine of a saint that became the center of Shi’a teachings

16th-17th

The importation of Shi’a theologians from Jabal Amal and Hilla continues by the Safavid State

1600

Without the Uzbek subsidies, Akbar able to subdue the last of the Afghan tribes

1611

Jahangir marries Nur Jahan, widow of Ali Quli Beg Ustajlu, the “Lion Tosser,” who was then appointed as commander of the imperial guard at Bengal

1612

Mumtaz, niece of Nur Jahan, comes from a Persian nobility family and marries Shah Jahan, who builds the Taj Mahal for her

1614-15

Abbas put to death some Qizilbash (Sufis of Qara-jadagd) who had defected to the Ottomans. The charge was on the crime of na-sufigari, without loyalty and obedience to Shah

1618

Abbas was pleased that Abdalis supported his mission in Qandahar. Abbas bestowed on the Abdali leader the title of Mir-i Afghanah and decreased taxes on their pastoral lands and sedentary farms

1623-39

Ottoman-Safavid War over control of Mesopotamia

1627

Jahangir comes to Kabul to restore his health

1629-42

Shah Safi, start of a philosophical renaissance, which produced the tradition of irfan, gnostic philosophy. The notion of high versus low Sufism

1630

Economic stagnation, plague and famine

1638

Safavids lost Baghdad to the Ottomans and Qandahar to the Mughals. The Safavid Governor, Ali Mardan Khan, and his 7,000 Qizilbash cavalrymen defected from the Safavid to the
Mughal side, fearing his execution by Shah Safi. Ali Mardan Khan, was appointed as the Governor of Kabul

1638
Shah Jahan’s son, Prince Murad Bakhsh, subedar of Balkh, marries Sakina Banu Begum, a Safavid princess

1639
Treaty of Qaṣr-e Shirin (or Treaty of Zuhab) ended 150 years of intermittent warfare between the Ottomans and Safavids. Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin established a border between the two empires, virtually unchanged into modern times, and Ottoman sovereignty was restored in Baghdad

1640
Mullah Sadra Shirazi, the master of the Illuminationism (or Ishraqi) School of Philosophy said there is no difference between the mosque and the Sufi tekke, congregation hall. Sadra defended high Sufism and criticized low Sufism of qalandars

1641-52
In Kabul Ali Mardan Khan and his Qizilbash cavalry built the grand bazaar of Char Chatta

1642-66
Shah Abbas II marks the apex of high Sufism. He built tekkes in Isfahan. Sufi masters were respected and favored by Abbas II, whose official historians called him Shah-e darvish dust, Sufi-loving Shah. Mullah Sadra’s attempt to unify high Sufism with Shi’ism brought down on them the wrath of Muhammad Taqi Majlisi, who ascended from the Safavid Shi’a hierocracy

By mid-1640s
In Persia the Akhbari School becomes a distinct full-fledged Shi’a trend that rejected the use of reasoning in deriving verdict and considered only the Qur’an and the Hadith. It was crystalized by Astarabadi and crushed by Behbahani

1646
Shah Jahan assembled an army of 60,000 with field artillery under command of his son Prince Murad Bakhsh, who was ordered to restore Nazar Muhammad Khan as a tributary ruler or to annex the Khanate of Bukhara

1647
Mughal-Uzbek Treaty led to the establishment of a border about 50 kilometers north of Kabul

1648-53
Safavid-Mughal War over Qandahar: Shah Abbas II retook Qandahar. Abdalis and Ghilzais sided with the Safavid in wars against the Mughals. Qandahar stayed in hands of
Safavids until the Afghan Revolt, 1709

1666-94 Clashes over ir'fan and Shi’a hierocracy in the Safavid State, which enabled Uzbek to restart raids in Khorasan that added to the economic decline in the region.

1677-98 Amin Khan, Governor of Kabul, married Sahibjan, daughter of Ali Mardan Khan. A skilled diplomat who kept the Afghan tribal frontier quite by paying subsidies.

1681-1707 Mughal-Maratha Wars

1690 Georgian and Afshar tribesmen formed the backbone of the Safavid military against the Baluch and Ghilzai raiders. Shah Alam, son of Aurangzeb and the Governor of Kabul, tried to incite the Ghalzai tribe to rebel against Safavids.

1694-1722 The final triumph of Shi’a hierocracy came with the rise of Shah Sultan Husayn, who was under the influence of rigid Shi’a religious scholars. The persecution of Sufis was instituted. Majlisi obtained a decree for exile of Sufis from Isfahan.

1694-1726 A new threat to the Safavid State materialized in the eastern provinces as the Shi’a conversion of Sunnis intensified that sparked off a series of revolts.

1699 Aurangzeb sent an embassy to Isfahan to restate the Mughal claim to Qandahar.

1700 Possible for Shi’a jurists to denounce Sufism under the new post of Mullah bashi.

1703 Baluch tribesmen ravaged Qandahar and forced the Safavids to take refuge in the citadel. Baluch uprising held in check with the appointment of Gorgin Khan.

1707-12 Bahadur Shah I changed the prayer call to the Shi’a version, which started the Khotbah controversy in the Mughal Empire. He was previously the Governor of Kabul, 1698-1707.

1709-11 Afghan Revolt, Mir Wais killed the Safavid governor and led expeditions against the Shi’a Hazaras.

1710s The Shi’a Sayyid Brothers become kingmakers, who chose...
Muhammad Shah (4th son of Bahadur Shah), 1719-1748. A period of ill administration for the Mughal Empire

1715 Ghilzai Conquest of Herat. Abbas Quli Khan, Governor of Herat was in charge of the Qizilbash garrison

1719 Mahmud Ghilzai in charge of Qandahar marched to Kerman

1720 Ghilzai-Abdali Battle at Dilarum, Asadullah Khan, the Abdali leader was slayed by Muhammad Zaman Khan, who gained control of Abdali controlled areas

1720 Revolts in the Caucasus, Kurdistan, and Khuzestan regions against the Shi’a conversion policies of Isfahan

Early 1700s Asr-e inhitat wa soqut, an era of civil decadence, and absence of centralized power, which allowed for the prominence of clerics. Shi’a and Sunni clerics declared each other as “heretics” to justify wars of expansion

1722 Battle of Gulnabad, Mahmud met the Safavid army at Gulnabad, east of Isfahan, and started the seven-month Siege of Isfahan. By October, many inhabitants died of disease and starvation

1722 Shah Sultan Husayn surrendered and declared Mahmud as Shah of Persia

1722 Ahmad Khan Abdali was born in Multan

1725 Sultan Husayn and most Safavid princes were imprisoned and executed. Russian forces invaded northwestern part of the country and the Ottomans reached Hamadan and Kermanshah

1722-25 Mahmud Ghilzai overthrown by nephew, Ashraf. Ashraf gains the enmity of Qizilbash by slaughtering 3,000 of them in Isfahan

1725-29 Ashraf lost Qandahar

1729 Nadir assembles an army and led the resistance with the aid of Qizilbash amirs

1729 Battle of Kafer Qala. Nadir Afshar retakes Herat
1729-47 Nadir restored political unity within the Afshar. Created a Ghilzai-Abdali alliance to have a Sunni battalion in his army

1730 Reconquered western and northern Persia from Russians

1732 Nadir’s victory over Abdali. Resettles 60,000 Abdalis in Mashhad, Nishapur, and Damagan. Nadir enlists Abdalis in his multiethnic army

1732 Ahmad Khan and his older brother, Zulfiqar Khan, imprisoned by Husayn Khan Ghalzai, Governor of Qandahar

1732-33 Nadir besieges Baghdad. Ottomans agreed to return to Treaty of Zuhab (1639) frontier

1736 Nadir held a Qurultai, Nadir declared as the first Shah of the Afshar tribe of Qizilbash

1737-38 Nadir Shah besieges Qandahar. He accuses the Mughals of aiding the Afghans

1738 Nadir Shah captures Qandahar and frees Ahmad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan. Appoints Ahmad as Yasawal in army. Nadir leaves a Qizilbash unit in Qandahar

1738-47 Ahmad involved in Nadir Shah’s campaigns

1739 Battle of Karnal. Nadir Shah defeated the Mughals with his Georgian, Qizilbash, and Abdali troops. He did not attempt to remain in India, but the Indus River became the agreed border between the Mughals and the Afsharids. Nadir leaves Qizilbash units in Kabul

1739 Nadir Shah made enormous demands for taxation, death penalty for those who did not pay. Nadir became autocratic as the power of the bureaucrats declined

1740-57 A branch of the Afshar family originating from Khorasan was able to take control of the Bengal Province for production and control of tin that were used for weapons

1740 After return from Delhi, Nadir’s military campaign to Central Asia led to taking of Balkh, Samarqand, Bukhara, and Khiva. He left the Khan of Bukhara as a subject ruler and annexed lands up to the Amu River

1737-40 Nadir Shah leaves sizeable Qizilbash units in various
strategic cities and towns on his military campaigns to India and Central Asia for logistical and taxation purposes

1741 Nadir made Mashhad his capital after campaigns of Mughal India and Central Asia

1736-44 Nadir Shah occupies Oman and Bahrain

Mid 1740s Nadir Shah became morose and suspicious and had many of his loyal Qizilbash followers executed at the slightest hint of opposition

1747 Rival Qizilbash assassinated Nadir Shah. The Afsharid polity disintegrated into three parts.

1747 Ahmad Khan returns from Mashhad to Qandahar. While in Qandahar, Ahmad captures a caravan headed from Delhi to Mashhad

1747 Ahmad Khan Abdali crowned as Shah in Qandahar, which marks the emergence of pre-modern Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah strikes a deal with the Qizilbash in the eastern cities

1747 Conquest of Kabul. Ahmad Shah reaches an agreement with the Qizilbash units in Kabul

1747-1823 Rise and fall of the Durrani Dynasty

1747-72 Ahmad Shah uses the administrative skills of the Qizilbash

1747-53 Ahmad’s First-Third Punjab Campaigns

1749 Mughal Emperor cedes west of the Indus River

1750 Ahmad captures Herat from Shahrukh, Nadir’s son. Ahmad relocates about 12,000 people from Nishapur to Herat, where his son, Timur Khan, was the Governor

1751-54 Ahmad Shah captures Nishapur and Mashhad. While he is in Nishapur, he relocates Abbas Quli Khan to Kabul. Abbas succeeded in arranging a marriage between Ahmad and his sister, as well as a marriage between the daughter of Ahmad and his eldest son

1752 Ahmad Shah subdues area north of Hindu Kush. Treaty of Ahmadiya in Kashmir
1756-57   First Battle of Panipat. Ahmad Shah sacks Delhi and installs Alamgir on the throne. Marries the daughter of Muhammad Shah, the Mughal Emperor, and also arranges the marriage of his son, Timur Khan

1757-59   Shah Waliullah, a Muslim leader of India, appeals to Ahmad Shah for help against the Maratha Confederacy

1757   Revolts in Qataghan and Badakhshan

1760   Second Battle of Panipat for control of northern India

1761   Third Battle of Panipat, decisive win for Ahmad against the Hindus, 12 km front

1762   Sixth India Campaign, crashes the Sikhs

1762   Ahmad Shah sends letter to the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa III

1764   Seventh India Campaign, even outcome. Ahmad has disease on his face

1766   Eighth India Campaign, Sepah-Salar Jahan Khan and 6,000 soldiers killed at Amritsar

1768   Afghan-Bukharin Treaty. Surrender of the Kherqa, Cloak of the Prophet by Mir Muhammad Murad Beg, Khan of Kunduz, to Ahmad Shah

1772   Upon Ahmad Shah’s death, the Durrani chieftains’ only reluctantly accepted Timur’s accession. Timur Shah depended on the Qizilbash and created a force of Qizilbash cavalry to serve as his personal bodyguards

1772-75   Timur Shah with the help of the Qizilbash move the capital from Qandahar to Kabul. Most of Timur’s reign was spent fighting civil wars and resisting rebellions

1793   Timur’s fifth son (had 24) Zaman Shah, who was Governor of Kabul, succeeds him

1793   Zaman Shah eliminates Sardar Payinda Khan, son of Haji Jamal Barakzai. Zaman’s mother, Fatima Sultani Begum, plays a key role in his ascendency

1793-1801   Zaman imprisoned many of his half-brothers. The quarrels
among brothers provided the pretext for colonial intrusion
Zaman Shah removes Barakzai leaders from power and
replaces them men of his own lineage. He also executes the
Chiefs of the Nurzai, Alizai, and Qizilbash in Qandahar for
aiming to dethrone him. Payinda’s family escape to Persia

1798-99 Change in Qizilbash-Durrani relationship

1799-1849 Ranjit Singh, Governor of Punjab (Lahore), founder of Sikh
Empire

1800-39 Royal Dualism and Badal, vendettas, conflicts and wars
between Payinda Khan’s 23 sons, especially Fateh Khan
(Barakzais) and Zaman Shah (Sadozais)

1801 Zaman Shah is blinded and overthrown by Payinda’s sons
who then place Shah Mahmud on the throne. Not the end of
royal dualism rather the start of great violence

1801-1978 Payinda’s sons dominate the political arena

1801 British-Qajar Treaty, protect India from any Afghan or
French threat. Treaty used terms such as “king of the
Afghan,” “Afghan dominions” and “Afghan nation”

1801 Shah Mahmud appoints Fateh Khan Barakzai (Payinda
Khan’s son) as the Grand Vizier to alleviate the royal tension

1803 Shah Shuja imprisons Shah Mahmud and takes power

1804 Kabul Conflict – devastating riots against the Qizilbash as
Qajars claim Herat

1807 With the help of an Uzbek mullah, Sufi Islam, and Head of
the ulema of Herat, Haji Mullah Musa, Jihad was declared
against the Qajars in Herat

1808 Napoleon sends the French embassy of General Gardanne to
the Qajar court. Napoleon is interested in weakening British
in India with the help of the Qajars

1809 The British sent Mountstuart Elphinstone to Shah Shuja in
Peshawar. British East India Company also sent a mission to
the Shah of Kabul. Treaty of Eternal Friendship was signed,
which marks the entry of Kabul into Western politics and
academic circles
1809 Treaty of Amritsar with the British. Shah Shuja agrees to a joint response in case of a Franco-Qajar aggression. British refers to Shuja as “Shah of Kabul”

1809 Shah Mahmud defeats Shuja in Peshawar. Shuja escapes to Punjab and takes refuge with Ranjit Singh

1809-18 Shah Mahmud’s second reign. He alienates the Barakzais, especially Fateh Khan, the son of Payinda Khan, who was blinded. Fateh’s brother, Dost Muhammad Khan, later got revenge

1813-1907 The “Great Game” starts with the Russo-Persian Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, and concludes with the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907. The Second “Great Game” a less intensive phase followed the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, but it quickly diminished after the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union became allies in the Second World War

1815 Shah Mahmud creates a Silk industry in Kabul (shawls) once the silk trade revenues were lost to the Qajars

1818-26 Royal Dualism continued in Kabul. Ahmad Shah’s polity fragmented into several independent polities each ruled by a different Durrani leader. Chaos reigned as sons of Payinda Khan struggled for supremacy

1818-19 Intense Sunni-Shi’a enmity in Herat. Afghans tolerated the slave trade carried on in Khorasan by Turkmen. The Qajars attempted to retake the highlands from Afghans

1819-23 Ayub Shah, another son of Timur Shah. Kashmir was lost

1820s-30s British industrial goods and commodities reaches Kabul via Bombay. Products were mainly luxury fabrics (velvets, satin, cotton) copperware, and cutlery

1823 Fall of the Durrani Dynasty. The Barakzais ruled Kabul and Qandahar, while Herat and Balkh remained semi-dependent

1823-26 Interregnum in Kabul

1826-1929 Rise and Fall of the Barakzai Dynasty
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1826</td>
<td>Dost Muhammad Khan takes power. His mother and wife are Qizilbash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1826-39</td>
<td>Dost’s reign coincides with the British- Russian geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia. Dost ruled, 1826-63, except Shuja’s second tenure 1839-42, and his son’s, Wazir Akbar Khan in 1842-45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1827</td>
<td>Sayyid Ahmad Barelevi comes from India and encourages the Barakzais to rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1830</td>
<td>British argued that Qajars made two concessions in the Treaty of 1801. First, Afghans were an independent people. Second, recognition of Afghanistan as an independent state. The Qajars, however, denied that the treaty meant any such thing as British continued to support Dost Muhammad Khan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1835</td>
<td>Dost wages a war against the British and drives Armenians and Jews out of Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1837</td>
<td>Alexander Burnes comes to Kabul and asks Dost not to pursue Peshawar. The Russian envoy, Ivan V. Vitkevich, also comes to Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>Lord Auckland orders the British military invasion of Kabul. Shah Shuja with the support of the British claims the throne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839-42</td>
<td>Anglo-Afghan War I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839</td>
<td>Kabul Uprising. Dost fights against Shah Shuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1839-70s</td>
<td>The “Pan-Islamic” appeal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>Dost Muhammad Khan was unsuccessful to retake power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841</td>
<td>Akbar Khan (mother Qizilbash) kills Burnes and Macnaghten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>Assassination of Shah Shuja in Kabul near Sia Sang by a Qizilbash. General George Pollock sets the Char Chattah bazaar on fire, which starts a period of economic stagnation that lasts (four decades) until Amir Shir Ali Khan’s reign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>Ottomans attack Karbala, diverts Qajar attention westbound away from Herat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845-63</td>
<td>Dost Muhammad Khan second reign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

270
1850  Shi’a Imambara on 10th of Muharram 1267 A.H. attacked. Many Shi’as murdered, including women and children, and their properties plundered. For years, Shi’as were prohibited from observing their religious rites.

1854  Qajar envoy arrives in Kabul. The Barakzai rulers of Kabul and Qandahar publicly referred to as Governors. The Qajars never recognized the legitimacy of the Barakzais and considered them rebellious subjects.

1855  Treaty of Peshawar. British refers to Dost Muhammad Khan as “Walee of Cabool and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession.” North of Hindu Kush not included. Dost accepts British subsidy and halts territorial claims to Peshawar, a major shift in Dost’s policy toward British.

1857  Mutiny in India, Dost did not interfere.

1857  Treaty of Paris, British forces the Qajars to renounce their rights on Herat.

1858  The India Act led to the British assuming direct control of India in the form of British Raj.

1861  Qajars and Dost Muhammad Khan agree on Herat Territory, which included the provinces of Farah and Ghor. Dost annexes Herat.

1862  British expand ties with Amir Shir Ali Khan.

1863  Revolt against Shir Ali by his half-brothers, Muhammad Azam and Muhammad Afzal Khan.

1863-66  Amir Shir Ali launches the Shirpur Project with the help of Qizilbash residents in Kabul.

1866-67  Muhammad Afzal Khan, some Kabul residents give loyalty to him near Bala Hissar. Afzal soon dies of cholera, woba.

1866  The movement of religious nationalism or Pan-Islamism grows with Sayyid Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani’s arrival in Kabul. Pan-Islamism, a reaction to European colonialism, focused on Sunni-Shi’a unity.

1867  Sayid Jamal ud-Din Afghani becomes Azam’s consultant.

1868-79 Amir Shir Ali second reign

1873 Granville-Gurchakoff Agreement. Amu Darya becomes the boundary

1874 Amir Shir Ali appoints his thirteen years old son, Abdullah, as heir-apparent. Abdullah’s mother, Aisha Begum, daughter of Afzal Khan.

1874 Amir Shir Ali summons eldest son Yaqub Khan from Herat and imprisons him in Kabul.

1875 Rise of Tories in London. Tories launched the preemptive “Forward Policy” and wanted a permanent establishment in Kabul, which resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

1877 Sayyid Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani’s letter to Sultan Abdul Hamid during the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-78. Afghani wants Muslims bordering on or within Russia to rebel (Afghani writes an influential essay, “Refutation of the Materialist” in year 1881).

1878 Russia sends a mission to Kabul under General Stolyetov.

1878 British envoy, Sir Neville Chamberlain and his forces not allowed to visit Kabul, stopped in Khyber Pass.

1878 British Viceroy, Lord Lytton, cancels the previous treaty with Dost Muhammad Khan. British troops enter Afghanistan.

1878 Amir Shir Ali appoints Yaqub Khan as his representative as he travels to Balkh to seek Russian aid. Amir Shir Ali’s modernization projects ended. Sardar Yahya Khan, Governor of Kabul, unsuccessfully mediates with the British.

1878-80 Second Anglo-Afghan War. Both Sunnis and Shi’a of Kabul fought against the British. Qizilbash neighborhoods provided food, shelter, and treated the wounded.

1879 Ayub Khan defeated the British at the Battle of Maiwand and Muhammad Jan Khan Wardak defeated the British in Qal-e Qazi known as the Battle of Asmaie Heights, but Kabul was devastated and left without a single commercial building and a ruined economy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Treaty of Gandamak ended the Second Anglo-Afghan War. Yaqub Khan referred to as Amir of Afghanistan, but Yaqub relinquished foreign policy decisions to the British for a fixed sum of subsidy. Cavagnari, British military administrator, comes to Kabul and stays in Bala Hissar. General F. Roberts invites Yaqub Khan to India who then lives in Dera Dunn until 1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Liberals back in power in London, who wanted a Protectorate State in Afghanistan instead of a permanent establishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Abdurrahman Khan in Khanabad receives a letter from the British Viceroy, Lord Lytton, to ascend the throne in Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-1919</td>
<td>Indirect Colonialism. Afghanistan becomes a protectorate of the British-Raj</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Abdurrahman Khan launched his notorious state spy system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-1901</td>
<td>Institution of Page Boys Ghulam Bacha, established to fill the bureaucratic void in the provincial areas as well as to control the government’s reliance on the Qizilbash bureaucrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-83</td>
<td>Ayatollah Hojat’s family property seized by Abdurrahman for proselytization of Shi’a Fiqh. Abdurrahman tried to eliminate the Qizilbash who were supporters of his rival, Amir Shir Ali, during the royal dualism of the 1860s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>First Chindawol Uprising. Hazaras come to Qizilbash aid. It led to the establishment of Qala-e Hazara in Chindawol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>Abdurrahman’s anti-Shi’a decree fatwa, was signed by Mir Ahmad Shah, which declared Shi’as as “enemy of the state”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890-93</td>
<td>Abdurrahman ordered the murder, exile, and confiscation of Shi’a assets in Hazarajat under the governorship of Sardar Abdul Qudos Khan, a large number of Shi’as were enslaved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>Naser ud-Din Shah Qajar warns Abdurrahman about his anti-Shi’a policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883-1946</td>
<td>Period of intense dissimulation taqiyya for Qizilbash, except for Amanullah’s reign, 1919-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Peaceful transition of power in the new hereditary kingship system that was created by Abdurrahman to Habibullah</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1901 Origin of Afghan Nationalism. Mahmud Tarzi arrives from Turkey to Kabul, establishes the Young Afghan movement and starts the *Seraj al Akhbar* newspaper

1904 Habibullah enlists a few Hazara units in the army as part of the nationalism project

1905 The Japanese triumph over Tsarist Russia. Tarzi and Young Afghans praised the Japanese victory

19?? Habibullah used the Shi’a army units to quell the Mangal and Solomon Khel uprising in eastern Afghanistan

1906-11 Iranian Constitutional Movement enthused the Constitutionalists *mashruta khahan* in Kabul

1909 Habibullah arrested and executed the *mashruta khahan*, which marginalized the Young Afghans who considered themselves as the vanguards of progressive socio-political change

1912-13 Habibullah reformed his father’s notorious intelligence network and dismantled the *Siah-Chah* dungeons, but the death penalty was not rescind

1914 Many Shi’a households (Hazara and Qizilbash) fled to Persia

1919 Habibullah is assassinated; he declined the independence demand of the Constitutionalists *mashruta khahan*

1919 Third Anglo-Afghan War

1919 Amanullah publicly announces Afghanistan’s independence in front of the British envoy in Murad Khani

1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi

1923 Constitutional Monarchy. Approval of the first Constitution *Nezamnama-i Asasi*

1923-29 Amanullah tried to transform the foundation of society from the top by committing to the ideals of progress, unity, and bringing socio-economic justice to the people

1923 Amanullah visits *Takia-Khana* Mir Akbar Agha and Faqir
Husayn’s in Chindawol to bridge the gap with the Qizilbash

1928 Anti-state revolts stirred by the British

1928 Shi’a scholar, Ayatollah Hojat returns to Chindawol from years abroad in Najaf


1929 Civil War

1929 Kalakani break ties with the Soviets, which cuts Afghanistan from the outside world

1929 Abdul Razzaq raised a flag with Amanullah’s emblem with the help of 400 Kabulis, but Kalakani had him hanged

1929 Anti-Shi’a fatwa issued, which culminated in Kalakani attacking Chindawol

1929 Reza Shah sends an Iranian mission to aid the Shi’as of Kabul after Kalakani’s men looted Qizilbash homes and shops, and raped women

1929 Kalakani sends Faiz Muhammad Katib, Nur al-din Agha Jawanshir (a Qizilbash from Kabul), and some Qizilbash elders to Bamiyan to negotiate with anti-Kalakani Hazaras

1929 Kalakani appointed Kaka Muhsin Qizilbash as Governor of Hazarajat and Mirza Mujtaba Khan as Minister of Finance

1929-78 Nadir Khan founded the Musahiban (Muhammadzai) Dynasty

1929 Nadir Khan’s Ten Point Guideline

1931 Second Constitution

1932 Kabul University opens, but Shi’as initially not enrolled

1933 Nadir Shah assassinated by a Shi’a youth, Abdul Khaliq

1933-73 Afghan State increases ethno-nationalism

1936 Ayatollah Hojat runs the first Shi’a seminary *houza*, in small
city of Behsud

1937  Persian is temporarily banned in favor of Pashto in the country’s education system

1937  Ismael Balkhi returns from Karbala to Herat after the completion of his seminary studies

1938  Ayatollah Hojat opens *Takia-Khana Omomi* in Chindawol

1940  Balkhi travels to Qandahar, Kabul, Hazaratjat, and northern Afghanistan

1940  *Pashto Tulana*, Pashto Academy

1942  Historical Society of Afghanistan

1945  *Takia-Khana Omomi* in Chindawol is closed

1946  Hashim Khan resigns and Shah Mahmud Khan becomes the Prime Minister

1946  *Hizb-e Irshad*, Party of Enlightenment

1948-49  Period of intense political and cultural activities under Shah Mahmud Khan relative liberalism

1950  Second Chindawol Uprising. When Balkhi and *Hizb-e Irshad* members imprisoned

1950  The Awakened Youth Movement begins at Kabul University

1950  *Hizb-e Watan*, Homeland Party

1957  Abdul Malik Abdul Rahimzai (Finance Minister) and members of the Second Constitutionalist Movement, *mashruta khahan* arrested

1958-89  Abdul Baqi introduces Shi’a youth to Marxism

1964  Third Constitution ratified under the Premiership of Dr. Muhammad Yusuf. Dr. Yusuf frees Balkhi

1968  Balkhi institutes a *Takia-Khana* in Behsud

1968  *Nezat-e Pasdaran*, the Guardian Movement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Balkhi poisoned by the state at Aliabad Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Daud Khan topples Zahir Shah’s constitutional monarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td><em>Group Mostazahefin</em>, the Powerless Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Saur Revolution by the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Third Chindawol Uprising. Anti-Marxist demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td><em>Hizb-e Tawid</em>. Party of Unity, armed resistance against the Soviet backed PDPA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2

Online libraries, depositories, and journals accessed from Indiana University, Bloomington

- Afghanistan Digital Library
- American Anthropologist
- Ariana Encyclopedia
  http://database-aryana-encyclopaedia.blogspot.de/
- Central Asian Survey
- Central Eurasian Studies Collection at IU Wells Library
- *Critique and Vision*. Journal of Culture, Politics, and History in Afghanistan
- Digital Persian Archives
- Encyclopedia Iranica
- Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd Edition
- Herman B Wells Library
- Iran Chamber Society. Calendar Converter
- *Iran Nameh*. Persian Quarterly Journal of Iranian Studies
- Journal of the International Society for Iranian Studies
- Journey of Maps and Images on the Silk Road
- Mahmud Tarzi Cultural Foundation
  http://www.mahmudtarzi.com/
- The bounded files of *Anis* and *Islah*, and *Kabul Times*
- The Cambridge History of Iran, volumes 6-7
- The National Library and Archives of Islamic Republic of Iran
- The Sinor Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies (The SRIFIAS Central Asian Archives)
- The American Society for Ethnohistory
- University Microfilms International (Thesis and dissertation collection)
- Wadham College, University of Oxford. *Discovering Persia’s Manuscript*
### APPENDIX 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>British Primary Sources</th>
<th>Term Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>George Forster, <em>A Journey from Bengal to England through the Northern Part of India, Kashmir, Afghanistan and Persia</em> (1783)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>Mountstuart Elphinstone, <em>An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary and India</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>James Atkinson, <em>The Expedition into Afghanistan: Notes and Sketches</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>R. Burford, <em>Description of a View of the City of Cabul the Capital of Afghanistan with the surrounding Country</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>Vincent Eyre, <em>The Military Operations at Cabul</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843</td>
<td>Godfrey T. Vigne, <em>A Personal Narrative of a Visit to Ghuzni, Kabul and Afghanistan, and of a Residence at the Court of Dost Muhammad</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>Mohan Lal, <em>Travels in the Punjab, Afghanistan and Turkestan to Balkh, Buhkara, and Herat</em></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>J. H. W. Hall, <em>A Connected Narrative of Principle Military Events in Sind, Balouchistan, and Afghanistan</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>John William Kaye, <em>History of War in Afghanistan: From the Unpublished Letters and Journals of Political and Military officers employed in Afghanistan throughout the Entire Period of British Connection with that Country</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Malleson, Colonel G. B. <em>History of Afghanistan from the earliest period to the outbreak of the war of 1878</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>Sydney H. Shadbolt, <em>The Afghan Campaigns of 1878-1880</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>H. Howard, <em>The Afghan War of 1879-1880</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CIRRICULUM VITAE

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Anthropology (Sociocultural). Indiana University, Bloomington May 2017
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Topic: Globalization, Social Change (Modernity, Development, Nationalism), State-Formation and Minorities, Social Movements, Anthropological Theories, Historical Anthropology, Methodologies

AWARDS & RECOGNITION

Future Faculty Teaching Fellowship Indiana University 2016-17
Associate Instructor (AI) Finalist, Dept. of Anthropology 2015, 2017
Stanford University Honorarium Payment 2016
Islamic Studies Program Travel Grant 2015
Indiana University Summer Language Newsletter, The Polyglot 2014
David C. Skomp Dissertation Research Fellowship 2013
Social Science Research Council Dissertation Development 2012
History Honor Society, Phi Alpha Theta (Theta Pi Chapter) 2008

MANUSCRIPTS

Journal Articles
“The Tenor of Soviet-Afghanistan Relations, 1919-1953” Summer 2017
“Foundations of Conservatism in Afghanistan, 1929-1933,” Summer 2017
“Who are the Qizilbash of Kabul?” Summer 2017

Bibliographies
Shi’a Sources in Afghanistan In Progress
Afghan-American Sources In Progress
PRESENTATIONS

“Research in Conflict Zone: Ethnohistory in Kabul” International Education Week, Indiana University South Bend Nov 2016

“Who are the Qizilbash of Kabul?” Afghanistan in the Modern World Faculty Workshop, Stanford University May 2016

Fazel, Solaiman, and John Baden. “A History of Afghan Migration to the United States: Pre-1979 to the Present” Annual Conference of the Italian Society for the Middle Eastern Studies (SeSaMO), University of Catania, Italy Mar 2016


“Approaches to Translation: Persian Poems and Prose” Indiana University Jul 2015


“Peoples and Cultures of Afghanistan” Islamic Studies Program, Indiana University Feb 2015


“What is the Americanist Paradigm of Sociocultural Anthropology?” (talk in Dari) Kabul University, Afghanistan Aug 2014

“Women in Afghanistan” 20th Annual ACES Conference, Indiana University Mar 2013


“Mardan-e Kosh Bakht: A Poem by Partaw Naderi” Indiana University Apr 2011


“Yusuf Khass Hajib: Kutadgu Bilig, Islamic Mirror for the Prince,” Indiana University Sept 2010

“Rage Against the System: The Dilemma of Internet Freedom in Iran” 17th Annual ACES Conference, Indiana University Mar 2010
TEACHING

**Sole Instructor:**
- Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology  Fall 2016 & Spring 2017
- Globalization, Development, Conflict  Spring 2017
- Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East  Fall 2016
- Modern Iran and Afghanistan  Spring 2016
- Persian Language  Summer 2010-Summer 2015

**Associate Instructor:**
- Language and Society  Spring 2013 & Fall 2015
- Ecology and Society  Fall 2012

TEACHING TRAINING

“Preparing Future Faculty Conference,” 22nd Annual Conference, Indiana University  Feb 2017

“Joy of Teaching” Indiana University South Bend  Dec 2016

“New Faculty Orientation” Indiana University South Bend  Aug 2016
  Leaner Centered Syllabus, Backward Design of Courses, Better Grading with Rubrics, Active Learning and Student Engagement, Expectations and Evaluations

“Innovative Technologies for Advanced Language and Cultural Learning”
Flagship Teacher Training, University of Arizona  May 2015

“Bridging Traditional Divides: Reimagining your Role in Academic Life” Annual Future Faculty Teaching Conference, Indiana University  Jan 2015

“How Hip is your Teaching?” Faculty Colloquium on Excellence in Teaching (FACET), Indiana University  Sept 2014
  “The OPI Assessment Workshop” American Council Teaching Foreign Languages Arizona State University  Apr 2014

“Internship: Teaching Anthropology,” Department of Anthropology  Fall 2012
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

**Book Reviews**
“Practicing Oral History in Historical Organizations” *Anthropology Book Forum*  
May 2017

“Globalization and the Hajj Pilgrimage” *Anthropology Book Forum*  
Nov 2015

“A Global Middle East: Mobility, Materiality, and Culture in the Modern Age, 1880-1940” *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies*  
May 2015

**Elected Position**
Vice President of Communication, Anthropology Graduate Student Association  
2014-2015

**Graduate Assistant**
Islamic Studies Program  
2014-2015
Center on American & Global Securities  
2010-2011
Department of Central Eurasian Studies  
2009-2010

**Community Engagement**
“Thinking about Graduate School in the Field of Anthropology” Undergraduate Roundtable, Indiana University South Bend  
Oct 2016

“The War in Yemen is Political and Ecological: Forget Sunnism and Shiism” *Informed Comments: Thoughts on the Middle East History and Religion* (Op-ed)  
Apr 2015

“Lynching Farkhunda” Rebirth of Gender Equality and Accountability in Afghanistan *Informed Comments: Thoughts on the Middle East History and Religion* (Op-ed)  
Mar 2015

“Brief History of U.S. – Iran Relations” Lawrence North High School, Bloomington  
Dec 2011

“Social Problem in Post-Taliban Kabul” Ariana International Television, Irvine CA  
Apr 2010

“Brief Survey of Afghanistan: History, Politics, and Culture” International Studies Center, Indiana University  
Mar 2010

**Events Organized**
Anthropology Graduate Student Symposium, Indiana University  
Mar 2015
“Mapping the Landscapes of Islamic Studies Conference” Indiana University
“Afghanistan: Rebuilding Fragmented Social Institutions” Indiana University  
Apr 2014

“In Praise of the ‘Tatar’ Tsar Boris Gudonov” Ron Sela, Indiana University  
Jun 2014

“A Glimpse into Persian History and Culture” Narges Nematullahi  
Jul 2014

Film Series “Iranian Cinema” Paul Losensky  
Fall 2011

**LANGUAGES**

Farsi/Dari (fluent), Classical Persian (fluent), Tajiki (spoken), Arabic (reading)

**PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP**

Afghanistan Centre at Kabul University  
Afghanistan National Archives  
American Anthropological Association  
American Institute of Afghanistan Studies  
American Society for Ethnohistory  
International Society for Iranian Studies  
Middle East Studies Association  
The University of Chicago Middle East History and Theory